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People-based conservation is often portrayed as a mutually beneficial marrying of 
ecological and rural development objectives. In this thesis I examine the extent to 
which such approaches are indeed as ideal as the rhetoric suggests. 
Drawing on empirical ethnographic data gathered from Madikwe Game Reserve and 
three villages neighbouring it in South Africa's North West Province, I argue that 
people-based approaches to conservation and rural development are constrained by a 
number of factors. I show that they seem unable to operate independently of 
hegemonic development discourse, or to avoid using paradigmatic models that 
encourage gross simplifications. Their use of generalising models encourages binary 
thinking which precludes a sensitive understanding oflocal complexities. The neo-
liberal language that generally accompanies such approaches obscures how power 
operates both locally and regionally. Indeed, rhetorical changes from top-down to 
bottom-up, _people-centred routes to conservation and development seem to have little 
effect on the actual implementation of initiatives: local people have remained 
marginalised or excluded. 
In the Madikwe context, a politically correct over-emphasis on rural development 
rather than conServation meant that an economic definition of Madikwe as a 
potentially sUstainable business dominated the Madikwe project. Conservation was 
(rhetorically) sidelined. Villagers were expected to benefit through a share in profits 
derived from ecotourism - not through visiting and sharing in the nation's natural 
heritage. Thus, the Reserve was the exclusive domain of privileged visitors, while 
villagers were denied access. Such an approach revealed that the managing agencies 
held a particularly synchronic view of development to which short-term economic 
benefits were central. It contrasted strongly with that of many villagers who argued 
that a major role of the Reserve should be to expose local school children to its 
conservation and tourism operations, to educate and encourage them in order that one 
day they might command top jobs within the Reserve. They argued that it was only 
through the long-term investment in future generations that local residents would ever 
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Madikwe Game Reserve 
A 65,000 hectare, big five game reserve, established in 1991, and located 
close to the Botswana border in South Africa's North West Province (see map 
1, page 6). At the time of my fieldwork in 2000, the Reserve straddled the 
Rustenburg and Central Districts. According to the NWP&TB (below), 
Madikwe was established with the express aim of using people-based 
conservation to bring economic development and opportunity to the area 
The Madikwe Project 
A term used to signify the role of Madikwe Game Reserve in its entirety: to 
stimulate and finance rural development through conservation operations. The 
Madikwe Initiative (below) was encompassed within the Madikwe Project. 
The 'partners' of the Madikwe Project were the NWP&TB, the private sector 
lodge operators within the Reserve and the so-called local community 
(below). 
The Local Community 
The residents of the three villages in closest proximity to Madikwe Game 
Reserve (see map 3, page 34). In 2000, Molatedi, to the east, fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Rustenburg District Council as well as of Chief Matlapeng 
and his Tribal Authority. Supingstad and Lekgophung, to the west, were in the 
Central District. Supingstad's traditional leader was Chief Suping, and 
Lekgophung's was Chief Tsiepe. 
The Madikwe Initiative 
A DtID (below) funded development initiative aimed at aiding local residents 
to become equal partners in the Madikwe Project and to maximise benefits 
accruing to them from the Reserve. It was initiated by the NWP&TB and 
implemented by Mafisa Research and Planning. 1 
The North West Parks and Tourism Board (NWP&TB) 
The government agency managing Madikwe Game Reserve. When the 
Reserve was first established in 1991 its planning and development fell under 
the former Bophuthatswana homeland administration, and the 
Bophuthatswana Parks Board managed the Reserve. After Bophuthatswana 
was reincorporated back into the Republic of South Africa in 1994, 
1 There are substantial differences in (theoretical) approach between Mafisa and the NWP&TB which 
indicate that, just like the 'objects' of development, developers too cannot be consigned to a single, 
convenient category. For my analysis to be sufficiently perceptive to be useful, I have therefore tried to 
approach Mafisa and the NWP&TB as separate entities. However, as they are often entangled as 












Bophuthatswana Parks Board became North West Parks Board and later, 
North West Parks and Tourism Board. 
Mafisa Research and Planning 
DnD 
The non-governmental organisation (NGO) implementing the Madikwe 
Initiative, directed by Eddie Koch and Peter John Massyn. Mafisa was 
established in the mid 1990s geared towards facilitating people and parks 
initiatives. 
The British Department for International Development (fonnerly the Overseas 













"Romeo Four, Echo Five Delta ... Romeo Four, Echo Five Delta, come in please," 
stuttered the radio as I drove homeward to the former missionary building where I 
was staying in Madikwe Game Reserve. "Go ahead, Echo Five Delta," I replied. "Can 
you make twenty hundred hours, Onverwacht? Over." "Copy that. Over and out." 
That evening I dressed in my dirtiest jeans and set off to the Madikwe ecologists' 
residence, wondering what wildlife adventures the night might have in store. Over the 
months that I had been staying in the Reserve, carrying out fieldwork in three of the 
nearby villages, I had become friends with the ecologists, Seamus and Magriet. By 
way of social life they occasionally summoned me by radio and invited me out on 
various ecological expeditions. Many days I had helped to feed freshly shot buck 
carcasses to lions or wild dogs that had, for various reasons, been confined to fenced 
off enclosures, or bomas. One night I joined them for a hyena 'call-up' where we sat 
in the Landcruiser growing steadily colder and hungrier, blasting into the night's 
stillness tape recordings of yapping, howling, snarling hyenas feasting on a carcass. 
Eventually our patience was rewarded when a pack of the spotted beasts came to 
investigate. Another afternoon I had helped drag a warthog carcass along a road and 
then hoist it into a tree - a process the ecologists called 'leopard baiting'. The idea 
was to try to get the leopard habituated to a particular tree, in order that game rangers 
might be able to locate the shy cat for tourists to view. Once I had even assisted with 
an elephant autopsy, the only time I can truly claim to have been up to my neck in 
guts. Each wildlife encounter had been tremendously exciting, reconfirming for me 
what I already knew - that wildlife experiences have an undeniable primeval 
attraction, an awesome kind of power, part of which is the fallacy of being 'at one' 
with nature. It is a power that draws people from allover the world, making game 
reserves one of the more lucrative business propositions within the tourism sector in 
South Africa. 
On this particular night the ecologists needed to locate, tranquilise, and transport to a 
boma three lionesses that were due to be transferred to Pilanesburg, another game 











Board. The exercise was part of a conservation measure to ensure lion populations did 
not become too inbred. 
Thwak! With a growl the lioness leapt into the air, a dart dangling from her flank. As 
the anaesthetic took effect she sank slowly to the ground. Thwak! A second lioness 
was hit. The third snarled furiously, circling us menacingly, pacing just out of range. 
Following Magriet's lead I jumped off the Landcruiser to help heave and haul the 
dead weight onto the back of the vehicle, allthe while keeping an anxious eye on her 
incensed, undarted sister. "Quick! She's waking up!" shouted Magriet, abandoning 
the other darted lioness and sitting on the head of the one in the 'Cruiser. There 
followed a scene of concentrated anxiety: the darts had malfunctioned and the beast 
we had lifted into the 'Cruiser was stirring with increasing vigour. We struggled to 
restrain her while Seamus slammed the vehicle into gear and tore off through the 
bush, branches whacking at our heads, the third lioness pounding after us. After long 
minutes Seamus judged he had put enough distance between us and our pursuer, 
slammed to a stop and leapt out of the cabin to re-inject the groaning animal we were 
barely managing to hold down. To my great relief she slumped immediately into total 
unconsciousness. Off we drove through the bush, at a more sedate pace, swaying and 
ducking under thorny branches, adrenalines running high. I stared at the huge lioness 
at my feet, and felt awed. The even ng had been another fine example of the powerful 
attraction of the bush, the great sense of privilege and wonder that comes from 
experiencing close encounters with wild animals. 
* 
A few days after the lion capture debacle the ecologists were transporting the single 
successfully captured lioness to the Pilanesburg National Park. An old man was 
walking wearily along the long, potholed road from Molatedi, on his way to visit his 
daughter in Obakeng. The ecologists' Landcruiser sped past in a cloud of dust, 
ignoring the old man's signal for a lift. He shook his head, as ifto say: "Those people 
from the Reserve, they do nothing to help us, ever." He stomped grumpily onwards 
no doubt thinking angry thoughts about Madikwe, a fortress impregnable behind its 
imposing electric fences. Some few kilometres further he saw the Landcruiser pulled 











Serves them right." As he drew level, to his amazement and great excitement, he saw 
there was an enonnous lion lying in the back of the vehicle. 
By that afternoon Molatedi was humming, electric with news of the lion that had 
passed through the village. "Why weren't we warned?" "This could have been very 
dangerous!" ''Why couldn't they at least let us look at the lion?" "It was coming right 
through our village! We have a right to view it in this circumstance!" ''Why is it that 
we must go to Pretoria Zoo if we want to view these things?" "Who are these people 
who experience these wondrous things while we are not allowed to go? We are the 
ones who are living next to this Reserve! We should have the first rights to see the 
wild animals! This should be our land and we are not allowed even to look at the 
animals that are there, not even when they are coming right through our village!" I 
thought guiltily of my privileged lion experience and said nothing. 
But the episode and the debates it sparked in Molatedi made me think differently 













Madikwe Game Reserve is really most necessary: it helps to take the squash out of the 
past twenty years (interview, Madikwe Game Reserve lodge employee and local 
resident, 19 July 2000). 
There is a seductive argument that has come to dominate international conservation 
discourse. It suggests that by managing conservation strategies as sustainable and 
economically profitable businesses, both rural development and ecological objectives 
can be met. It is a utopian vision which implies that all involved will benefit. It is a 
vision that is particularly appealing in South Africa because one of the legacies of 
apartheid is severe economic inequality due to grossly restricted access to resources 
and services. This is especially the case in the rural areas of the former bantustans or 
homelands where many game parlcs are situated. 2 In political terms, the mutually 
beneficial marrying of people, conservation and development is particularly 
gratifying, containing as it does the notion of direct atonement for the days offorced 
removals3 and elitist, preservationist, 'fortress' approaches to conservation which 
dispossessed and excluded local residents. 
The subject of this thesis is people-based conservation and its ability to fulfil both 
ecological and rural development objectives. Using Madikwe Game Reserve, in 
South Africa's North West Province, as a case study, I argue that people-based 
conservation, as it has been conceptu:a1ised at Madikwe since the establishment of the 
Reserve in 1991, could more appropriately be described as a complex and often 
paradoxical operation of power that ultimately resulted in the exclusion of local 
people both from the Reserve and from the ecological and developmental operations 
on which the Madikwe project was based. My fieldwork, rather than suggesting that 
the local Community had become, or was on the way to becoming, an effective 
stakeholder in the Madikwe project (which is a driving concern within people-based 
2 In the following chapter I provide an overview of the apartheid legislation that led to the creation of 
ethnic national states, known as homelands or bantustans, for different ethnic categories. 
3 In order to make room for game reserves to be established, people were often forcibly removed from 
their land. For more details about forced removals see page 58 and the section From Fortress 











conservation approaches to development initiatives), found concepts of participation, 
representation, stakeholders and partnerships to be highly problematic in practice. 
* 
Some 250 kilometres northwest of Johannesburg lies the busy market town of 
Zeerust. Towards the end of the town's main road is a large sign directing travellers 
to Madikwe Game Reserve, the first visual evidence along the road from the North 
West's northernmost metropolitan outpost that the place exists.4 The R49 out of 
Zeerust cuts a straight line through the bushveld, passing rapidly through two villages 
where dark oily patches scarring the tarmac warn motorists of the wrath that can be 
expected from villagers, sick of road deaths, taking the law into their own hands, 
holding up traffic and setting fire to offending vehicles. Or so the story goes at the 
Kopfontein border post to Botswana, 100 kilometres further along that same road: 
"Be alert!" warns the guard, "Those are dangerous villages. They set up roadblocks 
and have sometimes even destroyed vehicles. They are very angry at the traffic that is 
going too fast back and forwards from Gaborone to Johannesburg." Indeed, until 
Madikwe Game Reserve was established in 1991, the R49 was not used for much 
other than as an access route to and from Botswana and the few farms and villages 
scattered along the way. 
Just over 80 kilometres after leaving Zeerust, Mad~e's electric fence begins, 
stretching forbiddingly along the eastern side of the road. Soon there is a sign for 
Abjaterskop Gate, the main entrance on the western side of the Reserve. Looking to 
the right, one can catch sight of the gate house and perhaps even one of the guards 
leaning against the boom. A few kilometres further, sweeping around a wide bend in 
the well cambered R49, it would be easy for a stranger to the area to miss the small 
sign, pointing to a dusty dirt road to the left, indicating the direction to Supingstad.s 
After the smooth, fast tarmac of the R49, the road to Supingstad, with its large, 
unexpected potholes, choking clouds of dust, and scatterings of donkeys and goats, 
comes as a shock to the uninitiated. The few kilometres seem to stretch interminably 
before the first houses appear,then a school on the right, a mass of scarlet 
4 Map 1 on page 6 shows the route from Johannesburg to Madikwe. 














Map 1: Location of Madikwe Game Reserve 












bougainvillea marking the chief's house on the left and, further on, a turning to the 
right leading to the Tribal Authority office and Lekgotleng, where community 
meetings (makgotla) were held. Another few kilometres beyond Supingstad, the road 
peters out into a delta of tracks which is the village of Lekgophung, markedly smaller 
and poorer than Supingstad. One track leads to the village school, a large dusty 
playing field backed by a long, low teaching block. Another winds around to the post 
office, Tribal Authority office and community hall where, on the monthly pension 
day,6 there is a small market. Yet another leads steeply uphill and out of sight to the 
village shop. 
These were two of the three villages that, under the Madikwe Initiative,7 were the 
focus ofMadikwe Game Reserve's rural development aims. The third, Molatedi, was 
located to the east of the Reserve, along a dirt road that presented even more of a 
challenge to unaccustomed drivers than the one to Supingstadand Lekgophung. 
Coming from the Reserve, and having first successfully navigated the car-sized 
potholes, a traveller first passes Mr Ramorula's general store on the right and then 
comes to the Tribal Authority office compound on the left, which, as in the other two 
villages, marked the centre ofMolatedi. Further along the road was a small medical 
clinic and then a school, with large signs proudly attributing its existence to the 
efforts of the local RDP forum.s 
In 2000, when I was conducting my fieldwork, unemployment was high in all three 
villages. Figures, gathered from three socio-economic surveys, ranged from thirty-
four percent (perkins, 1993), to fifty-five percent (Bologna, 2000), to ninety-one 
percent (Magome and Sentle, 1998). While such statistics are highly problematic, 
given the many variables that may affect them, it was evident that employment 
opportunities were extremely limited in the villages. Before the establishment of 
Madikwe in 1991, cattle farming and limited chrome mining were the main sources of 
wage employment in the area this side of Zeerust. The majority of households were 
6 When state pensions are distributed. 
7 A British DtID-funded development initiative intended to help enable three villages to become more 
effective partners in Madikwe Game Reserve and hence to realise benefits coming from the presence 
of the Reserve. See The Cast; page x and page 61-62 for more details. 











largely dependent on small-scale agriculture, pension funds and remittances from 
family members working elsewhere. 9 
At the time of my fieldwork there were few services and little infrastructure in the 
villages: none had tarred roads and the water supply for most households was from 
communal standpipes that had only recently been introduced. While Supingstad had 
had a reticulated electricity supply since 1996, neighbouring Lekgophung was still 
not connected at the time of my fieldwork, although Eskom, the South African 
electricity board, had plans in place to set up the necessary infrastructure. Some fifty 
of about two hundred households in Molatedi were still waiting to be connected. The 
overall picture was one of poverty and lack of opportunity in this underdeveloped, 
economically depressed, and sparsely populated region ofN orth West Province, 
formerly part of the Bophuthatswana homeland. 10 
This thesis is concerned with rural development, specifically the capacity and 
potential of game parks and ecotourism to function s effective routes to socio-
economic upliftment and the reduction, if not elimination, of poverty in South Africa. 
In particular, the thesis is concerned with people living next to a large, potentially 
highly lucrative game reserve - and yet having limited, or no, access or secure tenure, 
nor real means of grasping the opportunities that were supposedly waiting for them 
behind MadikWe Game Reserve's fence. The thesis focuses on two broad interrelated 
themes in this marginal area of South Africa's North West Province: one is the 
experiences of people living with the reality of conservation-driven rural development 
initiatives; the other is the propensity for powerful, pervasive discourses arising from 
such initiatives to reshape attitudes and social relations. 
Thesis Map 
After providing a map of the thesis to guide the reader, this chapter moves on to 
present an overview of people-based conservation as it was conceptualised at 
Madikwe Game Reserve and then situates it in the broader context of conservation-
9 For a more detailed description of the socio-economic situations in these villages see The Villages in 
2000 in the following chapter. . 











driven development in southern Africa. The final section of the chapter comprises a 
discussion of my research methods. 
Chapter two introduces Madikwe Game Reserve and the three villages adjacent to it 
in greater detail. It explains how the Reserve came to be established by the then 
Bophuthatswana Parks Board, now North West Parks and Tourism Board (hereafter 
NWP&TB or the Board); it outlines the factors that led to the implementation of the 
community development and support programme known as the Madikwe Initiative; 
and it introduces Mafisa Research and Planning, the NGOresponsible for the 
implementation of the Madikwe Initiative. The chapter also provides an overview of 
the historical and socio-political context and background necessary to enable the 
reader to understand the complexities of the area. 
Chapter three focuses on shifts in prevailing discourses of development and 
demonstrates that the rhetoric of the Madikwe Initiative-related agencies was 
consistent with people-based, grass roots, bottom-up, participatory discourses of 
development. The chapter argues that the uncomfortable discrepancy between the 
rhetoric and the actual practice of the agencies exposed and accentuated a power 
imbalance within the Madikwe Initiative that rendered the so-called local community 
marginalised and excluded. Drawing on post development literature, the chapter 
demonstrates that the development agents' conformity to a hegemonic, paradigmatic 
development discourse enabled and encouraged the creation of false and misleading 
knowledge about the villages. Another consequence was that local residents' potential 
involvement in the Madikwe project was confined to a pre-established framework 
which again emphasised the power imbalance, forestalled the establishment of real 
bottom-up interventions, and jeopardised the success of the Madikwe project. 
Chapter four then argues that paradigmatic discourses fail to reflect or accommodate 
the complexities of diverse local realities. Drawing on empirical data concerning the 
relations between the Madikwe Initiative and Chief Suping from the village of 
Supingstad, I show that the exogenous agents created a deeply reductionist yet 
intensely powerful democracy/autocracy binary. This binary obscured the operation 
of power within the Madikwe Initiative and precluded its agents from generating a 











the entire village of Supingstad from the Initiative. The chapter focuses on the all-
pervasive issues oflocal governance, specifically the role of chiefs and tribal 
authorities in a new democratic South Africa Central to the discussion are notions of 
democracy and autocracy, of power struggles and political expediency, of shifting 
positions and evolving identities, of the condition of living between the binaries, of 
being traditional and modern; loCal and national, all at once. 
Building on chapter four, chapter five focuses on the complex conflicts between 
competing local governance structures: the chiefs and 'traditional' tribal authorities 
on one hand and the more recently established, 'democratically' elected district 
councils on the other. Using the example ofMolatedi village, where there were five 
different and overlapping committees and structures, I demonstrate that a significant 
number of villagers became alienated from the Madikwe Initiative development 
process because oftensions over village governance. Those tensions were 
exacerbated by the presence of the resource-rich Initiative. Despite the efforts of the 
Initiative's agents to avoid becoming involved in local politic~, ultimately they were 
forced to align themselves with one structure, thereby inevitably antagonising the 
others. The situation contrasted strongly to that in Lekgophung where there was a 
single structure effectively representing the village and where Madikwe Initiative-led 
development interventions had thus proceeded relatively smoothly. But the 
Initiative's inability to ameliorate or accommodate local governance conflicts in 
Molatedi, and the ensuing antagonism and exclusion that resulted from that, again 
highlighted the problems that arise from adhering to an inflexible paradigmatic 
discourse. 
Having shown in chapters four and five how a high proportion of local residents came 
to be alienated or excluded from the Madikwe project because the developmental 
approach ofNWP&TB and Madikwe Initiative agents adhered to a paradigmatic 
model that was unable to assimilate or adapt to the intricacies oflocal realities, 
chapter six moves on to discuss how the very conceptualisation and management of 
the Reserve justified and perpetuated the persistence of inequalities and local 
exclusion. Drawing on post structuralist approaches to landscape theory, I argue that 
Madikwe is a culturally constructed landscape with deeply political influences. The 











concepts that could be sustained through ecotourism. However, conflicting 
perceptions between the 'partners' ofMadikwe regarding the role the Reserve was 
playing, or should have been playing, for residents of the neighbouring villages 
illuminated how, in reality, an emphasis on economic profit precluded access to the 
Reserve for villagers. Through presenting an overview of the history of conservation 
discourse and the changing conceptualisation of game parks in South Africa, I show 
how the rhetoric of the NWP&TB came to be so firmly (and misleadingly) focused on 
community development rather than conservation. Such a focus is indicative of yet 
another insidious form of power underlying Madikwe, a power that further ensured 
villagers were denied access to the Reserve. This was because, according to such 
narratives, economic development is what is important, not recreation or game 
viewing. Therefore the Reserve caters only for exclusive tourism and the receipts 
generated from private sector lodge operations. Yet, as I demonstrate, to the majority 
of village respondents, Madikwe represented more than just a business: it was about 
the conservation of the nation's natural heritage, a heritage to which local residents 
were denied access - just as in the colonial and apartheid days of 'fortress' 
conservation. 
Having established how local residents were excluded from the Reserve right from its 
conception, as well as through the theories and logic guiding its operations, chapter 
seven then shows how the NWP&TB's solution to such exclusion - the Madikwe 
Initiative - was also flawed from the start. The chapter focuses on the NWP &TB 's 
view of the villages as the 'weak leg' of the Madikwe Project and the Madikwe 
Initiative as the remedy, aiming to strengthen the communities' involvement in the 
Madikwe project. By presenting an overview of the Madikwe Initiative's structure 
and approach to development and illustrating, through empirical evidence concerning 
the projects, the effects of such an approach, I argue that projects were not sustainable 
because of an imbalance of power that favoured the Initiative's agents. I show that 
project participants were critical of such imbalances, but that their views had little 
impact on the structure or operations of the Madikwe Initiative. However, they did 
feed into an evolving village-based discourse of se1t7other, of defining 
'empowennent' as control and choice, of a growing belief in the importance of local 
autonomy and of ensuring that power and control was retained in the village rather 











In the final chapter I conclude that 'people-based conservation', as practiced at 
Madikwe during the time of my fieldwork, was failing to.reach its potential to 
ameliorate rural underdevelopment because it was adhering to a paradigmatic model 
which could not cater for the complexities intrinsic in everyday life in each 
neighbouring village. Village residents were viewed by the dominant partners of the 
Madikwe project as 'the local community', a 'stakeholder', but one which was failing 
to fulfil its role. This view enabled, and at the same time concealed, the operation of 
power that marginalised village residents and excluded them from any sort of 
meaningful participation in the Madikwe project. I stress that such exclusion, rather 
than being intentional on the part of either the NWP&TB or the Madikwe Initiative, 
was a result of the inevitable gap between generalised, appealing rhetoric and 
complex, specific reality. 
Throughout, I have avoided utilising the binary model in which a theoretical 
statement is laid down and developed preliminary to empirical enquiry. I have sought, 
rather, to integrate the two in some ways after the fashion in which all our minds 
work in reality. I have hoped to give some sense of the way in which theoretical 
concerns shadow fieldwork enquiry, infecting and inflecting, for better or worse, but 
never pretending a clinical segregation of the two (P.R. Anderson, pers. comm., May 
2007). Ifat times this leaves a eader wishing for a fuller statement of theoretical 
precepts, I must urge that reader to consider that no theory should ever safely precede 
empirical observation just as no empirical observation should be taken at face value. 
Madikwe Game Reserve and People-Based Conservation 
Madikwe Game Reserve has often been described as a successful example of people-
based conservation. This is particularly true of its managing agency, the North West 
Parks and Tourism Board, which claims that its primary concern is people, not 
wildlife, that it uses conservation as a profit-making business, a means to an end, 
which is rural development rather than simply the protection of natural biodiversity. 
The Board describes itself as: "a conservation organisation that is world-renowned for 
its pioneering approach to people-based wildlife conservation" (Davies, 1997:2). It 











business opportunities) from the presence of the Reserve, ''then firm support for 
protected areas will be achieved and important conservation objectives will be met 
almost as a secondary spin-off benefit" (ibid). 
Immediately evident from the outset of my fieldwork was that the presence of 
Madikwe Game Reserve had brought two contemporarily powerful discourses to the 
area: the discourses of conservation and of rural development. According to the 
rhetoric of the NWP&TB, the two coexisted, united harmoniously under the broad, 
evocative banner of 'ecotourism'. Ecotourism was tantalisingly presented by the 
Board as potentially the most effective solution to South Africa's rural problems 
whereby the national natural heritage could be conserved while, simultaneously, 
poverty and underdevelopment were being addressed. The Board's central argument 
was that Madikwe Game Reserve was a business, and conservation the means of 
generating a profit, forty percent of which would be channelled through a Community 
Trust Fund into development projects in the villages. ll For example, one NWP&TB 
brochure claimed: 
[Madikwe] should not be looked at as solely a protected area or tourism destination - in 
truth, the Reserve acts as a major social and economic core and engine around which the 
development of the entire region can be based (Davis, 1997:2). 
My fieldwork suggested a less idealistic picture than that painted by the NWP &TB. 
Indeed, the Board's view of its approach to conservation was just one of many 
perspectives I encountered of the intended role of Madikwe Game Reserve. The more 
I became immersed in the field, the more diverse and divergent became the opinions I 
heard from my research participants. Ultimately, the myriad differing views they 
expressed led me to see that the NWP &TB' s claims to people-based conservation had 
had highly complex and problematic consequences. Contrary to the NWP&TB 
rhetoric, the economic definition ofMadikwe as a 'sustainable business', an 'engine' 
to drive development throughout the region, meant that the Reserve, and the natural 
heritage within it, was the exclusive domain of high paying, elitist tourism. Because 
the Reserve was not yet making a profit and the Community Trust Fund had not yet 
11 The park warden explained to me that before the Community Trust Fund can start functioning, 
however, the Reserve must cover its operational costs and at least begin paying back the original 












been established, villagers had not experienced the promised economic and 
developmental benefits. For the vast majority oflocal residents, Madikwe was little 
more than a continuing story of exclusion, a continuation of the apartheid and, indeed, 
the pre-apartheid periods of dispossession. 
A number of key factors contributed to Madikwe's exclusion oflocal residents which 
are best introduced through looking at people-based conservation on a more general 
level. One major reason that local residents are often forestalled from participating to 
any meaningful extent in conservation-driven development initiatives - even those 
initiatives run under the people-based conservation banner - is that the people-based 
conservation paradigm is so alluring that agencies tend to adopt its easily accessible 
rhetoric without managing to translate that rhetoric into meaningful changes in 
practice. Rural development maxims become incorporated into public sphere 
parlance, and conservation objectives are simultaneously sidelined, even though those 
objectives are still, in practice, the central concern, or attraction, for all those who 
have access to the Reserve, such'as ecologists, rangers, lodge management and 
tourists. Hence, to return to the Madikwe example, comments from NWP&TB agents 
regarding the role of the Reserve (such as that quoted above) are notably free from 
ecological concerns - despite the fact that in reality the Board's mandate is, first and 
foremost, to fulfill ecological objectives. For example, an excerpt from the 
NWP&TB's mandate in the Land Incorporation Agreement (2000) reads: "the Board 
is obliged to manage, control and develop Madikwe and promote the protection, 
conservation and propagation of indigenous wild anima1s, fish and indigenous 
plants ... ". The 'people' aspects of its commitments are not mentioned. 
As I will show, conservation and its ethics, principles and objectives (sustaining the 
nation's natural heritage) becomes overshadowed, on a discursive level, by a heavy 
emphasis on development. Whether intentionally or not, this is another form of the 
power that underlies conserved areas, a power that marginalises or excludes local 
residents. It has tended to result in interventions that fail to achieve the goals of aiding 
local residents to become involved in and reap benefits from conservation operations. 
Instead, those development initiatives often lose coherence as, and possibly even 
because, their motivating force (conservation) is not the driving force behind 











residents, rather than being empowered to embrace the Reserve's priorities - namely 
conservation strategies - become further marginalised, even alienated, from 
conservationist discourses and their associated practices. 
Indisputably, the very concept of conservation needs questioning: how, once socio-
economic responsibilities have been attended to (even if only with a perfunctory 
rhetorical nod), it has come to occupy such a moral high ground; how its 
envlronmental goals are then co~idered to be ethically faultless; how the very idea of 
conservation has come to be so accepted and taken for granted that it is almost 
conceptually invisible. For, as Braun and Wainwright say: "environmental politics are 
always entangled with a cultural politics of knowing ... [and] the very thing that is 
taken to be the object of environmental studies and politics - namely, 'nature' - is an 
effect of power" (2001 :41). Furthennore, conservation has a proven capacity to 
generate economic profit through ecotourism. But it is those who have ownership and 
control of the ecotourism related operations, and the profits, who reap the benefits. 
Meanwhile, where local resident 'stakeholders' do not have secure tenure over or 
within a conserved area they can 'participate' in conservation only through having a 
share of the economic profits from ecotourism, and then only when delivered to them 
(usually via a trust) to finance exogenously initiated development projects (cf. Adams 
and Hulme, 200 I; Emerton, 2001; Turner, 2004 and Matose, n.d.). The usual result is 
that it is only wealthy national and international tourists who have access to South 
Africa's natural heritage, while poor local residents are excluded. 
Yet, people-based conservation suggests a cure-all for a major facet of South Africa's 
rural problems and thus continues to be deeply appealing. Indeed, initiatives based on 
people-based approaches to conservation and development have become 
progressively more prevalent throughout southern Africa, especially in the last 
decade. Interventions range from relatively small scale initiatives such as some of the 
CAMPFIRE projects in Zimbabwe, to the Peace Parks Foundation's Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas (TFCAs) which create vast conservation 'corridors' stretching 
across international boundaries. Not only does people-based conservation affect the 
lives of ever increasing numbers of people, but it is penneated by some of the most 











redistribution; unemployment; poverty; underdevelopment and massive rural/urban 
inequalities. 
There is a variety of phrases used to denote these developmental approaches to 
conservation. They include 'community-based conservation'; 'community-based 
natural resource management' (CBNRM); and 'people-based conservation'. All 
contain the notion that conservation can no longer be justified unless local people 
benefit. However, the phrase people-based conservation neatly conceals two 
dominant narratives. One is about conservation and natural heritage, the other is 
concerned with economic profit and development. Many conservation agencies 
triumphantly portray the two as mutually supportive and harmonious. Yet, attempting 
to treat the two as symbiotic can be problematic because they seek to fulfil 
interrelated y~t entirely separate functions. Local residents often have highly 
restricted access to conserved areas largely because both the managing conservation 
agencies and the local private sector have found exclusive tourism to be the most 
effective way of generating profit from conservation. The result is that local residents 
continue to be excluded from conservation and associated development initiatives, 
despite the people-based conservation banner. 
There is undoubtedly a need to ensure that conservation is economically viable and 
sustainable. Yet, to reduce it to the economic sum of its parts is to adopt a particularly 
impoverished definition of sustainability that is at odds with popular notions of 
sustainable development which emphasise local empowerment, participation and 
capacity building. 12 Even the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme 
called for "participation of communities in management and decision making in 
wildlife conservation and the related tourism benefits" (cited in Honey, 1999:345). In 
many respects, appeals to people-based conservation mirror a commitment to that 
kind of sustainable development, at least on a discursive level. Yet, as I shall show in 
the chapters that follow, practice does not necessarily reflect that stated commitment. 
12 The literature emphasising the centrality of social elements of sustainable development is vast See, 
for example, Honey, 1999, Gibbon et al, 1995, O'Hearn, 1999, and even the Brundtland Report, 1987 











Central to much people-based conservation discourse is a belief that rural populations 
need to organise themselves under a single representative committee, a "coalescent 
structure of organization which is the overall arbiter of community stance and action" 
(Barrow and Murphree, 2001 :35). The problems arising from this organisational 
prerequisite constitute a major thread that runs through this thesis. For my fieldwork 
in the villages around Madikwe found that, particularly in Molatedi village, conflicts 
between competing local governance structures had highly complex impacts on the 
development enterprise. The conflicts emphasised a lack of social cohesion in the 
village and illustrated (as I will show) how the organisational requirement is highly 
difficult to achieve through intervention, if it is not already in place. 
Such problems have led academics and practitioners to question people-based 
approaches to deVelopment. For example, in 2003, PLAAS 13 ran a web-based 
discussion forum entitled CBNRM in Crisis. One of the main reasons to which 
contributors attributed the crisis within CBNRM discourse is that external agents, 
whether they are NGOs, governments or donor agencies, have a tendency to bring 
into 'the community' already prescribed agendas about how local residents should be 
mobilised. Even if some form of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) approaches or 
other similar approaches are applied'in assessing community needs, they tend only 
partially to meet local residents' aspirations. As Njaya (2003) says, often community 
institutions or organisations are established at the behest of external agents who fail to 
understand the scale and complexities of existing groupings and relationships within 
such communities. Needless to say, the nonn is that they fail. 
The development arena has been a focus of social science research for at least the last 
fifty years, the period which Sachs (1992) calls 'the age of development'. 14 Bennett 
and Bowen (1988) argue that: "Because development has become a historical and 
national necessity [sic], anthropologists are drawn into participation even as they 
protest its means and ends ... " (1988 :2). Indeed the arena of development, as I will 
discuss in chapter three, is highly contentious - and infinitely complex in its impact 
on socio-cultural, economic and political processes (Grillo, 1997). Development 
13 Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies at the School of Government, University of the Western 
Cape. 
14 Sachs dates the beginning of the 'age of development' from 20 January 1949, the day that President 











interventions, largely because of innumerable unintended impacts and 
correspondingly disastrous results, have attracted passionate and penetrating analyses 
and critiques from a large number of anthropologists (see, for example, Ferguson, 
1990,1999; Sachs, 1992; Escobar, 1995; Werbner, 1999; Gardner, 1997). Yet, 
despite the evident failure of many development programmes, the need to address the 
real issue 0 f poverty cannot be avoided and the perceived potential of development 
interventions to fulfil the development dream never entirely evaporates. Before 
setting forth on my own journey into the development arena I will first comment 
more fully on my presence in Madikwe and the research methods I used. 
Methods and Ethical Considerations 
Hermeneutic philosophy in its varying styles ... reminds us that the simplest cultural 
accounts are intentional creations, that interpreters constantly construct themselves 
through the others they study (Clifford and Marcus, 1986: 10). 
In anthropology, or anyway social anthropology, what the practitioners do is 
ethnography. And it is in understanding what ethnography is, or more exactly, what 
doing ethnography is, that a start can be made toward what anthropological analysis 
amounts to as a form of knowledge (Geertz: 1973:7-8). 
My fieldwork in and around Madikwe Game Reserve took place between February 
and December 2000. It was geared to fulfil the aims of three distinct but overlapping 
undertakings: a Mafisa-linked exploration .ofpotential cultural tourism options in the 
area; a socio-economic survey and evaluative report for the NWP&TB to assess the 
impact often years ofMadikwe Game Reserve on the three villages in closest 
proximity to it; and research for this academic thesis. At times, therefore, my 
fieldwork was shaped by research briefs from Mafisa and at other times by 
requirements for the NWP&TB survey with the result that the data presented in this 
thesis are the product of a wide range of research methods. As Gupta (1998) points 
out, anthropologists legitimately and necessarily utilise a variety of methods to 
achieve their goals, and it is important to acknowledge and explicate them. The 
purpose of this section is to describe and discuss the different methods I used and the 
data they generated. 
The chapters that follow are necessarily shaped and informed by the totality of my 











understandings gained through each of the three undertakings. However, unless 
otherwise stated, evidence presented throughout the thesis derives from in-depth 
interviews, conversations and chats, ranging from tightly fonnal, particularly in the 
early stages offieldwork, to wholly infonnal, relaxed and familiar as relationships 
with key respondents grew progressively more comfortable and trusting. This 
evidence is referenced with interview dates, regardless of the level offonnality of the 
exchange, or whether I was conducting the interview specifically to feed into the 
NWP&TB report or for my own thesis. The two often overlapped. I have also made 
use of quantitative data generated from the socio-economic survey, which is 
referenced accordingly. IS 
I went to Madikwe initially to conduct research for Mafisa into cultural tourism 
possibilities that could link into and enhance the people-based conservation initiatives 
that the NWP&TB said were the bedrock of the Madikwe project. My first point of 
entry to the villages was therefore through and with Mafisa. Thereafter, my dilemma, 
as an anthropologist, was that I was forever- associated with Mafisa no matter how 
hard I tried to convince fieldwork participants that I was an independent, neutral and 
unbiased researcher, as unfeasible as that was. Furthennore, in attempts to 
disassociate myself with the colonial and apartheid past of South Africa, I would 
introduce myself as coming from Ireland (usually managing to point out that Ireland 
has suffered a longer period of colonisation than any other country in the world), 
conveniently failing to mention the years of my undergraduate degree at the 
University of Sussex in England. Itl ways such as this I attempted to construct an 
identity based on my assumptions of what ingredients that identity might need for me 
to be most sympathetically received by village residents. Eventually I realised the 
futility of my efforts. To most villagers I was a potential resource, one of those people 
who come, with varying priorities and agendas, from 'the Reserve' (Madikwe). In 
their eyes, I was white, female, well educated, wealthy and highly privileged. 
One experience in particular brought me face to face with my pretensions. I was 
walking past the bottle store in Molatedi with Paul, a young resident of the village 
whom I had come to know quite well over the months. As we drew level with a group 











of men sitting on the shop's stoep, or veranda, one of them shouted to me: "Hey, 
lady! Please help us with some rands. We have nothing-". Paul, embarrassed, said 
something angrily to them in Setswana, at which they looked chastened and 
apologised. "I was telling them you are a researcher, not one of the tourists," Paul 
explained. I had a sudden realisation that I was being viewed and treated in very 
particular ways. It was as if those who had had more contact with me had learnt how I 
. wanted to be treated and even went as far as to pass on that knowledge to those not in 
the know. In this way, it seemed that my interactions with people were often 
consciously contrived. We were operating within a framework that had been 
established through years of researcher-researched role playing. 16 Such a framework 
inevitably had a great impact on how respondents selected what they did and did not 
share with me. It highlighted the importance of the long-term nature of 
anthropological fieldwork methods where participant observation and rambling 
infonnal conversations can fill in many gaps left by more contrived and rigid 
interviews. My methods, between the survey for the NWP&TB and research for 
Mafisa and my own thesis, were at times consistent with the fonner, at times with the 
latter. The remainder of this chapter comprises three sections: the first provides a 
description of my presence in the field; the second details the NWP&TB survey 
methodology and the third discusses broader ethical considerations. 
Living in a Mission 
Whether or not Madikwe Game Reserve was degraded fann land ten years prior to 
my tl,eld stay,17 in 2000 itwas a rocky, impenetrable landscape of dense thorny bush 
. . 
accessed by a miniinum of challenging (particularly for the old Opel KadettI drove) 
dirt roads. It looked just like my Out of A[ricaJ8 cliched imaginings of a quintessential 
African wilderness. More or less in the middle of the Reserve was Vleischfontein 
Mission,19 the downstairs half of which was used as offices by the NWP&TB. 
16 Including the original pre-feasibility survey conductc:d by a finn known as Settlement Planning 
Services (SETPLAN) in 1991, four surveys had been conducted in the villages, as well Madikwe 
Initiative-related research and DfID reviews. Many of my respondents therefore had a history of being 
'researched' . 
17 As the SETPLAN pre-feasibility study which recommended the establishment of the Reserve asserts 
(see pages 55-57 of the following chapter). 
18 A romanticised film about colonial Kenya, starring Robert Redford and Meryl Streep. 











Mall 2: Madikwe Game Reserve. 










Vleischfontein became my base and home for my first six months in Madikwe?O I 
had a little room upstairs, one of a row of five. At 4 pm every weekday the gates to 
the Reserve were locked and I would have to be back from whichever village I had 
been conducting research in. The Parks staff would all have gone for the day, not to 
return until eight the following morning, and I would be alone in the Mission. I soon 
established a routine of writing up my field notes, planning the following day and 
cooking an evening meal. I had no shortage of time to reflect and mull over each 
day's experiences. 
Living at Vleischfontein was not ideal for my fieldwork, which would doubtlessly 
have benefited had I actually lived in each of the villages. But the NWP&TB allowed 
me to stay at the mission free of charge, and funding did not stretch to 
accommodation costs in the villages. Having to keep gate times was particularly 
irksome as it imposed tight strictures on my time, often curbing spontaneous 
interactions. It was possible to request special permission from the park warden to 
return late to the Reserve, but this was not encouraged as it caused considerable 
inconvenience to the Park's staff. Nevertheless, given its central location, 
Vleischfontein was the most practical place for me to base myself.21 Furthermore, 
when I first arrived in Madikwe I was working for Mafisa, which had its headquarters 
in an out-building of the fonner Mission. Three months later I was deep into the 
socio-economic survey for the NWP&TB and needed access to the office equipment 
at Vleischfontein. My evenings were then spent loading data into a NWP&TB 
computer. 
The Socio-economic Survey 
Some ten weeks after I arrived in Madikwe the NWP&TB commissioned me to 
conduct a socio-:economic survey in the villages. The Reserve was approaching its 
tenth anniversary and the Board had decided this was an apposite time to assess the 
20 In appendix 4 there is a photograph I took in 2000 of the main building. My room was to the right of 
the entrance. For the remainder of my stay I lived in the old farmstead at Onverwacht, a (former) farm 
to the south east ofVleischfontein, where the ecologists lived. 
21 The location ofVleischfontein Mission can be seen on map 2, page 21. Map 3, page 34, shows the 
distance of the villages from Vleischfontein and from one another: while Lekgophung and Supingstad 
were relatively close to one another, Molatediwas located on the opposite side of the Reserve. A round 
trip of the villages covered some 200 km - and that on roads that were profoundly potholed and pitted, 











impact Madikwe had had on what they termed the local cornmunity.22 The aims of the 
survey were to establish local perceptions and attitudes toward the Reserve; to 
detennine the extent of villagers' involvement in Madikwe; to elicit villagers' needs 
and priorities; and to provide a socio-economic overview of the villages to compare 
with three earlier surveys conducted in 1993, 1998 and 1999. 
I decided the best way to proceed would be to employ a field assistant in each village 
who would be able to administer interview schedules and also act as a translator. 
Following local protocol I wrote to the Tribal AuthoritY3 in each village and asked 
them to select five residents, who were fluent in Setswana and English, for me to 
interview. In an attempt to ensure that assistants were as neutral as possible, and 
perceived to be so by respondents, it was desirable that they were not members of any 
village committees and that they did not have strong political affiliations. After the 
first round of interviews in Supingstad and Lekgophung, I invited Moses Molefe and 
N aledi Rapoo to work with me. Moses was twenty-one years old and had recently 
completed matriculation. He was taking some time out while deciding what to do 
next. His dream was to become a pilot. He lived with his parents, who were relatively 
well offby Supingstad standards, three brothers and a sister, but had a rondawel (a 
round, thatched mud-brick building separate from the main house) to himself N aledi 
was twenty-six years old and had completed her matriculation several years before. 
She also lived at home (in a single building) with her mother, an aunt, two sisters and 
four nieces and nephews. Both Naledi and Moses were charismatic people, 
questioning and assertive. They immediately engaged with the research, offering their 
thoughts and opinions. 
The process of finding a field assistant in Molatedi was more problematic. After 
numerous requests to the Tribal Authority and two abortive interview session 
22 A notion that I problematise throughout the thesis. See chapter three in particular. 
23 The colonial and apartheid systems of government created institutions that were called 'tribal 
authorities'. They were each presided over by a chief who was recognised by the government in power. 
The tribal authorities comprised a set of persons, conventionally men, who were regarded as 
counsellors to the chief (see Hammond-Tooke (1975) for a detailed description of the structure of 
tribal authorities). It is important to stress that notions of tribe and tribal are highly problematic and 
contested in the South African context, particularly as they were pivotal injustifying the colonial and 
apartheid governments' strategies for dividing and controlling the country's population. See Skalnik 
(1988), who traces the terms to their colonial origins, discusses how they were used to legitimise 
separate development and exposes them as the inappropriate yet resilient impositions they are, 











attempts where nobody turned up, the Tribal Authority finally managed to present six 
people for interview. None was appropriate: two were members of the chiefs family; 
another was the daughter ofMr Ramorula, Molatedi's main businessman; another 
was heavily involved in ANC politics and two could not really speak English. I asked 
the Tribal Authority to draw up another list of people, but after a week it still had not. 
As the pilot study and first week of research had already been completed in both 
Lekgophung and Supingstad, there was no time to wait, so I asked Seth Modisane, 
whom I already knew, ifhe would be my assistant. Seth was in his early thirties and 
lived alone in a two-roomed house. He was unmarried and had no children. Although 
Seth had been involved in village politics (he had been a member of the Village 
Service Committee and the former Community Development Organisation -
committees which I will introduce in detail in the following chapters) and had also 
worked with Mafisa, at the time he was not involved with any of these bodies. It is 
almost certain that his past activities impacted on respondents' attitudes towards him 
and perceptions of his neutrality, but he was well liked in the village and, in the 
circumstances, he was the best option. Indeed, his knowledge and understanding of 
. the numerous complex issues and conflicts in Molatedi were of fundamental 
importance to the success of the research. 
The Interview Schedule 
While it is highly questionable how effectively statistics gathered from questionnaires 
and interview schedules reflect the rea11ife situations they are supposed to represent, 
they nevertheless can be an efficient way of reaching a large number of people in a 
relatively short space oftime (Tuckman, 1988; Bernard, 1995). The NWP&TB 
required a sense of 'majority' views and hard percentages from the survey. For these 
reasons the NWP&TB project manager and I decided interview schedules would be a 
useful tool, provided the data gathered from them were clarified, coloured and 
explained by the everyday contact and interactions that are so central to 
anthropological fieldwork methods. Based on my own earlier research in the villages 
while working for Mafisa (see the following chapter), I designed the interview 
schedules (reproduced in appendix 1) to elicit varying and changing community 
perceptions and attitudes towards the Reserve as well as to gather socio-economic 
data. The questions were written in English and then translated into Setswana. As a 











conveyed, a different person translated the questions back into English (cf. Bernard 
(1995:275) who stresses the importance of what he calls back translation when 
phrasing questions in another language). During this process, my field assistants and I 
discussed each question to see how it might be interpreted in the villages. We then 
conducted pilot studies in each village. 
The Pilot Study 
Moses and N aledi each administered six trial interview schedules in Supingstad and 
Lekgophung respectively, choosing respondents randomly. As Supingstad and 
Lekgophung are located close together, it was possible for both Moses and Naledi to 
be present for some of the pilot interviews, one interviewing and the other observing. 
I was present for all but two of the interviews and this also served as a training 
process for the field assistants: after each session, we discussed and practiced 
interview techniques and identified and suggested remedies for problems within the 
interview schedules. 
For example, we found that some questions were taking too long for people to answer 
in proportion to their importance to the aims of the research, so we amended or 
dropped those questions. We also found that respondents' interest tended to flag 
towards the end and answers thus become too superficial. To remedy this, we 
rearranged the order of the questions and this allowed interviews to flow more 
smoothly and helped to keep the pace going. Due to time constraints and the fact that 
pilot studies had already been carried out in the other two villages, Seth piloted only 
two interview schedules in Molatedi. We did not feel any further changes needed to 
be made. All in all, we conducted research for the survey between May and October 
2000, the bulk of the interview schedules being administered between July and 
September. 
The successful execution of the fieldwork, both for this thesis and for the NWP&TB 
survey, was almost entirely due to the personal relationships and understandings 
Moses, Naledi, Seth and I developed together. Over the course of the survey we 
interviewed over four hundred people. Because of the wide scope of the aims of the 
survey a variety of quantitative and qUalitative research methods were used, ranging 











conversations and participant observation. Interviews and conversations carried out 
before the survey fonnally began fed into the fonnation of a set of questions that I 
came to see, for the purpose of the survey, as representing the major issues around 
Madikwe. 
Altogether we surveyed two hundred and forty households in Lekgophung, 
Supingstad and Molatedi. Each interview schedule was administered face to face. 
Initially we were going to weight the sample size according to the population size of 
each village, but in practice, due to time and transport constraints, we divided the 
sample equally, conducting eighty interview schedules in each village. Every effort 
was made to aim for a random sampling selection process but, as there were no maps 
of the villages showing houses, or data on household makeup, this was difficult. 
Similarly, the 1996 population census was neither recent nor detailed enough to help 
with the sampling process. These factors meant that formally systematic random 
samplingJechniques could not be used, such as those Bernard (1995:71-101) details 
in his comprehensive guide to sampling methods. Instead, I drew sketch maps of the 
villages, and took a rough count of the number of houses. My field assistants and I 
then chose houses randomly within geographical locations. For example, in 
Lekgophung, we surveyed approximately every fifth house along each road. 
Respondents were drawn from all adult members of selected households, rather than 
just the household heads. We followed this approach in order to obtain as wide as 
possible a range of opinions and ideas, representing different age groups, gender, 
employment status, education level and so on. 
Initially I intended that the sample of two hundred and forty households would be 
stratified to include representatives of all people involved in Madikwe, for example, 
employees within the Reserve and participants on all Madikwe Initiative projects. 
This became problematic due to differences in the kinds of questions that needed to 
be asked of those familiar with the Reserve and those not. It was also desirable to see 
how many Madikwe-related employees and trainees were caught in the random 
selection process. Therefore I drew up separate interview schedules and processes for 













I held semi-structured interviews with a selection of people employed on each 
Madikwe Initiative project and with a cross section ofNWP&TB and lodge 
employees. I detennined the sample size by making it relative to the number of 
people working in a particular project or occupation. I selected respondents randomly, 
with the use of staff lists. With the lodges and theNWP&TB staff, I stratified the 
sample to include employees working in different sectors and domiciled in different 
areas. I interviewed all members of upper level management. 
Focus Group Discussions 
Despite the problems inherent in them, surveys based on formal interview schedules 
administered by interviewers can be an effective way of collecting data, especially in 
comparison to systems of self-administrated questionnaires (Bernard, 1995). 
However, a major concern, particularly with the collection of qualitative data, is that 
structured questions severely limit the depth and scope of information a respondent 
offers. Structured interview questions are necessarily designed more on the basis of 
the researcher's preconceptions than on what the respondent may find most 
important. Although every effort was made to include open-ended questions which 
would allow respondents room to raise and discuss issues they found most important, 
I felt that the interview schedules were still too structured to ensure a full exploration 
of participants' priorities, perceptions and ideas. A further consideration was that 
interview schedules are static, usually involving only the interviewer and the 
respondent, question and answer (Punch, 1998). 
To create a more dynamic environment to elicit and discuss different views, I 
therefore also held a series offocus group discussions. The aim was to have three 
focus group discussions in each village, each comprising not more than ten people in 
a context where people would feel comfortable voicing their views. Interest and 
attendance varied widely from village to village. Ultimately, three discussions were 
held in Lekgophung, two in Molatedi and four in Supingstad, as residents' interest in 
attending there was far greater than in the other two villages. The first discussion took 
place in Supingstad's Tribal Authority office in a situation that unavoidably became 











the discussion to the extent that it became morelike a forum for airing patriarchal 
views. Although towards the end some younger men and women finally offered a few 
opinions, the experience made me appreciate the benefits of small and agel gender-
equal samples for discussion groups so that participants would be less likely to be 
intimidated by older men. Thee such meetings were held in the following weeks. In 
Molatedi and Lekgophung the groups were never larger than ten people. 
Broadening the Focus 
My field assistants and I also interviewed residents in the nearby village of 
Nietverdiend (see map 3, page 34), as well as a selection of nearby farmers and farm 
workers, to see how their perspectives might differ from people resident in the 
villages that were within the scope of the Madikwe Initiative. We held twenty-four 
such interviews. Of these, fourteen were semi-structured and were carried out by 
Moses and Naledi in Setswana while I conducted the rest, which were more open-
ended, either in English or, more problematically, in Afrikaans with the aid of a 
translator. 
Ethics and Reflexivity 
The nature of our research relationships and the fact that anthropologists often work in 
contexts characterised by differential access to power and resources imposes upon us a 
grave responsibility to consider carefully the character of our research and its likely 
effects for those who participate in it (Ethical Guidelines, 2005). 
In the context of practicing and maintaining good ethiCal conduct in the field, I had 
two major, overriding concerns. The first was any unintended and damaging 
repercussions my work might have on research participants, and the second was a fear 
of misunderstanding or misrepresenting those participants. 
My research, particularly for the NWP&TB survey, was geared primarily towards 
assessing and understanding perceptions and realities of the impact the Reserve and 
the Madikwe Initiative had had and was having on the residents of the three villages. 
A major theme that runs through this thesis is that there was an overwhelming 
imbalance of power that rendered villagers marginalised and placed them at the 
bottom of the hierarchy around which the Madikwe project was structured. It is not 











from the villages held intensely negative views of the partners who dominated the 
project, and even of the few village residents who were seen as reaping profits at the 
expense of others. In order to protect those respondents I have omitted their names 
throughout the thesis, apart from those respondents who were in public office (such as 
the chiefs), whose positions thus made their identities apparent, and who had given 
me express pennission to cite them. 
My other chief concern about the ethical dimensions of my fieldwork was the 
question of accurate respondent representation. This came to dominate the data. 
analysis and writing up process. Because of my discomfort with interpretation and 
representation, the first draft of the report I wrote for the NWP&TB was called 
Voicing the Issues. It presented only excerpts from interviews, with a minimum of 
interpretation and analysis. I felt there was no place in that highly complex world for 
my own voice. Who was I, a mere outsider and a foreigner, to have an opinion? Yet 
the NWP&TB had employed me to have an opinion. In order to fulfil my brief and 
produce a document that could be useful to the Board, analysis and interpretation 
were essential. 
According to Grillo (1997) I was not alone in my torment: he asserts that since the 
1980s anthropologists have become increasingly absorbed with reflexivity and self-
analysis, suffering what could be termed a post-modem crisis (1997:1). After many 
months of living in Madikwe, conducting fieldwork in the three villages, I finally felt 
I had begun to understand the meaning of such a crisis. What I found to be highly 
problematic was the need to organise, and present in a linear manner, be it a report or 
an academic dissertation, more than a year of multi-dimensional thoughts, ideas, 
perceptions and feelings - and to then consign those experiences to an ordered, 
tangible form which is easy to scrutinise, to. read, criticise and evaluate. One result of 
the fieldwork experience was a daunting realisation of the multiple ways of 
understanding and infinite shades of meaning that a researcher must process and then 
shape into a cohesive, coherent argument. Eventually, the crisis can cripple - and 
ultimately become the height of self-indulgence. At times anthropologists' 
predilection for reflexivity is simply fence sitting, which, although uncomfortable, is 
not nearly as difficult as actually producing, processing and forming a hopefully 











For me, it was the need to order my fieldwork, to order research participants' 
perceptions and, worse, to order my own understandings and interpretations of those 
perceptions, that I found so uncomfortable and problematic. Evidently, fieldwork 
methods impact heavily on the results that are produced, just as interpretation of those 
results can never really be objective. Indeed, it is important to recognise the 
unfeasibility of objectivity within the research process as such a recognition enables a 
more accurate view of the relationship between researcher and research participant, 
which is inevitably one of unequal power (Nagy Hesse-Biber and Yaiser, 2004, Mills, 
2004). My background, assumptions, influences and experiences could not but shape 
the research process and how I interpreted the data it generated. Indeed, as Abu-
Lughod says: 
to ignore the encounter [between anthropologists and their hosts] not only denies the 
power of such factors as personality, social location in the community, intimacy of 
contact, and luck (not to mention theoretical orientation and self-conscious methodology) 
to shape fieldwork and its product but also perpetuates the conventional fictions of 
objectivity and omniscience that marks the ethnographic genre (1987: 10). 
In order to remind the reader that the fieldwork data I gathered were so definitely 
shaped by who I was, throughout the thesis I emphasise and restate my presence in 
the field. I also quote research participants extensively throughout the following 
pages in order to bring their voices to the fore. Although I have 'tidied up' quotes for 
the sake of clarity, I have deliberately kept such tidying to a minimum in order to 
provide as precise as possible a reflection of the voices of respondents , to retain the 












Setting the Scene 
Finding the Fieldwork Site 
It is clear that one of the key resources that these communities own is their culture 
and history. Culture is an asset that communities own and that can be marketed, 
particularly to tourists, in a way that creates jobs and attracts investment Cultural 
tourism, that is tourism which develops and promotes the diverse heritage ofa 
country, region or particular community has been shown to be the most effective and 
sustainable basis for community tourism. Supporting, developing and promoting the 
cultural and historical wealth of these communities is, therefore, a key component of 
the Madikwe Initiative (E. Koch, Mafisa Director, email correspondence, 13 
February 2000). 
This was what I had been looking for - an opportunity to explore the cultural tourism 
pos~ibilities within a people-based conservation framework in a rural South African 
setting. I had recently completed a coursework-based research project on tourism to 
Robben Island and Cape Town's townships in which I had focussed on issues of 
representation and authenticity, exploitation, voyeurism and stereotyping. 
MacCannell (1992) wrote: "Tourism is not just an aggregate of merely commercial 
activities; it is also an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition; a framing 
that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs" (1992:1). Indeed, 
while writing my paper on the Robben Island museum and township tours I had 
grappled with the problematic potential of history and culture to become packaged 
commodities that lose integrity through being angled to meet the demands of a 
tourism market. The Madikwe Initiative presented an opportunity to explore issues 
around 'community tourism' (as outlined by Koch above), particularly as work had 
not yet begun: I would be able to witness its evolution from the start. 
Soon it was all arranged. I would go to Madikwe and conduct preliminary research 
for Mafisa into cultural tourism possibilities. At the same time I would be able to 
undertake research for my own thesis. "You do have a car. Yes? You'd better drive 
up," added the director ofMafisa in our final telephone conversation, "I'd like you to 











collection of the Tswana by Duggan-Kronin.24 And anyway, you'll need a car in 
Madikwe." 
And so early one February morning in 2000 I set off in myoid Opel Kadett on the 
longjoumey from Cape Town to Madikwe, which I knew was somewhere in the far 
North West Province. But as I drove out of Cape Town I had little idea of how far 
that actually was. The Klein Karoo. The Groot Karoo. Scrubby bush, distant horizons 
and dry, shimmering heat. It seemed quite reasonable when the needle on the Opel's 
temperature gauge inched steadily upwards into the red. The clacking noise coming 
from somewhere under the bonnet was more alarming. Forty kilometres outside 
Kimberley the car finally gave up. My saviour was a huge Afrikaner man who 
hitched my car to his fifty-two ton truck with a five-foot air pipe, and towed me to 
safety. I stayed in Kimberley for four days, perusing the museum's Duggan-Kronin 
collection and admiring the town's Big Hole,2s while I waited for a farm mechanic 
(located some 20km outside Kimberley, near to where I broke down) to fix my car. 
Eventually the mechanic admitted that I might be waiting for weeks, so I proceeded 
to Johannesburg in a hired car. 
The adventures of the trip from Cape Town tremendously, if misleadingly, elongated 
the distance I had travelled, rendering Madikwe forever in the back of beyond in my 
mind, just as befits any 'genuine' safari. Furthermore, as my car was still being 
repaired by the farm mechanic, I travelled from Johannesburg to Madikwe with a 
Mafisa consultant. So it was that on my arrival in Madikwe I was finnly linked to 
Mafisa. As I have mentioned, I spent much of the following months protesting the 
Mafisa labelling and striving to convince research participants of my 'independent' 
status. As I write this now I am sure that such protestations were fruitless. I do not 
doubt that most people in the villages viewed me as a potential source of opportunity, 
one of those MafisalParks Board elite who had unrestricted access to the Reserve and 
its resources, which, in a sense, I did have. 
204 Alfred Martin Duggan-Kronin (1874-1954) was an Irish photographer who photographed Tswana 
~eople extensively. I have included two of his photographs of Chief Gaborone in appendix 2. 
S The remnants of an opencast diamond mine hacked out of blue kimberlite rock that has the 











The purpose of this chapter is to introduce my fieldwork site: Madikwe Game 
Reserve and the three villages adjacent to it that were the focus of the Madikwe 
Initiative - Molatedi, Supingstad and Lekgophung. I provide an explanation of how 
the Reserve·came to be established, as well as an overview of the historical and socio-
political context in which it was developed. The overview is intended to help the 
reader to understand the complexities and tensions that have influenced the social and 
developmental relationships, attitudes and perceptions in the area. It also illuminates 
one of the main threads running through the thesis: that development is unavoidably 
and intensely political and cannot proceed effectively unless the socio-political 
context that has shaped, and continues to shape, the lives of the people to be 
'developed', is understood, addressed and accommodated. 
An Historical View 
In this section I draw on historical data about the Madikwe area in order to create a 
sense of the socio-cultural and political processes that have shaped the region where 
the Reserve and the villages of Lekgophung, Supingstad and Molatedi are located. 
The Reserve straddles two districts that, at the time of writing, are the districts of 
Lehurutshe to the west and Madikwe to the east. But, during my fieldwork the former 
was known as the Central District and the latter as Rustenburg District. Names 
change and borders move - indeed, the land which comprises my fieldwork site has 
been viewed and demarcated in many different ways during its documented history 
by the diverse people who have occupied or traversed it. A perusal of those different 
perspectives serves as a reminder of how space comes to be a cultural construction-
and is thus irrevocably a reflection of dominant politics and shifting balances of 
power. It is plainly well beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a thorough 
exploration of the history of the region.26 My aim, rather, is to provide an overview, 
painted in broad brushstrokes, of past events and processes that, at the time of my 
fieldwork, still had reverberations in the area, influencing actions and relationships. 
26 For a particularly comprehensive exposition I refer the reader to Manson (1990), whose doctoral 
thesis comprises a history of the area, focusing particularly on the Marico District in the period 1848 -











Map 3: Madikwe Game Reserve and surrounding villages. My fieldwork sites, Lekgopbung, Supingstad and Molatedi, are circled 
in green. 
Scale: 1:250000 











In order to develop a picture of pre-colonial history, a researcher is inevitably drawn 
to the work of ethnographers, anthropologists, historians and archaeologists, work 
that is often as problematic as it is informative. The chief flaw that has infected many 
accounts of pre-colonial Africa is the practice of dividing the African population into 
clearly delineated 'tribes' and presenting chronological accounts of patriarchal 
succession complete with the European practice of numbering monarchs - even going 
as far as to use Roman numerals. In the case of the Madikwe area, a reader ofBreutz 
(1953), Ellenberger (1912), Rheinallt Jones (1937) or Van Warmelo (1935), for 
example, is faced with a litany of Tswana patronyms that succeeds, one could argue, 
in little more than alienating the majority of readers from the subject matter. 27 While 
such sources do provide a history (of sorts), it is an impoverished history that lacks 
sensitivity to context and fails to acknowledge the complexity and range of factors 
that have shaped settlement patterns and movements. The result could more usefully 
be viewed as a colonial counter history that is explicitly not interested in people's 
relations to land or to each other. Rather it is concerned with grouping, categorising, 
labelling and geographically confining people in a manner that ultimately served the 
colonial cause of justifying occupying powers' claims to land.28 
The authors referred to above document chiefly lineage over the centuries in accounts 
that duly note the squabbles of brothers, the splitting of 'tribes' into 'sub-tribes' and 
the places to which each group then travelled. Thus, from such accounts, one learns 
that the dominant leadership of the people living inSupingstad today are called the 
BaHurutshe-baga-Suping; in Lekgophung the BaLete, and in Molatedi the BaTlokwa. 
By association, all the people living in each village often come to be labelled 
BaHurutshe, BaLete or BaTlokwa respectively?9 To highlight the superficiality of 
such designations, it is constructive to quote Spiegel who wrote: 
... 1 find difficulty with an approach which sees as primary any sense of necessary 
continuities between people who, over time and to distinguish them somehow from 
27 An amalgamation of these histories is reproduced in Appendix 3: Colonial Chronologies. 
28 It also often served the interests of those who were locally dominant at the time the written record 
was created - chiefs and the men who were their counsellors and acolytes. 
29 For example, Mafisa initiated a theatre group project in Molatedi and called it the Thakadu Theatre 
Group, after the totem animal of the BaTlokwa, on the premise that it was representative of the 











others, are described by a single name .... Social categories have been [quite fluid] in 
the past and ... individuals and indeed named groups have [readily] switched 
allegiances in changing circumstances ... The same applies today, making the nature of 
group membership and association an issue worthy of analysis in its own right One 
certainly cannot take named groups for granted, and then proceed to use them as a 
natural starting point for discussion and analysis (1990:52). 
Suffice to say that the early history of people in the region was shaped by centuries of 
centralisation and fragmentation that led to emergent Tswana chiefdoms. These 
chiefdoms were characterised by power struggles where patriarchs strove to control 
resources, particularly cattle and land, and where, from the 13th century onwards, 
there was Ii gradual shift, sparked by trade, from subsistence living to the 
accumulation of surplus (Guy, 1987; Hall, 1987; Manson, 1990 and Wright, 1978). 
By the mid 18th century, ivory trading and the associated profits had become a 
defining factor of such chiefdoms' economies, with a concomitant intensification of 
power struggles and the emergence of social classes within and between particular 
cohorts of people (Manson, 1990). A patronage system that was of critical importance 
to the emergence of social classes was a practice known as mafisa whereby less well-
offmen would work for chiefs or other wealthy patrons in return for the loan of cattle 
- needed for ploughing, transport and milk. Thus a cycle of dependency was created 
which helped enable patriarchs to develop and sustain a support base (Schapera, 
1953; Denbow et al, 1985; Manson, 1990:46-7).30 
By the mid 18th century, patrilineal ward systems had become a salient feature of the 
political organisation of Tswana chiefdoms. Schapera describes a ward in the 
following tenns: 
The ward ... is a patrilineal but non-exogamous body of people forming a distinct 
social and administrative unit under the leadership and authority of a hereditary 
headman. Wards vary considerably in size; some have less than 100 people each, and 
others well over 1,000, but the majority contain between 300 and 600. The members 
consist, firstly, of the headman's close relatives; some of the smallest wards are in fact 
single family groups. But the great majority also contain other family-groups, 
sometimes remoter segments of the headman's lineage, but often not related either to 
him or to one another, except perhaps through intermarriage .... Each ward has its own 
name, its own settlement or settlements, and one or more cultivating areas of its 
own .... The ward is also the basic unit in the administrative system .... Only the chief 
can create or recognize a new ward .... The chief himself is head of the royal ward ... 
30 The practice of mafisa is particular pertinent to the Madikwe context as the NGO running the 
Madikwe Initiative in 2000 was named after it As will be seen in the chapters that follow, such an 
association is more than a little ironic given the balance of power that I saw as defining Mafisa's 











[andJ ward hamlets are usually situated according to traditional rules of seniority and 
precedence (Schapera, 1953 [1991J:40). 
Such a system of social organisation helped to strengthen a chiefs autonomy. Indeed, 
an important aspect of the ward system was that ward heads "constituted a nascent 
appointee bureaucracy which could be used to increase centralisation and liberate the 
ruler from dependence on his potentially rebellious relatives" (Omer-Cooper, 
1969:211). Manson (1990) argues that the ward structure greatly facilitated the 
amalgamation of people into Tswana chiefdoms and Schapera (1952, 1953) describes 
how chiefdoms were not self-contained ethnic units. Rather, steady flows of 
immigrants ensured social heterogeneity, which again underscores the superficiality 
of consigning people to homogenous social categories or named groups. 
The 'Difaqane' and the Colonial Encounter 
During the 1820s and 1830s there was widespread conflict across the whole South 
Africa region. The period has often been referred to as the difaqane or mfecane -
broad terms referring to Zulu conquest led by Shaka. Both terms are strongly 
contested as they fail to acknowledge the multiple origins of the conflicts that swept 
the region - conflicts that pre-dated the expansion of the Zulu kingdom and were 
aggravated,.ifnot instigated, by the colonial encounter (Cobbing, 1988; Wright, 1988; 
Manson, 1990). Manson identifies four trends within the period: 
... firstly that it was a time of extreme political fluidity when different groups competed 
for power, secondly, that political allegiances consequently shifted frequently and did 
not correspond to any notions of race or ethnicity, thirdly that groups which could offer 
political security and material sustenance were likely to attract large followings, 
fourthly that traditional leadership structures fell apart, many never to be revived 
(1990:65). 
For the people in the Madikwe area there was a similar picture of strife, movement 
and political expediency - as is indicated in Appendix 3: Colonial Chronologies. For 
example, it is known that people described as the Matabele, led by Mzilikazi, invaded 
the area in the early 1830s and that Chief Matlapeng, great-grandfather of Franz 
Matlapeng who was the chief of Molatedi village when I was there in 2000, retreated 











'1912; and Huffinan, 1997).31 Tswene Tswene became the capital of the Tswana 
chiefdom (known as BaTlokwa) over which Matlapeng ruled until the late 1800s. By 
then there was increasing pressure on land from Afrikaner (Boer) farmers, who had 
started settling in the area from circa 1850, claiming entitlement to land because they 
had helped to drive out Mzilikazi's Matabele in 1837 - another instance of expedient 
alliances and shifting allegiances. 
Indeed, from the first wave of Voortrekkers, 32 repercussions have emanated from the 
colonial encounter that have shaped relationships between the local population and 
the land that today comprises Madikwe - and even the very contours of the Game 
Reserve itself. In 1836 the first Boers trekked from the Cape and moved slowly 
northwards, pegging and parcelling land into farms on which to settle. For more than 
a decade the Dwarsberg Mountain Range, to the south of the Madikwe area, acted as 
a barrier stemming the northward flow of the trekkers. It is instructive to look at a turn 
of the 20th century map of the region (reproduced on page 39) depicting how the land 
that became Madikwe Game Reserve is bordered by the considerable boundary of 
Dwarsberg Mountains to the south and the Great Marico River to the east. To the 
north and west the map peters out into the British Bechuanaland Protectorate (which 
was not established until 1884), a few sparse squiggles the only indication that, in 
1901, it was not an entirely featureless or uncharted wilderness. South of the 
Dwarsberg Mountains bold letters proclaim the Marico district, bordered by the Great 
Marico River to the east and the South African Republic to the west. It is 
characteristic of the general fluidity of borders, particularly during this period of 
expanding colonial frontiers, that although the border of the South African Republic 
was defined by the 1871 Keate Award it was not until the early 1960s, when a fence 
was erected, that the exact boundary was demarcated to mark the boundary between 
the then Transvaal Province of South Africa and the Bechuanaland Protectorate that 
later became Botswana (Lamar and Thompson, 1981). 
31 Map 2 on page 21 shows Tswene Tswene, to the north ofV1eischfontein. 
32 Frontiersmen who have also been called Boers or Afrikaners, but who themselves hardlY'constituted 











Map 4: 1901 Map of the Region. 
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By the 1850s colonial hunters were finding their way through the Dwarsberg 
. Mountains and Boers began to encroach into what is now the Madikwe area. 33 
George Copp Westbeech (1844 - 1888) was one colonial hunter and pioneer who 
helped open a road north to the Zambezi Valley. He died while travelling between 
Mochudi and Zeerust and is said to be buried in the middle of what is now Madikwe 
Game Reserve, at Vleischfontein (Shaw and Parsons, 1989).34 Zeerust, the nearest 
- South African town to Madikwe and located some 80km from the southern border (in 
2000) of the Reserve, was a booming frontier town from 1867 until it was eclipsed by 
the establishment of Mafikeng in 1886 (Manson 1990:126). Manson cites an article in 
the Transvaal Argus (7 February 1867) which describes Zeerust as "a new village in 
the vicinity of the rich and friendly kafir tribes who live in peace and carry on an 
extensive trade in ivory and ostrich feathers etc" (1990: 127). Manson writes of how, 
in general, Tswana people in the area (he focuses particularly on people under the 
leadership of those he describes as BaHurutshe chiefs) were successful 
agriculturalists during this period, with large herds of cattle and crops of maize, 
sorghum, wheat, melons, tobacco and citrus (ibid.). 
By the end of the 19th century Boers had settled extensively in the region. The result 
was escalating struggles over land and access to, and control over, productive 
resources. 1868 saw the rush for goldfields at Tati, and the Marico lead mines were 
opened a few years later. In 1869 diamonds were discovered at Kimberley. As more 
and more people moved northward from the Cape Colony into the area, prospects for 
settlement for black people became increasingly limited. Many Tswana people were 
dispossessed of their land by Boer settlers (Van Onselen, 1996:20) - such as the 
people who were liviilg under the rule of Chief Matlapeng at the BaTlokwa capital at 
Tswene Tswene. By the 1890s they were forced to leave. Matlapeng's heir, 
Gaborone, went with his followers and established hlmselfin the place that today is 
known as Gaborone, the capital of Botswana Another son, Sebolawe, moved to 
Naaupoort (farm no. 150 on map 5, page 41) and founded the village ofMolatedi in 
1890 (Breutz, 1987). 
33 Manson (1990) claims that Boers did not start occupying land north of the Dwarsberg until as late as 
1884-1885. 











Map 5: Cadastral Map ~f Bophuthatswana and the Madikwe Area 
Scale: 1 :250 000 










At the same time, some 45 Ian to the west, Suping, the great-great-grandfather of 
Victor Suping (who was chief in Supingstad village in 2000) was also striving to 
acquire land for his people. According to one source (Native Affairs Department, 
1904), he applied to the government of the South African RepUblic in 1891 to grant 
him some of Hartebeestefontein fann (no. 195 on map 5, page 41) as well as 
neighbouring Vinkrivier farm (no. 132 on map 5, page 41). His request was denied 
but, on 9 April 1894, he and his followers bought 3556 hectares ofVinkrivier with 
the Superintendent of Natives acting as trustee. He also retained the use of parts of 
Hartebeestefontein. There was little water on Vinkrivier which necessitated that wells 
be sunk. Grazing was so poor that Suping was forced to move cattle onto 
neighbouring unoccupied white-owned land. He soon came into conflict with Boer 
farmers over grazing rights and accusations of stock thefts (Native Affairs 
Department, 1904). Eventually, in 1895, he succumbed to pressure from the white 
farmers and moved with his people to Odi, near Gaborone, in the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. After the South African war (1899-1902) they returned to Vinkrivier, 
under the leadership of Suping's son, Thebe, Suping having died in 1896. In 1903 
Thebe Suping built the village of Supingstad and in 1906 he and his followers bought 
the eastern portion of Hartebeestefontein from the government (Breutz, 1989; 
Manson, 1990; Rheinallt Jones, 1937). 
Less information is recoverable about the people under the rule of the BaLete chief. 
ChiefMokgobjwe (great-grandfather of Tsiepe who was chief of Lekgophung in 
2000) and his followers had been living on the western portion ofHartebeestefontein 
(farm no. 195 on map 5, page 41) since 1893 (Breutz, 1989:259), and bought two 
portions of the farm in 1901. The village of Lekgophung was established on the fann 
in the same year. The land Suping bought in 1906 adjoins their land. 
The years leading up to the establishment of these settlements were characterised by 
increasingly restive politics, with borders and ownership of resources becoming ever 
more contested. In 1877 the British annexed the Transvaal. Soon thereafter they 
established a Department of Native Administration in the Transvaal, following a 
system similar to that already in place in Natal whereby the province was divided into 
defined districts overseen by magistrates who liaised directly with the Secretary of 











to systematically undermine the social and economic security of rural Africans while 
providing a workforce for the mines and white farmers. For example, a ten shilling 
hut tax was imposed on African men - which had the effect of forcing increasing 
numbers of Africans into wage labour (Roux, 1948:76). 
Antagonism between the British and the Boers grew into an ever escalating struggle 
over control and power that erupted into the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-1881 
(Lehmann, 1972). There was no unified Tswana response to the war. Some groups of 
people sided with the British, others with the Boers, some with both (but at different 
times), others with none. When the British finally withdrew from the Transvaal, the 
Boers took retribution regardless, imposing fines on black people, confiscating 
livestock, seizing land and introducing more taxes. In addition to the ten shilling hut 
tax the British had started, there were also road, dog and farm taxes, and a tax of two 
shillings on any African who had not held employment with a white farmer in any 
taxable year (Manson 1990:174-194). This latter law was indicative of the fact that 
productive activities on white-owned farms had declined substantially during the 
years of conflict. Severe droughts in 1880-1881 and 1882-1884 compounded farmers' 
problems - for Tswana and Boer alike. But increasingly harsh laws imposed on 
Tswana and other African people in the South African Republic (what had been the 
Transvaal; and later reverted to that description as a province of the Union of South 
Africa in 1910) meant that relationships between black and white farmers became 
progressively more tense. In 1896 pass regulations entrenched control over the 
movement of Africans. Then, in 1899, the South African war broke out. As Manson 
says, the war (1899-1902) ''transfonned the human geography of the region, and it 
thrust entire communities into new political and economic relationships" (1990:227). 
He adds that although the evidence is that many Tswana sided with the British "Boer-
Hurutshe relations were peppered with instances of mutual cooperation even up to the 
end of the 19th century" (1990:237). 
In 1884 the British annexed Bechuanaland and the Republics of Stellaland and 
Goshen.3s The following year, typical of the seemingly arbitrary way in which 
3S Two Boer Republics that had been established to the west of the line demarcated by the British as 











colonial powers packaged land, the British divided Bechuanaland along the Molopo 
River. The area to the north became the Bechuanaland Protectorate and to the south 
the Crown Colony of British Bechuanaland. The division is important because the 
portion labelled the Bechuanaland Protectorate was given independence in 1966 and 
became Botswana. The Crown Colony of the British Bechuanaland, on the other 
, hand, became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910, and hence fell under the rule 
of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party in 1948. The farms that in 2000 comprised 
Madikwe Game Reserve, and the villages of Supingstad, Lekgophung and Molatedi, 
fell into that second portion. During the course of 1904-5 all African-owned title 
deeds were transferred to the Commissioner for Native Affairs (Manson, 1990:254), 
so by the time of Union in 1910 the land that each group had purchased was 
communally owned and vested in each respective chief but held in trust for them by 
the Commissioner for Native Affairs. Effectively, therefore, they lost all freehold 
rights. 
That was the situation, then, when what has proved to be a critical piece of 
legislation, the 1913 Natives Land Act, was implemented, dividing the Union of 
South Africa into black and white areas. The Act restricted land ownership and 
occupation rights for black people, some seventy-five percent of the population, to 
designated areas constituting just seven percent of the land (Davenport, 1991). It also 
prohibited sharecropping in the highveld region (Van Onselen, 1996:7) which meant 
that increasing numbers of black Africans were forced into wage labour. Sol Plaatje 
(1982) wrote of the Act: "Awaking on Friday morning, 20 June 1913, the South 
African native found himself, not actually a slave, but a pariah in the land of his 
birth". Map 5 (page 41) shows that while Vinkrivier (farm no. 132) and 
Hartebeestefontein (farm no. 195), both in the Marico District, and Naaupoort (farm 
no. 150) in Rustenburg District (the farms where Supingstad, Lekgophung and 
Molatedi respectively were established), became part of the black scheduled areas (as 
they were already so-called Native Reserves), the twenty-eight farms that were later 
to comprise Madikwe Game Reserve were white-owned and therefore became 
prohibited areas for Tswana occupation, other than as labourers. 












The 1913 Natives Land Act was followed by the Beaumont Commission of 1916, set 
up to identify and recommend more land areas that might be scheduled for black 
occupation. Its recommendations were, however, ignored following a change in 
government. But a similar set of recommendations underpinned the subsequent 1936 
Trust and Land Act which increased black scheduled land to twelve percent of the 
country (Roux, 1948 :296). As the following section describes, these Acts provided 
the basis for the creation of separate 'homelands' in a system which attempted to tum 
the 'Native Reserves' into independent 'national states'. 
Apartheid and the Rise and Fall of Bophuthatswana 
In 1948, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party, with its infamous policy of separate 
development, or apartheid, came into power. Once in office the apartheid government 
passed a string oflegislation which increasingly differentiated black from white land 
and black from white administrative systems. Included were the Population 
Registration Act of 1950, whereby all South Africans were classified into 'racial' 
groups (West, 1998); the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951; the Natives Resettlement 
Act of 1954; and the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act of 1959. One historian 
has written: "As early as 1952, Verwoerd, the architect-in-chief of' grand apartheid' , 
had given notice to all who would listen of 'how the various Acts, Bills and also 
public statements which I have made all fit into a pattern, and together form a single 
constructive plan' (Van Onselen, 1996:357). According to Davenport, also in 1952 
"Verwoerd announced a campaign to eliminate black land ownership in white 
farming areas, and to get rid of African squatting and labour tenancy on white farms 
through the conversion of all farm workers to wage labourers, and the revision of the 
1936 Land Act to make its anti-squatting provisions enforceable" (1987:372-373). 
This policy of dispossession and segregation culminated in the creation often 
'homelands', or bantustans. Between 1976 and 1981 'independence' was granted to 
four of these so-called homelands.36 
In December 1977 Bophuthatswana, comprising those parts of the former Crown 
Colony of the British Bechuanaland that were considered as black-occupied in terms 
of the 1913 Land Act, and scheduled for black occupation under the 1936 Trust and 
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map that most powerfully portrays the so-called rationale that attempted to unite the 
six distant and disparate segments of land into a single, independent country. 
Bureaucratic Violence: The Homelands Policy of Grand Apartheid 
Many of the most brutal gross human rights violations that took place during the 
apartheid regime have, since apartheid's fall, been documented by South Africa's 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), through painful and vivid public 
hearings that shocked the world. But, it is clear that the gross injustices of apartheid 
were not limited to those most extreme human rights violations. Colin Bundy (1999) 
has compared apartheid's trajectory to a slow dawn followed by a brief noon and 
argued that, while the TRC focussed on the 'heroic minority' that constituted those 
most harshly affected during that brief noon of apartheid, it failed to address the 
entrenched effects of over two hundred years of colonial conquest and the systematic 
bureaucratic violence suffered, in some parts of the country, by the 'stoic majority' 
(Bundy, 1999). The homelands policy of grand apartheid and the associated laws that 
deprived the majority of South Africans of basic civil rights constituted some of the 
more violent of those bureaucratic decisions. It provoked widespread fury, disbelief 
and bitterness and has had far reaching effects that are still, over a decade after the 
abolition of homelands, difficult to fully unravel and comprehend. 
Most of the areas allocated as homelands were barren tracts of densely populated 
land. There are estimates that some three and a half million black South Africans 
were removed - usually forcibly - to these overcrowded homelands (Platzky and 
Walker, 1985), where there was little chance of finding work, not enough land even 
for subsistence agriculture and where overcrowded conditions often resulted in out-
breaks of disease (Sparks, 2003; Jeffery, 1993). In the process, over nine million 
black South Africans lost their South African citizenship. 
The homelands, as indeed the native reserves before them, were effectively labour 
reservoirs, providing cheap labour for the mining industry, for associated support 
industries and for growing urban areas. However, with the tightening of what were 
called the pass and influx control laws soon after World War II it became illegal for 











from those (about one in four) who, under 'section 10' of the Blacks (Urban Areas) 
Consolidation Act of 1945, had pennission to live and work in white areas. These 
'section 10' rights were available only to people who had been born in that particular 
('prescribed') urban area, had lived there continuously since birth, and to those who 
had entered an urban area legally and had lived there for fifteen years continuously or 
had worked there uninterruptedly for one employer for ten years. The wife or child 
(under eighteen years of age) of a man with such rights could also live with him in the 
urban area, but only if housing was available (which often it was not). People without 
section 10 rights were not pennitted to spend longer than seventy-two hours looking 
for work in an urban area (Savage, 1986). Consequently, most black people with jobs 
in white areas remained entirely dependent on their white employers, particularly 
from the late 1960s: redundancy meant being forcibly removed to a homeland, where 
there were few jobs. As a result the homelands became less 'labour reservoirs' for the 
white areas, and more like unemployment reservoirs - that only those who had work, 
and were therefore permitted in white areas, could escape. Journalist Riaan de Villiers 
wrote of the homelands: 
For the first time in my life, after a visit to the Ciskei, I have understood what the 
homelands mean in terms of economics. It's just God-Awful. The leftwing phrase that 
homelands are labour reservoirs is absolutely true .... The place is a vast ghetto. The 
subsistence agriculture theory is a myth .... Those people are crammed in there and 
they can't get out. The only way a man can get out is ifhe is recruited as a contract 
worker .... There's nothing, no visible means of life support (quoted in Johnson, 1981). 
Given the overcrowding and paucity ofland available even for subsistence farming, 
reserve and then homeland residents became increasingly dependent on white areas 
for employment and economic support. Across the country, separate education 
systems resulted in black people being poorly educated, or not formally educated at 
all. They were also deliberately prevented from acquiring skills under the Job 
Reservation Act, whereby skilled jobs were reserved for white people. Black people 
could not become apprentices and could not join trade unions, which meant that 
wages could be kept low. Sparks has said of the system: "It must be. the only instance 
in history in which a government deliberately crippled the skills base of its country's 
working class" (2003 :21) and, agreeing with Cyril Ramaphosa, a former trade union 
leader and subsequently a captain of industry, he continued ''this planned neglect 
[was] the worst of all apartheid's crimes against humanity. Its legacy is now the new 











It is not surprising, therefore, that the homelands were a burning issue and a central 
focus point for resistance to the apartheid regime. Many people said that homeland 
leaders (including the majority of the supposed 'tribal chiefs') were sell-outs, 
'Pretoria puppets', who had co-operated with the apartheid government and, in 
accepting independence, or even so-called self-government, had made possible the 
severe restriction of civil liberties and rights of black South Africans - not least of 
which was the loss of South African citizenship. The intensity of resentment was 
illustrated in Bophuthatswana when the Legislative Assembly building was burnt 
down soon after the homeland became 'independent' in 1977 (Jeffrey, 1993). From 
the moment of Bophuthatswana's 'independence', there was conflict between 
'President' Mangope's administration and the African National Congress (ANC), the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the opposition parties in 
Bophuthatswana: the National Seoposengwe Party (NSP) and the People's 
Progressive Party.CPPP). The ANC, importantly, had refused to register as an 
opposition party, declaring firstly that it would never recognise Bophuthatswana's 
independent status (worldwide, South Africa and the other 'independent' bantustans 
were the only countries that did) and secondly that it was a liberation movement 
rather than a political party. 
There is much evidence that Mangope's presidency was more like a dictatorship than 
a democracy, that elections were rigged and voters bribed or intimidated. There were 
reports of severe civil rights violations, such as widespread abductions and shootings 
by police; of prohibitions of political meetings other than those of the ruling Christian 
Democratic Party (CDP); and that political opponents to the administration had been 
detained without trial (Sparks, 1994:208). In the words of a senior ANC official, 
"Mangope is the law in Bophuthatswana. Even the CDP of which he is the leader is 
not free to function as a political party, except to echo his own sentiments. There is 
absolutely no free political debate, even within the party itself' (interview cited in 
Jeffery, 1993:28). Furthennore, there were many allegations of widespread corruption 
and nepotism within the Bophuthatswana administration (interview with human rights 











By the 1980s, fifty-four percent of Bophuthatswana's working-age population was 
working in white areas of South Africa, either as migrant labourers or as border 
commuters forced to comply with the pass laws. Their earnings constituted forty-six 
percent of Bophuthatswana's income (ibid.). The economy was heavily dependent on 
platinum mining (forty-seven percent of GDP), and on white-dominated South Africa 
for budgetary aid as well as employment. Yet, during the 1980s the Bophuthatswana 
administration spent millions of rand on high prestige proj ects, such as a ninety 
million rand convention centre with a new parliament building and a second supreme 
court; a sixty million rand international school; a multi million rand opera and concert 
hall; a two hundred and fifty million rand power station that was then dismantled, 
having never been used; and a national airline that ran at a substantial loss (Jeffery, 
1993). According to a former economic advisor to Mangope: "Since being forced into 
early retirement in 1982, I have observed sadly that nothing is really developing in 
Bophuthatswana - except the government offices, houses, cars and the roads for the 
elite to drive around on. Mmabatho as a capital must surely rival the ancient pyramids 
as a monument to its ruler" (professor Magyar, cited in Black Sash: 1990: I 0). 
Meanwhile, in 1988, seventy-one percent of the bantustan's population was living 
below the minimum living level and the average monthly income per capita was 
eighty-five rand (Department of Population Development, 1990-1991). 
Throughout his presidency, which lasted as long as Bophuthatswana itself (1977-
1994), Mangope relied heavily on South Africa to help him maintain his position. For 
example, on 10 February 1988 the Bophuthatswana National Security Unit (BNSU), a 
part of the homeland's army, staged a coup d'etat. Mangope and his ministers were 
detained and the leader of the PPP, Mr 'Rocky' Malebane-Metsing, swore himself in 
as the new president. But the South African Defence Force came to the rescue and 
restored Mangope to power, in the process sparking off a barrage of criticism which 
questioned Bophuthatswana's independence in light of its dependence on South 
Africa to maintain the status quo. International newspapers commented on 'PW 
Botha's puppet being rescued' (Cooper, n.d:1O). By August 1988, the PPP had been 
declared an unlawful organisation and was banned in Bophuthatswana. Malebane-
Metsing fled into exile in Zambia, where he joined the ANC, itself then in exile. 











We have shown the world we are determined to protect democracy .... Our very 
freedom and all that goes with it must be firmly embedded in the tenets or rules of 
democracy. This was especially brought home to me when I realised on February 10th 
that it was for democracy that I was prepared to die ... Without democracy the other 
values and principles that we cherish would not last long ... (cited in Cooper, n.d: 1 06 
and 132).40 
On 20 December of that year, the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(Codes a) was established in what was to turn out to be a first stage of a process of 
negotiations that eventually lead to a united and democratic South Africa. One of the 
central points on its agenda was the reincorporation of the homelands. Of the four 
'independent' homelands, the Bophuthatswana administration was the most insistent 
on its right to retain sovereign status. M,angope was the only 'independent' homeland 
president to refuse even to sign the Declaration of Intent (to bring about an undivided, 
free and democratic South Africa). He attempted to justify his refusal to entertain 
notions of Bophuthatswana being reincorporated with South Africa by dredging up 
bits of distant colonial history. He argued that in 1895 the British had reneged on an 
earlier promise not to annex what was then the Crown Colony of British 
Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. Because of Britain's failure to honour its word, 
the area that was now Bophuthatswana had come under South African rule. Hence, he 
argued, Bophuthatswana's independence in 1977 was nothing to do with apartheid, 
but rather a regaining of Batswana's rightful sovereignty that dated back to the end of 
the nineteenth century (Jeffery, 1993:138). It was not a strong argument, especially 
given that the former Crown Colony had comprised only a small part in the northwest 
of Bophuthatswana. The argument had little impact on the ever growing resistance to 
Mangope. 
In a last ditch attempt to retain 'independence' in 1994, Mangope led 
Bophuthatswana, along with Ciskei, another 'independent' bantustan, to join the 
Concerned South African's Group (CO SAG), an unlikely Boer-Zulu alliance, with 
ChiefButhelezi and his Inkatha Freedom Party and the far right Afrikaner 
Conservative Party at its centre. The alliance was purely opportunistic as politically 
the members had little in common, except the need to join together in the face of the 
then new ANC-National Party coalition in order to prevent South Africa's transition 
40 For a detailed treatment of the concept of democracy, particularly the way it is frequently invoked as 
an unimpeachable ideal in contexts where it is clearly being used for political expediency, see chapter 











into a united democracy. Along with the Conservative Party there was also the 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (A WB), which was even more far right that the 
Conservative Party, its members described by Sparks as 'crude, racist Rambos' 
(1994: 198). These rightwing Afrikaners joined together into the Afrikaner 
Volksfront, which hoped to bring about an independent Afrikaner volkstaat (people's 
state). The Volksfront was chaired by the Conservative Party's Ferdi Hartzenberg, 
while Constand Viljoen, ex head of the apartheid-era South African Defence Force, 
led a directorate of four generals who had been appointed to put together a Boer 
People's Army. 
In March 1994, twenty-two thousand civil servants of the Bophuthatswana 
administration went on strike over pensions and wages. This was because the 
ANC/N ational Party N egotiating Co~cil had agreed that on election day, April 27th, 
the homelands would be reincorporated into South Africa, and the administrations 
would cease to exist. The Bophuthatswana civil servants therefore wanted their wages 
and pensions before this happened. Bophuthatswana was reduced to anarchy when the 
homeland's police joined the strikers: looters ran amok through Mmabatho, the 
homeland's capital; students took over the university; and workers took over the 
Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation. Mangope called in his COSAG allies, the 
Volksfront, for help, stipulating, however, that members of the A WB should not be 
part of any plan to restore order in Bophuthatswana as there would be clashes with his 
own army if they did. 
The Volksfront came to the rescue, imagining that by stabilising Bophuthatswana and 
restoring Mangope to power they would be in a stronger position to negotiate for their 
own independent state. However, despite warnings from Viljoen, Eugene 
Terre'Blanche, leader of the A WB, ignored all pleas to keep A WB members out of 
Bophuthatswana. Their presence in Mmabatho aggravated an already highly tense 
situation and led to disaster for both Mangope and the Volksfront. According to 
Sparks, A WB groups arrived" ... in their farm trucks, armed to the teeth with hunting 
rifles, shotguns, and pistols .... They drove through the streets of Mmabatho yelling 
racial abuse at the locals and taking potshots at groups of people, killing and 
wounding several .... And it so outraged the already shaky Bophuthatswana Defence 











Conflict between Mangope and the ANC grew ever more intense. The ANC 
circulated pamphlets of highly charged statements and calls for action such as the 
following: 'Mangope's hands are dripping with the blood of our defenceless and 
oppressed people ... '; 'Mangope's actions are dictatorial and one-man show. He did 
not consult our people for his independence ... '; 'Starvation wages, unemployment, 
high rent tariffs, bus-fares are having a high toll on our people. Only his pockets are 
getting fatter ... '; 'Defy Mangope's laws and march to Freedom ... '; 'Demand and 
intensify the call for reincorporation'; 'Force Mangope to resign ... '; 'Boycott all 
Mangope's functions and celebrations'; 'Refuse to join his organisations ... ' and 
'Demand your land appropriated by Mangope, Agricor and his puppet ministers' (An 
ANC Call to the People in Bop, reproduced in Jeffery, 1993:296-7). 
On 12 March 1994, some six weeks before the then proposed date for the first post 
apartheid election on 27 April, Mangope was finally deposed, informed by apartheid 
South Africa's Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, and Mac Maharaj representing the 
ANC,41 that Bophuthatswana was no longer independent, and that Mangope therefore 
had no country to govern. Mangope had no choice but to accept the situation. The 
erstwhile South African ambassador to Bophuthatswana, Tjaartvan der Walt, became 
administrator, with Job Mogoro, an ANC representative, appointed as co-
administrator soon afterwards. The Bophuthatswana homeland was no more, and in 
time it was incorporated into one of post apartheid South Africa's nine new 
provinces, the North West Province. 
After Apartheid: Traitors or Heroes? 
In South Africa's first democratic elections, some eighty-three percent of Tswana 
people in what became the North West Province, voted for the ANC (Sparks, 
2003 :230). Apartheid was formally over, and South Africa was a united, democratic 
country, with the homelands apparently seamlessly reabsorbed into its borders. Yet it 
was evident that such a dramatic transition could not happen overnight. It was 
perhaps inevitable that part of the legacy of apartheid in the North West Province 
would be political distrust, suspicion, divisions and confusion. Mangope had not only 











collaborated with the enemy, the apartheid government, but in his attempts to retain 
'independence', had fonned an opportunistic alliance with the most extreme far right, 
white Afrikaner racists - proof enough, for many, of his perfidy. In many people's 
eyes he was a sell-out of the worst kind, a traitor in the extreme. But, to some people, 
especially those who had collaborated along with him, he was a hero. He had done his 
utmost to protect Tswana rights to self detennination in an independent 'democracy'. 
In stark contrast to Mangope, and with over seventeen years of well documented and 
open conflict with him and his Bophuthatswana administration, was the ANC, the 
freedom fighters. They were the ones who had fought and defeated the evil system of 
apartheid and, through an outstanding (though often deeply criticised) process of 
negotiation and compromise with apartheid's governing National Party, had enabled 
South Africa's peaceful transition to a united democracy. In the eyes of the world 
they were true heroes - and were acknowledged as such when FW de Klerk, the 
National Party's leader,and Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC, became joint 
recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
It was highly evident in the new democratic South Africa that among the most 
economically deprived of previously marginalised areas were many rural parts of 
former homelands. In those areas there had been few resources to fund social welfare 
schemes such as pensions and, because of the country's history of land dispossession 
along with the pass and influx control systems, unemployment had been the most 
concentrated. As soon as the homelands became reincorporated into South Africa, 
many who were resident there rushed to the cities in search of work (Sparks, 2003). 
The result was a rapid growth of squatter settlements around urban areas, 
overcrowding, unemployment and, with it, an ever increasing crime rate. But those 
left behind in the rural areas still had little chance of securing employment and were 
usually heavily dependent on remittances from family members who had managed to 
find work in urban areas. 
Hence, there was, and still is, a definite need for development interventions which 
focus on improving access to services and resources in those rural areas, on 
alleviating poverty and unemployment, and on trying to stem the rural-urban flow of 











were precisely the kinds of rural area settlements that were under-developed and 
impoverished as a result of the injustices of the past, and Madikwe Game Reserve 
offered a promise of opportunity and development. Indeed, Madikwe's potential to 
constructively stimulate the building of a more optimistic future for residents in the 
villages neighbouring it was one of the primary reasons it attracted me as a fieldwork 
site. 
Why a Game Reserve? 
As map 6 on page 46 shows, when Bophuthatswana became 'independent' in 1977 its 
lands resembled an awkward jigsaw. In an attempt to create corridors to link together 
some of the islands of Bophuthatswana territory, South Africa's Homeland 
Consolidation Programme initiated a series of Acts to transfer parts of the intervening 
land from South Africa to Bophuthatswana. The twenty-eight white-owned farms 
lying between the two segments of Bophuthatswana that contained the villages of 
Supingstad, Lekgophung and Molatedi became a focal point of the Programme's 
activities. Starting in 1980 with the Borders of Particular States Extension Act, five 
Acts were passed which culminated in Proclamations numbers 4 and 98 of 1989 and 
70 of 1990 whereby some 70,000 hectare~ of farmland were expropriated from the 
white commercial farmers who had owned the twenty-eight farms, and transferred 
from South Africa to Bophuthatswana. 
The land was handed over the Bophuthatswana Land Allocation Board which initially 
intended to pass it to Agricor, the Bophuthatswana Department of Agriculture, for 
formal distribution to 'emerging' black farmers. But it so happened that the then CEO 
of the Bophuthatswana Parks Board42 was flying over the area and saw that while 
much of it, particularly the southern half, was prone to drought and was overgrazed, it 
showed great potential for a game reserve. Mangope, who could see evidence 
throughout the homeland that the Bophuthatswana Parks Board was delivering 
successful, labour intensive, economically sustainable interventions43 (indeed, their 
42 Now North West Parks & Tourism Board (NWP&TB) - the agency managing the Reserve. 
43 Pilanesberg National Park is given as an example by the Board (pers. comm., June 2007), but its 
people-centeredness, particularly at its conception, is questionable - especially considering that it was 











budget had been increased from R6 million to R23 million in just five years), 44 agreed 
to bring in an independent finn to conduct a survey to detennine the optimal use for 
that land (interview with NWP &TB Resource Economist, 11 June 2007). The survey 
was carried out by Settlement Planning Services (Setplan) between 14 December . 
1990 and 31 January 1991. The resulting report recommended that the establishment 
of a game reserve would be the most efficacious and potentially lucrative use for the 
twenty-eight farms described as overgrazed and degraded by cattle ranching (Setplan, 
1991:8). 
The Setplan survey had looked at two main options: 
1) the establishment of extensive cattle ranching with irrigated agriculture; and 
2) wildlife tourism and the development of a big five game reserve. 
The criteria used to evaluate the most appropriate land use were: 
i) social: assessing the impact and implications of the option on the local population; 
ii) economic: from the perspective of regional and local economic conditions; 
iii) financial: the impact of each option on government finances; 
iv) technical: the technical capacity oflocal residents and government support 
services to operate and maintain the different options considered; 
v) institutional: the organisational ability of private and public groups to participate in 
each option; 
vi) environmental: the impact of the options on the local environment; and 
vii) strategic: the impact on overall national development objectives and strategies 
(Setplan, 1991). 
Setplan recommended the game reserve option for the following reasons: 
• Once fully established, Setplan predicted, the game reserve would be able to 
generate in excess of twelve hundred jobs compared with just eighty from the 
ranching option, with an associated pay roll ofR4.5 million per annum. The 
44 At the same time, Agricor was not enjoying such a successful track record. Many of its agricultural 
interventions had proved to be economically unsustainable. According to a former member of the 
Bophuthatswana Parks Board this was because "they had too much money and the interventions were 











cost perjob opportunity for the cattle ranching option would be in the region 
ofRl50 000, while that of the game park would be nearer R25 000; 
• The spin-off effects of the game reserve on the local economy, through 
linkages and multipliers, would be much higher than from cattle ranching; 
• The local economy, already highly dependent on agriculture, would be 
significantly diversified and improved; 
• The net income accruing to the government through taxes would be 
significantly increased (Setplan, 1991). 
Thus Madikwe Game Reserve was established in 1991, in the midst of extreme 
political turmoil, three years before the formal inauguration of the post-apartheid 
South Africa South Africa's North West Province did not yet exist, and Madikwe 
was therefore developed in the 'independent' Bophuthatswana homeland. The 
Mangope Administration was still in full swing, with Mangope firm in his support of 
the apartheid regime and adamant in his refusal to allow Bophuthatswana to be 
reincorporated into South Africa. 
It is evident from the Setplan report that the establishment of the Reserve was 
recommended for socio-economic reasons, rather than for the sake of ecology and 
conservation. It enabled what was then still the Bophuthatswana Parks Board to assert 
its proud claim to people-based conservation: 
Madikwe Game Reserve is arguably one of the flTSt game reserves in southern 
Africa to be established for wildlife conservation purely on socio-economic 
grounds ... The approach to conservation that has been adopted at Madikwe puts the 
needs of people before that of wildlife and conservation (Davies et al, n.d.). 
Indeed, according to its former members, the Bophuthatswana Parks Board was 
highly progressive in its approachto conservation management. The Board had at its 
core a group of what one former member described as 'forward thinking, liberal 
men', some of whom had been headhunted from organisations such as Natal Parks 
Board, the CEO of which was 'very Eurocentric', particularly in comparison to the 
CEO of the Bophuthatswana Parks Board who was 'not so policy-driven'. In other 
words, while Boards such as Natal Parks were still focussed purely on conservation, 
Bophuthatswana Parks was already embracing the so-called 'people-and-parks' 











relevant in the emerging economic context in which they were implemented (pers. 
com., June 2007). The interventions they initiated were thus redolent with the rhetoric 
of people-based conservation. 
Such reasoning reflected a major departure from earlier national park ideology, such 
as that then still dominating Natal Parks,. which held that preservation and 
conservation were ends in themselves. That brand of ideology had justified game 
parks being established at the cost of dispossessing and relocating black South 
Africans (Carruthers, 1997). Examples offorced removals are numerous and include 
Sabi, where 3000 residents had been relocated in 1902; the Makuleke people, who 
were dispossessed of their land in 1969, to make room for the Pafuri region of the 
Kruger National Park;45 and the PiIane people, who were forcibly removed in 1979, 
in order for Pilanesberg National Park to be created (Kaplan, 2000). 
The Bophuthatswana Parks Board's 'people and parks' philosophy mirrored a shift 
that was taking place on a global level towards a way ofthjnlcing that conservation 
must be not only economically sustainable, but also able to deliver concrete benefits 
to local residents, particularly the poor. An example is the ideology behind the Bali 
Declaration of 1982 which emphasises sustainability as opposed to preservation, and 
states that protected areas must serve human society (Carruthers, 1997:14). The 
argument is that ecological sustainability can only be realised if there is firstly socio-
economic sustainability. 
However, translating ideology into practice has, unsurprisingly, proved to be 
problematic. Pilanesberg, also set up under the former Bophuthatswana government, 
is often referred to, by the North West Parks and Tourism Board (NWP&TB), as 
Madikwe's sister park. When Pilanesberg was first established in 1979, the African 
Wildlife periodical wrote that Bophuthatswana "emerge[ d] as the shining example of 
how wildlife management should be practiced in Africa" (vol. 43, no. 6, 1989:325). 
Yet according to Carruthers: 
45 Their case is perhaps the best-known in South Africa today as, in November 2000, they finally won 
what had then been the largest land claim to date (24,000 hectares) (Kaplan, 2000). For more details on 











It would be inaccurate to think of the Pilanesberg National Park as a conserved natural 
area: it is more of a forced removal, land reclamation and game stocking project .... 
[pilanesberg] owed its very origins to the 'homelands' policy of the nationalist 
[apartheid] government of the 1960s .... Even at the early planning stage, opposition to 
the scheme was intense from the Pilane clan [sic] who had inhabited the crater for 
many years .... It thus had a difficult birth at a time when paramilitary wildlife 
management and anti-human ecology was powerful in national park dogma (1997:9). 
In contrast to Pilanesberg, with its anti-people ecology that excluded local people, the 
NWP&TB claims that Madikwe Game Reserve was established only after careful 
consultation with, and approval from, the villages adjacent to it. Although a detailed 
implementation plan is not laid out in the final Setplan report, it states that the 
research found "a game park would be acceptable to the local communities and 
arrangements can be made to grant local herbalists controlled access to the park for 
the collection of specimens" (Setplan, 1991: 17). The report adds that "Poaching is not 
foreseen as a major threat" (ibid), but does not provide any evidence or reasons for 
such a statement. 
Drawing on the findings of the Setplan report the NWP&TB has, right from its 
conception, described Madikwe Game Reserve as a partnership between three main 
stakeholders: the state, the private sector and the 'local community'. The Board has 
repeatedly emphasised that its driving concern is not conservation, but to bring 
economic development to the 'local community' . According to a general manager: 
Our focus from the government is to improve the quality of life, financially and 
socially, of the people in the area and we use conservation, as we would have used 
mining or agricultural practices. We use conservation as the most efficient way to 
address our main objective, which is economic development. But if conservation 
management is not up to standard we will not achieve this. So conservation is not 
secondary but nor is it an end in itself. It is a strategy to achieve economic 
development (interview, general manager, Protected Areas Management, NWP&TB, 
25 July 2000). 
At the start of 2000 the Reserve comprised some 65,000 hectares46 and stretched 
across the boundary between Rustenburg District to the east and Central District to 
the west (see map 3 on page 34). According to the NWP&TB, Madikwe was 
46 The figure cited for the number of hectares that Madikwe comprises is inconsistent throughout 
NWP&TB and Madikwe Initiative literature. See page 55 above where I refer to the Setplan document 
which states that 70,000 hectares had been expropriated. After careful consultation with the park 
warden he decided the most accurate estimate of the Reserve's size in 2000, before the incorporation 
of the 1500 hectares ofSentellies Farm (no. 93 on map 5, page 41) in June 2000 (see pages 167-168), 











established with the express aim of bringing economic development and opportunity 
to an area that had largely been denied access to both (Davies, 1997). 
Enter the Madikwe Initiative 
By 1993, it was evident that the Reserve had not yet begun to succeed in its regional 
economic objectives. In response to the evidently unequal nature of the 'three-way' 
partnership between the Parks Board, the private sector and the villages, the Parks 
Board began approaching donor agencies for funding for community development 
and empowerment interventions. Discussions began with the then Overseas 
Development Agency (ODA) of Britain which at the time had a 'people-and-parks' 
programme. But before any agreements were made the events of 1994 overtook the 
proceedings and discussions were halted during Bophuthatswana's reincorporation 
into South Africa and the transition from apartheid to democracy. In 1998 
negotiations reopened, the ODA having now become the British Department for 
International Development (DflD) and the Bophuthatswana Parks Board the North 
West Parks and Tourism Board. DflD awarded the NWP&TB a sum ofUK£41 0 
00047 to fund an initiative that would be independent of the Board and aimed at 
ensuring that the Reserve benefited local residents and maximised its economic 
impact on the local economy. Because DflD required a well-defined area, limited in 
size, in which to implement capacity building projects, the main developmental drive 
of the Reserve as a whole came, perhaps by default, to focus on the villages of 
Supingstad and Lekgophung to the west and Molatedi to the east, rather than 
encompassing all the settlements in the area (interview, former NWP&TB Resource 
Economist, 11 June 2007). 
The NWP&TB then invited tenders from independent agencies with the expertise to 
manage the Initiative. Mafisa Research and Planning (hereafter Mafisa), a non-
governmental organisation (NGO), applied and after a series of interviews was 
appointed. The Madikwe Initiative was launched at Tau Lodge in Madikwe Game 
Reserve in 1998 (ibid.). 











Mafisa Research and Planning 
Mafisa itselfhad grown out of the collaboration of three individuals: Eddie Koch, 
David Grossman and Peter John Massyn. From the early 1990s all three were 
particularly gripped by the concept of 'people and parks' and had had experience of 
such initiatives through work they had done with an organisation called Group 
Environmental Monitoring (GEM). They also knew Derek Hanekom, who became 
the first ANC Minister of Land Affairs in Mandela's cabinet, and had gathered from 
him that in the new democratic South Africa people would be compensated for 
having been forcibly removed from their land during the apartheid era. The three 
were aware that the Makuleke people had been forcibly rc:moved to make room for 
the Pafuri strip of the Kruger National Park48 and so supplied them with informal 
technical support, also mobilising the Legal Resource Centre to help them put 
together a land claim. Out of this experience, the three created a formal partnership in 
the shape ofMafisa, with Koch and Massyn as directors (Grossman was already the 
director of his own ecology and planning consultancy business). After the Makuleke 
case, where they continued to be involved, the Madikwe Initiative was their second 
project (interview, Mafisa director, 7 June 2007). 
According to the directors of Mafisa the aims of the Madikwe Initiative were as 
follows: 
The Madikwe Initiative is being implemented according to three key areas of focus. 
The first is centred around the understanding that if the communities surrounding 
Madikwe are to benefit from its existence then they need to hold some ownership 
stake in commercial lodges in the Reserve. Secondly, tourism creates jobs and it is 
important that people from the surrounding villages are suitably trained to take up 
senior wage employment in the lodges. And thirdly, tourism in the Reserve as well as 
the daily operations of the Reserve itself may create many opportunities for 
entrepreneurship and small business development in areas such as lodge maintenance, 
the provision of bricks, bush clearing, construction, the provision of fresh produce to 
the lodges .... Local entrepreneurs need to be trained and their businesses supported so 
that they can enter into business contracts with the lodges and the park in these areas 
(Koch and Massyn, 1999). 
Mafisa's modus operandi was to recruit consultants as and when their expertise was 
. required for a particular project. As an organisation it comprised a loose-knit web of 
consultants held together by a core of directors and associates. All expert personnel 











had other work and responsibilities elsewhere and both directors were based far 
afield, one in Johannesburg and one in Nelspruit. In order to cohere and monitor the 
various projects comprising the Initiative, Mafisa employed a field coordinator who 
was supposed to live full time in Madikwe.49 
The Initiative faced multiple difficulties from the start, not least because the 
Reserve's development stagnated largely because pending land claims made issuing 
new private sector lodge concessions problematic. 50 A director of Mafisa asserted that 
there was thus no thriving market to sustain the emerging small businesses Mafisa 
had set up (interview, 7 June, 2007). At the same time, as I will show, the 
government's restructuring oflocal government exacerbated governance problems in 
the villages. 
The Villages in 2000 
After the turbulent history of the previous few centuries, the turmoil of the colonial 
encounter and the repression of the segregationist and apartheid years, the post 
apartheid picture of the villages when I arrived in 2000 was relatively tranquil. The 
population of each village was reasonably stable, with roughly 3500 people living in 
Supingstad, 2500 in Lekgophung, and 2500 in Molatedi. 
But in each of the villages unemployment was high. Indeed, according to the socio-
economic survey I conducted, the combined unemployment proportion for all three 
villages was 55% of the working population.51 As figure 1 illustrates this broke down 
to 68% in Lekgpphung, 56% in Supingstad and 46% in Molatedi. 
49 For more details about Mafisa see chapter seven, particularly the section A Culture o/Consultants. 
50 For more details about the land claims see chapter 6 pages 175-176. 











Figure 1: Breakdown or Unemploymcnt Proportions in Eaeh Village in 2000. 
Unemployment proportions 
~ ~ 30 ,-------"r------------------------------------------, 
~ " li' 
~ ,g :> 60 t------
... ..!!! .. 
o o· f-----a. c. 40 
• 0" "0. 
~ ~ '0 t-----1: ~ i!: • 
" 0 
~ . 




Th~ tabl~, bdow f1Tovid~ mow detai ls ahout tb~ employment pa(t~ms in each village. 
showing the proponions oflhe working population surveyed that were employed 
locally or that Were known to rn, migmnt work~rs_ 
Table 1: Employmcnl and Fnemployment by Gender in 2000 in Lckgophung 
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Table 2: Area of Employment by Gender in 2000 in Lekgophung 
Gender Employed Employed Migrant 
in total Locally Workers 
No. % No. % No. % 
Female 35 100 18 51 17 49 
Male 37 100 11 30 26 70 
Total 72 100 29 40 43 60 
[Source: 2000 survey] 
As the table above shows, of the 72 surveyed people in Lekgophung who were 
employed (and of an employable age), 43 (60%) were known migrants. Broken down 
by gender, 17 (49%) of those migrants were women and 26 (70%) were men. 
Table 3: Employment and Unemployment by Gender in 2000 in Supingstad 
Gender Employable Employed Unemployed 
Age* in total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Female 135 100 48 36 87 64 
Male 124 100 67 54 57 52 
Total 259 100 115 45 144 56 
*Aged between 15-60 years. 
Sample size: 475, including persons outside working age. 
[Source: 2000 survey] 
Table 4: Area of Employment by Gender in.2000 in Supingstad 
Gender Employed Employed Migrant 
in total Locally Workers 
No. % No. % No. % 
Female 48 100 15 31 33 69 
Male 67 100 25 37 42 63 
Total 115 100 40 35 75 65 











In Supingstad, 75 (65%) of the surveyed working population were migrant workers, 
33 (69%) women and 42 (63%) men. 
Table 5: Employment and Unemployment by Gender in 2000 in Molatedi 
Gender Employable Employed Unemployed 
Age* in total 
No. % No. % No. % 
Female 157 100 70 45 87 55 
Male 136 100 88 65 48 35 
Total 293 100 158 54 135 46 
• Aged between 15-60 years. 
Sample size: 492, including persons outside working age. 
[Source: 2000 survey] 
Table 6: Area of Employment by Gender in 2000 in Molatedi 
Gender Employed Employed Migrant 
in total Locally Workers 
No. % No. % No. % 
Female 70 100 16 23 54 77 
Male 88 100 15 17 73 83 
Total 158 100 31 -20 127 80 
[Source: 2000 survey] 
The picture in Molatedi was the most extreme of the three villages, with migrant 
labourers constituting 127 (80%) of the employed population of 158, which broke 
down to 54 (77%) of the employed women and 73 (83%) of the employed men. Thus, 
my survey suggested that, as in the apartheid days when a high percentage of 
homeland residents were dependent on work in 'white' areas (55% in 
Bophuthatswana in the 1980s; Jeffery, 2003 :31), households in 2000 were heavily 











Rustenburg and 10h;mnesburg. Mining still played <I significant rok in employment, 
con,titliling ~ome I R% o)"job, among the employed people interviewed in my survey. 
Another striking feature about each of the villages' economies W<lS a ma.~,i ve 
dependency on pension income that. according to my survey results. contributed 
nearly 27% to tOlal household income arros, the vil1age~, lor all oou,chold members. 
not just those drawing the pension. This broke down to 4R% in Lekgophung, 34% in 
Supingstad and 14% in Molatedi. Figure 2 hclow shows the relative proportions in 
households of people drawing pensions and \vage incomes in each village. 
Figure: 2: Non-subsistence ~o urces of household income in each " mage in 2001l 
(ie. not including ~uh" i ~tenct agriculture or other s ub~is le n ce acthities). 
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(127 people) anos, the village, ~t~ting that 01' all service, ~chf>ols most pre~singly 
needed allention. Ofthosc 127 respondenls. 620/0 'were in Lekgophung, 23% in 
Molatedi and 15% in Supingstad. 
Figures 3-5 below show a gendered brc<lkdown 01" education level, lor <ldllll~ in each 
village. In Supingstad 28% of all surveyed adulls had matriculated (completed high 
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Figure 5: Gr:aph .• howing a gemlered breakdown of education levels in :\l ola tedi 
in 2000. 
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Overall, tbese socio-economic indicators suggesl thal J .ekgopbung was markedly less 
amuent lhan the other two \'illagcs. Lekgophung had lhe highesl rate or 
unemployment; households in Lekgophung were considerably more dependent on 
pen~ion income than those in Molatedi or Suping~tad: and the formal education level~ 
were lower. This impression was supported by visual evidence - most ob\iously. its 
roads and buildings. ll 
""hile statistics sucb ~s tbose 1 bave presented from my socio-economic survey are 
useful for illustrating the general shape of the data generated hy the survey, it is 
questionable bow accurately they reflecll'eality. given the many variables Ibm may 
affeet tbeir proportions. For example, althougb tbe survey found that some 
households had very low non-~uh~islCllce incomes (~uch as a houseliold of len people 
living oil' a ~ingl e pension of R540), no one wa~ actually ~larving in any orlhe 
villages, and no one was homeless. This shows tbe inherent sllperficiality of statistics 
(panicularly lin anthropological analyses) in thai [hey are lmable 10 explain 
mechanisms people usc to supplement housebold income and tbe different ways 
wealth can be generated. Lctus consider a couple of examples. 










Khumo, a twenty-eight year old woman with some eight to nine years of schooling 
(she did not have matric) and who had never been formally employed, lived in 
Lekgophung with her parents, four brothers and a sister, constituting a household of 
eight persons. Two of her siblings were still in school and the rest of the family was 
unemployed. Khumo's father, Tsome, was drawing a monthly state pension ofR540 
and that constituted the entire non-subsistence household income. However, Tsome 
owned the buildings and plot, so there was no rent to be paid. Also, bills were kept to 
a minimum as they had no electricity, running water, telephone, or hire purchase 
payments to make. The family had access to land where they grew vegetables such as 
beetroot, spinach and cabbage for household consumption. Although they had no 
cattle, they had five goats and eight chickens which they 'raised for family 
consumption. They also brewed beer which they sold locally. According to Khumo, 
these activities enabled the household to make ends meet. 
Similarly, twenty-eight year old Masaka lived in a ten-person household in 
Supingstad with his daughter, two sons, a sister, grandmother, aunt, and three first 
cousins. His wife had died. He was unemployed and none of the ten household 
members was earning a wage. Five were at school, two were toddlers, and his aunt 
was also unemployed. Masaka's grandmother drew a monthly pension ofR540 all of 
which went into household expenditure. The household owned nine goats and seven 
chickens although they did not grow any crops. However, Masaka's three cousins 
spent part of the week living with their paternal grandmother, and their father, who 
was a miner, sporadically sent remittances to their mother (Masaka's aunt). 
In ways such as these, people survived, despite extreme poverty. Not surprisingly, 
Madikwe Game Reserve presented a vision of opportunity to villagers such as Khumo 
and Masaka even though, along with 83% of respondents surveyed, they had never 
been to the Reserve and had no personal experience of any benefits coming from it. 
Like many others, both Khumo and Masaka nevertheless talked of their hopes of 
getting jobs in the Reserve one day in the future and stressed that, at the very least, 
they wished to have the opportunity of becoming more involved in the Reserve, as 
did 96% of people I surveyed. It is also notable that Khumo and Masaka each 











people in interview after interview in each Village. In reality, apart from a minimum 
of employment (fewer than ninety jobs in all three villages combined) none of the 
three had seen any benefits prior to the implementation ofMadikwe Initiative 
projects. According to the NWP&TB, it was because the Reserve developed so 
rapidly, with Operation Phoenix (whereby 8057 individual animals belonging to 25 
different species were moved to Madikwe over just four years) constituting the largest 
translocation of animals to date in South Africa (Hofmeyr, 1997), that local villagers 
were largely 'left out' (Davies, 1997). 
A final point to make in this chapter is that the three villages were indisputably far 
from homogenous. Apart from the heterogeneous histories of their varied residents, I 
will show that each also had diverse internal dynamics, politics, priorities and 
influences. Yet, within NWP&TB rhetoric they were, and had since before the 
Reserve was even established, been referred to as 'the local community' as though the 
resi4ents of the three villages were some kind of homogenous, bounded, single, 
united entity. A major concern of the following chapter is to assess the impact of such 












Stakeholders and Stickholders: Power and Paradigms in 
the Development Arena 
Madikwe is run as a three-way partnership between the State (represented by the Parks 
Boards3), the local community and the private sector .... Without full and meaningful 
'participation and successful contribution of each one of these partners, the Madikwe 
project would fail .... Its ultimate success is based on a foundation of good and strong 
partnerships that have been forged between a number of stakeholders. Some of these 
stakeholders, such as the North West Parks Board, the private sector and local 
communities, are major and indispensable players in this 'partnership in conservation' 
(Davies, 1997:2). 
These statements, quoted from the Madikwe Development booklet,S4 are 
representative of declarations that the way forward for rural development is people-
based wildlife conservation. I heard such sentiments expressed repeatedly whilst 
conducting fieldwork in Madikwe and at the NWP&TB head office in Mmabatho, the 
capital of the North West Province. The NWP&TB was proud of its ''pioneering 
approach to people-based wildlife conservation" (ibid), and many NWP&TB 
employees spoke often, albeit in abstract tenus, of the importance of the 'local 
community' and of how community development, rather than conservation, was the 
primary objective ofMadikwe Game Reserve. "The local community," stressed the 
Park Warden of Madikwe during our first interview (4 April, 2000), "is a major 
stakeholder in the Madikwe project." 
The 'local community', it soon transpired, was a tenu used in the Reserve, usually to 
refer to the three villages adjacent to it: Molatedi, Supingstad and Lekgophung. In 
one of the first interviews I held in Molatedi, my respondent commented: "When they 
[the Parks Board] first came here they said we, the people in Molatedi, were going to 
benefit. But I ask you: how have we benefited? It is only the stickholders [sic] who 
are benefiting" [interview, older male Molatedi resident, 12 April 2000]. 
S3 Now North West Parks and Tourism Board (see The Cast, page x). 
54 A publication circulated to potential investors and also freely available from NWP&TB to anyone 











The irony implicit in this village respondent's interpretation of the community-as-
stakeholder rhetoric seemed profound to me at the time. It conjured up visions of 
aggressive people arriving in Madikwe, clutching and brandishing sticks with which 
to exert power and claim profits. Such imagery fundamentally helped to shake loose 
in my mind the powerful, appealing rhetoric of community-based development as 
articulated by the NWP&TB. It emphasised the need to examine, deconstruct and 
clarify key phrases used by the NWP&TB, such as 'local community', 'people-based 
conservation', 'three-way partnership', 'empowerment', 'participation', 'community 
development' and, of course, 'stakeholders'.' The first step was to trace where such 
concepts originated, to understand the politics and ideologies behind these seemingly 
utopian visions of equality and fraternity. The arena of development discourse 
seemed the logical place to start. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the rhetoric of the agencies 
managing development in the Madikwe area was firmly consistent with the 
discourses of people-based , participatory approaches to development that are 
presently dominant within hegemonic development discourse. Having established that 
relationship, I then begin to engage with one of the major themes running through this 
thesis: that the inconsistency between the rhetoric and the practice of both the 
NWP&TB and Mafisa revealed and emphasised a power imbalance within the 
Madikwe Initiative, an imbalance which the stickholder image had highlighted for 
me. I argue that the Madikw  Initiative's conformity to hegemonic development 
approaches, albeit rhetorical, concealed how power operates within that hegemony. I 
support this argument by drawing on literature which I categorise as being 
fundamentally 'post-development' in approach, a positioning that Rapley (2004: 352) 
cynically describes as a school of thought that believes the real goal of development 
interventions is inevitably human control and domination, not human improvement. A 
central aspect of this domination derives from adherence to hegemonic discourse 
because it encourages the creation of false or misleading knowledge about the local. I 
then go on to show that, in the Madikwe context, an inaccurate understanding of the 












The Post Development Position 
In the past few decades, there has been a major shift in development thinking. Post-
structuralists have, with varying degrees of success, drawn on a Foucauldian 
approach to trace how knowledge generates power, and that one can see the process 
manifested in the relations between development discourse and development practice. 
They have illustrated how monolithic, 'top-down' methods of state intervention are 
often largely neo-colonial, imperialist modes of control which subject 'indigenous' 
populations to 'western' visions of development, often with disastrous results for 
those populations. Sachs (1992) claims, in The Development Dictionary, that "The 
idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and 
disappointment, failures and crime have been the steady companions of development 
and they tell a common story: it did not work" (1992:1). Agreeing, to greater or lesser 
degrees, with such nihilistic views of the development dream, a growing body of 
critics has sought to determine why development has been so contentious and 
problematic. 
A good, and early, example is Ferguson's (1990) The Anti-Politics Machine. In his 
critique of the development enterprise, Ferguson documents the failure of 
development projects in Lesotho, effectively illustrating how development is "an 
interpretative grid through which the impoverished regions of the world are known to 
us" (Ferguson, 1990: 16). He shows how Lesotho was wrongly defined and 
categorised by the World Bank as "an aboriginal economy, that is a 'traditional' 
society somehow untouched by the modern world" (Ferguson, 1990:32). Indeed, 
already in 1981, in Families Divided, Murray had clearly shown that migrant labour 
was a 'way of life' in Lesotho, where a ''process of fundamental transfonnation ... has 
been taking place ... for more than a hundred years, as a result of the penetration of 
capitalist relations of production ... " (1981 :174). Ferguson points out how, on the 
basis of the World Bank's erroneous conceptualisation of Lesotho, developers 
attempted to provide technical solutions to problems they had perceived, without fully 
taking into account the complex socio-cultural roots of those apparent 'problems'. 
Ferguson investigated ''what happened when the plans produced by the development 
problematic ... encountered the elaborately structured 10ca1livestock system" in 











· meets 'culture"'. The argument is that there is often conflict when the protagonists of 
'western knowledge' and those of 'indigenous knowledge' come into contact, and 
that, thereafter, resistance to development interventions on the part oflocaI people is 
interpreted in the powerful western hegemonic discourse as reflecting ignorance. A 
consequence is that so-called indigenous knowledge is marginalised, undermined or 
ignored altogether and inevitably, it seems, insensitive outside interventions (or 
impositions) end in failure, if not catastrophe. 
While the tendency of hegemonic discourse to disregard indigenous knowledge may 
infonn a constructive argument for identifying conflicts arising from encounters of 
'western' and 'traditional', such totalising polarities can also limit understanding in 
the sense that there is often a complex overlapping and blurring of the boundaries 
between the seemingly stable canons of knowledge. Indeed, it is highly questionable 
whether these are useful categories to employ at all, fraught, as they are, with political 
and moral assumptions and implications. In South African Keywords, Spiegel and 
Boonzaier (1988) illustrate just how problematic the concept of 'tradition' and 
'traditional' has been, particularly in the South African apartheid context. They 
describe how the notion of 'tradition' was used by the apartheid administration to 
justify the policy of separate development. They write: 
The term 'traditional' has long been used as a euphemism for the labels 'uncivilised', 
'primitive', 'pre-literate', 'tribal' or 'non-western' .... [Black South Africans could 
hence be] ... seen as 'conservative', 'backward', 'pre-rational' and therefore 
fundamentally unable to compete with 'modem', 'progressive' or 'developed' people 
(1988 :40-57). 
Gupta (1998) also warns of the dangerous pitfalls that are necessarily associated with 
the use of such totalising categories. He highlights how, particularly over the last few 
decades, there has been a growing inclination within development discourse to over-
emphasise the notion of , indigenousness' as a discrete sphere deserving of an 
unchallenged 'privileged' positioning within hegemonic development discourse. He 
advocates the need for anthropologists to employ what he calls a cultural theory 
which takes into account the post-colonial condition - a condition within which the 
"hybridities and impurities that are the legacy of colonialism and global capitalism" 











hybridity, but to recognise that it is in a constant state of flux, subject to the multiple, 
changing influences that come with globalisation. Gupta argues that: 
'Indigenous knowledge' is not a static or closed system but is itself heterogeneous, 
hierarchical, and infused by relations of power and inequality; that 'indigenousness' is 
a conjuncturallocation rather than an essential identity; and that the effectiveness of 
'indigenous' identity depends on its recognition by the hegemonic discourses of 
imperialist nostalgia, where poor and marginal people are romanticised at the same 
time that their way of life is destroyed ... (1998:22). 
Escobar (1995) also advocates an approach to the local that embraces hybridity.55 He 
argues that the 'Third World' has been constructed by development discourse. Not 
unlike the insights gained from Ferguson's view of development as an 'interpretative 
grid', Escobar comes to a conclusion that development discourse ''has created an 
extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of 
power over, the Third World" (1995 :9). He therefore calls for the deconstruction of 
the development paradigm in its entirety so to create space for the 'unmaking' of the· 
'Third World', where 'hybrid' societies can clarify and str ngthen identities, 
embracing cultural, social, political, and even economic differences and thereby fulfil 
a potential "for resisting and subverting the axiomatics of capitalism and modernity in 
their hegemonic forms" (1995 :225). Escobar suggests that it is only possible for 'the 
local' to engage with 'the global' on a basis that can be insightful, productive and 
illuminating when local identity has been reclaimed, reshaped, owned and 'defended' 
in its specific context and locality, and when a "collective construction of 
alternatives" to hegemonic discourses has been effectively produced (1995:226). 
Fairhead and Leach (1996), in Misreading the African Landscape, present a 
particularly vivid example of the ability of hegemonic discourse to create false 
knowledge and thereafter exercise power, based on that false knowledge, over 
specific local situations or populations. They show how over the last century 
scientists and policy makers have fundamentally misunderstood, misinterpreted -
55 Escobar draws his defInition of 'hybridization' from Garcia Canclini's (1990) work. Escobar uses 
Latin America as his example: "Neither on the way to the lamentable eradication of all traditions nor 
triumphantly marching toward progress and modernity, Latin America is seen as characterized by 
complex processes of cultural hybridisation encompassing manifold and multiple modernities and 
traditions .... Within this view, the distinctions between traditional and modern, rural and urban, high, 
mass, and popular cultures lose much of their sharpness and relevance .... The hypothesis that emerges 
is ... of a hybrid modernity characterised by continuous attempts at renovation, by a multiplicity of 












misread - the landscape of Kissidougou in Guinea. That landscape comprises grassy 
savanna with patches of semi-deciduous forest surrounding most villages. The 
assumption that administrators made, supported by data provided by ecologists and 
scientists, was that those patches of forest were the last 'relics' of what had once been 
a completely forested landscape. The hegemonic belief was that the forest had been 
systematically degraded and destroyed by local land use activities. Through their 
fieldwork, Fairhead and Leach found that according to local knowledge the climax 
vegetation of the area was, in fact, savanna, not forest. Through specific socio-
cultural land use practices, villagers, rather than deforesting the area, had created and 
maintained the forest islands around their settlements. However, hegemonic 
knowledge reigned supreme, and land use policies were drawn up and implemented 
in accordance with that knowledge. The power of the hegemonic discourse was its 
ability to 'silence and subjugate' the local residents' views. 
Yet, rather than being merely the passive victims of outside interventions, 
Kissidougou villagers succeeded in developing avoidance mechanisms which helped 
render those intervention strategies ineffective. Indeed, Fairhead and Leach document 
a long history of effective local resistance to a string of inappropriate interventions, 
such as the banning of bush fires which, ironically, would have increased the threat to 
those forests the policy makers were trying to protect. Again it is evident that power 
does not reside solely with those operating within the hegemonic discourse arena. 
Local residents also wield and appropriate power, but perhaps in less visible, more 
subtle ways. Fairhead and Leach conclude: 
Kissidougou provides an extraordinary example of the production of erroneous 
knowledge concerning landscape history and the degradation problematic. While 
perhaps extreme, it does show that even the apparently most secure analysis and 
received wisdom can be challengeable, and exemplifies relationships between power 
and knowledge .,. (1996:291). 
Critics such as those cited above reaffinn the need to be ready to question, 
deconstruct and subvert hegemonic development discourses, to address issues of 
power in those discourses and in development practices, how it operates but also how 
it is often obscured. As the above examples demonstrate, such processes illuminate 











misleading representations of the 'Third World'. Said (1978) concluded his 
Orientalism with the following: 
The worldwide hegemony of Orientalism and all it stands for can now be challenged, if 
we can benefit properly from the general twentieth-century rise to political and 
historical awareness of so many of the earth's peoples. If this book has any future use, 
it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of 
thought like Orientalism, discourses of power, ideological fictions - mind-forg'd 
manacles - are all too easily made, applied and guarded .... If the knowledge of 
Orientalism has any meaning, it is in being a reminder of the seductive degradation of 
knowledge, of any knowledge, anywhere, at any time (Said: 1978:328). 
Said's hope that action would follow the rise of political and historical awareness was 
perhaps overoptimistic. Nearly thirty years after he published Orientalism the 
insidious relationship between knowledge and power operates as persistently as ever, 
as I strive to demonstrate throughout this thesis with the Madikwe example. 
The deeply destructive tendencies within the development arena to generate deceptive 
over-simplifications and misrepresentations of 'the local' have generally, if 
erroneously, been associated with 'top-down' approaches to development whereby 
interventions are imposed on local populations by exogenous agents. Yet, despite a 
major shift in development thinking and practice that, at least since the 1980s, has 
resulted in the creation of the more populist paradigm of 'bottom-up', 'grass-roots' 
solutions to underdevelopment, the consequences of the knOWledge-power 
relationship are as pernicious as ever. The Madikwe case, as I shall show in the 
chapters that follow, provides a clear example. But first let us consider briefly the 
genealogy of 'bottom-up' approaches to development and how they have been 
received, understood and internalised in the 'development industry'. 
New Paradigms But an Unchanging Story of Development 
. With his Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Robert Chambers (1983) was 
one of the earliest critics to systematically challenge the top-down hegemonic 
approaches to development that rendered the rural 'third world' misperceived and 
local knowledge misunderstood, marginalised or ignored altogether. He wrote: 
It is a truism that knowledge is power .... Those who are powerful and dominant have 
the greatest accumulation of wealth, a centralised and interconnected system of 











control over flows of information from the centre to the rural periphery. The 
association of outsiders' modem scientific knowledge with wealth, power and prestige 
generates and sustains beliefs in its universal superiority, indeed beliefs that it is the 
only knowledge of any significance (l983:7S-6) 
As the title of his book suggests, Chambers argued for bottom-up approaches to rural 
development, where participatory methods for implementing development projects 
could upset the hegemonic operation of power and thus create a space for local 
people's voices and knowledge to shape and dominate development interventions and 
their outcomes. This, he argued, was the only viable route to empowerment. Over the 
years he has been a great advocate for Participatory Rural Appraisal which he defines 
as "a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance, and 
analyze their knowledge oflife and conditions, to plan and to act" (Chambers, 
1994:953). He thus called for a 'new professionalism' that could embrace multiple 
disciplines, and for a reversal of the way development operates, in particular for a 
reversal of analyses from top-down to bottom-up. "The top-down mode," he says, 
"starts with disciplinary specialisation and uses its tools to examine rural situations. 
Bottom-up analysis starts with the condition of poor people, their resources, 
aspirations and problems .... it entails trying to see from within" (1983:184). 
Over the two decades ,since Putting the Last First was published, there has been a 
steady flood of critiques of development programmes, projects and initiatives that 
have advocated grass roots, people-centred approaches. Concepts that may have been 
relatively novel and challenging in the early 1980s have since become routine and 
commonplace, and have been absorbed into a paradigmatic discourse that has lost its 
vigour because the rhetoric often has little bearing either on the idiosyncrasies within 
specific local contexts or on the realities of development practice. As Henkel and 
Stirrat say: "It is now difficult to find a development project that does not in one way 
or another claim to adopt a 'participatory' approach involving 'bottom-up' planning, 
acknowledging the importance of 'indigenous' knowledge and claiming to 'empower' 
local people" (2001:168). Yet those claims so often are nothing but rhetoric precisely 
because on-the-ground agents are expected, and prefer to work with, ready-made 
models. Consider the redolent language of a NWP&TB brochure which outlines the 











To secure the communities' full participation in and 'ownership' of the project, 
Madikwe [Game Reserve] needs to be truly integrated into the local communities and 
economy. It is critically important, therefore, that communities are actively involved 
with the project as a major partner from 'day one' .... The Parks Board has facilitated 
the establishment of a community support and empowerment programme [the 
Madikwe Initiative] to develop capacity in the communities ... and ensure equal 
participation (Davies, 1997). 
It is clear from the above56 that the NWP&TB's stated approach confonns with now 
conventional people-based development paradigms, concerned with empowennent, 
capacity building and participation. Yet, it is equally clear from the post-development 
literature outlined earlier that rhetorical claims to significant changes in approaches to 
development do not necessarily mean those changes have occurred on the ground, or 
that the eventual outcomes are ultimately substantially different from those associated 
with top-down development interventions. Hence, phrases such as 'full participation 
in'; 'ownership of; 'truly integrated'; 'actively involved'; equal participation'; and 
'major partner from day one' need to be treated with caution and scepticism. As post-
development literature shows, adherence to paradigmatic models that encourage 
generalisations and the generation of false or misleading knowledge about local 
situations serves only to widen the gap between stated objectives and actual 
outcomes. 
Furthennore, as some of the post-development critiques outlined in the previous 
section have demonstrated, fundamental elements of what Henkel and Stirrat (2001) 
call the new development orthodoxy have proved to be highly problematic. 57 In a 
similar vein James (I999) says, "Even in its currently fashionable style of allowing 
for 'community participation', empowerment, a 'people-focused approach' and 
'listening to the voices of the poor', development discourse rarely engages with the 
human realities of the situations in which it is employed and applied" (I 999:13). 
Behind the heady, appealing rhetoric of concepts such as 'empowennent' and 
56 See also the quote at the beginning of this chapter - and, indeed, evidence presented throughout this 
thesis. 
57 For example, Henkel and Stirrat point out that 'empowerment' has become a vigorously contested 
term because it is often poorly defined. They write: "Usually, although not always, it is argued that 
people are poor because they are disempowered. Through empowerment people will escape poverty. 
Precisely what empowerment involves is frequently unclear, and at the same time empowerment often 
becomes the objective of development rather than the means towards development" (2001: 171). 
Hence, the concept of empowerment is misunderstood and it becomes yet another catch phrase 
inflating the rhetoric of so-called bottom up development projects. The result, more often than not, is 











'participation' hegemonic power is exercised as vigorously as ever, reinforcing 
power imbalances that maintain the marginal, subjugated position of those at whom 
development interventions are aimed. Cooke (2001) points out how participatory 
development is dominated by what he calls a 'proselytizing euphoria' when what is 
needed is a critical understanding of the dangerous limitations of participatory 
processes which, he argues, are often little more that coercive persuasion.s8 He Writes: 
Coercive persuasion suggests that participation can indeed be co-opted for a range of 
agendas other than those with the needs of the poor and oppressed at heart .... It also 
suggests that participatory development with an espoused and genuine commitment to 
meeting the needs of the poor and oppressed and to raising their consciousness on the 
part of the change agent are not in themselves ... a safeguard against disastrous 
outcomes from participatory development (Cooke, 2001: 121). 
Yet, despite such warnings of how grassroots, participatory approaches to 
development can (and have) become anew tyranny (Cooke and Kothari, 2001), they 
continue to be employed, often uncritically, by numerous development interventions. 
Even early critics such as Chambers (1983) stressed the importance of not merely 
adopting bottom-up discourse as though it were gospel, an all-purpose blue print. An 
emphasis on flexibility and capacity to accommodate the multilayered, ever-changing 
complexities oflocal situations has been highlighted repeatedly in people-based 
development literature. 
Facilitating development interventions to reflect such principles has proved to be a 
different matter. As Henkel and Stirrat say: 
While Chambers is remarkably open about the provisional nature of his methods, not 
so many of his followers, who have in effect 'routinized' the teachings of the prophet. 
This involves a stress on formulaic performance of particular methods and of 
arguments between those who can claim an immediate position in the apostolic 
succession and those whose relation to Chambers is less direct. Even mild questioning 
of Chambers' teaching can produce the most extreme reactions on the part of his 
followers and the damning of the heretic (200 I: 178) 
Although Henkel and Stirrat focus specifically on Chambers in the above, their 
argument is pertinent to the broader grassroots, people based development arena. 
S8 Cooke, drawing on Schein's work on Maoist China, defines coercive persuasion as a type of 
brainwashing whereby participatory processes become merely a 'technique' for' consciousness-
changing'. Project outcomes are shaped by the interventionist. "Grassroots, participatory, peasant-
orientated rhetoric. . . [resulted in] an ideological unanimity that facilitated Maoist oppression and, it 
can'be argued with hindsight, development programmes that led to devastating famine and 











Indeed, the theological language they use is apt. It reflects the pervasive power of 
hegemonic discourse to attract compliant, unquestioning converts to a new orthodoxy. 
One of the most problematic elements of such wholesale adoption of people -based 
development approaches is its tendency to encourage the utilisation of generic 
frameworks. Such frameworks seem inevitably to promote binary thinking, 
particularly as the paradigms of grassroots, people based approaches to development 
grew from a reaction to top-down institutional model-based approaches. Because they 
did, they reflect the binary opposites that created them. They inform what is, 
therefore, a fundamentally reactive discourse that depends on a vocabulary of 
extremes - bottom-up/top-down, for example, or democratic/autocratic, which is a 
major preoccupation of chapter four. 
Dramatic shifts in the conceptualisation of approaches to development have thus not 
meant that the negati ve manifestations of power within hegemonic discourse have 
abated. Notions of participatory development and empowerment, which focus on the 
local and putting local people and local knowledge first (Grillo, 1997:8) have, rather, 
the potential to create another, more insidious form of power and control to that 
produced by top-down approaches. It is a power that is intensely political, yet 
obscured because it utilises liberal democratic language that appears 'people-centred' 
- despite the evidence that development interventions rarely result in those at whom 
initiatives are aimed gaining greater autonomy or becoming more empowered or less 
marginalised to any truly significant or lasting degree. 
The Flattening Tendenc,ies of Paradigmatic Models: The Absent 
Community 
As illustrated earlier (pp 71; 79) with quotes from its literature, the rhetoric of the 
NWP&TB conforms to the paradigmatic discourse of people-based approaches to 
development. A consequence, as I shall show, is that it suffers from the problems one 
often sees when paradigms are adopted as models. Those problems manifest in two 
major, interconnected concerns that, the data below will illustrate, have had a highly 
negative impact on the development process at Madikwe. One arises from 











the rhetoric that is created on their basis. The other lies in the propensity of 
paradigmatic models to create the 'mind-forg'd manacles' to which Edward Said, 
drawing from Blake, referred already thirty years ago (1978:328). 
In the context of post-colonial theory, Homi Bhabha writes of what he calls the fetish, 
or stereotype, that "gives access to an 'identity' which is predicated as much on 
mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defence, for it is a form of multiple and 
contradictory belief in the recognition of difference and the disavowal of it" (1994:75). 
He argues: 
The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given 
reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation 
that, in denying the play of difference (which the negation through the Other permits), 
constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic 
and social relations ... (ibid). 
There is a similar weakness within the development arena. It is a weakness that 
enables some theorists and many practitioners to deny difference (albeit 
unintentionally) through generating and circulating fixed designations which seem to 
accommodate and articulate that difference but which actually become generalised 
categories. These categories grow to be more powerful and persuasive than the reality 
they (attempt but fail to) represent. For example, even when academic analysis refers 
to 'hybridity' in contexts of development, there is a danger of that concept, too, 
becoming merely another generic, non-specific category: the very act of assigning to 
'Third World' populations new 'hybrid' identities can, paradoxically, lead to a 
flattening and merging of the differences and complexities that those same theorists -
and consequently, more often than not, practitioners - who are protagonists for such 
hybridity seek to express. 'Hybrid' thus becomes another label or stereotype, a 
generalised identity, albeit one attempting to highlight difference, diversity, 
complexity and mUltiplicity. Moreover, it has the potential to lead to understandings 
of particular cohorts of people as homogenous, and then as constituting distinct 
'communities'. Such labels, through their tendency, in the ways they are used, to 
create arrested, fixed representations, have a similar effect to that elucidated by 
Bhabha: it is the effect of obstructing the generation of deep and meaningful 
dialogues of identity and difference. Even when an aggregation of people is labelled 











community', and as such can be, and commonly is, then approached as if it 
constituted a distinct and distinctive group of people, the complexity of whose 
interactions and diversities then disappears. 
That such an unenlightening approach to 'the local' is assumed time and time again 
within the development arena indicates the presence of the other major problem 
associated with paradigmatic models: the 'mind forg'd manacles'. It is a predicament 
frequently seen not only in development but within the social sciences in general, 
corrupting and contaminating the acquisition and operation of knowledge. Said 
(1978), as noted above, repeatedly highlighted and warned against ''the seductive 
degradation of knowledge", of passing on knowledge unthinkingly. He wrote: "The 
trouble sets in when the guild tradition of Orientalism takes over the scholar who is 
not vigilant, whose individual consciousness as a scholar is not on guard against idees 
recues all too easily handed down in the profession" (1978:326-327). He commends 
Berque and Rodinson for conducting their work with " ... a direct sensitivity to the 
material before them, and then a continual self-examination of their methodology and 
practice, a constant attempt to keep their work responsive to the material and not to a 
doctrinal preconception" (ibid). 
Yet Berque and Rodinson, with their sensitivity and responsiveness are, it seems, the 
minority. It is as though there is an inherent flaw within the epistemologies of social 
science. That flaw is the perc ived need to adopt and use paradigmatic models, 
models which inevitably flatten and obscure the complexities of that which they seek 
to address. It is as though both theorists and practitioners become captivated and 
entranced by a new idea, or model, that seems to offer solutions to all the tiresome old 
problems - a bottom-up approach will remedy all the problems that arose from top-
down development - to the extent that it becomes impossible to see beyond that 
model. In consequence, theories and methods cease to be sensitive and responsive to 
the material, or people they aim to empower. In this way, paradigmatic models tend 
towards taking on a particularly powerful life of their own - and, in the development 












Let us now consider the extent to which use of such paradigmatic models has affected 
the development effort in Madikwe. From the start, as is illustrated in the opening 
quote to this chapter, the NWP &TB conceptualised the three villages' residents as 
constituting a 'community' - a single, coherent, bounded social entity with shared 
values that could be labelled a 'stakeholder' in terms of a people-centred development 
model. 59 1bis conceptualisation had its roots in a socio-economic policy drawn up by 
an independent consultancy firm commissioned by the then Bophuthatswana Parks 
Board.6o The policy reportedly recommended that the Board should deal with 
democratic, representative committees rather than with traditional leaders because of 
the risk of powerful individuals appropriating all the profits (interview, former 
NWP&TB Resource Economist, 11 June 2007).61 Nothing was done until 1994 when, 
acting on this recommendation, the new NWP&TB created Community Development 
Organisations (CDOs) in each of the three villages. It then grouped the CDOs 
together under a single CDO forum. 
The park warden told me in several discussions that the CDOs had been intended to 
act as unifying committees that would comprise people who represented all socio-
economic and political categories and sectors within each village. However, as I shall 
show in chapter five, rather than operating as neutral bodies, the CDOs came into 
conflict with other committees that were already present in each village. 1bis was 
largely because they were heavily aligned with the chiefs and Tribal Authorities. For 
example, as ChiefMatlapeng ofMolatedi said, "with the CDO there were 
representatives of the Tribal Authority. Now, with the new structures, there are no 
Tribal Authority representatives .... With the death of the CDO we no longer can say 
what is going on ... " (interview, 5 July 2000). Indeed, of the fifteen members of the 
Molatedi CDO, all were described as 'elder people' (in general, my Molatedi field 
assistant explained, that meant over fifty years old) and only two of them were 
women (interview, sixty-three year old woman and former Molatedi CDO member, 
59 Needless to say, the concept of community has been thoroughly problematised, in the context of the 
development arena and beyond, by many academic critiques. See, for example, Cohen, 1985; Thornton 
and Ramphele, 1988; Oomen, 2000 and Hulme and Murphree, 2000. I do not expand on that literature 
here because it says little other than to offer the kind of critique I am here developing. 
60 Unfortunately, as far as I could find out, there are no copies of the original report and 
recommendations still existing, nor could any respondents remember the name of the consultancy firm. 
61 As another NWP&TB-linked respondent said to me: ''It's okay if the chief takes a back seat, but if 












28 April, 2000). At least four of the male members were ward heads and the 
chairperson was the chief s uncle.62 
In practice, rather than unifying the villages and easing communications, the CDOs 
created rifts and divides in each of the villages.63 The CDOs were formally disbanded 
within four years of having been created, following recommendations made following 
a survey (Magome and Sentle, 1998). That survey found that the CDQ model, 
wrongly assuming as it did that each village constituted an homogenous community, 
had failed (Koch, 2000:5). But by then, as I will show in chapter five, the mos had 
become institutionally entrenched in village politics. 
It is important to note (particularly as it starkly exposes the disparity between rhetoric 
and practice) that in their paper Challenging Eden, Koch and Massyn (1999), two of 
Mafisa's directors, thoroughly critiqUed the NWP&TB's CDOs and problematised the 
notion of community with which the Board was working. The paper addresses 
people-based approaches to development focussing particularly on issues in 
community-public-private partnerships. Koch and Massyn there discuss key 
differences between the situation Mafisa experienced in Madikwe and that which it 
encountered during its work: with the Makulek:e people in the Pafuri region of the 
Kruger National Park. The paper describes how, in 1969, some 3000 people of what 
Koch and Massyn describe as the Makuleke clan64 were forcibly removed from their 
land to make room for what became part of the Pafuri area of the Kruger National 
Park. In 1998 these people's representatives, now calling themselves 'the Makuleke' , 
won what was then the largest land claim in South Africa (24,000 hectares) (Kaplan, 
2000). The Makuleke claimants, having been successful in their claim, committed the 
land to remain inside the Kruger National Park and (like the NWP&TB's stated 
objectives for Madikwe) intended to use nature tourism as their main vehicle for 
62 The village was administratively divided into wards, and the ward heads report directly to the chief. 
See chapter two where I cite Schapera's (1953) explanation of the ward system. 
63 I return to enos and the divisive role they played in village politics using the example of Molatedi 
village in chapter five. 
64 Much South African writing has confused the political units comprising persons of various clans and 
named for the chief's clan as the named clan itself A clan is not a political unit; in southern Africa's 
predominantly patrilineal kinship system, a clan is a genealogically related set of putative agnates said 
to be descended from a common ancestor. In all recorded caSes, political units (chiefdoms, tribes etc.) 
comprised members of diverse clans if for no other reasons than that wives were commonly from clans 












development, economic growth and job creation. Collective ownership of the land, as 
well as commercial rights65 in the Kruger National Park, were fonnally and legally 
held by the Makuleke Communal Property Association (CPA).66 
Under the Communal Property Association Act (no. 28 of 1996) 'communities' were 
enabled to fonn legal entities known as Communal Property Associations (CPAs).67 
According to the Act, the motivation behind it was that: 
.. .it is desirable that disadvantaged communities should be able to establish appropriate 
legal institutions through which they may acquire, hold and manage property in common; 
... It is necessary to ensure that such institutions are established and managed in a manner 
which is non-discriminatory, equitable and democratic and that such institutions be 
accountable to their members; And .. .it is necessary to ensure that members of such 
institutions are protected against abuse of power by other members ... (The Communal 
Property Association Act no. 28 of 1996). 
While such legislation provides a necessary framewotX where the presently more 
marginal of South Africa's citizens, in particular, can begin to claim legal, albeit 
collective, rights over land ownership from the state, the reality of implementation of 
such a process is far from simple. The Makuleke CPA is, in fact, a good example. 
While initially it seemed that it was a shining success story (as Koch and Massyn's 
(1999) Challenging Eden describes), it has recently become evident that internal 
squabbles and the misuse of power have compromised the CPA's efficacy (pers. 
comm. with a development consultant who had been working in the area, February, 
2006). Similarly Robins and van de Waal have found in their recent fieldwork that: 
''there are indications of growing tensions around decision-making and representivity. 
This has been especially evident in relation to the spending of CP A money" (2006: 
12). Such evidence highlights how, in practice, CP As can be problematic in local 
circumstances. 
It is also worth noting that, in contrast to Koch and Massyn's (1999) confidence in the 
integrity and centrality of the CPA in the Makuleke case, a recent article (January 
65 The conditions for exercising commercial rights were that actions and policies be consistent with the 
terms of agreement set up by South African National Parks and a Joint Management Board, made up of 
representatives from the Makuleke villages and the conservation agency, to govern the way in which 
wildlife is protected in the area (Koch, 2000). 
66 A similar arrangement was made for claimants of areas of the Greater St Lucia Wetlands Reserve in 
northern KwaZulu-Natal (Walker, 2003). 
67 In this way, CP As have become a means oflegally defining a 'conmn.inity' in South Africa, which is 











2006) in Sawubona68 reports Makuleke spokesperson Gibson Maluleke to have said 
"it's no secret that the success of the Makuleke people is because we work with our 
chief, and we respect him and our origins. That is our roots and our chief is our leader 
because of his birthright. That is how we do it here, and it works very well for us" 
(Harvey, 2006:80). It is important to point out that since the Makuleke CPA won the 
land claim, neighbouring ChiefMhinga has lodged a counter-claim to the land on the 
grounds that Chief Makuleke was not a chief but merely a headman, and subordinate 
to ChiefMhinga. In light of this counter-claim, the political strategising evident 
within Gibson Maluleke's comment is striking. As Robins and van der Waal say, it 
indicates how ''the language and legacies of the Tribal Authorities established by the 
architects of apartheid are far from dead and buried. Both the Makuleke and Mhinga 
conu:n.unities have sought to strengthen and reposition their respective Traditional 
Authorities within the new political landscape of post-apartheid South Africa" 
(2006:6). It is evident that political expediency has much to do with Makuleke 
representations of solidarity (see also Friedman, 2005; Fay, 2007 and Whande, 2007). 
Indeed, the view of the Makuleke as a socially cohesive group united under the CPA 
is not as unshakable as it seems in Challenging Eden. The example shows that even 
where legislated structures are drawn upon to underpin 'community', local diversity, 
. political expediency and particular interests may disrupt the process. 
In contrast to the Makuleke people with their (at the time reportedly effective) CPA, 
the residents of the villages around Mruiikwe did not have any right to legal 
ownership of assets, land or resources in Madikwe Game Reserve, nor were they 
likely to obtain such ownership rights through the kind ofland claims process used in 
the Makuleke case.69 The land and infrastructure was state-owned (with an estimated 
value then ofR90 million), and the lodges with their infrastructure (valued at between 
R264,000 - R400,000 per bed) were private sector owned through lease agreements 
(Davies 1997). According to Koch and Massyn: "Since the property rights of the 
community were not defined their investment cannot be quantified, and thus their 
tenure is weak" (1999:14 - italics added). Again, the implication is that if the local 
68 The South African Airways inflight magazine. 
69 There were two pending land claims for parts of Madikwe, but none, while I was undertaking 
research, came from residents in the three villages that were the focus of the Madikwe Initiative 











residents had managed to fonn a CPA, they would have been in a much stronger 
position to reap substantial benefits from Madikwe Game Reserve. 
The key point to stress here is not that Koch and Massyn's claim that "the Makuleke 
community is characterised by a high degree of internal social cohesion. Its members 
have effectively combined their traditional structures with new civic bodies" (1999:6) 
may have been proven to be inaccurate. Rather, there is an uncomfortable 
inconsistency in their critique in that they have simultaneously questioned the 
effective empirical community and homogeneity of so-called communities in the 
Madikwe area, while celebrating the supposed social cohesion of the Makuleke 
community and the efficacy of their CPA. They say, for example: 
As is often stated, often rhetorically rather than with serious regard for the analytical 
and strategic consequences, groups of people are frequently described as a 
'community' even though they are no such thing .... The assumption ... that the three 
villages surrounding Madikwe formed a cohesive 'community' with a common set of 
interests was misplaced .... The anecdotes of fragmentation and fissure - evidence of 
complex social issues ignored by the assumption of cohesion that determined the early 
approach to development at Madikwe - could go on endlessly (1999: 11-15). 
Yet, on page 14 of the same document Koch and Massyn themselves refer to the 
villages as 'the community' (italicised in the excerpt quoted two paragraphs above). 
Apart from being blatantly contradictory, the logic they offer in the document is 
decidedly circular: they argue that it was that 'social cohesion' which helped enable 
the Makuleke not only to be successful in their land claim, but to control and 
potentially to realise their economic interests in nature tourism within the Kruger 
National Park. Yet, in the same paper, they thoroughly interrogate and reject the 
concept of community and the implied social cohesion: 
The evidence from southern Africa suggests that the 'C' in Community Wildlife 
Management does not exist as an entity. It is nebulous, fluid and elusive, and often a 
figment of the imagination of project managers and donors seeking quick fixes. A 
common belief amongst donors and project managers is that it saves time to group 
people together, because of the simplicity of 'working with' fewer groups. Our 
findings suggest the opposite: if the groupings within a community and the differences 
between groups, are not well understood and taken into account, then conflicts emerge 
which are difficult to heal (1999: 16). 
It is thus apparent that overall Koch and Massyn's well substantiated position is that 
the notion of community is thoroughly misplaced, ifby 'community' what is meant is 











are doomed once they attempt to impose social group boundaries. It was, or should 
thus have been, entirely unsurprising for Mafisa, given the well critiqued experiences 
of conservation-related development interventions, that the villages adjacent to 
Madikwe should not have been labelled 'the local community'. Yet, Mafisa's 
experiences with the Makuleke people, as outlined in Challenging Eden, illustrated 
how working with a single committee apparently effectively and democratically 
representing a seemingly socially cohesive group of people, was so successful. There 
lies the inconsistency within Koch and Massyn's critique, an inconsistency that is far 
from unusual within the arena of people-based development (cf. Barrow and 
Murphree, 2001; Jones, 2001; Njaya, 2003, for example). It is a contradiction that 
comes from highlighting and decrying notions of community for their falseness and 
propensity to iron out the wrinkles of difference, while at the same time calling for 
democratic, representative bodies (such as the eDOs described earlier and again in 
chapter five) as a central requirement to effective people-based development 
interventions. 
Koch and Massyn's argument about the importance of locally-based representative 
committees resonates with Barrow and Murphree's (200i) call for local populations 
to have local representative bodies if they are to profit from development 
interventions. In their critique of community-based conservation initiatives, drawing 
respectively on their experiences in East Africa and Zimbabwe, Barrow and 
Murphree stress that for people in rural areas to benefit from natural resource 
management it is imperative for them to fonn an 'organizational vehicle'. They argue 
that: "effective community conservation involves collective action, effectively 
organized" (2001:35). And they go on to assert that "any organizational vehicle for 
such collaboration is likely to require four characteristics: cohesion, demarcation, 
legitimacy and resilience" (2001:26). By cohesion they mean "a sense of common 
identity and interest which serves to bring people together for collaborative action, 
and leads them to collectively differentiate themselves from others [so that it] ... sets 
social boundaries and determines membership". Demarcation "sets the boundaries of 
jurisdiction for the collective regime". Legitimacy they define as "an internal 
legitimacy, endogenously derived but also sanctioned by the state" and resilience is 
"the organizational capacity to adapt in content and structure .... The ability to 











Lekgophung was the only village where there was a committee with any semblance 
of such an organisational vehicle. There, seventy-two of eighty respondents in my 
survey stated that the village's Reconstruction-and Development Programme (RDP) 
forum7o was the successful and legitimate committee representing the village.7} This 
statistic indicates that it therefore had 'internal legitimacy, endogenously derived', a 
finding supported by in-depth interviews and conversations where comments such as 
the following were common: 'The RDP are the ones that are successful in 
representing our village in the Reserve'; 'We are informed of everything that is 
happening in the Reserve, even if we don't have the opportunity of going there, 
because the RDP always calls a meeting'; and 'The RDP is helping us. When there is 
a problem we can go to them and [discuss it] ... Then they are repairing everything 
that is not in good condition in the village'. 72 
However, in both Molatedi and Supingstad the RDP forums- were not effective and 
there was a conspicuous absence of CP As or, indeed, any other elected entities that 
were simultaneously legal, legitimate and representative and had the ability to create 
village cohesion. Assumptions that such organisation could be achieved by a simple 
process of instituting representative democratic committees were highly problematic, 
as illustrated earlier through the example of the CDOs.73 
Given that Mafisa's directors, Koch and Massyn, had thoroughly deconstructed and 
problematised the notion of 'local community' in the Madikwe area, and had also 
warned of the damaging consequences of such assumptions, what is remarkable is 
that their argument seemed to have had little impact on the public rhetoric of the 
NWP&TB. Rather than commenting on internal discussions to which I have not been 
privy, I am referring to the language-NWP&TB uses to represent the Madikwe project 
to the outside world, which is awash with phrases celebrating the community as 'a 
70 The RDP forums were established through central government legislation in 1994 and intended as 
vehicles to facilitate development and promote participatory democracy at local level throughout the 
country. See chapter five, pages 132- 134 for more details. 
71 I offer a more thorough treatment ofLekgophung's RDP forum in chapter five - see the section 
Lekgophung's RDP Forum: Democracy, Strategy or Apathy? 
72 Interviews held with Lekgophung residents on 14 May 2000; 26 June 2000 and 5 June 2000 
respectively. 












key partner'; 'an indispensable player'; 'a major stakeholder'. Moreover, the practices 
of the Mafisa-implemented Madikwe Initiative did not appear to be substantially 
influenced by their critique.74 Indeed, the then CEO of the NWP&TB told me he had 
never seen a copy of Challenging Eden and was not even aware of its existence (pers. 
comm., 21 May 2001). This 'discussion paper' was not disseminated to the 
NWP&TB nor drawn upon to structure Mafisa's agents' work, which. underscores, 
once more, a seemingly inevitable dislocation between discourse and practice. 
Such a situation again highlights the problematic nature of knowledge, particularly 
how practice can come to be so inconsistent with rhetoric. As I shall show in detail in 
chapter seven, the Madikwe Initiative projects were top-down, tightly controlled 
interventions. In interview after interview respondents involved in these Mafisa-Ied 
interventions stressed the dependent, unsustainable aspects of the projects: 'we are 
unable to do things for ourselves'; 'Mafisa is very important. Once they are no long 
here I am. not able to say what may happen'; 'we are dependent on the Reserve, we 
are dependent on Mafisa, and we are always dependent on funding'. 75 Through such 
comments, terms such as development, upliftment, empowerment and participation 
became discursively bankrupt, condemned by respondents' commentaries to a 
growing wasteland of failed promises. 
Koch and Massyn's (1999) analysis of' community', and their calls to create more 
fluid definitions of the local which could encompass notions of complexity and 
diversity, did not lead to a change in how the villages were conceptualised and 
approached - either by the NWP&TB76 or Mafisa agents. Thus, while the theoretical 
positioning of the managing NGO's directors was strongly centred in 'people-based' 
development discourse, such a positioning had no impact on on-the-ground 
developmental practice. In this way, notions such as diversity and difference within 
supposed communities become absorbed into a simple designation that remains 
74 Although the Community Development Organisations (COOs) which the NWP&TB set up to 
facilitate liaison between the Reserve and the villages, but which in fact ignored intra-village tensions 
and hence contributed to social fragmentation, were eventually seen, by Madikwe Initiative 
consultants, as having failed, and were therefore disbanded (Koch and Massyn, 1999:15). 
75 In order of citation above, interview with theatre group, 25 September 2000; Molatedi herbicide 
of era tor, 14 September 2000 and Lekgophung bush clearing contractor, 26 August 2000. 
7 As is apparent from the NWP&TB literature cited earlier and from evidence generated through 











finnly in the realm of rhetoric and then loses its integrity simply - and sadly -
because it becomes just another label or category (like 'hybrid community'), that is 
seemingly constructed and used to conform to rhetorically approved (bottom-up, 
local-people-take-centre-stage) approaches to development. 
However, as the following chapters show, in all three villages the post-apartheid 
government initiated processes of 'restructuring social relations' had fuelled 
important debates centring around chiefs, tribal authorities, local government, 
empowerment, power and equal rights. None of the villages was a static, closed, 
'traditional' society, the passive object or victim of dominating hegemonic 
discourses.77 Moreover, my fieldwork evidence suggested that the majority of village 
fieldwork participants I spoke with were not merely downtrodden, passive victims of 
hegemonic power plays. To the contrary, I heard many remarks such as the following: 
• 'they didn't want to listen to our ideas'; 
• 'they have their own agendas'; 
• 'projects that are initiated are very foreign to us'; 
• 'these people [the consultants] should not be going past our chief or we don't 
know what ever may be happening. They must take these initiatives through 
the proper channels'; 
• 'the people were not consulted'; 
• 'they are not taking project initiatives via the community'; 
• 'handouts make fools of people' and 
• 'the chiefs have been made redundant' .78 
Such comments imply that many villagers of diverse local categories were actively 
engaging with meta-narratives of democracy, traditionalism, modernity - and with the 
power imbalances that had become evident within the development encounter - and 
which the stakeholderlstickholder image with which I began this chapter had first 
77 Even the fact that my survey found that 71 % of employed people across the villages were migrant 
labourers working in metropolitan areas such as Johannesburg, Soweto and Rustenburg indicates that 
endogenous discourse is far from unexposed to outside influence. 
78 In order of citation: middle aged unemployed woman in Lekgophung, 28 August 2000; young 
unemployed man in Supingstad, focus group discussion, I September 2000; middle aged woman, 
Molatedi,4 September 2000; older man and ward leader, Molatedi, 6 August 2000; ChiefMatlapeng, 











revealed to me. Rather than indicating powerless sUbjugation, or an outright rejection 
of the whole development enterprise, such statements reflect active engagement, and 
engagement from a critical perspective that resonates with the post development 
position outlined at the beginning of this chapter, and whose protagonists are at pains 












The Politics of Avoidance: Chiefs, Tribal Authorities and the 
Development Process 
I now build on the argument introduced in chapter three: that people-based 
approaches to conservation are fundamentally constrained, if not flawed, by their 
tendency to presume the validity of generic knowledge even when that knowledge is 
inapplicable to specific local circumstances. The present chapter illustrates how this 
tendency can forestall interventionists' access to local knowledge and priorities, 
which can then result in the development process underplaying or even bypassing 
local inequalities and power relations. The chapter focuses on the relations between 
Chief Suping of Supingstad and Madikwe Initiative agents, showing how their 
interactions resulted in an impasse that left all the players on the Madikwe stage at a 
disadvantage. 
Madikwe Initiative agents invoked a powerful democracy/autocracy binary to explain 
the impasse and, as I shall show, such binary thinking justified the so-called 
democratic Madikwe Initiative refusing to work with the person its agents saw as 
fundamentally autocratic, Chief Suping. As a result, the entire village of Supingstad 
was excluded from the direct attentions of the Madikwe Initiative. Through 
presenting empirical data concerning the impasse, the chapter aims to illustrate that 
autocracy and democracy are not the antithetical, discrete spheres they may seem to 
be, and that binary thinking based on an assumption that they are is thus not only 
reductionist but also severely hinders the process of accessing, assessing and 
understanding local situations and conflicts. 
Drawing on empirical evidence describing villagers' attitudes towards chieftainship 
and democracy, I argue that, in the context of conflicts regarding the governance roles 
of chiefs and their traditional authorities in post apartheid South Africa, democracy is 
a highly contentious and problematic notion. In order to contextua1ise this argument, I 
devote a significant section of the chapter to an overview of the political history and 











According to one Mafisa respondent, the impasse began in earnest at the start of 1998 
when Mafisa agents went to Supingstad village to conduct preliminary interviews 
with prospective candidates for the Madikwe Initiative's internship programme.79 In 
order to find applicants, Mafisa had approached the Tribal Authority some weeks 
earlier and asked for pennission to advertise in the village and for help with sourcing 
candidates. But when the Mafisa selection team returned to the village to meet the 
applicants they found that every person named on the list drawn up by the Tribal 
Authority came from the Suping family. Unwilling to support what appeared to be 
blatant nepotism, the selectors decided that none of those applicants would be chosen 
to participate in the programme. They asked the Tribal Authority to put forward 
alternative candidates but were met with an edict from Chief Suping stating that if 
Mafisa did not work from the original list then it was not welcome to work in the 
village at all (interview, 6 April, 2000; 5 May 2000). The outcome of the ensuing 
conflict was that five internship candidates were chosen from Mo1atedi, three from 
Lekgophung, and none from Supingstad. 
Within the first few days of my arrival in Madikwe one of Mafisa' s directors told me 
that Mafisa had had a standoffwith Chief Suping ever since the trouble with the 
internship selection process in Supingstad. He suggested that it would be useful if in 
my work in the villages I could try to open communications with Chief Suping, to see 
if there was a way to get him more involved in the Madikwe project. Thus, 
overcoming the impasse became a part of my original tenns of reference with Mafisa, 
a part I was never able to fulfil. For Chief Suping' s antagonism toward Mafisa was 
extreme. In his view Mafisa had hijacked the whole Madikwe project. He said: 
I was a co-founder of the original concept ofMadikwe Game Reserve. The first plan 
was to establish a 1ruSt fund for the three villages. But then they moved away from the 
original plan. The ODA [DfJD] came with sri initial four million rand for the Madikwe 
Initiative to establish a trust fund. But then things changed with the introduction of 
consultants. Who appointed this Mafisa? There has never been any link between the 
community [of Supingstad] and the park about them. There was no consultation .... I 
don't know what this Mafisa is. They are supposed to guide us in development. But I 
am sorry: they didn't.,. they haven't. What have they done? Where is the 
empowerment? Where is the partnership?,. (Chief Suping, 29 August 2000). 
79 A programme which sought to train eight young people from the villages in all aspects of lodge 











Worse, he levelled harsh accusations at Mafisa about its use of Madikwe Initiative 
resources: 
Outside consultants with good intentions are welcome. But let me be honest: They 
benefit a lot They are paid even when they do nothing. They are squandering money. 
All they are doing is building up capital for NGOs and they are the ones benefiting 
most at the end of the day. Little or nothing has been done. In Lekgophung there are a 
few things like the resource centre, but to me, after so many years, it is very 
little .... Where are the initial [financial] records? DfID initially gave R4 million. What 
happened to that money? I have not seen anything happening .and I think we need an 
enquiry into their activities. Ifpeople have handled projects that involve funds, and 
nothing has been produced, there must be an enquiry into how those funds were used 
(Chief Suping, 29 August 2000). 
When I reported back to the Mafisa director, relaying a diluted version of Chief 
Suping's views about overpaid consultants and unseen financial reports, his fury was 
palpable. He said he had gone out of his way to make sure Mafisa's operations were 
transparent and that each Tribal Authority was kept up to date with financial records 
and progress reports. Chief Suping, meanwhile, was adamant that Mafisa was 
determined to avoid him: 
From the beginning they preferred to come and have a meeting when I am not here. 
They seem uncomfortable, like I am embarrassing them with questions .... They are 
prejudiced towards me. I am too talkative, or else I am too intelligent for Mafisa (Chief 
Suping, 29 August 2000). 
And so the impasse continued. Chief Suping' s antagonism was not only with Mafisa. 
He also had a poor opinion of the NWP&TB's Community Liaison Officer (CLO)-
not just because of the Officer's connections with Mafisa, but because he failed to 
liaise with the chief or the Tribal Authority and thus jeopardised communications 
between the village and the Reserve: 
That CLO, I don't know. I have reservations .... To me he is part ofMafisa - he dances 
to their music. How often does he come to Supingstad? I don't know. What does he 
come here for? An emphatic I don't know. He should keep the community conversant 
with MGR affairs and to do that he must start with the head - with me. The gate to 
communication is here. But does he? No (ChiefSuping, 29 August, 2000). 
Private sector lodge respondents were also aware of the impasse with ChiefSuping. 
We have been here nine months .... We had to get the lodge up and running the way 
the owner wanted it Now that we've done that our priorities would have been with the 
communities. But sadly we are leaving. Hopefully whoever is taking over from us will 
have the same philosophies and will turn their attention to the community. Even in a 
small way. I don't have a specific plan, but my intention has always been to make 











been left out [of the Madikwe Project], or there has been more favour towards 
Molatedi. ... I think it is important to just get Chief Suping in here and get to know him. 
Take him on a game drive, sit and have a sundowner with him. Talk to him. Ask what 
his problems are and what he expects from us: 'As the general manager of Tau, what 
do you expect of me?' Whatever it might be .. at least make contact Why has he been 
left out? (interview with general manager of Tau Lodge,23 August, 2000). 
During my fieldwork period no lodge management employees ever did attempt to 
bridge the divide between ChiefSuping and the Madikwe project. The impasse 
persisted undiminished and Supingstad residents were thus excluded from the 
Initiative. The NWP&TB-employed park warden's view of the situation was 
unequivocal. He said: 
The people have been empowered. If they allow themselves to be led by men such as 
Kgosi [Chief] Suping, that is their choice. They have been empowered by national 
legislation that has established democratic district councils, but they feel oppressed. It 
is this traditional concept of allowing it to happen to them. They should organise 
themselves into pressure groups. We are a game reserve, a government structure. The 
district councils are the ones to deal with this. But there are definite traditional 
leadership rights and national government is struggling with what to do. Really we do 
not have the mandate to get involved (interview, 21 September, 2000). 
The warden's opinion was typical ofa tendency from all NWP&TB respondents to 
distance themselves, and the Board, from the conflict. His words also raise another 
problem that impacted on the development process in the Madikwe area, one that, at 
the time of writing, still rages throughout the new 'democratic' South Africa. It was 
about the conflicting roles of 'traditional' tribal authorities and the recently 
established, 'democratically' elected district councils. It highlights a contradiction in 
both the 1993 Interim Constitution and the Final Constitution of 1996. 
The 1996 Constitution and its Bill of Rights legally define the fundamental principles 
according to which South Africa is governed; principles that are supposedly 
democratic. Yet the Constitution also recognises the institution of (unelected) 
traditional authorities (South Africa, Act 108, section 211). People living in areas 
governed by such traditional authorities - although they have the right to vote for 
local government representatives - have therefore remained 'subj ects' of hereditary 
chiefs.so The rest of the population comprises fully entitled citizens of South Africa's 
80 According to the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance some 14 million people 
live in areas falling under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders (2003:33). Graham (2004) asserts that 
there are some 840 traditional authorities in South Africa, which have influence over 15 to 18 million 











new democracy, enjoying proportional and, in the case of metropolitan areas, 
constituency-based representation at all levels of government (see Mamdani, 1996 
and Ntsebeza, 2002). 
Mamdani's (1996) view of post-colonial African countries as bifurcated states, split 
along rural/urban, tribal/racial lines that serve to hinder and frustrate democratisation 
processes, uses a valuable lens through which to understand the inconsistencies 
within national legislation in contemporary South Africa 81 Such inconsistencies 
create highly complex conflicts between competing local governance structures. 
Tensions are intensified because South Africa's Constitution does not clearly define 
and distinguish between the respective roles of traditional authorities and district 
councils.82 But it is the inadvertent consequences of those conflicts that are of 
particular importance to the argument of this chapter, particularly how they may have 
contributed to the creation and justification of an apparently all-encompassing binary 
understanding of democracy/autocracy - at least from the perspective of Mafisa's 
agents and officials of the NWP&TB. 
The Madikwe Initiative and the P litics of Democracy 
When Madikwe Game Reserve was established in 1991 there were no (formal) local 
government structures in the villages.83 The area was still part of the Bophuthatswana 
homeland and each village was governed by a chief and traditional authority 
structures that were part and parcel of the Bantustan administration. All initial 
dealings between the then Bophuthatswana Parks Board (now the NWP&TB) and the 
villages consequently went via the chiefs. But, as I explained in chapter three, soon 
after the establishment of the Reserve, the Bophuthatswana Parks Board contracted a 
consultancy firm todraw up a socio-economic plan. In 1994, acting on the 
consultancy's recommendations, the NWP&TB set up a Community Development 
Organisation (CDO) in each village. The idea was that the CDOs would be 
81 For a more detailed treatment of Mamdani's argument about the citizen-subject conundrum see the 
section Collaborators or Administrators in this chapter. 
82 Because of their critical impact on the Madikwe Initiative development process, those conflicts are a 
main focus of chapter five. 
83 By (formal) local government structures I mean, following the language of the new South Africa, 
local government structures elected democratically, as opposed to the earlier traditional Tribal 












democratic, representative committees through which the Board would be able to 
access majority views and priorities in the villages, rather than channelling all its 
dealings through the chiefs. Thus, from the outset, the NWP &TB' s approach to the 
villages was informed by a policy of working with 'democratic' structures rather than 
'traditional' ones (interview, former NWP&TB Resource Economist, 11 June 2007). 
By the time the Madikwe Initiative became active in the villages in 1998, district 
councils had been set up under the Municipal Structures Act of that same year. 
According to one of the directors ofMafisa, "DfID insisted that we [the Madikwe 
Initiative] work with local government rather than the chiefs, that ownership of the 
projects, particularly the community lodges, must be by the community and not by 
the chief or traditional structures" (interview with Mafisa director, 7 June 2007). 
Hence, Mafisa's policy, as well as the NWP&TB's, was to liaise with the newly 
formed, ANC-linked, so-called democratic district councils rather than solely with 
village-based structures.84 Such a liaison strategy played out in different ways in each 
village. InLekgophung it was unproblematic as the village was effectively 
represented by the RDP forum which managed to cooperate with both the traditional 
structures and the district council.85 In Molatedi, as I will show in chapter five, it 
created complex and often insurmountable problems resulting in those villagers more 
aligned with the chiefs and traditional authorities becoming alienated from the 
development projects driven by the Madikwe Initiative.86 And in Supingstad, as this 
chapter illustrates, the whole village was excluded because Mafisa's policy alienated 
the chief. Indeed, in both Molatedi and Supingstad, relations between the 
chieftaincies and the Madikwe Initiative agents were tense, in part defined by 
conflicts that were rooted in the recent apartheid history (interview with Mafisa 
director, 7 June 2007).87 
84 These structures included a variety of civic organisations, not just the chiefs and their tribal 
authorities. 
85 See the section Lekgophung's RDP Forum: Democracy, Strategy or Apathy in chapter 5. 
86 For a particular example of how such alienation occurred see the section The Bopitikelo Centre: 
Focussing the Conflicts in chapter 5. 
87 The largely ANC-Ied liberation struggles often clashed absolutely with the former homeland 
administrations that had collaborated with the apartheid government. The clashes were particularly 












As explained in chapter two, until as recently as 12 March 1994 the Madikwe area 
was part of the Bophuthatswana homeland and, while some people were heroised in 
South Africa's new democracy for having fought for freedom and struggled against 
the brutal system of apartheid, others, who had collaborated with the South African 
government by supporting the homelands policy and acceptingjobs within the 
homelands administrations, were not so well regarded. And, although the ex-president 
of Bophuthatswana, Lucas Mangope, and his administration of 'tribal' chiefs and 
headmen were still regarded by some as having been lawful leaders of the 'Tswana 
nation',88 others saw them as having been 'Pretoria puppets', sell-outs who were 
directly responsible for the severe infringement of civil rights that was a result of 
apartheid legislation and the homelands policy. 
Right from the outset, the players on theMadikwe stage thus fell into opposing 
camps. As I described in chapter two, both the NWP&TB and Mafisa had a hard core 
of 'progressive', left wing 'people-and-parks' type individuals at their centres. Many 
were ANC members and had fought against the policies of apartheid. The chiefs, on 
the other hand, had been collaborators in the Bophuthatswana regime. Indeed, Chief 
Suping, had been a minister in Mangope's government. Not only that, but as Minister 
of Intemal Affairs, he had personally signed the deportation order from 
Bophuthatswana of the man who was the CEO ofNWP&TB at the time of my 
fieldwork. When I arrived, it was only six years after South Africa's first democratic 
elections and Bophuthatswana's reincorporation into South Africa Throughout my 
fieldwork I gained a strong sense that the views of many respondents reflected the 
tone of hopeful compromise, reconciliation and forgiveness which had become 
politically correct in the immediate post apartheid era But that did not mean that less 
worthy feelings of confusion, suspicion, anger, pride etc. did not exist or become 
apparent. I found that they did, and that they often translated into wariness or 
avoidance, a tendency, especially on the part ofNWP&TB and Mafisa agents, largely 
88 Here, 'Tswana nation' refers to the Tswana people living within the apartbeid-created homeland of 
Bophuthatswana, rather than to people living in the country of Botswana. See Lye and Murray (1980) 
for a detailed exploration of the problematic concept of population classifications (focusing on the 
Tswana and Sotho) and how such classifications defy nation-state boundaries as well as the boundaries 











to deny or ignore the political interruptions within development and to relegate 
governance issues to the far off realm of central government. 89 
Chief Victor Suping: An Autocratic Democrat? 
Although I had met Chiefs Matlapeng and Tsiepein my first week of fieldwork, 
Chief Suping was a busy man, often away from the village, and some five months had 
passed before I set off for my first meeting with him. I was filled with trepidation 
after months of listening to stories and comments about the chief that had led me to 
expect a forbidding man, important, commanding and powerful, a man whose 
contempt for development consultants was well known and who had little time for 
foreign, white, non-Setswana speaking females, particularly those conducting 
fieldwork for selfish academic theses. On arrival at his house I was shown into a 
formal front parlour where I waited, listening to the loud ticking of a carriage clock 
and noting the plush furnishings. Some ten minutes later he strode in, bristling with 
impatience, brusquely asking me my business. I explained to him about the survey for 
the NWP &TB, independent research and my aim to determine local attitudes and 
perceptions towards Madikwe ten years after its conception. Soon we were deep in a 
discussion about development, his antagonism towards me visibly lessening as he 
became engrossed in what was obviously a favourite hobby horse: 
What is development? To me, development is the spirit from within the people to 
progress in their lifestyles. But how is that done? How is this achieved? That is the 
question. The approach is my worry. If it started with training and then [was followed 
by] creating jobs, permanent jobs, through investment, to me that is the best method. 
Empowerment through training, andjobs through investment. ... But that is not happening 
with this Madikwe Initiative .... I have written to the park stating my views one after the 
other .... And what has happened to the trust fund? ... Now I am bitter about the park. The 
philosophy is not what it originally was. It has been taken out of the people's hands 
(ChiefSuping, interview, 29 August 2000). 
Ironically, as I detail in chapter seven, the expressed developmental aims of the 
Madikwe Initiative were entirely in line with ChiefSuping's own stated ideals of how 
development should proceed - through training, job creation and attracting private 
investment. Yet, despite both parties expressing similar developmental goals, there 
was still an unbreachable impasse between the two that precluded their cooperating, 
89 A good example of this wariness is evident in the park warden's attitude towards the impasse with 
ChiefSuping, cited on page 97: co ... national government is struggling with what to do. Really we do 











and also precluded any development interventions, certainly under the auspices of the 
Madikwe Initiative, being set up in the village where Chief Suping exercised 
authority. The tension, it seemed, lay in their conflicting understandings of the notion 
of development. Ferguson's insights from his work in Lesotho help to shed light on 
the problem: 
In the first sense, one speaks of 'development' as a progression toward a known end 
point, usually modern industrial capitalism. Thus people speak of the development of 
the forces of production, the development of 'modern society', the development of 
capitalism, and so on. In the second sense, so much in vogue in the late 1970s, 
'development' is taken to mean improvement in quality ofIife or standard of living, 
and the elimination or alleviation of poverty. It should be clear upon inspection that the 
development of capitalism and the elimination of poverty are, if not positively 
antithetic (as many neo-Marxists argue), at any rate not identical. But it seems to be a 
theoretical necessity in 'development' discourse ... for the two to be co-present and 
even conflated (1990:55). 
While ChiefSuping was advocating development in what Fergus n (1990) describes 
as the modern capitalist sense, it was evident from the Madikwe Initiative-related 
literature I consulted that, despite the rhetoric propounding its democratic principles, 
the Madikwe Initiative was concerned with poverty alleviation and targeting the 
poorest and most marginal of the population - which meant those apparently most 
materially disadvantaged. An example was a rhetorical stress on the importance of 
applying what was called the 'wage mechanism': ''Wages go directly into the 
household and - with affirmative gender and poverty alleviation criteria - can go to 
the most marginal groups in communities" (Koch, 2000:12). Such an ideological 
focus on affirmative action could not but contradict the Madikwe Initiative's 
ostensible calls for transparent and accountable democracy - which became another 
source of friction with the chief. 
By the end of my first interview with Chief Suping I found myself developing an 
almost sympathetic understanding of his antagonism toward the Madikwe Initiative 
and his concern to retain village autonomy over local development. What, in fact, had 
the Madikwe Initiative achieved in its two years of operation? Certainly nothing in 
Supingstad. In his view, the village was better off without over-paid consultants 
imposing their agenda and undennining village autonomy. As the chief said: "In the 












It can be no coincidence that Supingstad, with its powerful, well connected chief, was 
the only one of the three villages adjacent to Madikwe to have SABC90 coverage and 
electricity as early as 1996. At the time of my fieldwork in 2000, Lekgophung, a mere 
stone's throw down the road, was still not connected and some thirty-eight houses in 
Molatedi were still waiting to be connected (interview, Molatedi ward head, 6 May 
2000).91 ChiefSuping was undoubtedly a powerful man with considerable political 
clout on a national and regional level. He had been Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
Bophuthatswana homeland administration, right up until the last moment when 
Mangope was forcibly deposed and Bophuthatswana abolished. Then, in 1998 he was 
elected chairperson of the Council of Traditional Leaders, a national statutory body 
comprising eighteen members, three nominated by each of the six statutory Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders.92 While his political role on a national level meant 
that he spent much of his time away from Supingstad, he nevertheless managed to 
keep a tight hold on what was happening in the village, through the Tribal Authority 
and also through his brothers who acted as his representatives in village affairs. 
Chief Suping presented himself to me and, I discovered, to others as playing a vital 
role as representative of his people. He saw that role as an essential go-between who 
would and could mediate between the village's residents and exogenous agents who 
came to implement local projects. "To keep the community infonned" he told me, 
''you must start with the head. Then we can call our communities together and tell 
them what is going on" (29 August 2000). He added, with some emphasis, that he 
was accountable to his subjects and responsible for safeguarding what he called the 
community's interests. 
90 South African Broadcasting Corporation. 
91 By March 2006 those houses were still not connected (pers. COmIn., Molatedi resident, 23 March 
. 2006). 
92 The Council of Traditional Leaders and the National House of Traditional Leaders were established 
on 18 April 1997. Its statutory role is to advise the national government on the role of traditional 
leaders and customary law. It also has the power to conduct its own investigations, advise the country's 
President on request and elect its own office-bearers (South African govemment.htm.., 30 May 2006). 
Only six of South Africa's nine provinces have Houses of Traditional Leaders. This is because the 
other three, Northern Cape, Western Cape and Gauteng, arejurisdictions in which there were no chiefs 
or traditional leaders recognised by the apartheid regime. This does not, however, mean that nobody in 











In an interview with the Namibian World News, ChiefSuping is reported to have 
spoken of how, compared to the apartheid days when chiefs were 'more like 
executives', in South Africa's new democracy they were becoming increasingly 
active in their communities, driving development such as the building of schools and 
clinics, and settling disputes. "If the communities felt that the chief was acting above 
his powers," he said, "they would rise up and say 'no' " (7 April 2004). At least 
rhetorically for Chief Suping, and probably too for many other chiefs like him, the 
role chiefs must play in the new democratic South Africa is one that is in their 
subjects' interests and is constrained by those same subjects' ability to intervene if 
they act against those interests. This kind ofleadership role, alleged by chiefs to be 
responsive to local demands, represents a type of 'working democracy' even if it 
precludes any real electoral representation process. That there is the possibility that 
chiefs actually may be upholders of some fonn of participatory and representative 
processes indicates that the democracy/autocracy binary is a gross simplification of a 
complex issue. Indeed, the notion of democracy itself is highly political and 
contestable, as the following section demonstrates. 
Democracy: A Versatile Abstraction 
As we have seen, the Madikwe Initiative was not functioning in Supingstad because' 
of conflicts between its implementers and Chief Suping. At the heart of the conflict 
was a clash over understandings of what constitutes democracy. While, on the one 
hand, Chief Suping saw himself as performing a legitimate democratic role (a 'chief 
by the people'), the NWP &TB and Mafisa considered him to be an autocratic ruler. 
Their perception derived from his refusal to work with their version of democratic 
principles. They could not tolerate or accommodate what they saw as his nepotistic 
tendencies and despot-like insistence on controlling development interventions in the 
village rather than allowing what they saw as grassroots initiatives to drive such 
processes. Consequently, they evoked the seemingly impregnable 
autocracy/democracy binary to describe the situation and justify the impasse they had 
reached. From an outsider's perspective, however, one can see that it was such binary 











In contrast, ChiefSuping, as illustrated above, considered the Madikwe Initiative's 
agents to be self-seeking outsiders who neither understood nor had the best interests 
of villagers at heart. It was therefore, he said, his duty to protect the residents of 
Supingstad and to ensure that, at least, they understood the agenda of these and other 
external agents. As shown above, his explicit argument for doing so was that his role 
was to safeguard community interests and thereby to ensure a fonn of what he saw as 
participatory or working democracy in the face of power-wielding, resource-rich 
outsiders. 
The Madikwe Initiative consultants were not alone in their view of Chief Suping as 
an iron-fisted ruler. Within my first few interviews with villagers in Supingstad, 
respondents had begun hinting about the autocratic role played by their chief: "We 
have a chiefwho is running this village and, because he was fighting with this 
Mafisa, now no one here can be involved [in the Madikwe Initiative]" (interview, 
young man resident in Supingstad, 2 May 2000); "Our chief, whenever consultants 
come here, he runs them out of the village. He wants to do everything himself' 
(interview, young man resident in Supingstad, 26 May 2000); "This village is led by a 
chief, and everyone who wants to help the village must firstly contact our chief and 
make sure he is agreeable" (interview, middle aged woman resident in Supingstad, 25 
August, 2000). What these quotes and many other unquoted comments suggest is that 
even if village residents had desired to become involved in the Madikwe Initiative 
they were forestalled by the chief's attitude and behaviour.93 
Chief Suping, as I have illustrated, was deeply antagonistic towards the Madikwe 
Initiative for a range of reasons, village autonomy and financial transparency being 
central. But he presented an unexpected aspect to his hostility in populist terms: 
Those saying they wanted to help came with their own concepts and projects and ideas. 
They didn't want to listen to ours .... I have been to see the chiefs ofMolatedi and 
Lekgophung and I found they don't mow what is going on. They have been made 
redundant. But this is not going to happen in my area I am accountable to my people 
and I have to make sure that we are not sold a concept that we do not mow. People 
must first understand all the options. They have to sit down and decide what can be 
done and what they want, not have consultants just come and tell us. Before, we did 
93 In fact, the park warden's quote on page 97 suggests that they were also forestalled by the 
NWP&TB's laissez-faire attitude: "The people have been empowered. If they allow themselves to be 
led by men such as Kgosi Suping, that is their choice .... Really we do not have the mandate to get 











everything on our own. HandoutS make fools of people (Chief Suping, 29 August 
2000). 
The chief's apparently populist objections appear to centre on three main points: 
outsiders seek to impose projects in ways that seemed to him to be particular and self-
seeking rather than altruistic; he therefore argued that it was his duty to struggle to 
retain his power in order that he could continue to protect the interests of 'his people' 
and their ability to reach autonomous decisions; and, perhaps most importantly, the 
chief emphasised a need to elicit informed, 'democratic' decisions regarding 
resources, thereby implying that Mafisa's methods were not democratic. 
What is striking, and begins immediately to upset the apparent impregnability of the 
'autocratic/democratic' binary, is the seeming absurdity of an unelected, hereditary 
chief presenting himself as an 'accountable' protector of what, as he describes it, is 
essentially participatory democracy (he says, for example, as quoted above: "people 
must first understand all the options [ and then] ... sit down and decide what can be 
done and what they want"). To give credence to his view is to shake the vision of an 
autocratic, oppressive tyrant denying opportunities to his downtrodden subjects. 
Instead, there is the possibility that he is effectively representing unwary villagers to 
sophisticated outsiders offering dubiously motivated 'handouts'. 
In addition to respondents' accusations of autocracy, which were diametrically 
opposed to ChiefSuping's portrayal of himself as a democratic protector of the 
people's rights to autonomy, some Supingstad residents also complained of the 
chief's tendency towards nepotism. For example: "Whenever there are any jobs or 
projects being promoted, the chiefis always sure to push forward his family first" 
(interview, young mother, Supingstad resident, 15 July 2000); "Royalties [sic] are the 
people who are always involved in MGR. That is why we know nothing about what is 
going on. Elect people who we think can represent us, not their family, [who are] 
running after money" (interview middle aged woman resident in Supingstad, 27 July 
2000). These views were echoed by the Mafisa consultant who told me about the 
fiasco with the Supingstad internship application process.94 
94 Outlined at the start of this chapter: Because Mafisa selectors perceived the candidate list to be 











It was ironic that many village residents, particularly women and younger men (over 
seventy-five percent of the kinds of comments quoted above were made by people in 
one of these categories) expressed the same views on the chiefs tendency towards 
autocracy and nepotism as did the Madikwe Initiative consultants. Yet, they were 
nevertheless punished by the Madikwe Initiative's selectors' decision and excluded 
from the internship selection process - even though they were effectively on the same 
side as the Madikwe Initiative in its conflict with Chief Suping. In this way, the 
Madikwe Initiative's notion of democracy was damaging even to those who agreed 
with it and whom it hoped to assist and support. That the development agents did not 
try to bypass the chief and work with villagers who were supportive of the Initiative 
indicates that the Initiative's agents' approached the village as ifit were an 
homogenous community represented in toto by its single traditional leader. It is ironic 
that Mafisa's directors, Koch and Massyn, had already thoroughly problematised such 
an approach in 1999 with their Challenging Eden.95 
The situation reveals a series of contradictions: on one hand Mafisa objects to 
autocratic traditional leaders who dominate their subjects; on the other hand Mafisa 
uses those same autocratic traditional leaders as brokers for access to those villagers -
to the extent that a whole village's population was excluded because the village chief 
did not condone the Initiative and because the Initiative's agents disapproved of the 
chiefs behaviour in his broking methods. And finally, Mafisa's own senior personnel 
write critically of approaches that fail to recognise the heterogeneity of all, but 
especially local, populations. 
What becomes clear from the example of the internship selection process then, and 
what is most salient here, was that the Madikwe Initiative's definition of democracy 
ultimately resulted in exclusion, even of those its agents might have regarded as 
appropriate targets of their interventions. Because of the offending evidence of the 
chiefs nepotism, the principle that the correct purpose of development projects was 
to target the most marginalised of a disadvantaged population, rather than people 
who, because of their surname, were presumed to be better off, eventually overrode 
the conventional orthodox belief in equal rights for all citizens. So deep was the belief 











Despite their accusations of autocracy and nepotism, in interview after interview 
often the same respondents indicated support for their chief as an effective leader and 
representative of the village.97 Co~versely, people were generally either negative or 
ambiguous about the local district council representatives for whom they had 
supposedly voted. I asked people what they felt the role of the district council was. In 
contrast to most respondents in Molatedi and Lekgophung who answered along the 
lines that it was to bring development to the villages, in Supingstad the vast majority 
either stated that they had no idea, or that Supingstad was not served by a district 
council at all. Indeed, other than in Molatedi (where a district councillor was resident 
in the village - see chapter five), a significant proportion of respondents from the 
other two villages claimed they did not know who their local councillors were. To put 
it bluntly, in a one-person-one-vote scenario, the evidence from my fieldwork 
indicated that there was a strong likelihood that the chiefs and their tribal authorities 
would win more support than the district councils for matters concerning village 
representation, were the issue to be put to a referendum that precluded campaigning. 
What becomes evident here is that in such a situation there can be no consensus over 
the definition of 'democracy': is it democratic, on principle, to target the most 
marginalised rather than the population as a whole? Is it democratic to bypass and 
exclude a chief's kin simply because of their kinship with that chief - particularly if 
they are themselves impoverished individuals? Is it democratic for a development 
agency to exclude one village entirely, for whatever reasons, while including its two 
neighbours - particularly when all three have been identified as potential 
beneficiaries? Is it paradoxical that an autocratic, unelected chief should present 
himself as a protector of democratic processes, while simultaneously being seen to 
favour his own family above the rest of his 'subjects'? 
Democracy is an ambiguous, elusive concept, difficult to define. Its meaning at a 
particular moment is dependent on the context in which it is used, and the socio-
cultural and political influences which have shaped and informed that context. An 
97 The situation is reminiscent of the struggles over the Makuleke land claim. outlined by Robins and 
van der Waal (2006) as cited in chapter three whereby, in the face of counter-claims from Chief 
Mhinga, so-called Makuleke people have expediently sought to strengthen their colonially-instigated 
Traditional Authorities while at the same time claiming to be united in a post-apartheid legislated 











understanding of specific situations is therefore integral to understanding particular 
nuances of the meanings of 'democracy' . According to Peter Murphy: 
Democracy is not a free-standing political culture. It is not an ideology in itself .... 
Democracy can only be a manifestation of more fundamental cultural and 
philosophical ideals [such as liberalism, republicanism, socialism or populism] .... all 
of us, when we talk about democracy, have in mind a definite political and social 
regime. And on the substance of this regime, we will not necessarily be in agreement 
(1993:12-13). 
Hence, in order to understand notions of democracy, especially in the complex socio-
political context(s) of development in a situation such as at Madikwe, what is 
required is contextual analyses of the 'regime(s), , the actual substance and operation 
of the conflicting institutions of local governance (the 'traditional' tribal authorities 
and the district council structures), and the historical and political factors that have 
shaped them. This is important because the varying support for each institution came 
to be expressed within a straitjacket of an autocratic/democratic binary which 
rendered the'conflicts one dimensional and obscured alternative notions, or motives, 
such as the operation of power to effect control. It was as though 'democracy' was the 
last word, a tenn that could be bandied about, requiring neither defining nor 
defending. 
For this reason, democracy is a highly problematic tenn. It acts as a conceptual 
. barrier, shielding difference. It is a powerful tenn, yet also an ambiguous one, 
because its meaning is changeable, dependent on the particular context and view 
point it is used from. Therefore, one person's notion of democracy may seem to be 
another's of subjugation (hence the impasse between ChiefSuping and Mafisa as well 
as the lack of village consensus over governance issues). In this sense, appeals to a 
notion of democracy can have, and in the Supingstad case have had, the propensity to 
generate conflict and retard understanding of alternative interpretations of what 
constitutes individual liberty, freedom, community representation and effective, fair 
negotiation (or, in other words, what is said by many to constitute democracy). Such 
appeals also enable proponents of such democracy to loudly condemn apparent 
dissenters, without needing to recognise that the dissent may be due to differences of 
. situation, interpretation and understanding. In other words, in a situation of conflict 
there may be multiple layers of reasoning (operating in the same context of power and 











binary, and especially not while one wears the moral blinkers frequently generated by 
contexts in which the dominant operation of power is concealed because it has been 
labelled democracy. 
Support of chiefdoms may, on the surface, seem to fly in the face of particular notions 
of freedom and civil rights. It may seem to be illogical and contradictory, especially 
given, in Supingstad (and to a lesser extent in Molatedi), the strongly expressed 
accusations of autocracy and nepotism on the village chiefs part. However, the 
negative indictments of chiefly conduct did not preclude many of those same people 
supporting their chiefs over issues of village representation - particularly when the 
alternative was an unknown outsider (such as the district councillors were in 
Supingstad and Lekgophung) ostensibly elected by popular vote. 
An understanding of the broader political and historical background in the national 
context helps to shed light on the many-layered influences contributing to such 
apparent contradictions, such as the political expediency that can be seen in a concern 
to keep a hold over power and control in the village. It helps to explain how the 
institution of chiefs and tribal authorities has not only managed to survive South 
Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, but has retained (or, in some cases, 
regained) varying measures oflegitimacy, both externally in terms of the policy of 
central government and internally in the eyes of a significant number of their subjects. 
At this point I therefore provide a brief overview of chieftainships and the shifting 
bases of their legitimacy, particularly in contemporary South Africa. 
Negotiating Legitimacy: The Changing Face of Chieftainships 
The Tshidi hold that legitimacy is a negotiable value. Indeed, this underpins their 
theory of incumbency and is systematically expressed in a model which describes 
the relationship between the performance of a ruler and his legitimate power. 
According to it, the rights of an incumbent are not immutably predetermined; rather, 
he and his subjects are constantly engaged in a transactional process in which the 
former discharges his duties and, in return, is delegated the authority to influence 
policy and people. The degree to which his performance is considered to be 
satisfactory is thought to determine the extent of the office-holder's legitimacy, 
expressed in the willingness of the public to execute his decisions. This, of course, is 
a simplification: power is not allocated by popular consent alone and the chiefs do 
not watch impassively as their regimes are evaluated. Nevertheless, the incumbency 
model represents a medium through which debate over chiefly performance and 











A central question to ask is 'what constitutes legitimacy'? Conceptually, is legitimacy 
separable from power and authority? Is legitimacy, as Comaroff (1978) argues above, 
a negotiable value based on performance? How did many chieftainships and their 
incumbents managed to hold positions of centrality to rural governance throughout 
the apartheid years? Did such centrality imply legitimacy? And if so, was that 
legitimacy drawn from below, in the fonn of support from their subjects, or was it 
more a form of tyranny, the operation of power and ostensible authority vested in 
them from above by oppressive colonial and apartheid governments? Indeed, can the 
authority of an intercalary leader in circumstances where there is an overarching 
power structure be 'legitimate' without support from both above and below? If the 
chiefs were held in position only through apartheid policies, is there not a 
contradiction in claiming continued legitimacy in the post apartheid era, rather than a 
new legitimacy deriving from their subjects' resistance to new forms of top down 
interventions? 
These are complex, controversial questions. An important point to make immediately 
is that chieftainships were never uniform throughout South Africa, as is highlighted 
by the work of academics who have undertaken empirical research of specific case 
studies in different provinces. For example, Ntsebeza (2002) argues that in the 
Eastern Cape, particularly in the ex-Ciskei bantustan area, traditional authorities are 
"either weak or do not exist" (2002:358). Drawing on his fieldwork in the Xhalanga 
area, he says that because chieftainships were imposed under colonial rule they never 
established a strong foothold and therefore lacked local legitimacy. Resistance there 
to tribal authorities (each headed by a chief), particularly over land issues, became 
increasingly militant and, by the late 1950s, the government had resorted to "coercive 
. methods" to quell opposition to them. In the early 1990s resistance again became 
highly visible, with "running battles" and calls for civic organisations to be 
established to replace the traditional authorities imposed under the 1951 Bantu 
Authorities Act. Such calls have re-emerged in the post apartheid period, fuelled by 
frustration over the confusion caused by the ill-defined roles of tribal authorities and 
elected rural councillors (ibid). To cite an extract from an interview between 
Ntsebeza and a resident of Xha1anga: "Rural Councillors run in circles. This makes us 
a laughing stock and divides us .... You end up going to the chief even if you don't 











up bowing down to it, as it is often necessary ... [if you are to] get what you want" 
(interview, 9 September 2000 in Ntsebeza, 2002:369). 
Oomen (2000), in contrast, found in her fieldwork in Sekhukhune, Limpopo Province 
that, despite ferocious campaigns against the chiefs during the 1980s anti-apartheid 
struggles, eighty percent of her respondents amongst the thirty-two chieftaincies in 
Sekhukhune supported a traditional leader at the time of her fieldwork (2000:18). She 
says: 
The differences between 'traditional authority areas' often seem to defy either 
classification or generalisation .... Whether a village has strong civic organisations and 
powerless chiefs, or precisely the opposite; whether or not there are specific succession 
disputes; whether there is a lot of contact between chiefs and elected Councillors, or 
none at all: like local DNA, these factors shape specific political settings (2000:62). 
More in line with Oomen than Ntsebeza, 1 found during fieldwork that relations 
between the chiefs in the three villages in the Madikwe area and their subjects were 
dynamic and changeable, and differed greatly not only between respective villages, 
but also within each of them. In Supingstad many respondents were highly critical of 
the chief, accusing him of nepotism and of being too controlling and hence denying 
them opportunities because of his uncompromising attitude to the Madikwe Initiative; 
yet many of those same respondents indicated that they would nonetheless support the 
chief over the district councilor other civic organisations. 
In Molatedi, attitudes were similarly ambivalent toward their Chief, but often for 
converse reasons: respondents expressed frustration that Chief Matlapeng was not 
pro-active enough, that he was not fulfilling his role in sourcing development 
opportunities and furthering the interests of the community. For example: "Our Chief, 
he is not as energetic and hands-on as one would expect. He doesn't play his role" 
(interview, young man, 6 June, 2000); "The chief is hiding behind the old men. He is 
not understanding the young" (interview, young man, 23 June, 2000); "I don't know 
whatever it is the chiefis doing, but he is not helping us [with development projects]" 
(interview, middle aged woman, 8 May, 2000); "The chief is doing a good job. But he 
is still a young man. There [are] still many things for him to learn" (interview, older 
man, 6 April, 2000). Yet, rather than wanting to see Chief Matlapeng ousted and the 











play, and that he simply needed to improve his performance. None indicated 
preference for a district council-led administration at village level. 
In Lekgophung, nearly all respondents expressed support for their Chief Tsiepe, 
although this, in part, may have been because he took a back seat in village 
governance which, as I explained in chapter three, was dominated by the RDP forum. 
For example: "Our Chief, although he is not as educated as Chief Suping, we will 
stand behind him. We are Balete and we are happy he is our Chief. We don't care; 
whatever the case may happen: he is our Chief' (young woman, Lekgophung RDP 
forum member, 26 August 2000). 
Regardless of the varying levels and degrees of endogenous legitimacy bestowed on 
chiefs by their subjects,the fact remains that chiefs and their tribal authorities also 
have exogenous legitimacy. They are recognised in the Constitution. In terms of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003) they have a central 
role to play in local government in rural areas of what were the Bantustans, 
particularly around development and service delivery. They are, in many cases, a 
central and unavoidable feature of village life. They have power. They cannot be 
ignored. However, their presence reflects the history of apartheid and colonial rule, a 
history that has deeply negative connotations - particularly amongst those who see 
themselves as part of the vanguard of transformation towards 'democracy' - and it 
therefore had a great impact on perceptions of their legitimacy. This can be seen, for 
example, in the unwillingness of Madikwe Initiative consultants to work with Chief 
Suping, as much as in the ambiguous nature of villagers , perceptions of him. 
Collaborators or Administrators? 
Tracing the effects of colonialism on chieftainships, Mamdani (1996), in Citizen and 
Subject, argues that throughout Africa the most problematic and enduring legacy of 
colonialism is a society deeply divided along rural/urban and tribal/racial lines, what 
he calls a 'bifurcated state'. Colonial governments, when faced with the question: 
'how can a tiny and foreign minority rule over an indigenous majority?' (1996:16) 
found the solution, he argues, in combining direct and indirect rule. Africans in urban 











areas through indirect rule, 'decentralized despotism'(1996:8), in the form of tribal 
authorities, the 'long arm' of the colonial governments. Mamdani writes: 
Organized differently in rural areas from urban ones, that state was Janus-faced, 
bifurcated. It contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic 
authority. Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power 
of community and culture. Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power 
pledged to enforce tradition (1996:18). 
Post independence African states, argues Mamdani, have tended to be trapped in 
imitation, to reproduce the colonial legacy of 'bifurcated' power. There are either 
liberals who champion civil rights and freedom, or so-called Africanists who argue 
that "Africa's age-old communities" should be at the centre of politics, that custom, 
culture and tradition must be defended. These contradictory positions, in Mamdani' s 
view, constitute a "paralysis of perspective" and an impasse that can only be 
overcome through transcending and problematising each (1996:3-25). For, in order to 
achieve democracy, he argues, what is required is "the deracialization of civil power 
and the detribalization of customary power, as starting points of an overall 
democratization that would transcend the legacy of  bifurcated power" (1996:24-25). 
Yet, as early as the 1980s in South Africa (and probably before with the revival of the 
labour movement in the 1970s), urban-based civil society ideas such as civil rights 
and participatory democracy had permeated through to rural areas. Migrant workers 
and especially their Trade Unions ensured that there were strong flows of information 
and ideas between the two spheres, which suggests that Mamdani's rural/urban 
bifurcation is perhaps too crude a model (cf. Fine and Webster, 1989). 
It is evident nonetheless that the segregationist policies that led to the establishment 
of the native reserves (that subsequently became Bantustans), both in the pre-1910 
Union Boer Republics and under British colonial administration, were a particularly 
effective underpinning to British colonial rule and subsequently also to apartheid rule 
and policies. Such policies appeared, and were claimed by the colonial 
administration, to be protecting and defending cultural difference. Yet they were also, 
ifnot primarily, being used as a tool for subjugation, the British colonial rulers' 











Britain led the way in fashioning a theory that claimed its particular form of colonial 
domination to be marked by an enlightened and permissive recognition of native culture. 
Although its capacity to dominate grew through a dispersal of its own power, the colonial 
state claimed this process to be no more than a deference to local tradition and custom 
(1996:25). 
As a result, under British colonial indirect rule, what came to be described as 
tribalism became a deeply rooted characteristic of colonially-instigated socio-political 
organisation in rural areas. The Cape Colony's Glen Grey Act of 1894 had been an 
early and critical piece oflegislation promoting political segregation in what 
subsequently became South Africa. Local council systems were established which 
had the effect, amongst others, of reducing the scope of African political life 
throughout the 'native reserves' to local matters rather than encompassing the broader 
national sphere (Mbeki, 1992:5). Chiefs and their traditional authorities were 
encouraged to take up positions within the council systems. Appointed by the colonial 
authorities, they were never elected and had no tenn of office. To quote Mamdani 
again: ''the tribal leadership was either selectively reconstituted as the hierarchy of the 
local state or freshly imposed where none had existed" (1996: 16). Those chiefs who 
did not toe the line were dismissed and replaced with others; sometimes the 
rephicements were men who had only remote chiefly connections, a factor which has 
had important consequences for claims of legitimacy based on tradition and 
hereditary lineage within debates circulating in South Africa today (Ntsebeza, 2002). 
While it is questionable how legitimate these colonially appointed chiefs were to their 
subjects, it is also important to remember that, while many chiefs and their traditional 
authorities collaborated with the colonial state, some did not. Furthennore, as Bank 
and Southall (1996) argue, those who did collaborate managed to retain some 
measure of legitimacy because their roles were limited, their powers strictly 
subordinate to the colonial state. Ntsebeza (2002), however, takes issue with Bank 
and Southall (l996) by stressing that, from the late 1930s, traditional authorities came 
into increasing conflict with their subjects as they were forced to implement the 
government's much hated conservation measures, particularly Bettennent Schemes98 
98 Betterment was ostensibly aimed at addressing the crises caused by overpopulation in the 'native 
reserves'. Through the 1913 Natives Land Act, black Africans had been dispossessed of their land and 
restricted to 'Scheduled Areas' comprising only 7.3% of South Africa's total land mass, for 75% of the 
population. Under the 1936 Natives Land and Trust Act, this area was increased to 12.4%, which it 
remained unti11989 - for 28 million people (Sparks, 2003:49; Mbeki, 1992:20-21). The result was 











which included people being forcibly relocated to 'labour settlements' and large scale 
stock culls (2002:69). Because many traditional authorities had to playa central role 
in implementing these measures they came into direct conflict with their 'subjects'. 
Such conflict, argues Ntsebeza, ''was a clear expression of the loss oflegitimacy, 
especially on the part of those traditional authorities who were formally enlisted in 
the administrative arm of the state" (2002:69). 
While many traditional authorities may have escaped being entirely discredited 
during the colonial years, after the advent of apartheid, and particularly with the 
implementation of the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, they were forced to participate 
in tribal authorities and hence could not avoid being drawn into the apartheid 
administration (Ntsebeza, 2002:7). Govan Mbeki undermines any claims that chiefs 
may have succeeded in avoiding collaboration. He argues that through the 1951 Act 
"the nationalist [National party] government revived chieftainship which had been 
utterly crushed and destroyed after the Wars of Dispossession" (1992:66), and that 
"Verwoerd drew a picture of chieftainship restored to its ancient glory before the 
arrival of the white man, and assured putative chiefs that the government would 
empower them with the authority that was theirs by divine right to rule over their 
people" (ibid.). The National party also reorganised the local council system and, as 
Mamdani says, ''the functionary of the local state apparatus was everywhere called 
the chief." But he adds the proviso: "One should not be misled by the nomenclature 
into thinking of this as a holdover from the precolonial era" (1996:23), thereby 
rendering highly contentious the argument that chiefly legitimacy can be based on 
some kind of unchanging tradition. Chiefs were direct employees of the apartheid 
government which remunerated them relatively generously and ''raised their stipends 
to levels undreamt of before" (Mbeki, 1992:66). Furthermore, the new tribal 
authorities over which chiefs presided now had much greater powers vested in them 
than they had had in the colonial era, which resulted, according to Mbeki, in 
widespread corruption and bribery (ibid). 
than half their populations in the increasingly desperate conditions (Mamdani, 1996:19). The major 
and immediate problems were identified as the inability of peasant farmers to become self sufficient 
and the severe overgrazing of communal ground. Several short term policies were introduced through 
the Betterment Act of1939, including the culling of stock and the removal of people without arable 
land to labour settlements (Mbeki, 1992:21). Both policies had a highly negative impact on the rural 











Indeed, throughout the apartheid era chiefs were, in many areas, often regarded by 
their 'subjects' as powerful collaborators to be feared, oppressors rather than 
legitimate rulers, or so certain critics of the institution argue. For example, Lye and 
Murray (1980) state emphatically that in Bophuthatswana ''tribal chiefs ... [were] 
merely part of an imposed administrative superstructure that ... [had] no popular 
legitimacy" (1980:98). In line with Comaroff's (1978) analysis of the South African 
Tshidi, Lye and Murray argue that the apartheid policy of separate development 
retained "the form of chieftainship but profoundly altered its substance" (1980:98; 
italics in the original) in that the processes of consultation and participatory politics 
were no longer central or necessary characteristics of chiefly performance, largely 
because chiefs, supported and protected by the apartheid administration, no longer 
had to worry about competition for their chieftainship or about being removed from 
office should their performance be deemed unsatisfactory by their subjects.99 Yet, as 
Oomen (2000) found in Sekhukhune, and as I found in the villa~es around Madikwe, 
respondents indicated that on the whole, and despite the n gative impact colonial and 
apartheid era governments had had on chieftainships, the chief was still the legitimate 
head of their village. 
It is clear that there is no simple or unitary answer to what constitutes chiefly 
legitimacy. Ntsebeza argues, in the broader context of the limited success of state-
imposed democratic institutions and the corresponding re-emergence of support for 
traditional authorities in many parts of (particularly Francophone) post-colonial 
Africa, that 
the basis of chiefly power is defined in the negative, as a fallback position given the 
failure of the post-colonial state. It is as if the rule of traditional authority is seen as the 
lesser of the two evils. There is no suggestion in the literature that the re-emergence of 
traditional authorities is as a result of their legitimacy, or that they are accountable to and 
represent their subjects (2002:10). 
99 Comaroff (1978) explains of Tshidi chiefs that although they cannot be deposed, should a chiefs 
performance fall to a level regarded as unacceptable by his subjects, he may no longer be viewed as a 
real chief and his status may be reduced to that of a regent. He would then be expected to hand over to 
the 'rightful' heir, after a series of negotiations that re-opens the genealogical legitimacy of the 
incumbent's occupation of office (1978: 15). In The Tswana, Schapera and Comaroff (1953) say that if 
a chief s "conduct was unsatisfactory, he could be warned or reprimanded by his advisers or at public 
assemblies; ifhe ruled despotically or repeatedly neglected his duties, the people would begin to desert 
him, or a more popular relative would try to oust him by force, or, in the last resort, he might even be 











Contrary to Ntsebeza's claim, there is indeed literature arguing that traditional 
authorities draw their legitimacy from their subjects to whom they are accountable. 
For example, according to Spiegel (1995): 
In many areas of the country [South Africa] the only structure that many people 
respect sufficiently to grant it authority is the institution of traditional leadership .... 
Such respect for these institutions is frequently held primarily by otherwise 
marginalised people whose life experiences under apartheid have led them not to 
trust any other structure, among other reasons, for their harsh anonymity .... While 
many people (old people included) decry the practices of many incumbents of the 
office of traditional leader, they still value the institution - primarily for its role as 
intermediary between themselves and an anonymous and often intractable state 
administration (1995 :4).100 
Respondents in all three villages where I did fieldwork firmly stated their support for 
their chief-despite that support being coloured with criticisms regarding autocracy 
and nepotism in Supingstad or role fulfilment in Molatedi. 
A Leader is a Leader by the People:101 Traditional Leaders in a 
Democratic South Africa 
Increasing numbers of politicians and academics have been drawn into a debate over 
the role traditional leaders should play, or not play, in post-apartheid South Africa. 
One strand of the debate centres on notions of democracy and whether the very 
existence of the institution of traditional leaders is contrary to the spirit of South 
Africa's new democratic political dispensation. Another strand focuses on legitimacy . 
. It draws varioUsly on arguments about tradition and hereditary lineage; gender 
equality and representation; accountability and corruption. One argument holds that 
chiefs draw their authority and legitimacy from their precolonial roots; another that 
chieftaincy, as it exists today, is a product of colonialism and was, furthermore, 
thoroughly discredited through chiefs collaborating with the apartheid government; 
. that chiefdoms and their incumbents are corrupt, feared and represent the antithesis of 
civil rights and freedom. 
100 It is necessary to point out that Spiegel is writing polemically here, specifically to the Constitutional 
Assembly, in response to particular conditions in the immediate post apartheid period. 
101 I have borrowed this aphorism from Spiegel (1995) who says that it is one common to many 
southern African languages: "Sesotho: Morena Ice morena Ira sechaba; Xhosa: Inkosi yinkosi 











Mamdani (1996) has been an influential voice in the debate. He stresses the 
importance of transcending the balance of power shaped by colonial rule. He argues 
that although Africans were excluded by race from civil society during the colonial 
years, they were still incorporated into the arena of colonial power through indirect 
rule in the shape of traditional authorities, concluding that" ... no refonn of 
contemporary civil society institutions can by itself unravel this decentralised 
despotism. To do so will require nothing less than dismantling that fonn of power" 
(1996: 16). Following this line are those who argue that the very existence of 
autocratic, patriarchal traditional authorities in the political sphere compromises 
democracy (Bank and Southall, 1996; Van Trotha, 1996; Ray and Van Rouveroy-Van 
Nieuwaal, 1996; Ntsebeza, 2002). But as the previous section suggests, dismantling 
the institution is not only likely to compromise any sense of village autonomy, but 
could prove highly problematic, at least in the Madikwe area, given the evidence of 
chiefly support amongst villagers and given, at least in Supingstad and to a lesser 
extent in Molatedi, the lack of effective alternative administrative structures. 
In contrast to Mamdani, other critics (for example, Sklar, 1994) hold that multiparty 
\ 
democracy and traditional authorities can indeed co-exist, that there is a political role 
for chiefs to play, as long as it is subordinate to that of democratically elected 
institutions. Some proponents of such co-existence argue (as ChiefSuping himself 
did) that the institution of traditional authorities has democratic characteristics 
inherent to it, "elements of direct democracy complementing representative 
democracy" (Skalnik, 1996: Ill), and that it should therefore be incorporated into 
local governance, particularly because such a route would "strengthen rather than 
weaken current efforts to build a democratic culture among the African people" 
(Ismail, 1999:4). And while Mokogoro has argued that: "Should the hereditary 
undemocratic character and functions of the institution of traditional authority be .left 
as intact as it currently operates, it will frustrate the very ideals of a new democracy" 
(1999:8), he still calls for its maintenance in a changed fonn. Others, too, believe that 
a political role is possible for the chieftainships, but only if the institution is first 
adapted and democratised, ''transfonned to meet the requirements of a modern, non-
sexist and non-racial democracy" (Keulder, 1998:1), and with its role clearly defined 











Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act has sought to do by 
introducing formal processes for creating tribal councilS.102 
It is evident that the debate over chiefs as 'traditional' leaders is contradictory and 
often highly controversial, enmeshed as it is in the fraught history of pre-colonial, 
colonial, apartheid and post-apartheid politics. It is apparent in contemporary South 
Africa, where many areas' local government structures are weak and under-
capacitated, that the chiefs and their traditional authorities have, on the whole and on 
the ground, survived the transition to democracy. Moreover, they have political 
representation and clout institutionally through the National House of Traditional 
Leaders,103 and legitimacy from above through the Constitution and through national 
legislation. But, it is also evident, as the Madikwe example illustrates, and as Oomen 
(2000) indicates, that their authority and levels of support vary widely between and 
within different localities throughout the country, and that their subjects' attitudes 
towards them are complex, shifting and far from uniform. 
How did the above debate manifest in the context of Supingstad and theMadikwe 
Initiative's concerns there? Considering the controversial polarities of the debate 
over chieftainships and legitimacy, it is perhaps understandable that the Madikwe 
Initiative consultants, having given up completely on securing ChiefSuping's co-
operation, sought to avoid addressing governance issues in Supingstad, and to 
relegate them to the realm of central government. It is understandable if one sees that 
approach as reflecting a strategic attempt to use resources· effectively by ignoring the 
village which was led by what they saw as an obstructive chief, and then 
concentrating their energies elsewhere. 
102 For example, the Act stipulates that thirty-three percent of a tribal council's members must be 
women and that at least forty percent of its members must be democratically elected. The remaining 
members may be selected by the chief in terms of so-called 'custom' (Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003). 
103 See footnote 92 for more details on the National House of Traditional Leaders. It is also important 
to note that under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003), once the 
Premier of a Province has recognised a traditional community, that traditional community can establish 
a traditional council. The Act recognises tribal authorities as traditional councils. It states that they 
have an active and important role to play in local government development programmes and service 
delivery (Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003). Traditional Leaders are also 











The exclusion of Supingstad from the Initiative highlighted two main interrelated 
problems. One was the apparent ineffectiveness of the Madikwe Initiative's notions 
of democratic processes (in that, because of those notions of democracy, there was a 
notable absence of any of their democratically-based development interventions). The 
other was a failure on the part of consultants to succeed in 'putting local people and 
local knowledge first' as would be consistent with a 'bottom -up' approach to 
development, as propounded in the rhetoric to which they subscribed. Chief Suping 
had come to be seen as obstructing the developers' access to local people. Yet the 
chief, despite being active in national politics, was very much local and was clearly 
operating in the context oflocal knowledge, albeit a local knowledge embedded in a 
particular understanding of regional and national politics. In accordance with people-
based development ideology, should his knowledge not, therefore, have been put 
above that of outside consultants? Or is there some reasoning in the discourse of 
'bottom-up' development that precludes 'objective' outsiders from accepting the 
opinions oflocal elites as properly local? 
Once again, what underpinned the power play at work in Supingstad was the 
democratic/autocratic binary which apparently shaped the extei:na1 development 
agency's consultants' process of selecting the type oflocal knowledge they were 
willing to work with. Such an approach to deVelopment was certainly not democratic; 
nor was it properly 'bottom-up'. Yet, it was commitment to a discourse that 
celebrated and prioritised democracy and 'bottom-up' concerns that had led to the 
approach being adopted. 
Power and Control: Who Holds the Project Reins? 
Were one to take various appeals to notions of democracy out of the equation 
altogether when viewing the development encounter in Supingstad, what would then 
be revealed is that the conflict, rather than being effectively diagnosed through the 
convenient 'democracy/autocracy' binary, is fundamentally about power and control. 
The ultimate developmental goals (empowerment, job creation, poverty relief) of both 
the chief and the consultants were similar, at least rhetorically. The situation could, 
therefore, more usefully be represented as a struggle over who was holding the 











A general manager of the NWP&TB explained his view of the situation as follows: 
You have to understand that with Victor Suping there are complex political dynamics 
in play. He was Minister of Internal Affairs in the Homelands government and is 
therefore in conflict with the ANC ... He is a strong person in the way he manages the 
village ... He should be seen as appointing Mafisa to help his subjects, not the other 
way around ... But there is another element of tension between him and local 
government, and as a government institution we have to work with local government. 
It is impossible for us to interfere .... One tactic is to invest more time with him, but 
maybe it is better to leave Chief Suping to his politics and concentrate on the more 
progressive ones who want to take the opportunities. We can't get entangled with local 
politics, but we must leave the door open for Chief Suping (interview, 25 July 2000). 
The above suggests that the general manager's attitude towards ChiefSuping was one 
of resigned forbearance mixed with almost patronising exasperation. The words 'he 
should be seen as appointing Mafisa' require attention. 'Seen' in whose eyes? 
Presumably in the chief's own eyes, and in those of his subjects. But such seeing is 
meaningless, nothing but wool over the eyes. For it is clear from the rest of the 
interview extract that, in the general manager's view, power was legitimately 
exercised only by the NWP&TB and the Madikwe Initiative, not by a traditional 
leader. The rest was operational 'tactics' which ranged from 'investing more time' in 
the chief to 'leaving the door open' and finally concluded with giving up on him 
altogether, 'leaving him to his politics'. Such a position brings to mind Ferguson's 
(1990) depiction of development as an anti-politics machine. He wrote of the 
development apparatus in Lesotho: "it is an 'anti-politics machine,' depoliticizing 
everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the 
while perfonning, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation of 
expanding bureaucratic state power" (1990:xv). 
Significantly, the general manager reached the 'leave him to his politics' conclusion 
through employing another binary, the persuasive local/national binary. He 
articulated the chief's obstruction of the development process in Supingstad as being 
essentially politically motivated, and about apartheid-era national politics at that, or 
as one person's (Chief Suping' s) position within national politics. The sentence: "He 
was Minister of Internal Affairs in the Homeland's government and is therefore in 
conflict with the ANC ... "(italics added) indicates that apartheid-era politics still 
heavily influenced the general manager's thought processes, this even though Chief 











Traditional Leaders. It was evident that the general manager had a fixed 'once a devil,· 
always a devil' perception regarding Chief Suping, a perception that did not allow for 
the possibility that perhaps he only seemed devilish because his strategies and tactics 
were in opposition to the general manager's, particularly concerning the Madikwe 
Initiative. One result of this inflexibility was that the complexities of the situation 
were again reduced to oppositional binaries: Chief Suping "is a strong person" (i.e. 
autocratic), and to the general manager his strength far from equated with legitimacy 
- as is confirmed by the general manager's claim that the chief was not 'progressive'. 
The general ~anager's view again highlights how politics and development are 
inseparable spheres and how so often, as Ferguson (1990) showed, development tries 
to work against that interaction. This is especially true in the immediate post 
apartheid South African context where many people still carry the memory of 
apartheid politics close to their hearts, as is evidently the case with the general 
manager. His words illustrate how, in his and other developers' views, development 
practice is firmly linked, ifnot subordinated, to national, local, and even personal 
politics, three realms that are also inseparable. 
Mohan has argued that, in the context of participatory development, a heavy focus on 
the local "tends to underplay both local inequalities and power relations as well as 
national and transnational economic and political forces" (2000: 1). In chapter three I 
pointed out how the term 'local' can thus become an all-encompassing, homogenising 
label, even when hybridity and difference are understood to be implicit in that label. 
While Madikwe Initiative agents were acutely aware of the influence of external 
forces as well as the presence of internal tensions, specifically the conflicts between 
local government structures and so-called traditional tribal authorities (the next 
chapter will demonstrate how that played out in Molatedi in particular), they still 
tended to avoid addressing those complexities, and therefore flattened and 
marginalised them. Responsibility was rhetorically passed to central government, 
which in turn prevaricated endlessly an~ failed timeously to clarify the Constitution 
with respect to traditional leaders, 104 and to clearly define the over-lapping and 
104 The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act was passed only late in 2003, more 
than nine years after the installation of the first post-apartheid democratic government and only after 











conflicting roles of traditional authorities and local government in rural areas of the 
country. Even the policy-specifying White Paper on traditional authorities was vague 
and unclear about these roles. It stated: 
Potential investors are ... awaiting the clarification of certain policies relating to rural 
governance. Rural development is a priority of government. The legacy of 
underdevelopment in rural areas will, through such discussions, be addressed to the 
benefit of all our people. It is only through unity in action for change that we will 
prosper as a nation (2003:74). 
The point is that local/national binary thinking is just as unproductive and 
problematic to the development encount~ as the blinding dualities arising from 
democratic/autocratic reasoning. 
What became evident during my fieldwork was that awareness amongst NWP&TB 
officials of both potential and real local tensions and conflicts failed to translate into 
significant improvements in their practices when approaching a specific locality or 
implementing projects in an area such as Supingstad. Instead, when exogenous 
political influences interrupted what could be described as an essentialised and 
romanticised view of the local (for example, that it constitutes a coherent community) 
(Mohan, 2000:3), there was a standoff, a rejection, as witnessed in the general 
manager's statement quoted above: "leave Chief Suping to his politics and 
concentrate on the more progressive ones." In this context, progressive seemed to 
mean those who co-operated with the initiatives sanctioned by the external developers 
and funding agency, and which were seen to be m line with the developers' 
discourses about democracy and democratic principles, discourses that they 
understood were in line with national policies and all too often, therefore, at variance 
with local practices. 
Their attitude of interpreting local resistance to Madikwe Initiative interventions as 
ignorance brings to mind post development literature such as Ferguson's (1990) 
scathing critique of hegemonic discourse for its tendency to interpret local resistance 
as ignorance. That is because the antithesis of what the general manager regarded as 
'progressive' is backward, or at best stagnant, which implies a particular form of 












It is clear, from my analysis of Supingstad, that the chiefs obstructive position was 
about power, not ignorance. Nothing he said in the interviews I held with him implied 
. he did not want development in the village. On the contrary he repeatedly stressed 
that development, moving ahead, becoming modem, was his main priority. Rather, he 
did not want development projects that he could not control, and he justified his 
position by stressing that he was protecting the best interests of his 'subjects', that 
''handouts'', if not fully understood, "make fools of people" (interview, 29 August 
2000). 
One could again argue, therefore, that by refusing to engage with the chief, the 
Madikwe Initiative, despite its rhetoric, was practicing variations of an hegemonic 
'top-down' form of development that many theorists and practitioners have 
successfully interrogated and rejected. What was particularly unproductive and 
limiting about its agents' approach was their reluctance to engage with local political 
dynamics and with national and global processes which had an influence on those 
local dynamics. Instead, what were called political problems (such as the respective 
roles of traditional authorities and local government) were reduced to a category 
which floats under the general rubric of post-apartheid politics - a national, not a 
local problem - and as such were rejected by the Madikwe Initiative's agents. Hence, 
to reiterate the park warden's words, quoted at the start of this chapter: "There are 
definite traditional leadership rights, and national government is struggling with what 
to do. Really, we do not have the mandate to get involved" (21 September 2000). 
There is surely an uncomfortable irony in development interventionists refusing to 
'get involved'. 
In Supingstad, consultants' refusal to accept or involve themselves in the village's 
politics resulted in the exclusion of its residents from the Initiative's interventions. 
While the development interventionists were able to justify bypassing the village with 
its problematic chief through invoking the autocracy/democracy binary, in Molatedi, 
as the following chapter describes, they could not avoid becoming involved in village 
politics. As I will show, there, however, the developmental approach was nonetheless 
























Developing Democracy or Creating Conflict? Local 
Governance and the Development Process 
A major contention of this thesis is that people-based approaches to development tend 
merely to be another form oftop-down intervention characterised by an inevitable 
imbalance of power that ensures local people remain bottom of the hierarchy. I argue 
that seductive, utopian Ihetoric conceals 1;he operation of this power, however 
unintentionally, and even goes some way to disguising how interventions more often 
than not fail. 
Chapter four has shown that people-baSed development seems unable to function 
independently of the hegemonic, paradigmatic discourses that produce such rhetoric. 
In consequence it becomes compromised. A case in point is the stand-offbetween 
Chief Suping and the Madikwe Initiative which was exacerbated through the latter 
invoking a deeply reductionist yet intensely powerful autocracy/democracy binary. 
Such binary logic led the Madikwe Initiative to justify excluding the entire village of 
Supingstad from the Initiative. IOS Furthermore, in a manner which was another 
manifestation of the insidious operation of hegemonic power, the binary obscured the 
complexities of the situation and retarded, ifnot entirely forestalled, the generation of 
more accurate and sensitive understandings of the impasse. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use the example ofMolatedi to demonstrate how, in 
an instance where the Madikwe Initiative did intervene directly, a significant number 
of villagers became alienated from the development processes the Initiative instituted, 
primarily as a consequence oflocal political and governance-related conflicts. I show 
that these conflicts stemmed from the existence of several competing and conflicting 
forms of governance in the village: ChiefMatlapeng and his Tribal Authority; the 
Community Development Organisation (CDO); the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) forum; the Molatedi Service Committee (MSC) and the 











Rustenburg District Council (ROC) with its resident councillor. I06 The different 
structures and committees fell into two main groupings: the ROP forum and the COO 
were aligned with Chief Matlapeng and his Tribal Authority, and the MSC was 
aligned with the ROC, which had a strong presence in the village because of the 
resident councillor. Working with one meant almost inevitably antagonising the other. 
There were several Madikwe Initiative projects functioning in Molatedi and a highly 
visible community centre had been (half) built by the time I left the area at the end of 
2000. In the process of actually implementing projects, the Madikwe Initiative's 
development consultants had found themselves with no alternative but to liaise with 
one or other of the local governance structures. The one they selected ultimately was 
the ROC, as it was most closely aligned with the policies of national government 
~ 
having been established following the Local Government Municipal Structures Act 
) .. 
117 of 1998.107 
Having described the complex governance-related conflicts in Molatedi I then offer a 
brief comparative discussion of Lekgophung, where there was a single committee 
representing villagers' interests and negligible tensions over local governance. The 
primary purpose of the Lekgophung example is to illustrate how the idea of what is 
'politics' intrudes into how people construct local organisational structures. I show 
that while interventions proceeded relatively smoothly in Lekgophung, the Madikwe 
Initiative was unable to accommodate conflicts in Molatedi. 
Another function of this chapter is to demonstrate how exogenously driven attempts 
to establish (or impose) so-called democratic and representative committees that 
could ostensibly transcend local political tensions through by-passing longer 
established local governance structures paradoxically focussed internal village 
conflicts. It thus shows how they served to further fragment and divide the local 
populace rather than to help develop an hannonious unity, built on representivity, that 
their initiators hoped would act as a stable foundation on which to ground their 
development interventions. 
106 Although the RDP forum and the COO had been formally disbanded by the time of my fieldwork, 
both committees still played a significant role in Molatedi politics. 
107 As I explained in the preceding chapter, Mafisa agents said that DfID had 'insisted' they work with 











The problematic issue of representation highlights another major thread, first 
introduced in chapter three, that runs through this thesis: the success of people-based 
development is, I argue, compromised because of development agents' need for a 
representational structure through which to liaise and work with recipient 
populations. While chapter three focused on the NWP&TB's misconception of 
community and the ensuing establishment of the problematicCDOs, this chapter 
explores the tensions that arose between various governance structures in Molatedi 
because there was no single representational body capable of overriding all others. 
The chapter illustrates how these tensions were inevitably intensified by the 
development encounter - not least because the Madikwe Initiative was resource-rich 
with R6.4 billion from DfID. I shall begin by describing in more detail the different 
governance structures in the Madikwe villages, focusing particularly on Molatedi. 
Inexorable Bureaucratic Tentacles 
This first section shows that there was a plethora of conflicting local structures and 
committees in Molatedi, with overlapping mandates and varying degrees of 
legitimacy, all vying for power and control over governance and development with its 
attendant resources. From the appointment of chiefs and tribal authorities as organs of 
local governance in the colonial and apartheid eras, to the creation of district councils 
and village service committe s through the legislation of South Africa's new 
democratic government, these structures and committees have all been products of the 
top-downpoIicies of the relevant prevailing ruling power. 
A particular aim of the section is to argue that, contrary to the beliefs central to 
people-based development discourse that local autonomy should be strengthened if 
interventions are to reach their potential,108 the Madikwe Initiative actually aided and 
abetted the encroachment of the state into the villages - all the while attempting to 
maintain a fiction of its being a non-political intervention organisation. Such a 
predicament is clearly not unique to the Madikwe Initiative. Indeed, the crux of 
Ferguson's (1990) argument was that he could see in Lesotho that ''the 'anti-politics 
108 See, for example, the archive discussion around the paper "Land Reform in Zimbabwe: Lessons for 











machine' [the development apparatus] has been at work, as state power has been 
simultaneously expanded and depoliticized" (2001 :263). Similarly, Spiegel (1995),in 
a submission on the role of traditional authorities to South Africa's then 
Constitutional Assembly, wrote: 
A ... feature of much 'development' is that it requires and produces extensions of the 
bureaucratic tentacles of the state into areas and domains of life not previously 
intruded upon... [Development interventions] bring in their wake the unintended 
consequence of bureaucratic intrusions in local domains that were previously 
autonomous (1995:4). 
A good example to illustrate the often intensely divisive repercussions of such 
bureaucratic intrusions lies in the Community Development Organisations (CDOs) 
initiated by the NWP&TB in 1994. As I explained in chapter three (see pages 84-85), 
the NWP&TB presumed, based on its view that the residents of the three villages 
adjacent to Madikwe each constituted a fixed, homogenous 'community', that it 
would be possible to create an effective representative body or, as Barrow and 
Murphree (2001) would say, an organizational vehicle through which to liaise with 
the three villages. Hence, the Board established a CDO in each of the three villages, 
all then supposedly united into a. single CDO forum. 
Three fonner CDO members in Molatedi did tell me that there had been democratic 
elections for the CDO. As one said: "When we were elected to the CDO we had 
democratic elections in the presence of the community. People are not so much 
interested in meetings, but anyone who wanted could go .... There were about 100 
people109 .... Everyone voted for individual members for the CDO (interview, 6 May, 
2000). Yet other village respondents said that elections had not been democratic and 
that the CDO members had been appointed by the Tribal Authority. Given, as I 
explained in chapter three, that of the fifteen CDO members only two were women, at 
least four were ward heads, and the Chair was the chiefs uncle, it is likely that there 
is much truth in the latter view. 110 
109 Out of a total estimated population of approximately 2500, including children. 
liD Another factor that should be taken into account because of its impact on democratic processes is 
that across the villages only 12% of respondents in my questionnaire survey said they regularly 
attended village meetings, and 51 % said they had never been to a village meeting. The two reasons 
most frequently cited for not attending such meetings were that the individual had not been invited to 











The NWP&TB envisioned that the cnos would work in conjunction with the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) forums which had been 
established through central government legislation and had been functioning in the 
villages since 1994. The RDP began as a pre-l 994 ANC-developed plan that was 
intended to be implemented nationwide. Once the ANC-controlled government of 
national unity was in place, the RDP became policy. RDP forums were then 
established at local level throughout the country, with the intention of promoting 
participatory democracy. In Molatedi and Supingstad the process was effectively 
taken over, however, by the only well-developed locally legitimate structure in each 
village: the chief and Tribal Authority, with which the forums were closely aligned. I 
understood from my field assistants that in both those villages elections had not been 
democratic in any orthodox sense but that, in much the same way as the cno later 
came to be established in Molatedi, the Tribal Authorities had heavily influenced the 
choice of members. A consequence was that women and youth were not effectively 
represented since they had not previously been part of the Tribal Authority structures 
in the two villages. Undoubtedly partly because the RDP forums had been ineffective 
in promoting participatory democracy in Supingstad and Molatedi, their success was 
limited. 1 1 1 
On a policy level, one of the main aims of the RDP forums had been to facilitate 
development and, through delivering, or facilitating the delivery of, essential services 
including health, welfare, education, housing, land and water, to address the severe 
socio-economic imbalances existing in early post apartheid South Africa. 112 Before 
the end of 1994 it had become apparent, however, that most RDP forums were failing 
to deliver. Indeed, a recent article in Business Report cites unnamed critics of the 
RDP as saying that its ''redistributive promises" could not be met, and "having social 
democratic aims within a neo-liberal system is contradictory" (Bell, February 10, 
2006). Such a contradiction again resonates with Ferguson's (1990) argument that 
within development discourse there are two central aims: to develop capitalism and to 
eliminate poverty. Although these dual aims are often conflicting, they are 
nevertheless usually conflated within development rhetoric (1994:55). 
111 See footnote 132 which explains that the Lekgophung RDP forum had succeeded in becoming a 
rrfresentative committee. 












Partly as a consequence of the RDP failing to reach its potential, and partly as a result 
of neo-liberal global pressures, by 1997 national policy had changed direction: the 
RDP was replaced by the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution policy (GEAR) 
(Davenport: 1998:81-83). However, since only too often such national level policy 
changes do not necessarily lead to changes on the ground; by the end of my fieldwork 
in 2000, the RDP forums were still operating in the villages adjacent to Madikwe, 
apart from in Supingstad where its members had decided to disband. 113 
The NWP&TB's efforts to establish CDOs were an attempt to create the kinds of 
representative bodies that those who had designed the RDP and its forums had 
envisioned - and largely failed to achieve. As chapter three explained, the concept of 
the CDOs grew out of mistaken and highly problematic exogenous assumptions about 
representivity and about the feasibility of introducing ostensibly representative 
governance structures. It was not surprising then that the NWP&TB's CDOs were 
even less successful than the earlier legislatively created RDP forums. As Mafisa 
directors have explained after the event: " ... the CDOs helped contribute to 
fragmentation and lack of cohesion ... [because] in each of the villages they were set 
up in parallel to the local tribal authorities and RDP [forums]. Sometimes they 
operated in tandem with these other organs oflocal governance, at other times in 
conflict with them" (Koch and Massyn, 1999: 15). This was particularly the case in 
Molatedi where I soon found that the CDO had worked closely with the Tribal 
Authority but, as I describe below, had come into conflict with the new govemment-
linked structures, specifically the Rustenburg District Council (ROC) within whose 
nationally legislated jurisdiction the village lay, and with the Molatedi Service 
Committee (MSC). 
As I explained in chapter three, although the CDOs were formally disbanded in 1998, 
they had by then become institutionally entrenched in village politics - as had the 
113 When I asked Chief Suping what had happened to the RDP Forum he said: "They are not 
functional. They resigned out of frustration because those Mafisa consultants were squandering money. 
They [the Mafisa consultants] are paid even when they do nothing" (interview, 29 August, 2000). His 
view was in line with that of a former RDP forum member who said: "The RDP forum was 
[representing the village to the Game Reserve authorities] but it split because there was a lack of 
information and communication was not good. We were tired of unfu1fi11ed promises" (interview, 











RDP forums - and, during my fieldwork, I found that, as they did in regard to the 
RDP forum, respondents in Molatedi still spoke of the CDO as though it was a 
functioning committee, with various individuals recognised as active CDO members. 
Following the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 central 
government-linked district councils were formed throughout the country, the 
Madikwe area included. The CDO in Molatedi was thus replaced by the Rustenburg 
District Council linked village service committee (known as the Molatedi Service 
Committee - MSC). The intention was that the MSC would now represent the village 
and liaise between the Rustenburg District Council (ROC) and the chief and his 
Tribal Authority. 
In Search of Democracy: Molatedi Divided 
The fundamental aim of the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 was to promote 
representivity and democracy, particularly in South Africa's rural areas. Yet, 
Molatedi's Village Service Committee (MSC), which came into being as a direct 
result of this legislation, was the most problematic - or certainly the most openly 
criticised - committee in the village. From the very start I learned there had been 
problems with it, problems that revolved around issues of democracy and 
representation. Many village respondents, stretching across generational and gender 
divides, complained that the elections for the committee had been neither democratic 
nor transparent. Statements such as the following were common: 
• I was not informed of any meeting for these elections (interview with older woman, Molatedi 
resident, 10 September 2000); 
• As far as I can see, this committee was appointed by Rachel [the district councillor who had a 
home in Molatedi] without consultation with the community (interview, young woman, 
Molatedi resident, 3 October, 2000); 
• It was the 17th November 1998 when that MSC was elected. I was away and only found out 
when I came back on the 18th• I remember because it was pay day for the old [pension day]. 
That was the first time I ever heard anything about those elections (interview, older man, 
Molatedi resident, 13 Aprll,2000); 
• The COO was elected by the village; the MSC was elected [sic; appointed] by the district 
councillor. We don't want the MSC. They don't talk and they can't think (interview, older 
woman, Molatedi resident, 3 May, 2000); 
• The MSC was nominated by the councillor. That was not the agreement and [it was] not good 
procedure (interview, young man, Molatedi resident, 15 April, 2000); 
• The selection for that committee [the MSC] was not successful. People were placed there 
according to the desires of the councillor, not because the people wanted those people. That is 











because of politics (interview, older man, former Molatedi COO member, 10 September, 
2000). 
It is evident from the quotes above that a popular conception in Molatedi was that the 
MSC elections had been mastenninded by the then newly appointed district 
councillor. An important repercussion was that the MSC was widely viewed as little 
more than a puppet of the resident councillor. I asked the MSC Chairperson what had 
· happened. She replied somewhat contradictorily: "I think the elections were 
democratic. But I wasn't there for them. The problem was that when the elections 
happened, they were short of members, so other members were called in by Mrs 
Matlapeng [the resident district councillor] afterwards" (interview, 15 September, 
2000). 
Given that the resident district councillor, herselfhaving been appointed from a party 
list rather than directly elected as a constituency representative, had, of her own 
volition, appointed members to the committee, it is clear that the electoral procedure 
had not been democratic in any remotely orthodox sense. The outcome was that the 
· MSC, rather than comprising members who were representative of the whole village, 
was, in practice, geared primarily toward youth and younger women. As such, it 
operated in parallel to the older male-dominated Tribal Authority, and often came 
into conflict with it not least because it had usurped the role of the CDO, which had 
been, as I explained above, heavily aligned with the Tribal Authority. 
One respondent, an older man who was a member of the Tribal Authority as well as a 
fonner member of both the CDO and the MSC (the only Tribal Authority member to 
have sat on both committees114), explained his view of the roots of the conflicts: 
After the elections [for the COO] we needed training to guide us in our powers and 
duties to the community .... We had training in Pilanesburg for four days"S after which 
time we came back and were applying what we had gained from the training .... We sat 
and identified what the community needed and called a meeting where 300 attended. 
We wanted to know what the people needed. We made a list with the six priorities .... 
We wrote letters applying for assistance to the mines and the big companies, etcetera. 
There were many regrets [rejections], but then Amplats [Anglo American Platinum 
Mines Company] called a meeting in their board room. Six ofus went and drew up an 
agreement. They came to the village and ... agreed to pay the whole R32,975 .... [to 
build five classrooms and some toilets. These were vandalised soon after the building 
114 He had resigned after a few months because, he said, he did not feel the Molatedi Service 
· Committee was working in the best interests of the community (interview, 6 May, 2000). 











-had been completed]. We thought the [district] councillor had done it [orchestrated the 
vandalism], but we couldn't prove it She was jealous of our success and [we believe 
she then] decided the COO must be done away with. The ROC had their own 
committee [the MSC] behind the screen [sic; scene] [which] ... they appointed [with 
the excuse that] government wants only one body to represent the ROC and the village. 
So the COO was removed. We should have handed over all our documents to the 
MSC, but this wasn't done. We asked why. We were not saying that we wanted to 
remain, just that we wanted to hand over properly .... The VSC [village service 
committee] was not as trained and a little education is more than dangerous. I was 
trying to advise, but the VSC was misled by the ROC. They had not given us [the 
VSC] the correct way of dealing with the community. There is no information and no 
_ reports, even when the Tribal Authority wants to know what is happening (interview, 6 
May, 2000). 
In this respondent's view, the COO had been a more effective committee than the 
MSC on all counts: it had been democratically elected by a village assembly open to 
all (albeit few attended); its members had undergone training; they had conducted a 
participatory needs analysis; they had successfully sourced funding and delivered 
development initiatives to the village. The MSC, on the other hand, under the poor 
guidance of the ROC with its locally resident councillor (who was suspected of 
r sinking so low as to inflict malicious damage to COO-initiated projects), not only 
lacked experience, training and capacity, but was failing to liaise with villagers, to 
communicate or to deliver. 
Many other respondents were also highly negative about the MSC, giving examples 
of its failings such as the following: regarding the installation of water standpipes in 
the village, each household was supposed to be no further than two hundred metres 
from a standpipe, but some were over three hundred metres, and some as far as four 
kilometres. Another example of the MSC's failing was reflected in electrical 
installation which began in 1999. The process was coordinated by the MSC. Every 
household had expected to be connected, but Eskom (the responsible utility company, 
state-run) had left thirty-eight houses unconnected. This was seen as particularly 
unforgivable as all the houses in Supingstad, the village least linked to the new ANC-
led structures, had been connected already in 1996. Such perceived failings on the 
part of the MSC resulted in a prevalence of negative opinions, particularly from 
village respondents: 












• I think people should be appointed through the Tribal Authority, not the councillor, so they 
have the right visions (interview with young woman, clinic worker, Molatedi, 18 September, 
2000); 
• The only thing that is damaging for communication, from my point of view, is that committee 
[the MSC] (interview, older woman, Molatedi resident, 4 June, 2000); 
• It is mostly young women on this MSC, which was prepared by the councillor beforehand. 
Before, the CDO and the RDP were a joint venture with strong bonding, committed to 
development in the village. But with the MSC the criteria [sic] was different from what we 
had agreed. Before, we used to do things for ourselves. Now jJ;)ecause of the Rustenburg 
District Council], development facilitating is used to deny us opportunities (interview, 
middle-aged man, former CDO member, 6 September, 2000); 
• I don't know what goes on with that MSC. I don't want to lie. I don't know even if that 
committee is still existing ... They never call me to their meetings - because there is a 
perception that I was supporting the old CDO. But me, I work for the community. I am a 
neutral person (interview, NWP&TB Community Liaison Officer, 17 April, 2000).116 
Lack of representation, poor communication and inadequate capacity were the main 
underlying reasons for negative perceptions of the MSC. There was also an emphasis 
on the fact that it comprised mainly 'young women' - when it was established it 
comprised seven women (aged between 25 and 40) and three men (aged between 35 
and 63). Only one member was also a member of the Tribal Authority, and - as we 
have seen - he had resigned after a few months. 
Yet, regardless of its accuracy, local people's emphasis on its demographic 
composition illustrated the presence of yet another binary simplification: the MSC 
(and the RDC by association and because of the councillor) were equated with 
women and youth; the chief, the Tribal Authority and the cno with older men. In 
Molatedi, the former had, thus far at least, demonstrated that they were not as 
effective as the latter; therefore older men were regarded as the better option in terms 
of a governance structure. The complex problems oflocal governance (which centred 
around issues of social capital, capacity, role division, communication and 
representation) were thus concealed and then attributed, instead, largely to 
genemtional and gender differences - which was also another indication of the 
problems resulting because the MSC members had not been 'democratically' elected 
through majority vote. 
116 It is important to point out that the NWP&TB's Community Liaison Officer is here contradicting 
his position by being openly against the village's state-initiated structures with which it was the 
Board's policy to work. His words indicate a certain lack of understanding for local social and political 
dynamics, and go some way towards explaining why many villagers, as I will show in chapter seven, 
were highly antagonistic towards him. Comments such as: "[the CLO] may as well vaccinate all the 











Furthennore, the local development process (by which he meant the upgrading of 
infrastructure, building of classrooms and so on), at least in the CDO member's view 
presented above, had fonnerly acted as a 'uniting' activity under the leadership of the 
RDP forum and then the CDO, both of which had worked closely with the Tribal 
Authority. Now, because local development was fonnally (in tenns of national 
legislation) under the management of the Rustenburg District Council (to which the 
MSC was aligned), it was seen as being 'used to deny us opportunities'. The 
respondent intended the 'us' to refer to the village as a whole, rather than just the 
CDO or the Tribal Authority, but it is evident that the young women of the MSC were 
not part of that 'us'. He expressed the conflict in the language of exclusion, invoking 
an endogenous/exogenous binary: 'us', the village and the Tribal Authority and 
'them', the RDC and the MSC. He employed an argument similar to Chief Suping' s 
'handouts make fools of people' saying that unlike when 'we used to do things for 
ourselves', 'outsiders' would never work in the best interests of the village. Yet, not 
only did the MSC comprise only village residents, but the RDC councillor herself was 
also from, and resident in, the village. 
Although the CDO member expressed his view of the conflict through a series of 
binaries: endogenous/exogenous; male/female; elders/youth, which were clearly 
divided along the CDOIMSC and Tribal AuthoritylRDC lines, it was apparent that the 
conflict was actually about representation, control and delivery. It is possible, of 
course, that tensions would have been negligible, or at least democratically managed, 
in an ideal scenario where all villagers were effectively represented by the MSC and 
development had progressed smoothly. But it remains that the establishment of the 
MSC in Molatedi created greater societal divisions than before, rather than more 
effecti ve representation. 
The respondents' opinions cited above reveal, too, that many villagers perceived 
capacity to be a major problem with the MSC. According to a Molatedi businessman: 
"The local leadership is not exposed [sic]. They cannot drive the objectives of the 
government locally. They are struggling" (interview, Molatedi resident, 10 September 











The snag is that, in these villages, you will find committees that have been elected, but 
they are not capacitated and empowered. They always wait to see what the Kgosi 
[chief] wants done: they depend on me. These committees need to be guided. They 
have no real knowledge and they don't know what they are doing. They literally do not 
know how to communicate with the Park [MGR]. You find a semi-literate person 
having to deal with a person like you, and it is very difficult for them to understand 
and communicate with you. Mr Leitner [the MGR Warden] can come and speak 
English, but they will not really understand (interview, Chief Suping, 29 August 2000). 
A convincing view of the situation could be that such dependency on ChiefSuping 
was because of his prior experience in the political sphere, because he was perceived 
as being part of the bigger 'outsider' picture. A former CDO member in Molatedi, 
and one who had undergone formal training in Pilanesberg also stressed that capacity, 
particularly in comparison with the CDO, was a central failing of the MSC: 
They dissolved the COOs and came with a new committee called the Molatedi Service 
Committee. But the COO had been there for many years. They [the COO members] 
had experience and know what they are talking about - why couldn't we just add youth 
or add whoever you want to add on that COO committee? But the politicians weren't 
happy about that and said 'no, we want the people to elect a new committee.' ... To be 
honest they elected a lot of youth who were lacking knowledge as far as I am 
concerned, and some of them were not able to learn (interview, Molatedi, 11 
September 2000).117 
Recognising that the MSC needed training, the Madikwe Initiative added capacity 
building to its agenda, rather than looking for solutions locally. The training was 
carried out by the Pretoria-based DfID funded Centre for Opportunity Development 
(COD). But MSC members (who were the targets of COD's attention) were highly 
critical of its practices. For example: 
That COD - they kept changing their training timetable, changing the dates and not 
turning up, or coming very late. It is unacceptable. They ate being paid by DfID because 
of us. They come down here and get paid for doing nothing. Often they don't even bring 
their teaching aids, like flip charts and pens. It is frustrating (MSC member, 10 
September 2000). 
According to the MSC chairperson, the training was thoroughly unsuccessful. She 
said: ''most of the information is useless, as we can't apply it" (14 September 2000), 
indicating that it is insufficient for 'outsiders' simply to descend from on high 
117 In his work in the Eastern Cape, Ntsebeza (1999), too, found that problems with the capacity of new 
committees was not unusual. There were still Transitional Local Councils in the context he describes, 
which was the period before national post apartheid legislation had created a system of district 
councils: "Where rural people have been exposed to an alternative form of rural local government, it 
has been to the TrepCs [Transitional Local Councils]. However ... capacity problems encountered by 
the TrepCs, coupled with the fact that they are not visible and available, have led many rural people to 











(pretoria) and 'capacitate' people. Capacity building is a larger, longer-tenn process 
which needs to be locally driven and sustained by local knowledge and ideas 
(interview with Joel Bolnick, People's Dialogue, Cape Town,S June 2002).1l8 
Frequently, respondents explained that their major concern regarding the MSC was its 
demographic profile, heavily dominated as it was by women and youth. Given that 
initially the MSC comprised ten members, seven women and three men, such 
concerns were not unfounded. Of the original ten, one woman resigned due to ill 
health, and one man left, said the MSC chairperson (14 September, 2000), without 
giving a reason. The chairperson agreed that the predominance of inexperienced but 
aspirant youth on the committee was problematic. She said: 
It's true that many people [on the MSC] are very young, and they do not have all the 
necessarY knowledge. The problem is that they may leave the committee because 
they want to findjobs. We had a misunderstanding when the committee was set up: 
they were told by the RDe councillor that they would be paid, but they never were. 
So now they want to leave, and that's why young people ate a problem. It would be 
better to mix them with old people, too (interview, 14 September, 2000). 
Thus, acknowledged and recognised from within its own structures a pivotal problem 
with the MSC was, indeed, based on societal divisions - the age and gender of its 
members. This was compounded by a series of associated social structural 
constraints, the most pertinent being that the young members needed to seek wage 
employment, unlike the older men of the Tribal Authority and CDO, many of whom 
were state pension recipients. Similarly, while older men had had years of experience 
and training in administration and knew the social networks and how the whole 
administrative process worked, the youth of the MSC had no such experience. They 
were at a distinct disadvantage, a disadvantage that went well beyond the committee's 
lack of representi vity. 
Moreover, as the chairperson added, representational failings were only the beginning 
of the problems the MSC had to contend with. Even more problematic for her was 
that the MSC did not have a clearly defined role and, rather than being delegated any 
power or control by either the RDC or the Tribal Authority, was continuously 
llS I return to issues of capacity building and sustainability in the context of the Madikwe Initiative 











undennined by both, stuck in an intensely uncomfortable and awkward position in the 
middle of a conflict between the two competing forms of governance. She explained: 
My job is very difficult. Everyone is always shouting at me .... like with the water 
standpipes - many of the connections never happened because the [resident district] 
councillor is in mourning so ~ to send someone else to the tribal office119 to inform 
them that the house connections could start; but she still hasn't sent someone, and she 
is the only one to mow the answer why. They started putting in the standpipes in 
August 1997, but then we were told in February 1998 that we'd have to pay suddenly a 
bill ofR8700 divided amongst the whole village. Rachel Matlapeng [the resident 
district councillor] said the money [to pay for the connections] had already been 
allocated [elsewhere]. Some people who were away, living in Jo'burg as an example, 
were not using the water but had to pay still- Rl7 a month. In February 2000 
everyone stopped paying, [saying] why didn't they have water in their houses yet? 
They were promised last year. So everyone is shouting at me about water, but it is all 
up to Rachel and there is nothing I can do. These are the services of the government 
and she is the representative of the government If things went directly from the 
government to the tribal office and the MSC then things would be OK, we would have 
control. But it is not like that, so I can honestly say I don't mow what is the reason for 
the MSC ['s existence]. The only problem is the RDC. They want to get hold of 
everything and they don't want to tell the Tribal Authority. So they don't tell the MSC 
and then the Tribal Authority doesn't know - I do not have the correct information 
when they are asking .... The MSC together with the Tribal Authority should write to 
the RDC to tell them of all these problems. For example, the vending machine [for 
electricity coupons] is sitting there in Rachel's office, so no one can use it. But the 
Tnbal Authority doesn't want to [complain to the RDC]. I don't know why not Then 
with the roads, the MGR asked the government to pay for the roads to be improved, 
and the ROC is [has been] saying that the roads will be improved for a long time, but 
nothing happens, and I don't know why not, even when people are asking me 
(interview, 14 September, 2000). 
~e chairperson's frustration with what she saw as her thankless role was 
understandable. Her description of her difficult position suggests that the MSC was 
indeed little more than an ill-used puppet of the ROC's resident councillor - a 
position the chairperson seemed anxious to change as is evident from her stated 
antagonism towards the resident councillor and from the fact that she was attempting, 
she said, to ally the MSC more with the Tribal Authority than the ROC, even going as 
far as to suggest that the Tribal Authority and the MSC should write to the ROC 
together to complain about the councillor. Given its lack of autonomy and 
achievement it was also not difficult to see why the MSC attracted criticisms of the 
kinds cited earlier from village residents. 
The resident councillor was undeniably a major factor that prejudiced many people 
against the RDC (and, by unwilling association, the MSC, too). I tried repeatedly, 
throughout my fieldwork, to meet with Councillor Matlapeng. I wrote several letters, 











phoned her numerous times, and was finally rewarded with an appointment. But she 
failed to appear or to contact me to apologise. 1 redoubled my efforts to see her, was 
again given an appointment, and again was left knocking uselessly at her front door. 
The third time this happened, in September 2000, my field assistant could not 
suppress his sardonic smile: "That woman, she is most unreliable. She does not like to 
make herself available for people". It was evident that my own frustrating 
experiences in trying to meet with the councillor were far from unusual. 
Less than a: year before the commencement of my fieldwork the councillor's husband 
had died. According to my Molatedi field assistant, under customary law a widow 
and a widower are considered bad luck and therefore their actions and movements are 
restricted. They are supposed to stay at home, especially at and around noon. They 
are not allowed to enter the tribal court while in mourning - which lasts for one year. 
Many key respondents (such as the MSC chairperson quoted above) explained that, 
instead of sending a letter or a representative, the councillor used this customary law 
to avoid communicating with the chief or the Tribal Authority, which caused 
immense antagonism. According to Molatedi's ChiefMatlapeng: "The councillor is a 
messenger of the chief. She must supply me with genuine information whatsoever the 
circumstances" (interview, 14 April, 2000). The NWP&TB Community Liaison 
Officer described his view of the situation as follows: "I know about the squabble as 
well between Rachel [the district councillor] and the chief. The chief says 'I own -
this is my property' and Rachel says 'this is my area of jurisdiction'. So it is like two 
bulls in one kraal" (interview, 17 April, 2000). 
Chief Matlapeng was adamant, particularly when it came to development 
interventions, that the Tribal Authority was the only structure that could guarantee 
effective representation and communication - especially when it came to liaising with 
development agents. Regarding the Madikwe project, he said: 
At the very beginning, in 1991, when the Reserve was first established, who were they 
dealing with? The Tribal Authority. Then the COO was started and they liaised 
directly with them. But Mr Thomas Matlapeng [a member of the Tribal Authority] was 
there [on the COO] to represent us ... But, from the beginning, they dealt with the 
Tnbal Authority. So why then are they now asking who to liaise with? The Tribal 
Authority is the most immediate authority and no structure supersedes that. Weare the 
custodians of community assets and aspirations. We need to be aware of what is 
happening .... Whatever information they have, they must communicate to us, in 











must communicate with us and we can inform the community and invite all the 
different structures and tell them the information. ... Don't go to the other structures or 
else the information will not reach the community (ChiefMatlapeng, Molatedi, 5 July 
2000). 
It is clear that Chief Matlapeng saw himself and the Tribal Authority as the only 
effective conduit of information between outside agencies such as the NWP&TB and 
Mafisa, and what he regarded as the Molatedi community. His words mirror almost 
exactly those of Chief Suping: "To keep the community informed you must start with 
the head. Then we can call our communities together and tell them what is going on" 
(interview, Chief Suping, 29 August 2000).120 
The evidence from my fieldwork suggests that there was much truth in the two chiefs' 
words. In all three villages, all respondents knew how to access the tribal authorities 
because they operated through an established ward system. For example, in Molatedi, 
one respondent explained how the village was headed by the chief, who had two 
advisors. The village was then divided into eight different wards, each subdivided 
into different groupings and headed by ward head advisors. The chain of 
communication was clear. Ward leaders report to the chief, 'clan' leaders report to 
ward leaders, and everyone else reports to their specific' clan' leaders.121 Ward heads 
met with the chief and his two advisors regularly, usually three times a week. Now 
and then the chief would hold a meeting for the entire village (about 3500 people), 
but usually only about a quarter of the population would attend (interview, Molatedi 
resident, 3 April 2000).122 The system was tried and known. 
On the other hand, many people were unclear about the communication channels to 
district councillors. In Supingstad and Lekgophung some people were even unsure 
who the responsible district councillor was, or whether there was such a person. In 
Molatedi, as I have shown, the locally resident member of the district council was 
120 Quoted in chapter four, page 103. 
121 See note 64 above. I use 'clan' here simply because that is the English language term used locally 
to describe units below the level of ward - what Schapera (1953 [1991]:40) called a 'family-group'. 
122 See chapter two, pages 36-37 where I provide an explanation of the ward system in early Tswana 











often seen as obstructive and as contributing to infonnation blockages between the 
RDC and the Tribal Authority.123 
Such was the suspicion surrounding the councillor in Molatedi, and so negative were 
perceptions about the efficacy of the MSC, that the chiefand the Tribal Authority 
were often viewed as the better governance option. The situation provides support for 
the point Spiegel (1995) made in his submission to the Constitutional Assembly 
regarding the role of traditional authorities: ''the only structure that many people 
respect sufficiently to grant it authority is the institution of traditional leadership" 
(1995:4).124 
. In a context such as Molatedi, where there was a seemingly continuous progression of 
new committees, coupled with a definite lack of capacity in the newly created and 
supposedly democratic structures, it is unsurprising that people still expressed greater 
support for the chief and Tribal Authority than for the RDC or the MSC. One good 
reason given for such support was that when the CDO, finnly aligned as it had been 
with the chief and his Tribal Authority, had been coordinating development, it had 
succeeded in delivering highly visible projects, such as the classroom block, and had 
thus won local legitimacy. The MSC had no such obvious successes to its credit - and 
in fact was perceived by many to have failed not only in sourcing funding for village 
led initiatives but even in coordinating the delivery of government services such as 
water and electricity supply. Although development management under the CDO and 
governance under the Tribal Authority may have been far from ideal, many still 
viewed those structures as better and more effective than the combination comprising 
the resident district councillor, the RDC and the MSC - which were failing not only 
to communicate, but also to deliver, failures that were immediately noted. The chief 
123 Indeed, by the time of writing, and after the 2004 elections, Ms Matlapeng no longer held the office 
she did during my fieldwork period. 
124 Latham (2004), drawing on his fieldwork in Zimbabwe's upper Guruve and Zvimba, came to a 
similar conclusion: "The only institutions that are continuously present, and that have relevance for 
local communities, are those rooted in the indigenous system of governance ... the resilience of the 
indigenous or customary institutions derives from two major components: first these institutions have 
congruence with the people's worldviews and perceptions of governance of daily life, and with the 
management of resources; and secondly they are solidly based within the community, linked to the 
kinship system and their nested levels of jurisdiction. While it is undoubtedly true that central 
government, political parties, local governments and NGOs have disturbed and influenced these 
institutions ... it is also true that this influence seems to have had remarkably little impact over a 
relatively long period ... In most cases it is to the traditional rather than the statutory authority that 











and his Tribal Authority in Molatedi thus gained renewed support, albeit perhaps 
largely by default, with the fonnal replacement of the COO by the MSC; and in the 
process any hopes outsiders such as the NWP &TB may have had of introducing new 
structures, that (to introduce one side of another binary) might supersede a 
supposedly pre-modem (chief-based) system of local governance, were further 
thwarted. Such was the situation in Molatedi when Mafisa began work there in 1998. 
The following section illustrates, through the example of the Bopitikelo Community 
Centre, and the processes that led to its (semi) construction, how the presence of the 
resource rich Madikwe Initiative intensified governance conflicts in the village. 
The Bopitikelo Community Centre: Focussing the Conflicts 
In 1998, Mafisa initiated what came to be known as the Bopitikelo Community 
Centre in Molatedi. The project's aim was to build a community centre which could 
house various small businesses, be a place for villagers to meet, and act as a venue for 
cultural tourism, drawing in visitors from the Reserve. From its conception, however, 
the community centre project was caught up in the cross-fire of Molatedi politics. To 
begin with, Mafisa had liaised with the NWP&TB-instigated COO (which, 
remember, was closely aligned with the chief and the Tribal Authority). The COO 
had suggested the centre should be built on a site on a nearby hillside. But, before 
building had begun, the COO had been replaced by the MSC which, as we have seen, 
was closely controlled by the resident Rustenburg district councillor. The ROC, 
through the councillor, advised Mafisa that a site closer to the village and alongside 
the Marico River would be more suitable. Mafisa accepted the opinion and building 
went ahead. Little more than the foundations and walls had been built before heavy 
rains came at the.beginning of2000. The Marico filled and swelled andeventua11y 
overflowed. The Bopitikelo Centre, perched on its ROC-chosen riverside site was 
severely inundated. According to one Molatedi resident: 
When they [Mafisa] started, people did not really understand what was going on, why 
the centre was being built It was not properly explained. The Rustenburg [District] 
Council advised Mafisa badly and the result was that the centre was bUilt too close to 
the river. Then when the rains came the centre was terribly flooded. If they had 
explained things properly to the village this would not have happened. They should 
have asked the village where to build this centre. Now it is too close to the river. Who 
can make a business there? Why build a centre? When it comes to money, Mafisa are 
not doing a good job. They have done nothing to improve people's lives. The 











left for it. Now it won't develop. It is nothing (interview with middle aged woman, 
Molatedi Resident, 8 April, 2000). 
And another: 
Mafisa wanted to build a cultural centre and the CDO chose a good site. Then suddenly 
the MSC came along and undermined the COO. Suddenly the COO were no more. They 
were told nothing. Suddenly Mafisa was with this MSC and they didn't even tell us they 
were no longer going to be with us. And then the ROC told them to build the cultural 
centre next to the river. No one paid any attention to the site the CDO had chosen. I can't 
say anything [more] about that centre: have you heard how it was flooded? (interview 
with older man, Tribal Authority and former CDO member, 13 April, 2000). 
It is significant that both respondents expressed the conflicts as being fundamentally 
about autonomy, participatory democracy and representation. Both attributed the 
failure of the Bopitikelo project to Mafisa's choice of working with the exogenous 
RDC and the MSC. Indeed, not one of my many respondents125 expressed a wholly 
positive opinion about the centre, and the majority blamed its failure on the RDC. 
The situation illustrates how local governance, with the political tensions inherent in 
it, is unavoidably intermeshed with the implementation of development initiatives. 
The Madikwe Initiative could not but become involved in local politics because it 
was compelled to liaise with one structure or another. As implementers of what was 
essentially a government initiative, Mafisa consultants stated repeatedly that they 
were obliged to work with whichever committee was apparently most closely aligned 
to what they understood to b  the nationally recognised democratic structures oflocal 
government, in this case, theRDC with its MSC. But in Molatedi it was difficult to 
do so without alienating other committees and local governance structures. 
Furthennore, as we have seen, it is questionable how democratic those recognised 
structures actually were. 
Returning to the semi-constructed, much contested Bopitikelo Centre, it was 
fortuitous that, the main conflict having been expressed in terms of the location 
chosen for it, the river then flooded. This demonstrated the apparent ineptness of 
those whose voices had been predominant in the decision. It thereby fuelled the 
endogenous argument that the RDC, considered locally to be external to Molatedi's 
125 Either in the questionnaire surveyor other interviews and conversations. They included members of 











affairs, could not know the village's situation and would therefore necessarily have 
'advised Mafisa badly', despite the fact that one of the district councillors was from, 
and resided in, Molatedi. The Bopitikelo Centre thus became a locus for the 
expression oflocal conflict - with its internal and external political oars. It is indeed 
ironic that the building, intended to be a community centre, had come to be seen by 
many village residents as a product of insensitive, if not foolish, outside intervention 
that had bypassed community interests in ways similar to those described by Carter 
(1985, 1986) regarding the Steinkopfand Epeleging Community Centres in 
Namaqualand and Jabavu, Soweto respectively, albeit during the apartheid era. 
Soon after I left the Madikwe area, an article on the Bopitikelo Centre appeared in a 
built environmentllandscape magazine. The article quotes the architect as saying that 
"ThrQughout the building programme we have worked through a process of 
consultation between the tribal authorities and the newly elected democratic 
structures oflocal government" (Urban Green File, MarchlApril2001 :41). In no 
place in the article is that 'process of consultation' problematised. Nor is there any 
consideration of the limits of authority of any of the consulted structures, or that the 
fact that villagers were not represented by, or united under, any single structure might 
have been in any way problematic. On the contrary the article states: "Bopitikelo is 
the Tswana name for 'the place ofwallowing,126 ... The site has an understated 
tranquillity and the architecture is conceived to create a sense of place in sympathy 
with this" (Urban Green File, MarchlApriI2001:39).127 
In interview after interview respondents I spoke with in the village made it clear that 
the site was a place of overpowering conflict rather than understated tranquillity. It 
was intriguing that the governance conflicts, which had so severely compromised the 
success of the building's intended function, had not been recognised, nor seen as 
important enough to mention in the architecture magazine. According to Molatedi's 
Chief Matlapeng: 
126 An unfortunate irony, given the centre's contested location 'wallowing' on the Marico floodplain. 
According to my field assistant in Molatedi, Bopitikelo refers to the place where herders would take 
cattle to be watered and where they would afterwards lie and rest 
127 Again the similarities with the Steinkopf, Namaqualand project that Carter (1985) describes are 












With the Bopitikelo Centre, there is no resolution with the community. It is a white 
elephant. The people were not consulted. It is a political strategy of the RDC. The role of 
the !IDC is to bring services to the people. But the community must initiate the 
development projects and then pass them to the councillor who can take them to her 
superiors. And, if the RDC can assist, the councillor must bring that information back to 
the community. But in Molatedi they are not taking project initiatives via the community. 
They are coming with projects and imposing them on the community and this is causing 
a lot of tension. The District Council seems to be putting political interest at the forefront 
of projects. They always say the government is ANC and says this and this. We are less 
interested in who is leading the country. Weare not politicians and do not want to be. If 
you differ with them., they tell you that you are still locked in the old mentality of the 
previous government. So the people feel threatened by these things if they are a 
UCDp
128 
member or National Party or what ever is the case. They must not politicise 
things (ChiefMatlapeng, Molatedi, 5 July 2000). 
It is significant how in line Chief Matlapeng' s view is with that of Chief Suping 
which I presented in the previous chapter. Phrases such as 'the people were not 
consulted'; 'the community must initiate the development projects'; 'they are not 
taking project initiatives via the community'; 'They are coming with projects and 
imposing them on the community' indicate that ChiefMatlapeng, too, upheld 
(rhetorically, at least) values of participatory democracy. He viewed himself as the 
protector of his 'subjects' interests. His words clearly demonstrate that as far as he 
was concerned he had a decisive role to play in safeguarding the villagers' welfare 
against external interference by outsiders who come and impose their ideas, ideas that 
often seem to be motivated by what are seen as political ends that are not clear, and 
ideas that bring interventions that are not in villagers' interests. It is pertinent, too, 
that the RDC's choice of site for the Bopitikelo Centre was accepted over the chiefs, 
which goes some way to justifying Chief Suping's statement that ''the chief of 
Molatedi ... [has] been made redundant" (29 August, 2000),129 but also must 
contribute to the chiefs intensely negative opinions about the Centre. 
Chief Matl ap eng blamed the whole situation on what he described as politics, 
expressing the conflict as being impelled by national and regional government 
concerns versus the interests ofviUage residents. In the process, Mafisa came to be 
seen by those in the chiefs camp as linked to national and regional government and 
therefore, at least from Chief Matlepeng' s perspective, as somehow not working in 
the best interests of village people. The chief interpreted outside interventions as 
128 United Christian Democratic Party - the party now led by Lucas Mangope, previously president of 
the 'independent' Bophuthatswana. 











having what he suggested were political motives and biases that were ill-advised and 
inappropriate to local needs. He stated categorically that development should not be 
political. Yet it is evident from his views, such as those quoted above, that the 
bitterness of apartheid politics still strongly flavoured his reasoning. Phrases such as 
'if you differ from them, they tell you that you are still locked in the old mentality of 
the previous government', clearly show the pervasive legacy of apartheid: the 
suspicion and distrust that make 'people feel threatened". Such connotations 
translated into a tendency, both on the part ofMafisa and the chief, to label complex 
local governance issues as one-dimensionally political and to treat those political 
interruptions to local development processes as a product of central government 
concerns that were neither locally made nor locally held and therefore, not locally 
resolvable. 
It is striking how closely Chief Matlapeng also seems to concur with the Madikwe 
Initiative's consultants' antagonism towards what they vi wed as political 
interference in local-level development concerns. Both portrayed as 'politics' 
anything that they saw as disrupting their own particular view of what was needed for 
initiative implementation and local administrative consensus. While in certain 
respects each defined politics differently, both were referring to national-level party 
politics. Of particular significance here is that local politica1leaders (in this case, 
ChiefMatlapeng) had also been drawn into what is essentially Ferguson's (1990) 
anti-politics machine. 130 
Yet, it was precisely through the conflicts they engendered or, rather, accentuated that 
the Madikwe Initiative development process came to be an arena of local political 
contestation, one that was then phrased in terms of national political antagonisms. A 
result, as the case of the Bopitikelo centre indicates, was that many residents became 
hostile to the whole Mafisa-initiated development process. Surely, then, the 
intervention agency's attitude, quoted at the end of chapter four, that 'we cannot get 
involved in local politics' was short-sighted and inappropriate -largely because such 
involvement was unavoidable, because the agency's very presence was construed 
locally as political and because its interventions produced local political 











reverberations. Moreover, the result of that local political involvement by the agency 
was the alienation of a portion ofMolatedi village's residents; and that in tum 
undermined the original democratic principles of the agency's development effort, 
revealing yet another paradox. 
The situation described above ultimately jeopardised the Bopitikelo project as well as 
the Madikwe Initiative's credibility in Molatedi. It also resulted in increasingly 
negative local views about the perceived success of other Madikwe Initiative projects. 
For Madikwe Initiative-linked consultants working on the Bopitikelo Centre, the 
situation was frustrating. Understandably, they would have liked to have seen a single 
committee representing the villagers' interests - such as it had seemed the Makuleke 
CPA was that they had worked with in the Kruger National Park.131 My survey for the 
NWP&TB revealed that respondents in Molatedi and Supingstad were as concerned 
about representation and communication as were the Madikwe Initiative 
consultants.132 Yet neither side in either village could offer a way out of the impasse 
that both recognised as blocking the kind of progress all would have liked to have 
seen achieved. 
The case of the Bopitikelo Centre thus raises important issues centring around 
politics; village autonomy; participatory democracy; representation; communication; 
and, inevitably, power and control. It shows clearly that governance and development 
are inseparable spheres shaped and textured by politics, spheres in which 
development consultants could not and cannot avoid becoming involved. Rather than 
being non-political, the Madikwe Initiative, by working with the ROC, had a definite 
impact on the operation of state power in the village. Its very presence thus further 
aggravated internal village discordance - discordance that the Initiative was unable to 
ameliorate or accommodate and which ultimately jeopardised its success. 
Importantly, as the following section shows, in Lekgophung there was negligible 
discordance: a single committee, the RDP forum, had succeeded in dominating the 
131 I presented the case of the Makuleke in chapter four - see pages 85-89. 
132 l..ekgophung's residents were successfully represented by their RDP forum. At the time of my 
fieldwork it was considered, by over ninety percent of village respondents in the questionnaire survey, 












village's politics. Consequently, Madikwe Initiative interventions had proceeded 
comparatively successfully. 
Lekgophung's RDPForum: Democracy, Strategy or Apathy? 
Lekgophung's ROP forum, rather than being subsumed into the Tribal Authority, was 
neither gender nor generation biased, and comprised a wide range of people: six 
women and nine men, ranging in age from twenty-two to seventy-two. Although the 
chairperson was an older (business)man, there were also several extremely vocal, 
highly politicised women, who engaged with the national narratives of a 'new' South 
Africa which sought to empower those previously disadvantaged by apartheid. These 
women still lived in a village governed by a patriarchal chief and Tribal Authority 
system. Yet none seemed antagonistic toward the chief. For example, according to 
one woman whom I quoted earlier: "Our chief, although he is not as educated as 
Chief Suping, we will stand behind him. We are Balete and we are happy he is our 
chief. We don't care whatever the case may happen: he is our Chief' (young woman, 
Lekgophung ROP forum member, 26 August 2000). While Tribal Authority/district 
council conflicts were, for various reasons, rife in Molatedi, in Lekgophung the more 
directly government-linked structures functioned alongside and collaboratively with 
the Tribal Authority. The Central District Council (CDC), into the jurisdiction of 
which Lekgophung fell, was only ever mentioned in passing - indeed, most 
respondents did not know who the responsible councillor was. Unlike the ROC in 
Molatedi, with its highly visible (albeit inaccessible) resident councillor, it seemed 
that for Lekgophung the CDC was a vague, nebulous, unthreatening shadow in the 
background, one which was only ever mentioned, and then only by the few in the 
know, because it might one day run development initiatives when the Madikwe 
Initiative pulled out of the area. 
According to several members interviewed,the Lekgophung ROP forum had, from 
the very beginning, sought to transcend gender, generational and political party 
differences, thereby to ensure that the majority of villagers were effectively 
represented. The goal of the forum had been explicitly understood to be to act as a 











When we started building up the RDP [forum], the condition was to put every 
organisation in so that we don't have politics included. ANC, UCDP, Inkatha-
whatever the [party] politics. We've got churches, youth organisation representative 
societies, sports, the works. We were trying to do away with [party] politics .... We've 
got a very good relationship with Mafisa, and very heavy contact. We pushed it so that 
we linked again with the CDC [Central District Council] so we are all one unit, 
whatever we do. Because, as much as we know, Mafisa will soon be leaving. When 
their contract is over, the CDC will be taking the responsibility ( older man, 
Lekgophung RDP forum member, 26 August 2000). 
What is immediately striking in the above is the way in which politics (I have myself 
each time inserted the word 'party') is conceptualised, yet again, as something to be 
avoided. Equally striking is the belief that the only way to transcend such political 
differences was to ensure that all factions were included and represented. It was a 
particularly effective strategy in that it forestalled the establishment of other, 
conflicting committees (at least at the time of my fieldwork), thereby avoiding the 
unproductive situation of having a proliferation of competing structures, such as in 
Molatedi. But, perhaps more importantly, ChiefTsiepe and his Tribal Authority in 
Lekgophung appeared to confine their duties to a more administrative role than did 
those same institutions in Supingstad and Molatedi. As a result, conflict between 
different forms of governance was not as problematic as in the other two villages. 
Development interventionists, particularly given the reaction of the general manager 
of the NWP&TB to ChiefSuping, 133 could interpret this as meaning that the village 
or, rather, ChiefTsiepe, was ostensibly more progressive than a man like Chief 
Suping, who, through his detennination to retain control of his traditional role as 
leader, one that, in his case, was seen by many as autocratic leadership, obstructed 
Mafisa's development initiatives. 
But there was an alternative view, one which I heard voiced by various respondents. 
It was that Chief Tsiepe was an older man who did not enjoy the best health. He was 
not well educated in a formal sense and could not speak English. He lacked the skills 
(and perhaps the youthful energy - and health) single handedly to control 
development in the village or to engage in politics at the wider regional or national 
levels. Indeed, when I first arrived in Lekgophung, I went to meet Chief Tsiepe in 
order to ask his permission to conduct fieldwork in the village. Although he 











welcomed me to the village, he did not express much interest in what I intended to do. 
Instead, he immediately referred me to the RDP chairperson. 
In Lekgophung, the RDP forum was apparently better equipped to deal with 
development initiatives than was ChiefTsiepe, and was generally seen as working in 
the village's (and Chief Tsiepe's) best interests. This·lack of conflict meant that 
Madikwe Initiative project implementation had been relatively unproblematic, with 
the consequence that respondents there focussed less on issues of power and control, 
of interpreting development interventions as threatening their autonomy, than did 
respondents in Molatedi. Lekgophung residents had succeeded, early on, in creating a 
representative structure, and the ensuing relative success of development 
interventions in the village134 indicates why such a structure is a central requirement 
within people-based development discourse. However, given the less accommodating 
situations I have described in Supingstad and Molatedi, it remains a an extremely 
challenging requirement - one with which development agencies seem all too often to 
struggle to come to terms. 
Lekgophung's relative success with development projects leads one to ask how the 
village's residents had managed to succeed where the others had failed. One major 
reason was that ChiefTsiepe was, for various reasons, a weak leader. Another reason 
was that many residents ofLekgophung, such as the RDP members mentioned above, 
embraced the new hegemonic ideology ofliberal democracy propounded by the 
Madikwe Initiative, particularly as Lekgophung had previously been the least 
developed village in terms of infrastructure and therefore had most potentially to 
gain. A further factor was that Mafisa's agents targeted them more thoroughly and 
sensitively precisely because their chiefwas apathetic and posed no direct threat to 
the development agents, and because their relative lack of infrastructure made them 
seem to be the poorest. Furthermore, the lack of 'political' conflict and tension over 
governance issues enabled the Madikwe Initiative to liaise with the Lekgophung RDP 
forum without villagers feeling endogenous integrity or autonomy was being 
threatened. 











Representation, Communication and Enduring Conflicts 
But, as I have shown, the lack oflegislated clarity over the respective roles of 
traditional authorities and district councils, while unproblematic in Lekgophung, was 
highly problematic in Molatedi - and, as chapter four illustrated, also in Supingstad, 
although in very different ways. Tensions between the different governance structures 
in Molatedi were the product of a highly complex web of clashes and inconsistencies, 
in part a result of central government seeking to impose alternative, supposedly 
representative organs of governance on a rural village. That the representivity of 
those organs was also highly Questionable, coupled with the fact that they were failing 
to deliver, heightened local negative perceptions about them. In the case of Molatedi, 
it is not difficult to see how, as Ntsebeza (2002) argues, chiefly support can come to 
be defined in the negative as a default position: that people may not so much be 
supporting the chief, as not supporting newer nationally legislated local governance 
structures. 
One respondent suggested that the only solution to the conflict between the Molatedi 
Service Committee and the Tribal Authority, with its (former) CDO linkages, would 
be to establish an entirely new committee: "The chief, he thinks we should just take 
back the old CDO and add the MSC or whatever the case may be. But I say no way. 
There will be arguments and you will get nowhere" (older man, ward leader, 6 May 
2000). Given that tensions clearly stemmed from the presence of too many 
overlapping committees and structures, none of which had succeeded in being 
representative, it seems unlikely that the establishment of yet another committee 
would suddenly have solved issues of representation in Molatedi. 
The unresolved (and perhaps, within the framework of the kinds ofloca1 governance 
structures I have described, irresolvable) issues of representation and communication 
were put forward by 74% of village respondents135 in Supingstad and 68% in 
Molatedi as the most detrimental factors hindering the possibility of villagers . 
maximising- or even realising any- benefits from the Madikwe Game Reserve's 











presence on the borders of their villages. 136 For example, according to one young man 
from Supingstad: 
I realise that our village hasn't got a relevant representative that can attend meetings 
with the Reserve [management] so that information can be heard. So we must not 
blame the Reserve alone. What we must know is who represents the Reserve to the 
village and then we can choose someone who will represent our village at the Reserve. 
Otherwise this [development process] cannot be a success (interview, 28 August, 
2000). 
The NWP &TB did in fact have a Community Liaison Officer, just as Mafisa 
employed a Field Coordinator, both of whom were supposed to reside and work in the 
Reserve. Yet, during my fieldwork I observed that both officers spent a significant 
amount of time away from the Madikwe area. To many village respondents these 
officers were as frustratingly absent or elusive as effective village representative 
committees were to consultants. 137 Yet, as the respondent quoted above said, without 
effective representation and communication, development 'cannot be a success'. 
Once again it is difficult to avoid concluding that for development interventions to 
proceed smoothly their agents require a village-driven, representative organisational 
structure (such as Lekgophung's RDP forum) with which to work. But, as the 
situation in Molatedi illustrates, development agents may find, instead, several 
conflicting and overlapping committees and structures operating in a given locality, 
their very presence often a product of other development interventions. Furthermore, 
such tensions can become focused in the eye of the development encounter with its 
attendant resources. Ultimately, the success of the Madikwe Initiative's own 
interventions was jeopardised by its inability to accommodate governance conflicts, 
as case of the Bopitikelo Centre illustrated. By working with the RDC and its 
associated MSC,138 Mafisa alienated those villagers who supported the chief, his 
Tribal Authority, the 'fonner' RDP forum and the local CDO, and thereby 
undermined the Initiative's original democratic principles. An ideological reliance on 
'democracy' within people-based development discourse is thus deeply problematic, 
136 As I have said, over 90% of respondents in Lekgophung said the RDP forum effectively represented 
the village. It was no doubt because of this that representation and communication were not put 
forward as problematic issues to any significant extent by respondents in that village. 
137 For more details about the CLO and Field Coordinator see the section Absent Management and the 
~estion of Autonomy in chapter seven. 
1 8 Chosen ostensibly because according to statutory law they were the most democratic and 











especially when that is read to mean cooperation only with nationally constituted 
formal structures on the.grounds that they alone represent what is democratic. 
A related irony is that many respondents themselves phrased their resentment about 
Mafisa's decision to work with the ROC in terms of appeals to and about democracy 
and autonomy. They claimed that the MSC had not been elected by popular vote (and 
was therefore neither democratic nor representative) and that the ROC was an 
exogenous committee which did not know the village and did not have villagers' 
interests at heart, a factor exacerbated by the fact that Rachel Matlapeng was an 
appointed member of the ROC, not a constituency representative. In this way, the 
interface between the Madikwe Initiative and its Mafisa and NWP&TB agents on one 
hand and many Molatedi residents on the other became an arena oflocal political 
contestation in which the Madikwe Initiative was revealed as not only undennining 
village autonomy, but also failing to implement its interventions along so-called 
democratic channels. It was not able to embrace or accommodate the heterogeneous 
diversity ofMolatedi,.and the result, yet again, was alienation and exclusion. 
In the following chapter I show that it was not only the Madikwe developmental 
approach that caused such alienation and exclusion (as this and the previous chapter 













'The Far Side of the Country': Perceptions, Paradoxes and 
Miscommunications regarding the role of Madikwe Game 
Reserve. 
This thesis's opening epigram quotes the words of one of the few village residents 
who, at the time of my fieldwork, had secured permanent employment within the 
Reserve: "Madikwe Game Reserve is really most necessary: it helps to take the 
squash out of the past twenty years" (interview with a J aci' s Camp security guard 
from Lekgophung, 19 July 2000). Undoubtedly, Madikwe was a major, and highly 
visible, source of economic opportunity in this remote, rural area of South Africa. 
However, during my fieldwork I found that with fewer than ninety residents139 from 
the three villages that were the focus of the Madikwe Initiative directly employed in 
the Reserve, and the Community Trust pund140 not yet functioning, most villagers 
had not experienced any tangible economic benefits coming from the Reserve. The 
situation had led another village resident, also a lodge employee, to reflect sadly: "a 
community like this, they are very much sidelined. They are on the far side of the 
country ... " (interview, Maintenance Worker from Molatedi, Jaci's Camp, 21 August 
2000). Yet, as this chapter will show, to the majority of my respondents in the 
villages the Reserve represented more than the possibility of economic development 
and immediate employment opportunities. It stood for the conservation of South 
Africa's natural heritage, a heritage with which many villagers wished to identify and 
wanted to experience first hand. 
13~his figure includes employees who do not originally come from the area, but who had secured 
employment in the Reserve and were renting accommodation in one of the three villages. Excluded in 
the figure are people who come from other villages, such as Obakeng on the far side ofMolatedi, 
which are also in close proximity to the Reserve and should therefore be considered 'local', but are 
excluded as they are not part of the 'local community' (Molatedi, Supingstad and Lekgophung) as 
defined by the Madikwe Initiative. 
140 Once the Reserve had covered its start up and operational costs and had started making a profit the 
original idea was that the NWP&TB would establish a Community Trust Fund into which forty percent 
of the Reserve's profit would go for community development projects. To this day no such fund has 











The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how the very conceptualisation and 
structure of the Reserve justified and perpetuated the exclusion of villagers from 
sharing in the natural heritage created through its conservation activities, rather than 
enabling that to occur. The chapter builds on chapters four and five which established 
that a high proportion of local residents came to be left out of the developmental 
drive of the Madikwe project because NWP&TB and Madikwe Initiative agents 
adhered to a developmental approach that was too inflexible to adapt to local 
idiosyncrasies. And it shows that that same inflexibility and lack of ability to 
understand local people's wishes and perceptions underlay the exclusion ofloca1 
villagers form opportunities to share in the natural heritage that the Reserve 
represented. 
A primary concern of the chapter is to discuss differing notions of participation and 
involvement between the components of the Madikwe project's so-called three way 
partnership.141 I show that there was no unanimous understanding of the role the 
Reserve should play, and thus there were also considerably different perceptions as to 
its success. The resulting conflicts of view raise important questions, which this 
chapter will address, about how (and in whose view) success should be measured. 
Ultimately the residents of Supingstad, Lekgophung and Molatedi remained, in the 
words of the villager cited above, "very much sidelined" and "on the far side of the 
country". Yet, as the preceding chapters have described, according to the NWP&TB 
and the Madikwe Initiative, the fundamental role of the Reserve was to render 'the far 
side of the country' a central focal point for economic development. 
Madikwe: A Modernising Force and an Escape from Modernity? 
Within the Madikwe project's economic development objective there is an intriguing 
paradox: the main stated purpose ofMadikwe is to stimulate a depressed rural 
economy, to develop (read: modernise) a cohort of previously marginalised villages 
and their residents to the point where they can function productively in a national 
(and global) market economy. The proposed and planned method of generating 
141 As I have explained in the previous chapters, according to NWP&TB documents (see, for example, 
Davies, 1997) the Madikwe project was structured around a three-way partnership between the 
NWP&TB, the private sector and what was imagined was the local community - a misguided, highly 











revenue for that development process is ecotourism, which is dependent on wildlife 
conservation for the benefit of aflluent tourists. As the managing agency, the 
NWP&TB's first aim, therefore, was (and is) to attract such tourists. And the 
NWP &TB worked on an assumption that tourists are attracted because Madikwe 
offers an escape from modernity, from the unrelenting pace and 'homogenising' 
tendencies of urban life. The Reserve, like other conservation areas, is thus marketed 
as an area of wilderness, an idyllic rural arcadia, a place to retreat from the banality 
of urban grind. One NWP&TB brochure reads: 
The great, sun-drenched plains of Africa, pristine bushveld still populated by its 
original wildlife ... This sounds like an ecotourist's fantasy - but it is in fact what the 
North West Province offers to vacationers, busy people in search of weekend 
relaxation .... An overnight stay remote from city lights and noises, with the sounds 
and wild calls of the African bush as backdrop, is an unforgettable wildlife 
experience .... The stinging glare of the windscreen, the rough, dusty trail, the dense, 
harsh bush, the clear, cobalt sky, the still, moonlit night, the crackle of the log fire, the 
crispness of the dawn, the dew on the spider web, the teem of crickets ... if these are 
images which when con~ured inspire you and entice you, then the North West is for 
you (NwP&TB: 1999). 42 
In effect, as far as advertising and tourist expectations go, Madikwe is a sanctuary 
from modernity. It stands for South Africa as it ostensibly used to be: a wild, 
indigenous, unspoilt landscape, where visitors can be at one with nature, where 
danger is a clean danger, expected from encounters with proud, fierce lions or 
majestically angry elephants, rather than the dirty dangers of urban life, social 
sicknesses such as rape, shootings and hijackings. 143 Madikwe is thus represented as 
a solid, tangible manifestation of a nostalgic longing for the (mythical) purity of a 
bygone rural past. 
Yet, not much longer than ten years ago the land that today comprises Madikwe was 
what ecologists called an unhealthy landscape of degraded, over-grazed farmland. l44 
Now, it is a carefully constructed, conserved 'wilderness' area It is a representation 
of a chosen yet ostensibly timeless era, an era that pre-dates agriculture. It is a 
142 NWP&TB has been prolific in its production of such passages. I feel it necessary only to quote the 
one, to which I will refer back later in the chapter, in order for the reader to understand the gist of the 
NWP&TB's depiction ofMadikwe. 
143 I use terms in this paragraph, such as 'clean' and 'dirty' dangers and 'social sicknesses', in an 
ironic, generalised sense. I expect the reader to realise that I am aware that such terms are highly 
contested and problematic. They do not reflect my views on social issues, but neither is it within the 
scope of this thesis to enter into such an analysis. 











landscape void of people, yet simultaneously a world encapsulated within electrified 
fences and patrolled by anned guards; an area where one roams from the safety of a 
modem game-viewing vehicle driven by a game ranger, and returns at night to the 
state-of-the-art comforts of a luxurious lodge. It is, essentially, a powerful 
contemporary representation of an imagined past. 
The Hidden Power of Landscape Representation 
Before delving into the mechanisms that have produced Madikwe's landscape it is 
constructive to cast an eye over wider academic landscape scholarship, in particular 
post-structuralist approaches to landscape analysis (see, for example, Cosgrove, 1984; 
Daniels and Cosgrove, 1988; Baudrillard, 1987; Althusser, 1970; Bames and Duncan, 
1992; McGreevy, 1992; Smith, 1993). From a post-structuralist perspective a logical 
hypothesis to put forward is that a landscape such as Madikwe's is deceptive 
precisely because it seems to be no more than the sum of its visible parts: a wild, 
unspoilt piece of South Africa as it ostensibly always was. It appears to be natural and 
innocent (Duncan and Duncan, 1992), but it is what Umberto Eco (1983) might call a 
hyperreallandscape, a term that 0 Tuathail (1992), drawing on Baudrillard (1983, 
1987) defines as "a condition where reality has lost its referent, and models, 
simulations or scripts of the real become more real than the real itself' (1992: 157). 
As I will show, Madikwe is undoubtedly a cultural construction with profound socio-
cultural, political and ideological influences and underpinnings that function (albeit 
unintentionally) to exclude local residents. It is a landscape shaped, approached and 
understood by and through 'scripts,.145 Madikwe has been scripted as wild, natural 
and pure - with its 'great, sun-drenched plains' and 'dense, harsh bush' .146 The 
145 0 Tuathail defines scripts as "a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and 
attributes which are deemed relevant and appropriate to defining a place ... " (1992: 156). In the context 
of US. foreign policy towards apartheid South Africa (the hegemonic operation of power in the 
justification of sanctions), 0 Tuathail writes: ''In helping to constitute a 'reality' scripts structure ways 
of seeing and admit only certain political possibilities as ways of responding to that 'reality'. They are 
propagandistic not because they manipulate some supposedly non-discursive real but because they 
constitute it and attempt to tie it into a persuasive story designed to explain the messy complexity of 
events in a simple fashion" (1992: 157-158). Apartheid South Africa, 0 Tuathail argues, was 
simplistically scripted as a 'morally repugnant place', 'the tragic continent and bleeding country'. In 
such a way, its socio-cultural, political, economic and historical complexities were 'disciplined' or 
swept away and US foreign policy was able to adopt an uncomplicated position of 'moral clarity' and 
'unambiguous non-involvement' (1992: 156). 











'messy complexity of events' that fonned and shaped it has been tidied away, 
obscured by powerful but simplistic representations. 
The metaphor of landscape as text is a useful mechanism for establishing an 
epistemological approach to deconstruct what often appear to be unquestioned, 
natural readings oflandscapes. 147 Such an approach lends itself to unravelling and 
scrutinising the seemingly stable ideologies that infonn landscapes. The inevitable 
power structures that lie behind landscape representations are thus revealed - the 
'dynamics of power' shaping how we view the world (Barnes and Duncan, 1992). 
While it is important to bear in mind Bunn's warning that it is all too easy to "settle 
into a narrow reading oflandscapes as fonns of ideological production and 
subjection" (1992:3), such deconstructions can nonetheless generate insights about 
cultural meanings and values. 
Madikwe, as any deliberately contrived space, is a representation. To quote Daniels 
and Cosgrove: 
[Landscapes] may be represented in a variety of materials and on many surfaces - in 
paint, on canvas, in writing on paper, in earth, stone, water, and vegetation on the 
ground. A landscape park is more palpable but no more real, nor less imaginary, than a 
landscape painting or poem (1988:1). 
The extreme example of the eighteenth century British landscape gardener, Lancelot 
'Capability' Brown is at the germinal point oflaridscape creation. His work, and how 
it is received and interpreted still today, infonns my hypothesis of Madikwe as a 
hyperrea1landscape. I therefore ask the reader to forgive a brief excursion into the 
example of rural England. 
An Excursion to Rural England 
'Capability' Brown's landscapes were obvious constructions, infonned by prevailing 
notions of how the countryside should appear. Whole parklands were shaped by his 
art. Such obviously contrived landscapes, Bunn argues, were becoming increasingly 
147 As Barnes and Duncan write: " ... 'text' is an appropriate trope to use in analysing landscapes 
because it conveys the inherent instability of meaning, fragmentation or absence of integrity, lack of 
authorial control, polyvocality and irresolvable social contradictions that often characterize them" 
(1992:7) Similarly, accordiilg to Pugh, ''How a landscape is 'read' illustrates the primary role that 











unpopular by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Notions of the picturesque 
were dominant and contrived landscapes often dismissed as the ~'despised 'unnatural' 
clumps and belts that made up the semiotic of a Capability Brown estate 
improvement" (Bunn,1992:5). Yet they nevertheless retained a certain power to 
reconfirm false imaginings of what constitutes the countryside. They were and are 
solid and tangible manifestations of unrealistic representations. 
Such representations have been informed by centuries of artists, writers and poets 
who have also ignored the harsh realities, the strife of agricultural life, and 
contributed to the myth of rural England. 148 Indeed, Pugh (1990) argues that: "The 
verbal interpolates the visual, ... [that] the discourse of 'landscape' and the 'rural' was 
first negotiated through verbal modes of representation" (1990:2-3).149 How we 
experience particular landscapes cannot be divorced from, indeed is determined by, 
"descriptive language which modifies, even constitutes ways of seeing landscape" 
(ibid). Hence, on the basis of idealised representations, rural England is imagined as 
an idyllic arcadia, a series of bucolic landscapes where nature and agriculture coexist 
unproblematically and harmoniously. 150 Dryden wrote: "How blessed is he, who leads 
a country life, Unvex'd with anxious cares, and void ofstrife!"ISI while in Gray's 
Elegy "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife .... Drowsy tinklings lull the 
distant folds". Capability Brown carried the penned images of poetry, paintings and 
romantic novels through to landscape gardening where he turned on-the-ground 
landscapes into concrete reproductions of graphic and poetic representations - the 
final irony being that it is landscapes such as those created by Brown that are highly 
valued by England's National Trust, which, as Short says ''not only evokes the past 
but also creates it" (1991 :81). 
148 Wordsworth, Browning, Scott, Turner and Constable to name but a few. See critiques such as 
Reading Constable (Bermingham, 1990) and Aesthetic and Commodity: an Examination o/the 
Function o/the Verbal in Turner's Artistic Practice (pointon, 1990) for detailed deconstructions of 
landscape art that are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
149 He uses literature, agricultural writing and 'natural history' as examples of verbal modes of 
~resentation. 
IS Somewhat tongue in cheek, I quote Oscar Wilde, who wrote: " ... people see fogs, not because there 
are fogs, but because poets and painters have taught them the mysterious loveliness of such effects. 
There may have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare say there were. But no one saw them .... 
They did not exist until art had invented them" (1954 (1987):79-80), and on viewing a particular 
sunset: "It was simply a very second-rate Turner, a Turner of a bad period, with all the painter's worst 
faults exaggerated andover-emphasised" (ibid). 











Yet these representations and sentiments are dangerous in that they seem relatively 
hannless, easy to underestimate and dismiss with a tolerant 'it is only artistic licence' 
argument. However, it is those same false representations which have helped 'inform' 
public opinion and given rise to the huge controversies and conflicts over modern 
farming practices that rage in rural England today.152 To quote Short again: "Behind 
the criticism [of modern agriculture] lies a disappointment with the failure of 
agriculture to meet the standards of the pastoral myth" (1991 :39). It has therefore 
become imperative to the future of agriculture in England that the (socio-cu1tural and 
political) influence of such representations (particularly on popular opinion) is 
understood, although understanding will not necessarily diminish that influence. The 
dilemma lies in the power that inheres in misleading representations. It is a dilemma 
that mirrors almost exactly the potentially highly problematic condition in Southern 
Africa where powerful representations of 'the bush' can serve (and unquestionably 
have done in the past, as 1 will demonstrate) to encourage and justify the growing 
numbers of public and private game parks and nature reserves which have the 
propensity to further marginalise already underdeveloped, economically depressed 
rural areas such as the villages of Molatedi, Lekgophung and Supingstad. 
The Myth of Madikwe 
For Madikwe is a crystallised myth, a myth, like that of the English rural arcadia, 
which is informed and perpetuated by centuries of travel accounts, art and literature, 
the media and public opinion. Furthermore, Madikwe's location, being as it is in a 
remote rural comer of South Africa's North West Province, helps to strengthen its 
appeal, an appeal which relies, in part at least, on the faithful concretisation of the 
myth. For example, when 1 have asked friends and colleagues in Cape Town and 
Johannesburg for their perceptions of the North West Province, 1 have received 
replies such as "I don't know anything at all about it. There is never much news from 
152 The worst of the conflict is focussed on the Common Agriculture Policy and agribusiness: the 
industrialisation of agriculture, the loss of small fields and hedgerows and so on. But Williams makes 
an important point: "When I see the amount of work on urban parks and gardens publicly paid for as a 
matter of course, I wonder at the common urban blindness to all this work that actually produces and 
preserVes much of the 'nature' that visitors come to see. If it were not for the farmers ... with the hill-
sheep subsidy and guaranteed prices, there would have to be wardens if much accessible country were 











there" or "I have always thought of it as a wilderness place with no people" or "It is 
the Never Never Land of South Africa, the place where everything goes wobbly". 
In the South African popular imagination, too, the North West is the back of beyond, 
unpopulated and empty, the perfect location to attract urban escapists seeking an 'at 
one with nature' experience. An example of the strength of stich national imaginings 
is the Mail & Guardian's Krisjan Lemmer column which depicts the North West as 
the quintessential 'nowhere' of South Africa. The column features Oam (Uncle) 
Krisjan Lemmer sitting in his comfortable chair in the Darsbult (Thirst Hill) Bar, 
drawing thoughtfully on his pipe and regaling readers with his satirical political views 
- wry humour possible only because Oam Krisjan is constructed as a modem day 
Oom Schalk Lourens.1S3 He is speaking from beyond the peripheries, and appealing 
to a collective national past (one that is literary rather than political, and therefore 
tolerated with an amused smile) that can drift, unanchored, preserved and protected in 
the timeless, mythical Herman Charles Bosman country which is the North West, the 
'far side of the country'. 
Duncan and Duncan have said that, "By feigning naturalness or innocence, myths 
depoliticize the world" (1992:22). Madikwe is one such myth, albeit one created in 
response to specific demands (conservation, rural development, ecotourism) in a 
specific socio-political environment (the end of apartheid) and historical context (pre-
colonial to post apartheid). As I have been arguing throughout this thesis, it is also a 
highly charged political project. Yet it is presented as an unproblematic natural space, 
a stable and unquestioned real rather than constructed landscape. As the NWP&TB 
brochure (cited on 157) asserts: it is a "pristine bushveld still populated by its original 
wildlife ... " and thus, with just eight words, strips it of centuries of history, politics 
and context. 1S4 In this sense, Madikwe's is an empty, depoliticised landscape. But, as 
de Certeau has said, a landscape, being visible, ''has the effect of making invisible the 
operations that made it possible" (1984:97). Its very existence as a kind of myth 
inscribed on the earth's surface enables Madikwe to float in blissful calm above the 
153 A character created by Herman Charles Bosman (1905-1951), drawn from his one year's experience 
of living in what was then the Marico District, an area not far from where Madikwe is located. 
154 See chapter two for an overview of the complex socio-cultural, political and historical processes 











everyday political economy of its context and its creation, all the while appearing to 
address those very contested conditions. 
In order to ground Madikwe in its socio-political context it is useful to trace the 
operations that made the establishment of the Reserve possible and desirable. 
Therefore below I provide an overview describing how approaches to conservation 
have changed, particularly between the colonial and post apartheid periods. The 
overview is intended to contextualise the rhetoric of the NWP&TB in the political 
environment that engendered it. ISS But first, the following section brings to the 
foreground the divergent, opposing perceptions and expectations among the diverse 
partners in the Madikwe project. 
Conservation: A Hallowed Ideology 
A particularly prominent fieldwork finding was the extent to which villagers 
embraced the ideology of conservation: over ninety-five percent of survey 
respondents stressed that, on principle, it is essential to protect wildlife and that 
nature conservation is of paramount importance. Statements such as the following 
were common: 
• Nature needs protection from people who kill it unnecessarily. 
• There are many people who do not know about wildlife and nature things, so if we do not 
protect it, our children can never hear of these things. 
• Wildlife beautifies nature; without it, we have nothing. 
• It is very important to protect those animals so if we ever have a chance of going to the 
Reserve they will be plenty in number for us to see. 
• We need wildlife for our hearts and our souls. 
What became evident, as fieldwork progressed, was that many villagers were 
interested in the concrete role Madikwe was playing in conserving South Africa's 
natural heritage for present and future generations. They were drawn to the ideology 
of conservation. Few Oess than five percent) were critical ofMadikwe's conservation 
operations and, of those, most comments were about loss oflocal autonomy rather 
than censuring of actual practices. For example: "They [the Madikwe Initiative 











agents] claim that bush clearing is empowerment, but to me it is not. We have been 
doing this all our lives. We grew up clearing the bush and we were not even taught it 
- we just copied our fathers" (interview, Lekgophung resident, 26 August 2000). 
I found it even more striking that there was a greater prevalence of comments 
heralding the importance of conservation than those expressing economic concerns -
although given that villagers had been living in a state of so-called underdevelopment 
more or less since the villages were first established (see chapter two), and economic 
benefits coming from the Reserve had already proved to be minimal at most, perhaps 
this was not so surprising. Indeed, the majority of respondents (approximately eighty 
percent in my questionnaire survey) claimed they had never even heard ofMafisa or 
the Madikwe Initiative.1S6 Many interviewees said they were therefore not in a 
position to comment on projects and development initiatives. However, every 
respondent, without exception, had an opinion about the actual Reserve, and nearly 
ninety percent of questionnaire respondents said that wildlife conservation was the 
best land-use option for the farms comprising Madikwe. 
These respondents' interest in the Reserve were not dissimilar to those of tourists: 
they had the same desire to see wild animals and to experience the kind of supposed 
spiritual gratification found from a sense of being in what they too saw as the 
wilderness. But, as I established in chapter one, despite the fact that conservation and 
ecological objectives are undoubtedly the central attraction for all those who have 
access to the Reserve (the ecologists, rangers, NWP&TB personnel, lodge 
management and tourists), according to the rhetoric of the NWP&TB economic profit 
and rural development are the primary concerns of the Reserve - not conservation. 
Villagers were thus denied access to the Reserve largely because the NWP&TB and 
its private sector partners found exclusive tourism to be the most effective way of 
generating sufficient income to be able to realise profit. 
One of the biggest areas of contention, raised by nearly every respondent in each of 
the three villages, was that Madikwe Game Reserve was inaccessible to them. That 
156 This percentage does not reflect respondents who were aware that consultants had been coming to 
the villages and, especially in Molatedi and Lekgophung, were aware of the existence of projects 











inaccessibility was the single greatest factor contributing to their disillusiOilment with 
Madikwe and the way it was run. As one young mother said: ''What is very 
discouraging is that this game reserve is very near our village but most of us don't 
know it at all. We have never even been to visit there" (interview, Lekgophung 
resident, 1 September 2000). Another villager said: "How can they say it is a 
partnership when we are not even allowed to go there?" (Lekgophung resident, 17 
August 2000). A ceremony celebrating the incorporation into Madikwe of a 1500 
hectare farm, known as Sentellies (farm no. 93 on map 5, page 41), provides a 
poignant example of village exclusion. 
On 9 June 2000 Sentellies farm (see map 3), owned by a fourteen member syndicate 
based in Johannesburg, became part ofMadikwe Game Reserve. This was the result 
of many months of negotiations and successful compromises and, for the NWP&TB, 
represented a major achievement towards realising its aim of expanding Madikwe 
through incorporating adjacent land. A date was set for a ceremonial lowering of the 
fence, and news agencies such as SABC radio were invited in order to advertise 
Madikwe's success to the outside world. On the day of the ceremony there was great 
excitement at Vleischfontein, the old mission station and now the NWP&TB offices 
in Madikwe. Most of the staff, rangers included, were excused from their usual duties 
in order to be present at the ceremony. Students from the Park's Ecological Services 
section were roped into manning the main gates to the Reserve, in order that the 
NWP&TB guards could attend the great event. Lodge managers and front office staff 
were invited. The Park Warden prepared a moving speech and stated in his 
welcoming address: 
This land incorporation is the fruit of monthly meetings of the Madikwe Development 
Task Team. It has been a point of agenda for two years, and looked like a pipe dream 
which would never be realised. We have been looking forward to the first incorporation 
for a long time. 
Even the NWP&TB's Chief Executive Officer found time in a busy schedule to travel 
from Mafikeng for the occasion. Revealing again the Board's commitment to 
development through conservation he stressed in his speech that ''the most significant 
aspect about the expansion was job creation and community empowerment in that 











Yet, not a single person from what is probably best referred to as the 'last' sector of 
the three-way partnership, the 'local community' of villagers, or even their local 
leaders, was invited. To ChiefMatlapeng in Molatedi, this was just another example 
to illustrate how the villages were excluded at every turn. He said, in heavily emotive 
sentences: 
The community does not know about the ReseIVe because we have not been invited. 
We do not feel part of it We cannot identify with it. The achievements and failures 
are not shared. If we are not part of it, how can we have its interests at heart? We do 
not want to interfere with the daily running, but we would like to be included in 
special occasions. Like with a new species, such as the wild dogs, we could be 
invited to the releasing ceremony. They invite people from America to obseIVe and 
we are only three kilometres away but we are not invited ... And when they dropped 
the fence just now, there was a big ceremony but again we were not invited 
(interview, 5 July 2000). 
Phrases such as 'cannot identify with', 'do not feel part of, 'not shared', 'not invited' 
undermine the NWP&TB's claims to people-based conservation. The reference to 
'people from America' being invited implies the persistence of a fonD. of (neo) 
colonial invasion at the expense oflocal rights of access. Chief Matlapeng is, of 
course, drawing on powerful discourses of the controversial history of conservation, 
of fortress conservation and top-down development approaches, of (non) participation 
and exclusion. A middle aged man from Molatedi village reinforced this position: 
Has a school child from Molatedi ever seen such beauty as that ofMadikwe Game 
ReseIVe? No. But a child from Canada can come and behold this beauty. So only the 
chosen ones are allowed to go. The majority of people here do not know about the 
ReseIVe. It is only the international community with money who are chosen to go. The 
management should invite school children to come and drive through the park and 
know the animals and understand. They should have researchers to come and give a 
talk in the villages (interview 10 September 2000). 
Such an argument raises several questions. IfMadikwe is (in part, at least) about the 
conservation of South Africa's natural heritage yet villagers are denied access to it 
while the wealthy international community are the only ones 'chosen' to go, then, in 
reality, whose heritage is it? For whom is it being conserved? Is it only the privileged 
who have a right to access that heritage? What, actually, has changed since the days 
of apartheid, with its forced removals and anti-people ecology? In order to help 












From Fortress Conservation to People-Based Conservation 
Conservation is not a new ideology. As early as the eighteenth century, concern for 
the environment had resulted in the creation of conservation areas, such as forest 
reserves in the West Indies. By the nineteenth century, formal conservation 
institutions had been established in Europe and North America, and the first national 
parks crea~ed (Adams and Hulme, 2001 :10). Until the mid-twentieth century, global 
conservation discourse was informed by ideas that the natural environment and 
diversity of species must be protected from destructive human interference, the 
adverse impacts stemming from colonial expansion and the agricultural and industrial 
revolutions. 
By the nineteenth century in South Africa there was another discourse which said that 
conservation was necessary to protect species and ecology not from colonialism but 
from 'the natives' themselves who were seen by colonial administrators as over-
exploiting the land because they lacked an adequate understanding of ecological 
processes (cf. Carruthers, 1997; Honey, 1999). This exclusionary, preservationist 
approach has been called fortress conservation or the 'fences and fines approach' 
which, as Adams and Hulme say, "involved the creation of protected areas, the 
exclusion of people as residents, the prevention of consumptive use and minimization 
of other forms of human impacf' (2001: 1 0). The fortress approach to conservation 
was adopted throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, heavily influenced by expatriate 
Europeans with their appetite for huntinglS7 and their often misinformed notions of 
the wild African bush. As Bell argues: " ... the western. world gained a false 
impression of the 'natural' relationship between humans and their environments in 
Africa that has coloured western attitudes towards development and conservation ever 
since .... The west found in Africa the Garden of Eden of its romantic imagination" 
157 There is a vast cannon of literature concerning hunting and the depletion of wildlife in the colonial 
era. Rather than entering into a long perusal of it, I will merely point out the obvious: that hunting, for 
a number of reasons (the most central being sport and trade in trophies), was intense and widespread. 
This, coupled with drastic solutions to rinderpest and tsetse fly (the slaughtering of entire herds), 
resulted in a massive decline in wildlife numbers and finally a recognition of the need to start 
conserving wildlife in order to sustain hunting. Inevitably, many expatriates blamed the decline on 
black African hunters, and the Game Laws (1886, 1889 and 1902), coupled with the Gun Laws 











(1987:89).158 This reinforces how notions of the African landscape were (and still 
are) informed by representations in art, literature and the media. Adams and Hulme 
suggest that it was literature such as Serengeti Shall Not Die (Grzimek, 1960) and 
SOS Rhino (Guggisberg, 1966) which led to the portrayal of Africa "as Eden, 
humankind as its chief destroyer and conservation, through a protectionist strategy, its 
necessary regime of salvation" (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 12). 
Such portrayals have carried great weight in conservation discourse in South Africa 
and, throughout the colonial, the segregation and the apartheid periods, the creation 
of national parks was justified purely on the grounds of protecting (particularly from 
black Africans) depleting natural resources for the sake of the nation and the nation's 
future generations. Yet, the notion of nation applied only to a white elite, a 
perspective strongly reinforced by apartheid ideology and policy. That elite's 
members had exclusive access to the parks for leisure, game viewing, education and 
study (Carruthers, 1997, Stocking et al, 1995), the only black South Africans 
permitted there being those servicing the needs of the white elite visitors and those 
employed to help in the task of nature conServation. For many black South Africans, 
therefore, national parks meant forced removals or restricted and even total denial of 
access to the land and natural resources that had previously been where they had 
lived and farmed, and thus central to their livelihoods. Forced removals in order to 
make space for the construction of parks were seen to be necessary not only in order 
to create large stretches of relatively easily 'recoverable' land but also to protect that 
land from the ignorant 'natives' who were seen as having no sense of respect for the 
environment and were considered culpable in having contributed to environmental 
degradation through their purportedly backward farming methods (cf. Carruthers, 
1997). In this way colonial and apartheid administrators managed to create a fa~ade 
that justified taking land away from such people. 
One of the earliest examples is the Sabi Game Reserve (which subsequently became 
the Kruger National Park), established in the Transvaal Republic in 1892. Three 
1S8 The false impression, according to Bell, was a wrong perception of the balance between human, 
livestock and wildlife populations. He explains: "when Europeans first encountered Africa at the outset 
of the colonial era, they encountered a human population probably smaller than it had been since the 
Iron Age revolution ... reaching its nadir between 1900 and 1930. The same is true of livestock which 
were drastically reduced by the rinderpest pandemic of 1890-1900. As human and livestock 











thousand residents were forcibly relocated. Carruthers (1997) argues that the 
establishment of the Kruger National Park in 1926 was justified in part because of a 
general belief amongst white South Africans that wildlife conservation in itself 
constituted a legitimate and worthy form ofland use, and in part to "the nascent rise 
of Afrikaner nationalism, the consolidation of a Voortrekker mythology and the 
search for a unified white South African identity" (1997: 5-6). The Kruger Park was 
therefore a site for a reconstructed, exclusionist, national identity, drawn in part from 
a nostalgia for a romantic rural past, "a place where manhood could be proved" 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001: 11), and in part from a growing belief in the civilised 
virtues of conservation and environmental awareness. 
The construction of identity, most post-colonial theorists would agree (see, for 
example, Fanon, 1969; Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1988; Said, 1978), is a dialogical 
process, dependent on recognising difference from an obligatory Other. Bhabha 
wrote: "the question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, 
never a self-fulfilling prophecy - it is always the production of an image of identity 
and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image" (1994:45). Needless to 
say, the Other, in the context of the creation of South African parks, was the black 
person. And in that context, the white person became the conservationist, the 
legitimate hunter,159 while the black person was usually perceived of as a threat to 
conservation efforts, the criminal poacher. Such propagandist designations gave birth 
to the inherent power structures that controlled (and often still control) the 
man~gement of national parks, enabling conservationists to employ paramilitary 
methods of park policing, and to justify the exclusion ofloca1, usually black, always 
poor residents from reserves and from access to natural resources within those 
reserves. 
The hunting/poaching binary opposition has been pronounced within conservation 
discourse in South Africa, and has been a powerful tool for controlling natural 
resource management. It conceals an earlier and parallel history of how notions of 
conservation, since pre-colonial times, did exist in many black South African 
159 As opposed to the bloodthirsty sportsman or the greedy trader, slaughtering vast numbers of 
animals to meet the insatiable demand for products such as ivory, skulls and skins, who are the 











societies, where royal hunting reserves (such as those of Shaka Zulu) were 
established and rare species were often reserved for royalty (Carruthers, 1997, 
Kaplan, 2000, Jones, 2001). Through tot~sm, different tribal sub-groups were seen 
to respect and honour, and therefore protect, different wildlife species. 160 Tobayiwa 
and Jackson describe, in unashamedly sentimental tones, the cultural and social 
significance of the Shona totem system, claiming that: 
the totem system in Shona society was developed through observation and profound 
appreciation of nature ... [ which] has been passed on in the form of inspiring praise 
poems that have, in fact, expanded further to include the history of a people ... In a 
totem system like ours, nature is a part of one's being .... We have a project [the 
IUCNIWWF approved Mukuvisi project] designed to capitalize on the deep cultural 
involvement of the Shona people with wildlife and nature (1985:230-235). 
Although the totem system was not unknown in the villages around Madikwe, where 
the clan-totem animal for the Batlokwa (predominantly in Molatedi) is the aardvark 
(or anteater), for the Bahurutshe (Supingstad) the baboon and for the Balete 
(Lekgophung), the buffalo, during my fieldwork I did not find evidence that the 
residents of the three villages were as passionate about the significance of these totem 
animals (as proof of an undeniable asserted oneness of Tswana people and nature) as 
the authors cited above suggest of the Shona. Rather, totem animals were seen more 
as a part ofa distant cultural history than as a strategy for conservation. 161 
Despite evidence of certain direct and indirect ways of managing wildlife that existed 
prior to colonial rule (Jones, 2001), black South Africans were (and often still are) 
seen by conservationists as ignorant of conservation methods and in need of 
instruction. As a result of the colonial policies of exclusion, attempts to access 
wildlife, which, needless to say, was an important and valuable resource, were usually 
seen as 'poaching'. Carruthers (1997) argues that poaching often came to be 
employed as a form of resistance to colonial and apartheid-era conservation systems 
which denied black South Africans access to land. From a different perspective, black 
160 Schapera and Comarofl' explain of the Tswana: "There are special myths telling how each group 
acquired its totem, and people should not kill or eat their totem, nor touch its skin; should they do so 
inadvertently, they must undergo a purification ceremony to avoid illness or other misfortune" 
(1991:29). 
161 It is worth mentioning that it was cultural history that Madikwe Initiative interventions were tapping 
into. For example, the Mafisa-initiated theatre group in Molatedi was called the Thakadu Theatre 
Group (see chapter seven), Thakadu being SeTswana for anteater, and the film group was involved in a 











fanners have long resorted to what is effectively poaching, as one of the few available 
means of protecting their crops and livestock from wild animals. For example, Hulme 
and Infield (2001) write about Lake Mburo National Park where poaching was rife 
among local residents as well as staff of the former Game Department. They report 
that researchers162 in the area had established that local residents poach "as a way of 
reducing damage caused by wildlife" (2001:121) and furthermore that the local 
authorities and local councils "do not accept any responsibility for preventing it" 
(ibid). 
Since Madikwe's inception, poaching has not been amongst its problems. Indeed, 
Madikwe respondents cited the absence of poaching as proof of the effectiveness of 
the Reserve's people-based approach to conservation. For example, a member of 
Madikwe's Ecological Support Services163 said: 
Almost everywhere else I've been [including Pilanesberg and Molope] there has 
been a very negative feeling with the people outside the park. There was poaching ... 
We don't have poaching [here] and I have always put that down to the so called 
fantastic community relations - which mayor may not be fantastic - that I don't 
know (interview, 27 June 2000). 
What is reflected in the above quote is a change from the earlier fortress style 
approach to conservation to one that recognises the importance of enlisting the 
support and sympathy of neighbouring people, of involving, rather than excluding, 
people living in and around wildlife reserves. Indeed, even the initial pre-feasibility 
study for Madikwe contains evidence of such tactics for including local people. It 
states that: "A Game Park would be acceptable to local communities and 
arrangements can be made to grant local herbalists controlled access to the park for 
the collection of specimens. Poaching is not foreseen as a major threat" (Setplan, 
1991:17).164 During my fieldwork I did not find any indication that the proposed 
arrangements had been made for herbalists. To the contrary, I witnessed one village 
resident, who had access to the reserve through employment with Mafisa, illegally 
stopping, with a shrug and a wink for me, to gather buffalo dung for a herbalist 
162 The researchers were Namara and Infield (1998). 
163 While the NWP&TB managed the reserve in its entirety, the Reserve's Ecological Services were 
concerned with the welfare of the wildlife, carrying out day to day monitoring and evaluations and 
veterinary interventions when necessary. 
164 The Setplan study is outlined in chapter 2, where I also cite, on page 58, its claim that a reserve 











friend. Nevertheless, by all accounts, unlike in other parks and reserves, there was no 
poaching in Madikwe. 
A good example of the expediency of involving locals in conservation areas is 
provided by Jones (2001) who describes the changing approach to wildlife 
management at Kunene in Namibia There, poaching was a major problem and, by 
1982, the elephant population had been reduced to two hundred and fifty from one 
thousand two hundred in 1970. Jones describes how, in 1982, the Namibian Wildlife 
Trust hired Owen-Smith, who had formerly worked in the area, to help address the 
problem. 
[He] used his knowledge of the area and relationships with traditional leaders to open 
discussions with residents about the poaching and decline in wildlife. He established 
that the headmen and others were concerned at the situation, but were helpless to halt 
the decline as they had no authority over wildlife as game belonged to the 
government .... Owen-Smith proposed to the headmen that they appoint their own 
community game guards. They were not there to apprehend poachers, but to monitor 
wildlife and any suspicious activities and then report to their h admen, who would 
decide on a course of action .... Over the next ten years, game guards played an 
important role in reducing poaching .... The support given to the game guards by the 
headmen during this period was considerable and came to symbolize community 
commitment to wildlife conservation (2001:163). 
Key phrases here are 'authority over wildlife' and 'commitment to wildlife 
conservation'. They indicate the emergence - and employment - of a counter 
narrative to that of fortress conservation. It is a narrative which recognises that a 
sense oflocal ownership and control over wildlife is essential to enlisting the support 
oflocal residents, and hence to combating poaching, for example. The project has 
been so successful that it has also been introduced in Caprivi (interview John Hanks, 
a Peace Parks Foundation consultant, 22 December 2006). 
The local equity narrative has become increasingly dominant on a global scale in part 
because, by the 1960s, there was growing international concern over conservation in 
Africa. "Africa was becoming independent, and political control was shifting as 
'poachers' turned gamekeepers" (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 12). The community game 
guard approach adopted at Kunene reflects the recognition of the necessity, and 
indeed pragmatism, of harnessing local support in conservation management. 











enough to sustain many of Africa's wildlife species.165 Conservation "needed to reach 
out of protected areas into the wider landscape, and that landscape was increasingly 
densely inhabited" (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 18). The new narrative was, inevitably, 
the so-called people-based conservation,166 defined by Adams and Huline as "those 
principles and practices that argue that conservation goals should be pursued by 
strategies that emphasize the role oflocal residents in decision-making about natural 
resources" (2001: 13). The people-based conservation paradigm was developed and 
institutionalised through various global conferences, particularly in the 1980 World 
Conservation Strategy and the 1982 and 1992 World Congresses on National Parks 
(Stocking et al, 1995, McNeely and Miller, 1984, Kemf, 1993). Since then, it has 
come to dominate approaches to wildlife conservation. The examples are numerous, 
among them the 'Development Through Conservation' project begun in Uganda in 
1988167 and CAMPFIRE (1989) in Zimbabwe. 168 Initiatives, under the people-based 
conservation banner, range from local people being given full tenure and management 
rights over natural resources, to "glorified public relations exercises ... which try to 
make local people feel less antagonistic towards exclusion from a protected area by 
social investment and 'education'" (Adams and Hulme, 2001 :15). 
The North West Parks and Tourism Board's Approach 
The question, of course, is where does the NWP&TB fit into the people-based 
conservation paradigm? According to the way it advertises itself, it is "a conservation 
organisation that is world-renowned for its pioneering approach to people-based 
wildlife conservation which it has practiced since the late-1970s" (Davies 1997:2). 
Yet, there is less to the rhetoric than meets the eye. Given that ownership and tenure 
are of central importance to people-based conservation, Madikwe was remarkable in 
that the residents of Molatedi, Supingstad and Lekgophung had no tenure and no legal 
165 According to Adams and Hulme, research in conservation biology and the genetics of small 
populations of wild animals has shown that "large dispersal areas are needed so that species can move 
from 'island' to 'island' to feed, to ensure healthy breeding stock, and to respond to local extinctions 
and climatic change" (2001:18). 
166 There at:e a variety of terms, denoting a wide range of different projects, employed within this new 
discourse, including 'community conservation', 'people-based conservation', 'community wildlife 
management', 'collaborative management', 'community-based natural resource management' and 
'integrated conservation and development programmes' (Adams and Hulme, 2001: 13). 
167 See, for example, Adams and Infield, 2001. 
168 CAMPFIRE is one of the most well known and researched of community conservation programmes. Hence 











claim to the Reserve's land. Unlike many people-based conservation projects, such as 
the Makuleke's in the Pafuri strip of the Kruger National Park (described in chapter 
three), the villages' residents were not forcibly removed from Madikwe. 169 The land 
claims that were pending during my fieldwork came from two groups of people 
identified as the Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe and the Baphalane ba Sesobe who had 
been rent paying tenants on Kalkfontein (farm no. Ilion map 5, page 41) and 
Boschrand (fann no. 109) located to the west of Vleischfontein in the centre of the 
Reserve. When the farms became designated as 'white' areas in tenus of the 1936 
Trust and Land Act (see chapter two), these people were forcibly removed (paul 
Daphne, pers. comm., May, 200 I ).170 At least up to the time I completed my field 
work in 2000, they were living some distance from Madikwe and were outside the 
focus of the Madikwe Initiative. Hence, according to Madikwe's park warden at that 
time: 
This (the Reserve) is a public asset, not a community asset and the cOmmunities [the 
populations of the three villages] must not feel that this is their piece ofland. This is 
state land and there is an obligation to the state, not only to the communities in this 
area (interview, 21 September 2000). 
In the absence of villagers' communal rights oftenure over Madikwe land, perhaps 
what is important is the logic behind the NWP&TB's approach, ostensibly to ensure 
that, as has become generally recognised amongst policy makers and conservation 
agencies such as the NWP &TB, local residents must reap substantial benefits from 
protected areas if conservation is to be justified. Yet, the political expediency, the 
power, behind the approach can clearly be seen in the NWP&TB's linking of the 
allure of conservation with the promise of rural development. In the political 
environment of post apartheid South Africa, such an approach is not only expedient, 
but necessary. Gone is the possibility of fortress conservation, which is proven to be 
neither sustainable nor politically acceptable. So an alternative that purports to be 
community and development focussed has come to replace it. 
169 Chapter two provides an overview of the establishment of the villages and the ownership of the land 
that later became Madikwe Game Reserve. 
170 The Baphalane Ba Sesobe won their land claim in 2003 and were allocated 15 hectares ofland in 
the Reserve on which to build and run a lodge owned by the Bapalane Community Property 
Association as well as 4 600 hectares outside the Reserve for farming purposes (Government Annual 
Report, June 2003/4). The Barokologadi ba ga Maotwe won their claim in July 2007. In terms of the 
land claims settlement the land will still be used for conservation and managed accordingly by the 
NWP&TB. Existing lodge operators have been approached to "enter into the game lodge business with 











In the process, as) established in chapter three, conservation rhetoric has become so 
fiercely dominated by the (politically correct) spot light of rural development 
concerns that the point of conservation, the ethics, principles and objectives 
(sustaining the nation's natural heritage), have become sidelined - that is, within the 
rhetoric, at least, of managing agencies such as the NWP&TB. In practice, 
conservation is nonetheless still the central concern, or attraction, for Madikwe's 
. ecologists, rangers, lodge management, tourists and so on. But it is overshadowed 
discursively by the NWP&TB's emphasis on development. l7l 
Post apartheid South Africa is concerned with addressing inequality and, from a 
political and public policy perspective, that inequality means economic inequality 
which must be overcome by economic development. Rhetorically, therefore, 
conservation has come to be a tool to achieve such economic development, and that is 
then seen to be the only end result with which the villagers around Madikwe need be 
concerned - at least according to the primary stakeholders within the Reserve (the 
NWP&TB and private sector management). Thus, it became clear through interviews 
with those personnel (who are also the people most able to exercise power), that their 
collective position was that underdeveloped, marginalised villagers need, first and 
foremost, money, not beautiful parks; jobs, not leisure; modernity, not escape from it; 
employment, not safari holidays. 
A simple question arises: is Madikwe Game Reserve, as the NWP&TB suggests, 
merely a business much like any other, where the main goals are to create 
employment and generate profit, a portion of which will finance community 
development projects? Could it just as well be a mine, a casino or a factory, or is 
conservation important in itself? As quoted in chapter two, a general manager of the 
NWP&TB said that ''we use conservation, as we would have used mining or 
agricultural practices ... as the most efficient way to address our main objective, which 
is economic development" (interview, 25 July 2000). But Madikwe is not a mine, nor 
is it a factory. It is a game reserve, and that makes all the difference. In interview after 
I7I In her fieldwork in the Kgalakgadi Transfontier Park, Cassie Hughes (2005) similarlyfound that 
behind a fayade of agreement to involve local people old conservationist attitudes nevertheless 











interview village respondents (some eighty-eight percent of those surveyed) were 
adamant that the land Madikwe is on should not be used in a different way. For 
example: "Build a factory? No! Madikwe must stay! This conservation is very 
important to us. They must never close down the Reserve. They can find another site 
for a casino or factory or what what [sic]" (Lekgophung resident, 21 August 2000). 
Again, what is highly evident is the problematic contradiction between claims to 
people-based conservation and the continued lack oflocal people's access to the 
Reserve. At this point I will return briefly to the fence lowering ceremony as it was 
one of the most blatant examples ofvi1lagers' exclusion from the Reserve. I found it 
particularly striking that nearly every one of my respondents from within the Reserve 
itself sympathised with Chief Matlapeng' s sentiments (cited on page 168). The 
General Manager of Tau Lodge said: ''Yes I agree with the chief. They should have 
invited him [to the fence lowering ceremony]. I was invited because I'm the General 
Manager of the biggest lodge, and there were various other people there ... SABC 
radio, but no local dignitaries at all. I really think they should have been invited" 
(interview, 23 August 2000). A General Manager of the NWP&TB also agreed: 
I think it was an oversight that he was not invited to the ceremony. We have a policy 
with all our parks that whenever there is any function we invite the chiefs and local 
councillors. Without making excuses, to us it was a sniall function. We were even 
debating if the CEO [Chief Executive Officer] should be there, but I said 'sorry this is the 
first of our biggest projects, the incorporation of land. He must be there' (interview, 25 
July 2000). 
The fact that such an oversight was possible reinforces the views of those villagers 
who believed they were very much sidelined (on the 'far side of the country') in and 
by the Madikwe project. What was evident, yet again, was a major difference in 
perception between the NWP&TB management and village residents of the meaning 
of terms such as partnership and participation. Should villagers' involvement be 
confined to a sharing of the end result (the economic benefits; the product) of the 
Reserve's business operations as a tourist-oriented wild life resort? Or should 
'partnership' mean involvement in the processes of generating profit from 
conservation, as well as a sharing of the non-economic end results of those processes: 











majestic wild animals, the sense of being 'at one with nature' that I raised in the 
prologue to this thesis? 
According to Khumo from Lekgophungl72 the allure of the bush was of fundamental 
importance to her. She said that without wild animals and beautiful landscapes, 'life 
would be boring'. She had never been to the Reserve, had never seen an elephant or 
any of the Big Five and had never even been to Pretoria Zoo. Despite the extreme 
poverty of her household (with eight people living off a monthly income ofR540, 
excluding subsistence activities) she said that the most important thing for her would 
be to go to the Reserve just to see what it is like, to see the animals in their 
environment. She said that her greatest hope was that she should be offered a job in 
the Reserve - but said she had no expectations or hopes of benefiting financially in 
other ways. She also admitted that she did not really expect to get a job, particularly 
as she did not have matriculation or any training or work experience. Thus, her 
greatest hope was merely to visit the Reserve. 
The rationality behind expectations such as Khumo's was powerfully brought home 
by the school principal in Lekgophung: 
Since its inception there have been so many promises which are never fulfilled. They 
promised empowerment and better conditions at the school; buildings and equipment, 
computers. We have got nothing. They should let the students go there for weekend 
excursions, to view the animals and nature. They [children] have an interest and this 
must be cultivated by adults. They know there is a reserve, but they have never been 
there. They think about something big, something they can never go to. To them it is 
not accessible. It is a place for adults. And then, of course, there is the colour line 
(interview, 21 August 2000). 
Not only does the above highlight the friction that existed between the NWP&TB's 
rhetoric and its practice, but it shows the NWP&TB's approach to be essentially 
irrational. It again brings to mind ChiefMatlapeng's words: "If we are not part of it 
[the Reserve], how can we have its interests at heart?"l73 But according to Madikwe's 
operational warden: 
I do not think it will be feasible to bring school children here for educational tours. 
You need qualified teachers to teach them about environmental methods. I can see 
many clashes of interests if we bring in school groups. If we bring in one or two it will 
172 Introduced in chapter two. See page 69. 











snowball over night and we will have clashes with our current operators .... I did this 
for five years in Pilanesberg: I know what I am talking about. We had endless 
problems: too many children and a shortage of man power. There were clashes with 
the general public because the sites were not big enough. I don't think Madikwe will 
ever cater for that sort of thing (interview, 29 August 2000). 
Indeed, as chapter seven will explain, the NWP &TB instigated the Madikwe 
Initiative in order to help villagers maximise benefits from the Reserve. But the 
Initiative's (Mafisa and DfID-decided) priorities focussed on capacity-building 
projects and the creation of small spin-off businesses, not upgrading local school 
facilities let alone arranging regular access to the Reserve for school children from 
the nearby villages. The Initiative's interventions were aimed at adults, not children. 
Its projects targeted small numbers of individual residents rather than village 
infrastructure more generally. This was because of an assumption that it was only 
once the Reserve started making a profit, and the Community Trust Fund had been 
established, that more generalised, infrastructural development concerns could be 
addressed. Hence, at the time of my fieldwork, the majority ofviUagers had still not 
seen any tangible benefits coming from the Reserve, and that led to a growing 
frustration with the NWP&TB for failing to fulfil its promises. Respondents 
expressed their antagonism in increasingly negative terms. Particularly damaging, 
given the post apartheid context, were the accusations of racism such as the 
Lekgophung school principal's: "And then, of course, there is the colour line" and 
another: "that Reserve is only for the whites" (interview, Supingstad, 23 July 2000). 
Such views again work towards undennining the NWP&TB's claims that its practices 
are in line with people-based conservation approaches. Returning to Adams and 
Hulme's (2001) characterisations of people-based approaches, not only is there a 
glaring absence of 'full tenure and management rights over natural resources' but the 
other extreme, the 'glorified public relations exercise' (2001 :15) was proving to be 
decidedly unsuccessful. 
The situation highlights the problematic nature of notions of participation. 174 In his 
analysis of development discourse in Sri Lanka, Woost (1997) explores similar issues 
of village-level participation in the methods of development. He writes: 
174 For more on participatory approaches to development see the section New Paradigms But an 











... participatory discourse, like the notions of community that preceded it, clearly has 
many different connotations, only some of which hold the possibility for a more 
'bottom-up' debate about the social, economic and cultural arrangement of the present 
and the future (1997:230). 
As with the situation in Madikwe, Woost found that in Sri Lanka the language of 
development had shifted to indicate a move away from top-down approaches to 
development. Participation and empowennent were the new catch-phrases there too. 
Yet, in practice, nothing had really changed. The objects of development 
interventions, that is, the economic upliftment of poor villagers, were not being 
realised and those same poor villagers still had no voice in the methods used by 
development interventionists. Woost concludes: " ... within the dominant rhetoric of 
development in Sri Lanka, the vocabulary of participation has become one of 
subordination rather than of constructing an alternative to development. For, under its 
tenns, to participate is to bend one's purpose, goals and strategies to fit the official 
mould" (1997:249). 
Similarly, in the villages around Madikwe, people could only participate in the 
Reserve in the ways the NWP&TB identified as possible. Apart from two 
entrepreneurial businesses, those ways were largely restricted to small components: 
employment within the private sector lodges in the Reserve and the individual 
projects driven by the Madikwe Initiative. I discuss these in chapter seven. For the 
moment I wish to focus on the bigger picture, which is that ultimately villagers had 
little power, voice or access, either to economic benefits deriving from the 
developmental goals of the Madikwe enterprise in its entirety or to the NWP&TB's 
chosen route to development: conservation. In this sense, the development process in 
Madikwe was similar to that described by Woost in Sri Lanka: despite the rhetoric it 
was a top-down process, seemingly inevitably arranged in such a way as to preclude 
villagers' equal participation. 
It would be facile and naive to attempt an outright condemnation of the NWP&TB for 
being elitist and exclusionary in its management ofMadikwe. It is apposite, 
nonetheless, to point out that during my fieldwork I found that members of the white 
farming community from nearby Nietverdiend to the south of the Reserve had been 











and Supingstad were not. According to one fann owner: "The Parks Board 
[NWP&TB] said they would give me free entrance, but when I go into the Reserve I 
can only stay on the main roads. But that is not what I want. We [white people from 
Nietverdiend] should be allowed to go allover" (interview, 18 September 2000, 
translated from Afrikaans). This unequal access was also noted by the head ranger, 
who said: 
I never see these people [villagers from Supingstad, Lekgophung or Molatedi] around. 
But the Nietverdiend people come and utilise the park, so there is no reason why these 
people cannot [ do so] as well, as long as it is all communicated the right way through 
the Community Liaison Officer. That is his job. Mine is to arrange escorts [rangers] 
(interview, 22 August 2000). 
However, there were good reasons, practical, financial and theoretical, for restricting 
day visitor access to the Reserve. Firstly, the park warden claimed, areas of the 
Reserve set aside for day visitors had not been developed because of pending land 
claims. He said: 
The planning for day visitors has been in from day one. Land claims soon came in and 
stopped the development An area was already fenced off at Abjaterskop and is still 
fenced off. And an area in the southern area, for restaurants and picnic spots. The 
intention has always been there, but we are now limited to what we can do until the 
ownership of the land has been resolved. Land claims have made about forty percent of 
the park unattractive to private investors and it could be viewed as irresponsible for the 
state to invest major capital into such areas (interview with Park Warden, 21 September 
2000). 
Secondly, and at the risk of seriously labouring the point, I stress again that the 
NWP&TB saw the generation of financial profit as their major objective. Unarguably 
the Reserve could generate a greater profit through exclusive elite tourism than 
through catering for day visitors. According to the NWP&TB's Chief Executive 
Officer, the Pilanesberg National Park, also under the Board's management, was 
running at a loss because the largenumber of day visitors was not economically 
profitable (meeting, 21 May 2001 ).175 Madikwe was geared to attract high-paying 
exclusive tourism, only possible because tourists could be guaranteed game viewing 
experiences without crowds of people upsetting the illusion that the visitor is alone in 
a pristine wilderness. One lodge manager expressed the situation as follows: 
You can't just open the park up and have people drive through ... You can't say if 
you open up the reserve to the local community is it going to be sustainable. If you 











make it like the Kruger Park where people can pay an entry fee and just drive 
themselves around, private lodges like ourselves willjust fade away. The two can't 
co-exist You've got to make it either one or the other. And this way I think generates 
more revenue and foreign currency. The pwpose of the Reserve, I don't believe, is so 
that every child can know what an elephant looks like. The pwpose of the Reserve is 
(a) to conserve nature, Africa's heritage, and (b) to provide benefits to the local 
communities in terms of spin-offs from the funds that tourists bring .... If you just 
open it up, very soon that will destroy the natural habitat and there won't be 
anything. On the other hand, you can't take a huge area of land, turn it into this 
pristine wilderness area for rich tourists to come to, when people around it are 
suffering. They have to benefit or it just won't survive (General Manager, Tau 
Lodge, 23 August 2000). 
What is evident from the above is the lodge manager's purely financial notion of 
sustainability. For him sustainability referred primarily to his private sector interests: 
lodge management, a major and vital component of which was closely controlled 
game drives into the 'wilderness'. His operations would not be able to function 
profitably if there were large numbers of tourist roaming at will about the Reserve. To 
him the Reserve could only have the potential to be a sustainable business as long as 
high paying tourists continued to be attracted by its exclusivity. To put it bluntly, to 
the lodge manager, 'sustainability' was synonymous with 'foreign cash'. While such 
an impoverished definition of sustainability is at odds with populist notions of 
sustainable development which emphasise local empowerment, participation and 
capacity building, in the context of the ne -liberal market economy approach that the 
NWP&TB had adopted at Madikwe, it was entirely congruous.176 But it does reveal 
yet another contradiction where the NWP&TB's people-based conservation rhetoric 
sits very uncomfortably with its management of the Reserve. 
The 'foreign cash' definition ofsustainability was dominant amongst myNWP&TB 
and private sector respondents. It explained and justified their using. exclusive tourism 
to achieve such 'sustainability'. Yet its clashes with many villagers' perceptions of 
the role the Reserve should play for them were inevitable. To those villagers it was a 
role that went beyond the (as yet largely unseen) economic possibilities. The views of 
the majority oflocal residents clashed absolutely with the lodge manager's cited 
above: they wished to have access to the local repository of South Africa's natural 
heritage precisely in order to know what a wild elephant looks like in its natural 
176 The literature emphasising the centrality of social elements of sustainable development is vast - see, 
for example, Honey, 1999, Gibbon et al, 1995, O'Hearn, 1999, and of course the Brundtland Report, 












habitat. It appears, therefore, that villagers defined what the lodge manager called 
their 'suffering' differently from how the other two partners of the Madikwe project 
did so. Most village respondents were not only concerned with economic 
development: increased employment and better roads, schools and services. They 
were also interested in experiencing the 'beauty of nature'. It is surely a particularly 
prescriptive (and un-people-based) kind of patronising which presumes that villagers' 
aspirations were, or should have been, limited to purely financial and material 
concerns. As Wells et al (1992:42) say "Local participation viewed as a process goes 
well beyond simply sharing in social and economic benefits". Thus, according to one 
respondent: 
. Parks Board should go back to the drawing board and think. They should share these 
important things [ conservation] with the community .... Rather than hiring a coach to 
go to Pretoria Zoo they [ villagers] should rather pay an entrance fee for Madikwe and 
see wild animals in their natural habitats. This clearly shows that the public relations 
officer is side tracking important things and there is a break down of communication 
between the park and the communities (Lekgophung resident, Jaci's Camp employee, 
21 August 2000). 
And another: 
According to my belief, the Reserve must help the community. But the community 
doesn't know anything about the Reserve. They know nothing about wild animals 
and if they want to know they must go to Pretoria Zoo, even though there is a game 
reserve nearby. They [MGR stafl] are there to educate and empower the 
communities. They must invite the people to MGR to do game drives, so they will be 
able to develop an interest in the game reserve. That will lead to empowerment Once 
a child develops an interest, they will choose courses at school which are related to 
the game reserve; then later they can look for work there and not be too far from 
home (Molatedi resident, 5 July 2000). 
Central in the above is the argument that empowerment is only properly achievable 
through education (which in turn, it is implied, can lead to sustainable economic 
benefits such as employment). Similarly, the references to Pretoria Zoo, with the 
underlying message that 'if Madikwe won't help we will do it ourselves', emphasise 
the argument that a knowledge of the methods of conservation are equally as 
important as the economic outcomes of such methods (the generation offoreign 
currency), in terms of achieving 'participation' or 'empowerment'. Hence, according 
to the respondents cited above, Madikwe management had become 'sidetracked' and 
should have been rethinking their approach: the only way villagers could ever really 
benefit from the Reserve was through future generations becoming capacitated to 











This type of local diachronic understanding of the role the Reserve should have been 
playing for villagers contrasts strongly with the NWP&TB's particularly synchronic 
definition of development through conservation. I return to this point in chapter 
seven. Here, I emphasise that such views seriously undermine the NWP&TB' s claims 
to be practicing 'people-based conservation'; and I suggest a counter-argument that, 
as with parks in the colonial and apartheid days, it was still only the privileged, both 
conservationists and tourist viewers, who were seen as the kinds of people who 
should have access to the nation's natural heritage. 
Despite the radical change within hegemonic conservation discourse from colonial 
and apartheid-era fortress-type approaches to the people-based approaches prevalent 
in the new 'democratic' South Africa, local people were therefore still excluded. The 
NWP&TB's neo-liberal perspective obscured.the operation of power that made such 
continuing exclusion inevitable - and (politically) acceptable, even in South Africa's 
post apartheid environment of supposed atonement for the injustices of the past. 
Again, what had made this possible was a power lying in the invisible operations (the 
conservation/economic development framework) that had led to the establishment of 
the Reserve in the first place. The power of such a framework is that, through 
divorcing conservation and rural development (in that villagers had no control over, 
nor any real knowledge of, the management of natural resources in the Reserve), it 
led to the exclusion of villagers from the Reserve. And it thus served to ensure the 
persistence of inequalities in the Madikwe project's so-called partnership. 
Thus, when there were clashes of interest, the 'foreign cash' view of the sustainability 
ofMadikwe, and its supposed potential to 'bring development' to neighbouring 
populations, took priority over any immediately realisable people-based 
developmental considerations. Both the NWP&TB and Madikwe Initiative rhetoric 
suggests that the Initiative was set up precisely to address such inequalities, to 
'empower' and 'build capacity'. Moreover, the Madikwe Initiative's insistence on 
working with the most marginalised in the neighbouring villages (thereby excluding 
ChiefSuping's relatives - see chapter four) indicates a particular determination to 
empower and build capacity from the bottom up. Yet, as the next chapter will 
demonstrate, the Madikwe Initiative actually reached only a minority of villagers and, 











the three Madikwe stakeholders. For the majority of villagers, as this chapter has 
shown, continued failure to grant them access to the Reserve impacted heavily on 
their perceptions of the success of the whole Madikwe project. To many, it was just a 













'Before, there was nothing': Knowledge, Power and 
the Madikwe Initiative 
Most of my people do not know the Reserve. It is amazing because, when the Reserve 
was first set up, it was stated [by the Parks Board] that the nearby village[r]s will be the 
ones who will know the Reserve and benefit from it. .. [Now] the Madikwe Initiative is 
succeeding to an extent It cannot do everything at once, but everyone can see that 
things are better than they were before. Some things are happening at least Before, 
there was nothing (interview, translated from Setswana, with Chief Tsiepe of 
Lekgophung, 2000). 
At the time of my fieldwork, Madikwe Game Reserve had been running for nearly ten 
years. The NWP&TB had made much of the potential opportunities for 'community 
partnership and involvement' but, considering that most villagers had never been 
inside the Reserve and had not yet experienced economic benefits coming from it, it 
was evident that the Reserve was falling short of reaching that potential. Madikwe, 
rather than being viewed by the majority of village respondents purely as a source of 
economic opportunity, also stood for the conservation of South Africa's natural 
heritage. It was seen as a potential opportunity for them to experience the 'beauty of 
nature', to share in a part of the nation's natural heritage, a part that many felt they 
had a particular claim on given its proximity to the villages. But, because of the 
Madikwe management's economic priorities, and the Reserve's structure as an 
exclusive elite ecotourism destination, it was a heritage to which most villagers were 
denied access. Indeed, the very structure of the NWP&TB's Madikwe project 
reinforced and exacerbated the villagers' position as the weak partner. The Reserve 
was state-owned, and there was no local ownership of its natural resources or 
management rights over its conservation operations. To the majority of residents in 
Lekgophung, Supingstad and Molatedi, people-based conservation as practiced at 
Madikwe was experienced as little more than a continuing story of exclusion. 
From the NWP&TB's perspective, Madikwe was essentially a business, and 
conservation was simply the means of generating financial profit. Villagers were 
expected, in tum, to benefit through institutions such as a Community Trust Fund, 











business opportunities generated by the presence of conservation and ecotourism. 
Yet, in 1997, some six years after the Reserve had been established there were only 
two wholly successful entrepreneurial businesses functioning177 and fewer than ninety 
residents from the three villages combined were employed in the Reserve. The so-
called local community stakeholder was failing to reap significant benefits and was 
becoming increasingly marginalised in the Madikwe project as a whole. Recognising 
that the villages had largely been left out of the Madikwe project, the NWP&TB 
instigated the Madikwe Initiative which was launched in January 1998. In the words 
of the Board's Resource Economist: 
In reality, the Madikwe project is held up by the two legs of the stronger partners, the 
Parks Board and the private sector. The weaker leg, that of the community, dangles 
along .... The Parks Board recognises this and has facilitated the establishment of a 
community support and empowerment programme to develop capacity within these 
communities. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) 
has contributed substantially to this programme to ensure equal participation, 
especially by the communities. This support should not be linked to or administered or 
controlled by the Parks Board, in order to ensure the communities are indeed 
independent and not threatened by withdrawal of support if th y don't ',tow the line' 
[sic] (Davies, 1997:16). 
Particularly striking in the above is the NWP &TB' s imagery of itself and the private 
sector lodge operators as symbols of power and strength, carrying not only their share 
of responsibilities, but also shouldering the burden that seemed, both from Madikwe-
related literature such as the above and the majority of interviews I conducted with 
NWP&TB management personnel, to be the Board's view of their local community 
partner. The community was the weak leg, little more than a crippled appendage, a 
dead weight unbalancing the entire project. Similarly, the insistence that within the 
development programme the so-called communities should be independent of the 
NWP&TB, so that support could not be withdrawn if the villagers failed to toe the 
line, further emphasised the Board's positioning of the villagers and their leaders as 
weak, marginal, burdensome. 
Furthermore, prior to any significant input from, or involvement by, people from the 
neighbouring villages, the general Madikwe project (as distinct from the DfID-funded 
Madikwe Initiative programme) was already a tangible reality, a potentially lucrative 
177 Only one of which, Mr Ramorula's ofMolatedi, was based in one of the three villages immediately 
adjacent to the Reserve that were the focus of the Madikwe Initiative. The other was based in 











business with its parameters clearly defined by the two self-styled strong partners. 
And it was they who assigned the local community a role, albeit unspecific, but 
nonetheless pre-detennined by them in their assumed position as the stronger 
partners. Under such prearranged tenus, external support, in the shape of the DfID-
funded Madikwe Initiative, was essential if villagers were successfully to fulfil the 
developing stakeholder role, to grow into the shoes designed for them, and thus not be 
wholly amputated from the project. 
Such a view indicates the existence of a pre-drawn, solid hierarchy into which the 
villages and their residents were placed finnly, and seemingly irrevocably, at the 
bottom. Within this hierarchical, marginalising view presented by the NWP&TB, the 
Madikwe Initiative was of critical importance if the local community partner was to 
be helped and guided so that it could strengthen its position within the Madikwe 
Game Reserve project, and breach the hitherto impenetrable fortress that was the 
Reserve itself. Yet, as my fieldwork progressed, it became increasingly clear that 
respondents in the villages were not merely the powerless, subjugated mass that the 
weak-leg approach to the Madikwe set-up suggested. Nor was the Madikwe Initiative 
viewed in the villages as an unproblematic, empowering saviour galloping to the 
rescue. 
In my first months of fieldwork and data analysis I came to an initial conclusion that 
the Madikwe Initiative, like the NWP&TB and despite the rhetoric, was a purely and 
unashamedly top-down development intervention. As such its aims to render its 
projects independent and self-sustaining were unlikely ever to be realised. Just as 
villagers were marginalised regarding management rights and access to Madikwe and 
its natural resources, so, too, did they have little (or any) control over the financial 
resources or management of the Madikwe Initiative. Participation in the Initiative was 
controlled and constricted by an externally imposed framework: the projects and 
workshops predetermined by DfID as the primary donor agency and Mafisa Research 
and Planning as the consultant-dependent NGO implementing the Initiative. Yet, 
while conducting fieldwork in the villages, I met and talked with many forcefully 
eloquent people whose comments led me to see that it was grossly limiting to view 
the Madikwe Initiative simply as a series of burdensome externally imposed 











impacts in the villages, both among project members and beyond, and particularly 
within village-level development discourse more generally. 
The purpose of this chapter is therefore two-fold. Firstly, I look closely at the 
community support and empowennent programme known as the Madikwe Initiative, 
Considering it both in terms of its structure and its aims to develop capacity: to 
provide the knowledge, skills and training that were deemed necessary by the 
implementers of the Initiative ifloca1 people were to seize the economic opportunities 
presented by the presence of the Reserve and ecotourism, and hence ameliorate their 
position as the weak leg of the Madikwe project. Drawing on empirical data from 
Madikwe Initiative projects, my second concern is to explore perceptions of project 
sustainability, ownership and local power balances. I demonstrate that in many cases 
the experiences of participating in projects helped generate a village-based discourse 
of pronounced binary opposition in which notions of se1ti'other and 
endogenous/exogenous were pivotal in ongoing tensions concerning power and 
autonomy. The situation reveals how development interventions, rather than being 
linear processes, are multifaceted, with complex repercussions and reverberations, 
many of them quite unintended. 
Early in my research it became evident that attitudes to Mafisa and the Madikwe 
Initiative varied widely from village to village. If there is such a thing as a village's 
attitude, and if that attitude can be measured by the degree of residents , involvement 
in projects, then Lekgophung, where there was both the highest rate of participation 
in projects, and the least conflict arising from that participation, seemed to have the 
most positive attitude towards the Madikwe Initiative. In Molatedi, from which a 
similar number of residents were involved in projects as there were from 
Lekgophung, there was a high degree of conflict and contestation over the role and 
value of Madikwe. The Molatedi attitude towards the Madikwe Initiative could 
therefore be described as somewhere between ambivalent and antagonistic. In 
Supingstad, where the Madikwe Initiative was not functioning at all, the village's 
attitude could be imagined as entirely hostile, characterised by a complete withdrawal 
from any contact with Mafisa. However, digging slightly deeper, it is evident that 











An important point to stress is that in the survey I conducted, only twenty percent of 
the two hundred and forty respondents drawn from the three villages (eighty from 
each village), stated that they had ever heard ofMafisa: thirty-three percent of 
respondents in Lekgophung; twenty-one percent in Molatedi and only eight percent in 
Supingstad. While the ability of such statistics accurately to reflect the reality they 
supposedly represent is highly questionable, they do indicate that, despite two years 
ofMafisa's presence, contact with Mafisa, or even knowledge of its work, had been 
extremely limited. This raises important questions such as: with whom did Mafisa 
work? How were project participants selected? Who had access to Mafisa projects? 
How far did Mafisa's influence actually spread? Addressing these questions 
preoccupies many of the following pages of this chapter. But the indication that so 
few people had even heard ofMafisa suggests that its Madikwe Initiative-linked 
development interventions were not as dominant in local experience and discourse as 
may be expected from Madikwe-related literature (see for example Magome, 1998; 
Koch, 2000 and Davies, 1996, 1997). 
Considering the meagre number of villagers claiming even to have heard ofMafisa, 
this chapter, in part, focuses on a small minority, the few who were involved in 
projects and workshops initiated by the Mafisa-Ied Madikwe Initiative. In a broader 
sense the chapter is also concerned with the general condition of living next to an 
apparently lucrative ecotourism destination, a supposed source of economic 
opportunity that had failed, at least at the time of my research, to be realisable for the 
vast majority of villagers. It addresses, too, how many villagers claimed a dependence 
(real or perceived) on external interventions such as the Madikwe Initiative, if 
benefits were to be realised in the villages. For, to use the words of Chief Tsiepe of 
Lekgophung, 'Before [the Madikwe Initiative] there was nothing': nothing except a 
65,000 hectare, big five, malaria-free game reserve attracting increasing numbers of 
high paying tourists every season; a well run, lucrative ecotourism operation that had 
already been operational for seven years. 
It is useful to enter into a discussion of the role and effect of the Madikwe Initiative 











which was, in July 2000, one of only three commercial lodges in Madikwe. 178 At the 
time of the interview Jaci's Camp had been open for two months, but Garth had been 
overseeing the building operations and acting as manager since October 1999. 
Previously, he had managed Madikwe River Lodge, the first lodge to be opened in the 
Reserve, and was hence one of the people within the private sector most familiar with 
the Reserve and the area Through his work at the two lodges, coupled with 
involvement in a community garden project while he had been at River Lodge, 179 
Garth had also had more contact with residents in Molatedi 180 than most private 
sector employees who came from outside the area. In answer to a question about local 
residents' involvement in Madikwe, Garth replied: 
OK, we've got the park running, we've got it known as an international destination. 
We've got hundreds of tourists pouring in here, brilliant .... But one thing that always 
stumps me is that these guys [village residents] are not creating some kind of curio· or 
artefact that we can market here .... I would think that the best thing to do now is to go 
around to the local communities and say: 'hello everybody! Catch a wake up. Here is a 
-gold mine on your doorstep. What are you going to do about it?' I think that would be 
the way to get them [villagers] involved .... Even ifit's some twit who just wanders 
around and speaks to everybody and says: 'listen, this is what you can do and this is 
how you can do it. Here's a pamphlet. Go to that course on running a business, go to 
that course on running a food store.' ... I'm sure those things can be done. Maybe I'm 
naive, but I would have thought, if I was living somewhere like Molatedi and I saw 
these fat cats driving past in their hired Meres., I would think 'there goes an awful lot of 
money, how can I tap into that?' You could draw a big picture of an elephant and have 
elephant dung curios and collect elephant dung in the park and put it in latex or 
something dom They'll [tourists] buy anything. But even if the guys [villagers] don't 
have that thought pattern, if there was just someone who wandered around and tapped 
them on the shoulder and said 'look you can do this, this is easy. Try this and this and 
this' (interview with Garth, the manager of Jaci's Camp, 4 July 2000). 
The interview was co ducted more than two and a half years after the formal launch 
of the Madikwe Initiative which, under DflD's original terms of funding, should have 
ended six months earlier. From the perspective of an experienced lodge manager, still 
nothing was happening to utilise the Madikwe commercial operation for local 
villagers' benefit: the villagers were failing to tap into the tourist market, to profit 
from the 'fat cats'. In his view, the logical way for villagers to benefit was through 
more or less direct interaction with the tourist market, through, for example, 
178 There was also a bush camp and a number of small corporate lodges not open to the general public. 
179 The project had originally been funded by the Water Board, and had initially been successful, but, 
according to Garth, the funding stopped and "within two weeks we had a dust bowl instead of food 
gardens" (interview, 4 July 2000). 
180 Garth had worked with villagers from Molatedi rather than Supingstad and Lekgophung because of 











manufacturing curios and handicrafts. Hence, what villagers needed above all was a 
knowledge of that market and an appropriate 'thought pattern' with which to access 
it. 
Garth's market-centred view was echoed in the villages throughout my fieldwork, 
where many village respondents asked me questions such as: 'Who are these 
tourists?' 'Why don't they come to the village and share ideas with us?' 'Maybe if we 
can meet the tourists we can find out what they like.' 'How do those people live in 
those countries?' 'Parks Board must help with educating people, old and young, in 
how to make products with their hands that they can sell to the tourists'. Such 
questions and comments emphasised the fundamental gap between villagers' 
knowledge and experience and tourists' expectations. In their paper on Pro-poor 
Tourism, Ashley et al. (2000) indicate that such a gap is not unusual. They argue that: 
"Particularly important skills in tourism include language, and an understanding of 
tourist expectations. Training for small-scale tourism often has to begin with 'what is 
a tourist?', because being a tourist is such an alien experience for the poor" (Ashley et 
al.,2000). 
In the Madikwe context, the lodge manager's frustration with the dearth oflocal 
products available for him to market at Jaci's camp reinforced the point Ashley et al 
(2000) make. It was evident, to him at least, that without a basic knowledge of the 
markets they sought to target, the Reserve remained an impenetrable fortress for most 
villagers, particularly as far as access through the creation of so called spin-off 
businesses went, be they handicraft oriented or linked to servicing lodges. 
As I indicate in chapter six, many village respondents, too, stressed the importance of 
education as the most important route to their realising benefits from the Reserve. The 
difference was that those respondents had a longer-term view of the significance of 
that education than the dominant partners of the Madikwe project; and they had 
different ideas about the meanings of notions such as empowerment and capacity. For 
example, according to the Molatedi resident (5 July 2000) cited at the end of chapter 
six, children needed to be exposed to the Reserve and its conservation operations in 
order to develop an understanding and interest in what it was all about. Such an 











ultimately lead to their commanding significant jobs (rather than becoming cleaners, 
labourers and security guards, for example) within the Reserve's conservation and 
private sector lodge operations. For that respondent, capacity building and 
empowennent was a slow process which could be achieved only through investment 
in future generations. Similarly, according to school principals and teachers in the 
three villages: 
The children are very interested in the Reserve because of the conservation we teach. 
But they have never been there. They see buses coming from Jo'burg, but never us. 
Even I have never been inside .. .It is so important for the kids' interest to be aroused. 
They have to see something - if they are allowed to visit then they can talk about it 
At the moment the park is a sort of theory. The teachers try to teach them, but they 
are speculating really as they don't really know themselves (school principal, 
Molatedi, 14 September 2000). 
They should let the students go there for weekend excursions, to view the animals 
and nature. They have an interest and this must be cultivated by adults. They know 
there is a Reserve, but they have never been there. They think about something big, 
something they can never go to. To them it is not accessible ... (school principal, 
Lekgophung, 21 August 2000). 
The Reserve would be much better for us if they gave education because there are 
many people who don't even know a single of the big five. Bursaries and 
scholarships are what we need in this village, and to build colleges where our 
children can study about wild life (school teacher, Supingstad, 14 September 2000). 
The long-tenn vision of capacity building is critical in each of the above quotes. It 
contrasts significantly with that of the Madikwe Initiative, the fundamental concern of 
which was to establish businesses so that villagers could provide outsourced services 
to the Reserve and to create jobs so that villagers could be employed. The Initiative's 
interventions targeted adults and young people, not school children. But village 
respondents such as those cited above emphasise that it is their children, the future 
generations, they wished to see educated and capacitated so that they would be able to 
grasp top employment opportunities within the Reserve. There was one Mafisa-Ied 
project, the internship programme, that aimed to train eight young people in lodge 
management, tour guiding and game ranging. But, again, the project was characterised 
by the immediacy of its goals - to transfer the necessary skills to the interns within a 
very limited period, one defined by the funding available. The project was thus not 
sustainable over the longer term - most obviously because it was a training course and 
therefore entirely dependent on the NGO with its intermittent, exogenously controlled 












The presence of selfJother binary thinking is also highly evident in the above quotes. 
The respondents show the 'other', the Madikwe project's strong partners, to be both 
irrational and contradictory. How can villagers' involvement and participation ever 
occur if the central elements of the Madikwe project's 'business' remained an 
inaccessible mystery? The dilemma again brings to mind ChiefMatlapeng's words: 
"The community does not know about the Reserve because we have not been invited. 
We do not feel part of it. We cannot identify with it. The achievements and failures 
are not shared. Ifwe are not part ofit, how can we have its interests at heart?" 
(interview, 5 July 2000).181 
The Madikwe park warden's view was that education was, of course, very important, 
but not, unfortunately, part of the NWP&TB's mandate. He stressed that access would 
not be possible until the day visitors' zone had been developed (ifit ever was182) 
because of ''potential conflicts with high paying visitors seeking exclusive game 
viewing experiences" (park Warden, 21 September 2000). But what sort of 
organisation can claim, without appearing irrational nd contradictory, that its goal is 
to empower the local community, while its mandate forecloses on the possibility of 
educating or promoting school children's interest in the conservation and tourism 
operations that are the core functions of its presence? When there were clashes with 
the economic aims ofMadikwe, villagers were last in the pecking order, bottom of the 
hierarchy. They were the weak-leg in the partnership - both in practice and in how 
they were imagined by the dominant partners, which was more or less as dependents 
in need of succour. 
The continued fundamental lack of benefits accruing to villagers (not least of which 
was access to the Reserve for school children), and of knowledge about how to realise 
such benefits, raises questions regarding the role ofNGOs in general and Mafisa in 
particular. Was it Mafisa's role to bridge the gap between local residents, the private 
sector and tourists, to act as, to use the lodge manager's terminology, the 'shoulder-
tapping twit' dispensing knowledge on how to access the Reserve's ecological or 
tourism operations? From Mafisa's perspective, its role was to empower and to build 
lSI Excerpt from the longer interview quotation reproduced in chapter six (page 168). 
IS2 As indicated earlier, the area set aside for a day visitors' zone had land claims against it and hence 











capacity, which meant setting up 'real' businesses able to compete in a national and 
global market place. Hence, apart from a theatre and a film group and a lodge 
internship training programme (see below), Mafisa's interventions focussed on 
projects that, in 2000, were sti11largely not yet visible, either to tourists or to 
personnel in the private sector. These included brick-making, construction and bush-
clearing teams, the Molatedi Bopitikelo Community Centre, a Lekgophung Business 
Centre, and small business and institutional support programmes. 
According to Madikwe Initiative literature, the logic behind such initiatives was that 
privately owned small businesses such as the bush-clearing and brick-making teams 
"can effectively take advantage of business opportunities from wildlife areas and 
tourism lodges" (Koch, 2000:12); that through direct employment in lodges (for 
example, the internship programme) "the wage mechanism can often be the most 
effective form of delivering benefit into rural households from conservation 
areas ... [as] wages go straight into households and are not easily intercepted by 
powerful groups in 'communities'" (ibid). While such small business initiatives are in 
line with the 'ownership' philosophy behind many contemporary people-based 
development models,183 it is important to stress that at the time of my fieldwork, 
which was two and a half years into the Madikwe Initiative, not one of the Mafisa-Ied 
projects was independent or sustainable. Indeed, they were still referred to by 
Madikwe Initiative personnel as projects rather than businesses. 
Good Capitalist Entrepreneurs 
It was perhaps ironic that the two village-based businesses that were successful in 
breaching the Madikwe fortress, and that were owned and run by local private 
entrepreneurs, were themselves not a part or product of the Madikwe Initiative. One 
belonged to Ms Madupe who was based in the nearby village of Obakeng; the other 
belonged to Mr Ramorula who also had a family-run general store in Molatedi. Both 
were involved in a variety of activities related to the construction and thereafter the 
servicing oflodges. Each had a contract to collect wood in the Reserve, at a rate of 
R20 per ton, which they then sold to the lodges. According to the manager of Jaci's 
Camp: 











Ms Madupe ... delivers wood and helps with cleaning up ... When we need something 
done we call Ms Madupe. [During construction] every single Leadwood [tree] here was 
brought here by Ms Madupe, and every single rock in these walls. We used them 
extensively - everything that went into this lodge, and it's a lot. Thousands and 
thousands of Rand .... Mr Ramorula also supplies us with firewood and they do our 
garbage removal- and his wife is doing our laundry now .... All that's more than just 
job creation; that's empowerment.. .. Ramorula and Ms Madupe are terrifIc. They are so 
effective. Both of them are really good: capitalists to a fault but they know what they' 
are doing and they're doing a good job of it (interview, 4 July 2000). 
Particularly salient within the lodge manager's comment is his view that 
empowennent is synonymous with being a capitalist - which is not the same as 
having ajob. Indeed, at the time of my fieldwork, Mr Ramorula employed four full 
time labourers and Ms Madupe three (both were also able to source extra labour at a 
moment's notice should the need arise) and had no qualms about profiting from 
employing that labour. As Mr Ramorula said: "You need to be well organised to 
make a business. This is my business and I am the one who puts in the tenders and 
grasps the opportunities. Anyone who wants to can make their own business" 
(interview, 21 September, 2000). He added "These Mafisa projects, like the brick 
making, they cannot be successful because they have no capital. They can't buy 
cement and sand. And who is going to pay them [the labourers]? This is not a 
business" (ibid). Such a view pointed to yet another inherent ambiguity within the 
Madikwe Initiative: Mafisa's role was to spend R6.4 million for the greater good of 
the so-called local community as a whole. Yet one of the main ways it attempted to 
do this was through trying to create independent, sustainable businesses or, rather, to 
create good capitalist entrepreneurs ('capitalists to a fault', to use the lodge manager's 
phrase) - who, by definition, are profit-driven rather than proponents of social 
welfare. But in order for a business to be sustainable it needs workers from whom to 
appropriate surplus value. Not everyone can be a business person: some people must 
be the employees. Or, to take Mr Ramorula's perspective, if everyone is a wage 
labourer 'who is going to pay them?' 
The Madikwe Initiative had not (yet) succeeded in creating sustainable, independent 
businesses among the minority of villagers participating in the Mafisa-Ied projects. 184 
And it had certainly not achieved the near impossible feat of empowering the 
community as a whole to access opportunities in the Reserve. Furthermore, there 











were various local individuals and organised groups that fell outside the spotlight of 
the Initiative but which could well have been called upon to offer a service to tourists 
in the Reserve, thereby creating some income and a possible basis for longer-term 
sustainability. But the Initiative seemed to overlook, even ignore them. One example 
was a choir group in Molatedi, one of whose members said: 
Since we started in 1998, we have not yet asked any help from any company, institution 
or business. We thought Mafisa would see us and because we are well known in 
Molatedi they will be interested in knowing more about our project. But we realised 
Mafisa are only interested in projects they [have] started and ignore others ... We want 
to go and perform at the lodges but we can't get hold of the CLO [community liaison 
officer] or anybody who can help us with how to connect to the lodge management 
(choir member, Molatedi, 23 September 2000). 
And in the words of another villager, this one a frustrated local entrepreneur: 
They should create an opportunity for local investors to come in. I once went there [to 
the NWP&TB office] and asked if! could supply chickens to the lodges. I was told 
about health [regulations] etcetera, even before they said to come and talk. They never 
gave me a chance to explain what I wanted to do. I know health is important in that 
industry. I would have had the chickens slaughtered professionally and all those things. 
I spoke to [the CLO] about it but he was not interested in helping me. I also tried 
baking bread, but again all they spoke about was health, before even giving me a 
chance to speak. I know the customer sets the standard and it is up to the supplier to 
meet that standard, but how can you when they don't even give you a chance (middle 
aged woman, Molatedi Resident, 10 September, 2000). 
Both stories illustrate, again, how inaccessible the Reserve continued to be for many 
villagers and, too, the Madikwe Initiative's complicity in sustaining that lack of 
access. Central to both is the pervasive self/other binary, the perception that no matter 
how hard they might try to do things on their own (I can't help but be reminded of 
ChiefSuping's 'Handouts make fools of people' comment),18S they are unable to 
breach the Madikwe fortress. Without acceptance and authorisation from the 
Reserve's insiders their efforts continued to be frustrated and they remained outsiders. 
Power in this arena rested finnly with the villagers' apparent other, the NWP&TB's 
community liaison officer, the lodge management and Mafisa. Hence, according to 
the Chairperson of the Lekgophung RDP Forum: ''How can we get more benefits? It 
is a question of knowing what tourism is all about and, really, even I know so little. 
We are not exposed" (interview, 26 August 2000). Such a view echoes that of Ashley 
et al (2000) and of the lodge manager cited at the beginning of this chapter: what was 
still needed was what he called an 'appropriate thought pattern', a knowledge of how 











to access markets and a 'shoulder-tapping twit' to bring about both. Two of the 
interns put forward that same argument that what was needed above all in the villages 
was someone to go and explain the opportunities that could be grasped: 
If only the people in the village could develop something -like there are a lot of young 
people and they could do something like the theatre group in Molatedi, or making 
African art - or traditional dancing. We should initiate this as we are the ones who have 
had exposure and can tell them what people are interested in. The problem is that we 
never have time. In the village, people lack contact with lodge management so they 
don't know what is expected. They don't know what is possible. But we don't have 
time to sit with them (interview, 14 September, 2000). 
Yet, why was it that Mr Ramorula and Ms Madupe had had no such need of someone 
to explain the possibilities? They had both grasped every opportunity that arose from 
the presence of the Reserve. They had the correct 'thought pattern'. Indeed, the 
repeated opinion that villagers were dependent on external interventions if they were 
ever to realise benefits from the Reserve seemed to me to contradict the very 
existence of these two successful businesses. Mr Ramorula himself suggested that the 
reason more villagers did not manage to seize opportunities in the Reserve was based 
on a mixture of ignorance, cultural difference and laziness on the villagers' part: 
I organised the rubbish collection by myself: I am a qualified [self-taught] salesman. If 
they want to, others [local villagers] can get involved. But they don't understand the 
procedure at Parks Board. Someone should explain it to them. There are many 
opportunities for everyone, like tendering for the fence maintenance. I have put in a 
tender. I can do all of it if I organise myself properly. I know people in the village don't 
like it that I am doing so much. But people in this village are lazy .... It is good that 
Mafisa comes here, but people here do not understand them. They just listen to the 
talking and the meetings, but they don't -It's African customs. People can preach and 
preach to them, but they don't do it. But also Mafisa people expect people to do these 
things when they don't get paid. But you can't do things if you are not paid (interview, 
21 September 2000). 
Such a perspective indicates that, as far as Mr Ramorula was concerned, what was 
needed was more than a workshopped transfer of knowledge. What was needed could 
well be described as a good mercenary 'spirit from within the people'. What was 
needed were the main ingredients of capitalism: freedom of choice, knowledge of 
market and control of resources - none of which, as will become clear from case 
studies presented below, had yet been provided by the Madikwe Initiative, even 
though such factors were central to its goals. What could not be escaped, therefore, 
was an inherent contradiction within the Madikwe Initiative: it was that of trying to 











functioning within a capitalist (or even imperialist) system of development that 
sought to tum all the villagers into good subjects of such a system. 
A Culture of Consultants 
The very structure ofMafisa as an organisation further impacted on its ability to fulfil 
its aims - particularly when it came to establishing independent, stand-alone 
businesses. At its core were two main directors, one based in Johannesburg and one in 
Nelspruit. Then there were two people described as 'associates ofMafisa'. In addition 
to their work for Mafisa, one was also doing a Masters degree in tourism and 
development and the other owned and managed his own ecology and planning 
consultancy business. A fifth person who was part of the inner circle ofMafisa, 
described as a tourism planner, was also an executive director of a tourism company. 
Beyond this core circle of directors and associates, other consultants were also 
employed by Mafisa to impart skills to the participants in the various projects the 
NGO managed. 
Mafisa was therefore and fundamentally a loose network of consultants, each with 
various interests and commitments that went well beyond Mafisa projects. The 
consultants were brought into the Mafisa fold only when needed and called upon by 
the small unit of directors and associates - who themselves had interests and 
responsibilities that reached far beyond their Madikwe operations. The consultants 
were all based far afield, in places such as Johannesburg, Pretoria and even Cape 
Town. They would make flying visits to the Madikwe area, usually on a monthly 
basis (depending on what stage the project in question had reached), for a few days of 
intense workshops, meetings and planning. In order to keep tabs on what was 
happening in Madikwe while the consultants were focussing on other responsibilities 
in other areas, Mafisa also employed a field co-ordinator. This was particularly 
necessary as the consultants were paid on a daily basis so their visits were kept to a 
minimum in order to maximise the Madikwe Initiative funds. Such an arrangement 
inevitably created a particular set of problems and tensions that centred around 
project dependency. They are perhaps best described through looking more closely at 












The Thakadu Theatre Group: Reinforcing Dependence 
Thakadu, meaning anteater or aardvark in Setswana, is the totem animal of the 
BaTlokwa.186 Mafisa initiated a theatre group project of that name in 1998, with the 
intention of promoting cultural tourism in the area and establishing an independent 
business that could service the Madikwe lodges. 
Initially, the Thakadu theatre group seemed to have great potential for success. Its 
members had undergone professional training in acting, and their performances had 
met with a highly positive reception at lodges within Madikwe, from both lodge staff 
and guests. Yet, the project failed. Project participants perceived that this failure was 
largely due to their dependence on Mafisa, that they had not been empowered to 
access their own markets nor to function as an independent business. Such 
perceptions became a familiar thread running through many Madikwe Initiative 
projects. 
The main aim of developing the theatre group project was to create a local dramatic 
performance group in order to access a potential market for cultural tourism within 
the private sector lodges. The Madikwe lodges were thus targeted as the theatre 
group's primary market. Mafisa brought in two professional drama school instructors 
from Gauteng as consultants, with a briefto train and direct the group. Originally the 
group comprised nine young people, three from Molatedi, four from Lekgophung and 
two from Supingstad. According to one member, advertising for actors in the villages 
was flawed from the start: 
Mafisa didn't select the right people to be in the theatre. Mafisa never came to inform 
people in the village about the theatre, so people didn't know enough to get involved. 
So we didn't get all the right people and we ended up with only the seven. People 
thought it is not a man's job. Mafisa should have explained more. Then there would 
have been more than twenty [theatre group members]. Now we are having a problem 
finding replacements for the ones who are gone (interview, 25 September 2000). 
186 The section on Molatedi in Appendix 3 provides a brief overview of the early history of the 












The first play developed and perfonned by the group was called Modern Life. It 
portrayed aspects of village life, culture and history. Six perfonnances were staged, 
three of which were at lodges within the Reserve, before two of the members from 
Molatedi became sick, and one died. A second play, Brother James, was put together 
with the remaining seven members. It was also about Tswana culture and history but, 
at the behest of one of the consultant drama instructors, and in spite of the reluctance 
of several of the actors who found the subject matter 'colonial', 'irrelevant' or 
'uninspiring', focussed mainly on the Anglo-Boer war and Mzilikazi, a nineteenth 
century leader of a group that came to be known as the Ndebele people, and who fled 
from what is now KwaZulu-Natal first onto the highveld and later to what is now 
Zimbabwe. From September 1999, the group put on a further nine perfonnances, but 
only three of them were at lodges within the Reserve. The other six were at schools in 
the local area. Each perfonnance at the lodges was met with a highly positive 
reception. According to one lodge tour-guide, who had been appointed the lodge's 
new general manager a few days before I interviewed him: 
The theatre was brilliant. The rests loved them and there was very positive feedback. 
But they only came the once18 and then never contacted us again. I can't believe we 
haven't had them back. They have got to sell themselves ... They have to approach us 
(General Manager, Tau Lodge, 15 September, 2000). 
Indeed, it became very apparent that the group's inability to source perfonnance 
opportunities and to secure bookings was the major factor that led to its demise. The 
problem, again, lay in how the project was structured. Each booking within the 
Reserve was arranged by a Mafisa consultant, rather than by one or more members of 
the group themselves. Effectively this meant that the theatre group only performed in 
lodges when the consultant responsible had been in and around the area and had had 
time to focus on making bookings. 
A further problem was the turnover of Mafisa personnel: there had been three 
different Mafisa field-coordinators when I conducted fieldwork in 2000. This meant 
that often the group was not entirely sure who was responsible for making bookings -
a visiting consultant or the (also somewhat peripatetic) field coordinator. By the 
beginning of 2000 a Mafisa consultant had started negotiations for the group to sign a 
contract with Tau Lodge whereby they would stage two perfonnances per month. 











The contract with Tau Lodge had not materialised by the time I left the area in 
October 2000. Theatre group members complained that they had no idea who was 
responsible for following up on it and one said: "I don't believe that contract will 
ever be signed now"(interview, 25 September 2000). None of the members contacted 
the lodge directly. Rather, they waited for word from Mafisa, word that they said did 
not come. 
To add to the sense of disillusionment with the Mafisa consultants' failure to guide 
and capacitate the group's members to a point where they were able to find 
themselves regular work, they were further upset to learn that the never formalised 
contract had, in any case, been one where they would simply perform at the lodge 
and be paid by the guests and at the guests' discretion. In other words, rather than the 
lodge formally paying for the performances, the plan was that a hat would be passed 
around among the guests - a plan which theatre group members told me they took as 
a sign that the lodges did not value them: "The lodges have small interest in the 
theatre because they are not willing to pay for the performance. They take our 
business as if we are playing [rather than a serious, bona fide business]" (interview, 
21 September, 2000). 
One of the constraints on the group being able to arrange performances was, initially, 
lack of communication infrastructure. This was before an MTN (cellular phone 
network) mast was erected near Molatedi, a few months before my time in the field 
ended, providing reception for cellular phones for the first time. But until then the 
group had had no ready access to a telephone and, as there was only one Mafisa 
vehicle to be shared amongst all the projects, transport was largely limited to when a 
performance was actually booked. This was often given by group members as one of 
the main reasons it had had to rely on Mafisa consultants to organise bookings for 
them within the Reserve. Yet it was also evident that the group perceived itself as 
lacking the skills and knowledge to contact potential clients and secure its own 
bookings. It was a problem that they saw as going beyond communication difficulties 












For the performances we have done we have never been invited to be part of the 
negotiations. Weare too spoon-fed by Mafisa. But we need to learn so that, in the 
future, when Mafisa is gone we are able to do things for ourselves (theatre group 
member, 25 September 2000). 
Members of the group expressed frustration at their own inability to break their 
dependency, and also that the structure of the Madikwe Initiative was ineffective in 
providing a way of addressing the problem. For example, representatives ofDflD, the 
Madikwe Initiative's primary funder, came regularly to the villages to conduct 
evaluations of the projects. Theatre group members understood the evaluations to 
have been an opportunity for them to disCuss problems they might be having with the 
project. Yet, according to the treasurer, the evaluation interviews were unhel pfully 
one-sided and succeeded in little more than emphasising the Madikwe Initiative's 
top-down power structure: 
They only asked us who trained us and how many times we performed. They never 
asked us about problems we might have. They are just seeing projects started with their 
money. They are not interested in related problems. They never even think of hearing 
from the people, of asking if the project is progressing smoothly. They were too much 
in a hurry. They came late [for the meeting] and were rushed (theatre group member 25 
September 2000). 
Eventually, the limited number of performances scheduled in lodges, and the 
resulting insufficient and sporadic income, coupled with a certain disenchantment 
with the subject matter of the second play, created seemingly irresolvable frictions 
within the group and led to it disbanding. In the words of one of the actors: 
To me it was a very important project. But it was very disappointing. We won't do any 
more plays now. The members are not co-operating. Some members wanted to be rich 
oVernight, but it doesn't work like that. We would get RlOO-R200 for the performances 
in the lodges, and that would be shared between the seven. At the schools the students 
would only pay Rl or R2. So money was a big problem. Now the project will just fade 
out and finish. There is no future. One member has gone to Botswana to work in a 
tannery workshop. Even if a lodge said to come and perform tomorrow, we would have 
big problems getting the members together (theatre group member, 27 September 
2000). 
The case of the theatre group illustrates the project's utter dependency on Mafisa. 
Indeed, its participants suggested that the project was thwarted right from the start 
because Mafisa failed to explain what it was about and hence was unable to attract 
sufficient participants. But even once the small group was up and running, it was 
incapable of accessing its potential markets, of sourcing performance opportunities in 











down approach - bred dependency. And, as far as the group was concerned, DflD's 
representatives merely reinforced a power structure which left the participants 
subjugated, their voices unheard. 
The internship programme was also unsustainable. But, unlike with the theatre group, 
such lack of sustainability was only to be expected with a training course that was 
necessarily dependent on instructors and funding. What is particularly significant 
about the programme, as a closer examination in the following section highlights, was 
that it revealed an uncomfortable contradiction within the Madikwe Initiative's 
rhetoric of targeting the poorest of the poor - precisely because the programme could 
not reach that target group: the interns were selected because they were the best 
educated, most charismatic and self-confident of applicants, rather than because they 
were poor and marginalised. 
The Lodge Internship Programme 
One day I was going to the shop to buy some bread and I saw this advert for tour 
guiding. I didn't know what this was but I just said to myself: 'OK, go for it. This is an 
opportunity.' There were about ninety people who applied. Only twenty-four got 
through to the next interviews, then fourteen, then eight. Many people, especially at the 
finals, were much more brilliant than me. I don't know why I was chosen. Maybe they 
just liked my smile! Before, I was doing nothing, just sitting at home. Now there are 
opportunities opening. So many!... I want to be a vet. I plan to generate income by 
ranging and then, before ten years, go to university and study to be a vet. And I want to 
travel- everywhere! (interview with intern, River Lodge, 22 August 2000). 
I was in Mafikeng when my mum called me and said to me to come along because they 
were doing interviews for tour guiding and women could go too. So I went, and they 
liked me! It is such a pleasure being the only woman tracker here [at Tau Lodge]. I 
always thought it was a field only for the men. Being here I can see that anyone can do 
it. I am doing it! I think after five years of experiencing the bush [it] will be enough, and 
then in ten years I want to be running my own lodge, or managing something (interview 
with intern, Tau Lodge, 15 September 2000). 
The Madikwe Initiative's lodge internship programme, launched in 1999, involved 
the comprehensive training of eight young village people (six men and two women, 
all in their early twenties) in all aspects oflodge management, tour guiding and game 
ranging. A selection committee, comprising Mafisa consultants as well as 
representatives from the local private sector such as the assistant manager of Tau 
Lodge, was established to interview prospective candidates. The candidates needed to 











certificates. The three village Tribal Authority offices were contacted to recommend 
names of applicants. Problems were encountered immediately in Supingstad where, 
as discussed in chapter four, only people with the surname of Suping were nominated. 
Under the tenus of the Madikwe Initiative's mandate, participants had to be selected 
'democratically' from amongst all village residents. Madikwe Initiative consultants 
said they felt they could not condone what appeared to be blatant nepotism. Yet, 
when asked to put forward names of people other than those called Suping, Chief 
Suping refused. The result was that five candidates were chosen from Lekgophung, 
three from Molatedi and none from Supingstad (interview with Mafisa Consultant, 15 
April 2000). That was the first flashpoint in the conflict I described in chapter four 
between Chief Suping and Mafisa. 
The aim of the lodge internship project was to train the young people to a point where 
they would be sufficiently enabled and capacitated to command top level jobs in 
lodges throughout South Africa and beyond. During my research, the project was 
often cited by those respondents (from lodges, villages and the NWP&TB) familiar 
with the Madikwe Initiative, as the most successfully empowering of the Initiative's 
projects, and one that constituted precisely the kind of opportunity needed in post-
apartheid South Africa for people such as they. The programme's potential was 
reflected in the fact that discussions began for it to be run as a national pilot project 
with one hundred trainees being taken on as interns in game parks and reserves 
around the country and trained in much the same way as the Madikwe Initiative pilot 
had done for its eight interns. As the park warden ofMadikwe said: 
One of the most exciting projects is the Internship Programme which has now become a 
national thing ... That is very important because the lodges all want to employ skilled 
people from the area. Now they can't use the excuse that there isn't anybody. There are 
trained guides that understand the whole lodge setup (interview, 21 September 
2000).18"8 
An important aspect of the project was that the interns lived and worked in Madikwe 
lodges and learned tracking skills from qualified rangers. In this way, they received 
first hand experience not only in tracking wild animals, but with tour guiding and 
188 These discussions began as I was leaving the area and the future of the project looked extremely 
positive. Sadly, I recently heard that the national pilot never transpired. In fact, only one more 
internship programme was run, and that only because Mafisa managed to source private funding (pers. 











interacting with guests. Mafisa also secured the services of a number of consultants to 
teach the interns subjects such as history and literature pertinent to the area. This 
aspect of their training programme was co-ordinated by an historian from Cape 
Town. Projects included sourcing and researching local myths and stories to perform 
for tourists, in order to add a cultural element to the wildlife tourism that Madikwe 
offered. 
Respondents from the lodges' management staff and rangers were generally very 
positive about the project, saying it was well run by Mafisa. Moreover, the interns 
were well received by tourists I spoke to, various of whom said they enjoyed the 
opportunity of talking to people from the local villages: "It's fascinating talking with 
these guys. I am really interested in the local culture. I don't just want to see the big-
five. I want to know how the people live around here. For me that is the real South 
Africa, the whole experience" (interview with American tourist, 24 September 2000). 
Negative comments were few, flavoured with cultural racist/imperialist undertones, 
and came mainly from white lodge staff. For example, at Tau Lodge the head ranger 
voiced concerns about the interns' ability to converse intelligently with guests. He 
suggested, contrary to my own experience, that language was the crux of the problem: 
The internship programme is an effective way of improving skills and knowledge. [Yet] 
There are problems. There is a perception that you can create a ranger over eight months 
and expect him to be safe in the bush with wild animals out there, and to be able to hold 
an intelligent conversation with overseas businessmen. Can he sit down at dinner and 
have a conversation with the chairman of Anglo American? It is difficult to do that sort 
of thing. You need to be a good host and I am a bit concerned about our trainees. The 
main problem is speaking good English. They come from a background of speaking only 
their own language and it is virtually impossible for them to speak good English in such 
a short time. They need to be sent to someone who can improved their language skills 
(Head Ranger, Tau, 15 Septemb~r 2000). 
The manager at River Lodge was even more negative: 
The intern project is good and bad. If I want to learn something, I go out of my way. 
These guys are always complaining about the hours. It's a Tswana thing .... My 
immediate feel here is that they are lazy and don't want to work. When I studied I 
used to work after hours very late, and I had a part time job to pay the fees ... These 
guys are too molly coddled (Manager, River Lodge, 17 September 2000). 
It is necessary to point out that both times I met the .River Lodge manager everything 
he said was coloured with highly racist comments. Most of the staffmy field 
assistants and I spoke to, unlike in the other two lodges, were not happy working 











here are coping with racial discrimination, having low wages and eating food that is 
not good. There are no good aspects at all" (interview with a house keeping worker, 
River Lodge, 22 August 2000). I was not surprised when I heard the manager had 
been removed from the Lodge. 
At Jaci's Camp the manager had no such problems and said that the interns were a 
great bonus to the lodge. The most negative comment he made was to do with 
perceptions among the staff - and because of its far more reasonable tone (given the 
absence of racist overtones) it provides a helpful insight regarding the views of the 
ranger and other lodge manager cited above: 
.. .I have heard via the grapevine that there is a lot of - resentment is the wrong word -
trepidation about it [the internship programme], because people are coming into the 
lodges to be trained up to succeed the people who are working in the lodges, and that 
obviously kind of puts people's backs up. There is a perception amongst all lodge staff, 
staffwho come from the local communities as well- they feel threatened that here 
comes a young upstart who is going to come in here and learn how to do their job .... 
People's jobs, particularly in this area, are very precious. Nobody is going to want to 
train their replacement (Manager, Jaci's Camp, 4 July 2000). 
Underlying the criticisms of those whose jobs are threatened by the interns, and by 
the affirmative action policies of the present government, is fear - or, at best, 
resentment. Once they have the necessary skills, what can possibly stop the bright, 
charismatic youth of those formallymarginalised populations from taking their jobs? 
Indeed, the interns were highly enthusiastic about the great opportunities the project 
offered and told me that they expected that there would be no difficulty finding 
lucrative and satisfying employment on completion of their training. 
Yet they also raised concerns similar to those of the theatre group. Such concerns 
revolved around issues of managerial control and, for some, financial difficulties. 
While undergoing the training, although all expenses were covered, the interns were 
not paid a salary. This was problematic for some, especially those who had been 
gainfully employed prior to commencing the course. For example, one had been a 
school teacher and another had worked in a bush clearing team and now they were 











All the interns said that they were over dependent on Mafisa as the project's only 
source of funding. Their concerns went beyond merely participating in and 
completing the internship training programme. Indeed, and in a way that indicated a 
lack of trust in Mafisa, they expressed a desire to be involved with the broader 
mechanisms ofproject management, including the donor-funding process. For 
example: 
Mafisa should let us be involved with donors. They should help us to understand that 
system so we will know what to do when they go. Now we are so dependent on them 
that if they leave we are really helpless. Also, the most important thing is to involve 
us .... If they just get someone from outside for the big meetings, we don't know what 
is going on as there is no one to represent us (group interview with interns, 15 
September 2000). 
Similarly, knowing that funding was limited, the interns raised questions about 
Mafisa's priorities, and their own lack of voice in choosing those priorities. For 
example, Mafisa went to the expense of inviting two expert Gauteng-based 
consultants in local literature, something the interns regarded as unnecessarily 
wasteful, to come and teach the interns for a day. In the words of one intern: 
They keep hiring more and more people to come and do this and that But we don't 
see the need ... They kept coming with more people, like those literature people, 
[who] cost more and more money. They were good, but unnecessary and a waste of 
money, because then they told us there was no money for our drivers' licences. Our 
learners permits are about to expire and now they tell us they don't have the money. 
They shouldn't promise us things they can't do. They should have told us they can't 
afford it and then we can think on our own what to do, and make a plan (group 
interview with interns, 15 September 2000). 
The above is representative of concerns raised by other project participants that 
Mafisa was not very systematically organised when it came to structuring projects 
around budgetary limitations. At their most negative, such opinions became as strong 
as "Mafisa is squandering money" or even outright accusations of embezzlement. 
While Mafisa did keep strict financial records, and was inevitably closely monitored 
by DflD, it was evident that its project implementation methods were also somewhat 
haphazard - not least because of the apparently unavoidable turnover in Madikwe 
Initiative personnel, a point to which I return below. 
Despite such criticisms, the internship programme was perhaps the most 
unconditionally successful ofMadikwe Initiative projects. As a general manager from 











The Madikwe Initiative, especially the internship programme, is unlocking the potential 
in the villages. It is a great opportunity for skills development and then people can 
become employed in the tourism industry. The objective is to contribute by giving 
people capacity to take opportunities, to invest in MGR (interview, 25 July 2000). 
Indeed, as the two quotes at the beginning of this section reveal, the interns had clear 
aspirations to use the programme as a stepping stone towards real autonomy. On a 
rhetorical level at least, the programme was helping interns to develop such 
aspirations and imagine significant life goals that would enable them to become self-
sufficient. This again underscores the view, often presented by village respondents, 
that education is the most effective means to a long-term goal. 
Yet, it is important to remember that the interns were chosen for the project because 
they had been among the academically brightest and better educated of youth in the 
villages. It was the more advantaged (and hence secure) people such as the interns 
(and salaried professionals such as the school principals cited above) who were able 
to think strategically and imagine long-term goals. While the interns were 
undoubtedly learning skills necessary to take up senior employment positions in 
lodges, it was also evident that they were not the poorest of the poor, nor the most 
marginalised of an impoverished, underdeveloped population. Again, the Madikwe 
Initiative's rhetorical notions of development (and democracy)189 were inconsistent 
with its practice: on one level it claimed to target the most marginalised; on the other 
it recruited those already relatively capacitated and within the mainstream, some 
interns having left jobs to take up the opportunity Mafisa offered. In such a way the 
Madikwe Initiative also undermined its own ability to fulfil its overall goal which was 
to redress the imbalance of power between the partners of the Madikwe proj ect and 
enable the 'local community' as a whole to become an equal stakeholder. 
Dependency, Sustainability and the Balance of Power 
The examples of the theatre group and the internship programme highlight several 
overlapping themes that recurred throughout each of the Madikwe Initiative projects. 
189 I have outlined the Madikwe Initiative's approach to development in earlier chapters. See, for 
example, the section Democracy: A Versitile Abstraction in chapter four, where I also discuss an 












These themes centred around issues of managerial control, ownership, project 
dependence, sustainability, empowerment and autonomy. Particularly significant was 
that the theatre group, two and a half years into the Madikwe Initiative's presence and 
six months after the end ofDfID's original terms offunding, was still heavily 
dependent on Mafisa and the Reserve, as were other Madikwe Initiative projects such 
as the brick making teams, the construction teams and the bush clearing teams. For 
example, the bush clearing in the Reserve was all financially dependent on state 
funding that was channelled through the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DW AF) or national Poverty Relief money. 190 A consequence was that workers had 
become used to being paid at rates higher than those available on contract in the 
private sector. The bush clearing team leaders, who acted as contractors, thus found 
that the prices they had been paid in the Reserve exceeded what local farmers were 
willing to pay for bush clearing services. Furthermore, work within the Reserve was 
limited by the availability of the external funding, which was sporadic. As one 
contractor said: "We are dependent on the Reserve because they have the equipment. 
Also there is not enough funding and we are always dependent on funding" 
(interview, Supingstad, 24 August 2000). 
Phrases I heard from villagers such as 'we are too spoon-fed'; 'we need to learn ... to 
do things for ourselves'; 'we are so dependent on [Mafisa] that if they leave we are 
really helpless'; 'for the big meetings ... there is no one to represent us'; 'it was 
decided without our participatory involvement' reveal that project participants held 
strongly negative views about their dependence on Mafisa as an exogenous 
development body. Indeed, none of the projects was self-sustaining although, during 
my fieldwork, the theatre group was the only Madikwe Initiative project to collapse 
entirely. Although the group had the necessary skills and training to stage 
performances it was wholly dependent on Mafisa consultants to arrange those 
, . . 
performances at lodges and its members were not able effectively to source work 
190 Bush clearing was part of a nationwide drive to clear South Africa of invasive alien species, 
initiated by the Working For Water (WfW) programme, an inter-departmental initiative led by the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (OW AF), the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, and the Department of Agriculture. Its aims were to "protect and restore biological diversity 
(and] ... to create jobs and combat poverty, particularly in rural areas (A Working for Water Programme 
pamphlet, undated). Although it was a WfW initiative, funded by DW AF rather than DfID, the bush 
clearing project was implemented by Mafisa under the Madikwe Initiative. By the time I was 












opportunities within the private sector for themselves. Yet, despite so many 
respondents complaining so eloquently about project dependence, their views 
apparently had no effect, even though many were fonnally reported to the 
NWP&TB. 191 Their complaints did little in tenns of bringing about any visible 
change in the power structure of the projects or in the approach Mafisa's consultants 
adopted. In fact it became increasingly apparent that the people contracted as 
consultants by Mafisa were primarily consulting with Mafisa rather than with the 
villagers; in other words, they took their directives from Mafisa, and contributed to 
Mafisa as an institution, whilst regarding their role in the villages as an advisory or 
teaching one only. They therefore failed really to consult with villagers. 
The high degree of dependence, coupled with indications of the limited success of 
projects (such as the dispersal of the theatre group), strongly suggests that the 
undeniably top down approach to development practiced by the Madikwe Initiative 
was ineffective, at least in the short period for which the original DflD award was 
provided. Moreover, the very structure of the Mafisa-Ied Initiative encouraged, ifnot 
ensured, that projects were heavil y reliant on Mafisa or the Reserve, or both. In large 
part, this dependence was because the Madikwe Initiative programme was designed 
around the Reserve. Development was seen as something to be driven and shaped by 
the Reserve's presence and its need for labour, curios, servicing businesses and so on, 
rather than as something that should be designed around villagers themselves and 
their needs, interests and priorities. The Reserve, rather than the villagers, were at the 
centre ofNWP&TB and Madikwe Initiative thinking, and the result was an inevitably 
high degree of dependence on the Reserve. 
Furthennore, evident within the Initiative's literature is a belief in its need to retain 
power and to act as a watchdog - a belief that Mafisa is better equipped than village 
residents to control resources and make developmental decisions. For example, the 
same Madikwe Initiative document I quoted earlier in this chapter states that if 
initiatives are to be effectively driven in the Madikwe area, village level committees 
need to be 'strengthened and unified' through capacity building programmes (Koch, 
2000: 17). Such a claim is highly problematic. Top-down, exogenous interference 
191 Complaints were made directly to Mafisa consultants (conversation with Mafisa associate, 12 April, 
2000), as well as to me in the course of my fieldwork. Those made to me I compiled into a section 











with local governance can have complex and detrimental repercussions, repercussions 
that Mafisa's directors, Koch and Massyn (1999), thoroughly addressed in 
Challenging Eden. They also argued there that tensions and conflicts over local 
governance, particularly in Molatedi, were pronounced, and that development 
interventions needed to be able to accommodate such conflicts if they were to realise 
their potential. Furthermore, within people-based development discourse there is an 
implicit understanding that capacity building should be locally instigated and driven, 
a long-term process sustained by local knowledge and ideas (Bolnick, interview 5 
June 2002) rather than exogenously motivated. 
In addition to expressing a need to intercede in village-based committees, and in a 
way that would implicitly but effectively remove power and control even further from 
the village level, Koch's (2000) Madikwe Initiative document also emphasises that 
external monitoring of such local committees was required: 
local government [i.e. forma11ocal government institutions] is explicitly identified in a 
range of development and constitutional regulations as the institution to oversee 
development ... and frequently intervene, sometimes in a 'top-down' way, to enSure 
that Village level committees function in an equitable way ... [and that] NGOs and other 
trusted or impartial brokers can also play this mediation role ... Experience has shown it 
is not always wise to rely simplistically or romantically on the CBNRM assumption that 
shifting control down to 'grassroots' local groups will inevitably result in good 
governance and management (Koch, 2000: 13-17). 
Considering Mafisa's frustration in Molatedi with a profusion there of under-
capacitated and conflicting village-based committees, it is not surprising that it 
assigned itself the role of what Koch calls an 'impartial broker' with the right, ifnot . 
. -
the duty, to 'frequently intervene' in order to ensure development initiatives were 
driven effectively.192 But it also leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the Madikwe 
Initiative was thus, and in no uncertain terms, unashamedly a top-down intervention 
programme, with Mafisa acting as the 'trusted' central powerl'lOuse driving the 
projects. The obvious question to ask is: trusted by whom? Mafisa was not, on the 
whole, entirely trusted by project participants - as the project case studies illustrate. 
Norwere they trusted by many of those of my respondents in the villages who 
expressed an opinion about the Madikwe Initiative. Was the trust place in Mafisa a 











trust that itself came from the top down - from DfID as a funding agency concerned 
to ensure efficient and accounted-for use of its resources? 
The propensity for top-down development interventions to breed project dependence 
has been well documented and has little need for further comment here - indeed, top 
down approaches have been effectively critiqued and discredited by numerous critics, 
as 1 discussed in chapter three (see also, for example, Cernea, 1991, Gardner and 
Lewis, 1996, Henkel and Stirrat, 1996, Rew, 1997, Tucker, 1999). What is of 
particular significance is the unintended impacts of those interventions, especially 
how many respondents, in response to the disequilibrium of power, questioned the 
structure and operation of the Madikwe Initiative, generating a discourse of 
discontent about Mafisa's retention of control over the Initiative's projects. 
Absent Management and the Question of Autonomy 
Mafisa's directors and associates, all based far afield, had complete managerial 
control of the Madikwe Initiative, and its projects-in-progress were run largely by 
exogenous consultants. The consultants, too, were all based in distant places and 
visited the area sporadically only. Recognising the need for on-going and effective 
communication between the Initiative's projects, their respective project managers 
(who were rarely there), and the partners in the greater Madikwe Reserve project, 
Mafisa had employed a field co-ordinator shortly after launching the DfID-funded 
Initiative. That person was meant to reside in Madikwe, to be on the spot to oversee 
and liaise with projects, to deal with any problems that might arise with the projects 
and to report regularly to the largely absent management. 
The first field co-ordinator, whom 1 here call Joseph, was a black Setswana-speaking 
man. He was described to me by Mafisa agents as an affirmative action appointment, 
a so-called previously disadvantaged individual. His main duties, 1 was told, had been 
to liaise between Mafisa management, the private sector lodge management, the 
NWP&TB's Madikwe Reserve staff and the Madikwe Initiative projects in the 
villages. But he left, before my fieldwork commenced, under a largely unexplained 
cloud. Jeanette, the Madikwe's ecologist's wife, then filled the position temporarily 











appointed by Mafisa's directors in May 2000. Barbara described herself as an expert 
in conflict resolution and claimed she had had prior experience in dealing with 
service providers and in sourcing funding. Accordingly, Barbara's job description, 
which she described as 'nebulous', involved managing the Initiative on a larger scale. 
Her tasks included liaising with donors and with service providers - and hence 
required frequent trips to Gauteng. Furthermore, although she stayed in the Reserve 
during each week, she returned to her husband in Pretoria for weekends which 
became progressively prolonged after she became pregnant a few months into the job. 
As a result, she was often out of the Madikwe area, and not constantly available, as 
Joseph or Jeanette had been before her, to attend to queries and problems arising in 
the projects. Inevitably there were pitfalls with the new arrangements, most stemming 
from her absences from the Reserve itself. 
Among many respondents involved in Madikwe Initiative projects, one of the biggest 
bones of contention, aside from the limited contact they had with Barbara, was that 
she could not speak Setswana This was particularly significant as Joseph before her 
had been the only Setswana speaking person in a managerial position within Mafisa. 
Chief Suping lost no time in stressing the problem to me: "How many people are 
there in Mafisa? How many can speak Setswana? Why not have people who can 
communicate with our people?" (interview, 29 August 2000). While Chief Suping's 
general antagonism towards Mafisa could possibly have coloured his negative view, 
the chairperson of the Lekgophung RDP Forum, the committee which dealt with 
development initiatives concerning the village and which was generally highly 
supportive ofMafisa, had the same concern, a concern that was repeatedly voiced by 
village respondents, and raised in three focus group discussions: 
We thought that woman [Barbara] would be doing Joseph's work. He used to visit us 
frequently, she doesn't We don't know what her role is. We thought Mafisa could 
employ someone with a knowledge of the language of the people, but she cannot speak 
Setswana. It is a problem because if she can't find me, she cannot communicate with 
the others. Those people have difficulty expressing themselves in English. Barbara is 
only a help when I am here (interview with middle aged man, RDP Forum chairperson, 
Lekgophung, 26 August 2000) . 
... Most of the people employed in Mafisa are white. They fired Joseph and we were 
not told why. He was able to communicate in Setswana with the people, unlike the 
woman [Barbara] who is employed now. She cannot communicate with us and we 
find this very difficult... It would be better if the RDP [forum] together with the 
community and chief could just sit down and write a letter together to the people of 











Joseph from his post. They should ask Mafisa to choose a better person who can 
speak the language of the people (interview with young man, Lekgophung, 17 
August 2000). 
Such views contrasted strongly with those of Mafisa agents as well as several 
NWP&TB respondents, who repeatedly stressed the advisability of development 
initiatives being removed from village-level control in: order to avoid inter committee 
conflicts. In the words of Madikwe's park warden: 
I think Mafisa's failures were, and still are to an extent, having too many people 
involved in running this. It creates confusion in the communities. Their previous 
liaison person [Joseph], a POI [previously disadvantaged individual], was not up to 
scratch and was unable to fulfil his mandate. A lot of time was wasted there but now 
it seems to be running better since they employed someone with more experience and 
training. It is better to appoint an outsider, someone who can drive initiatives through 
and be above the village structures (interview, 25 July 2000). 
The problem oflanguage was also raised by some project members who said that they 
had difficulties understanding the consultants who ran the workshops - most forcibly 
by members of the construction teams, who needed to learn technical skills in a 
language foreign to them and all within the limited space of a short series of 
workshops. Yet, ironically, given that some respondents complained that they often 
could not understand the consultants, many said the solution was to hold additional 
workshops, and I repeatedly heard comments such as ''we need to be workshopped 
more", indicating that project members were embracing the development agenda, 
with its jargon and methods seemingly intact. This initially seemed to contradict often 
repeated claims that the consultants were the ones who benefited most from the 
Madikwe Initiative. But, as I demonstrate below, it became increasingly evident that 
these respondents were not, in fact, buying wholesale into the hegemonic 
development discourse. Rather, they were selecting and appropriating certain aspects 
that could help strengthen local autonomy. As with the conflict between Chief Suping 
and Mafisa, these respondents saw the real problem as not being about the methods of 
development but about who was exercising control over those methods - and the 
resources available to put them into effect. 
Among village respondents, one of the few people I interviewed who did not say that 
the Madikwe Initiative's co-ordinator's language was an issue was the manager of 











character who himself spoke good English, was a member of the RDP forum and was 
well connected in the village. It was not difficult to see why Mafisa's directors found 
him an attractive candidate for the management of the business centre, much as they 
had the eight selected interns. Indeed, according to another respondent who worked 
within the Madikwe Initiative, he was "knit closely" with Mafisa, and had been 
unfairly appointed: " ... when [the manager] was chosen for the business centre, five 
people applied, but the others didn't have a chance. They interviewed him at his house 
and even made the conclusion there. It was not fair and this sort of thing creates· 
conflicts" (Lekgophung Resident, 12 August 2000). 
Throughout my interview with him, the business centre manager was adamant that 
Mafisa could do no wrong. Its agents were the people who ''broke down the Berlin 
Door" [sic] and hence created opportunities for the villagers to start becoming 
involved in the Reserve. Below is an extract from the interview which illustrates his 
views on the language issue: 
Q: Some people find it problematic that the new field coordinator can't speak 
Setswana .. 
R: That doesn't matter! You can't force her to speak Setswana. Why can't those 
people speak her language? If they want to blame her, why can't they talk her 
language? 
Q: But people could question why Mafisa doesn't employ someone who can speak 
Setswana. 
R: Exactly. But let's say [ask] why? If they can't find someone who can speak 
Setswana, what must they do? The post must stay open? (Interview, Lekgophung, 26 
August 2000). 
The business manager's opinions initially struck me as almost absurdly biased; he 
seemed to be a man who knew on which side his bread was buttered. But, as time 
went on, I began to feel he was raising an important point: language was perhaps not, 
contrary to what I had thought I had understood from interviews with project 
participants, the insurmountable problem jeopardising the success ofprojects. 
Although it was not ideal for workshops, for example, to be conducted in a language 
other than that which was the trainees' mother tongue, it was a difficulty that could, 
and was, overcome: the brick makers had learned how to make bricks; the theatre 











build structures such as 'driftS,;193 and the bush clearers had become expert in 
. handling specialised machinery and herbicides - and all despite language differences. 
Yet, some of my respondents had taken the issue further by finnly stating that 
problems with communication went beyond being merely a question oflanguage to 
becoming far more negative questions of race, colour and cu1.tural difference: "They 
must employ consultants who can be understood easily and not keep sending all these 
white people. I suggest they mix them with black people" (interview, young man, 
brick maker, Lekgophung, 20 August 2000); "They are training people with skills, 
but it is bad that they are employing [as trainers] only white people who cannot 
communicate with our elders" (young, man, Security Guard, J aci's Camp, 22 
August); and "My understanding about Mafisa is that they are really too white and 
they don't want people who understand the work [of others] .... They are comfortable 
when they are alone, doing nothing alone. I want to ask Mafisa to change their 
attitude" (interview, middle aged woman, member of a garden project, 194 Molatedi, 
21 September 2000). 
The more I, with my unmistakeably white skin, spoke to people - and always in 
English, at best occasionally sprinkled with a few token Setswana words - the more it 
seemed to me that the issue was not purely about whether or not consultants spoke 
English or Setswana, or even what colour their skin happened to be. There was I, a 
white English speaker, apparently escaping resentment. But I was not a project 
manager, a wielder of power, a holder of resources - or an imparter of knowledge. 
People did not need to understand me. Yet, for the most part, they managed to do so, 
ifnot directly then with the aid of translators. 
It became increasingly apparent that the antipathy expressed about language and 
about race was more a protest over the balance of power which left all decision 
making and control of financial resources with people regarded as outsiders. 
Respondents could not see, nor even imagine, Mafisa involving local residents on a 
managerial level, empowering villagers to be in control of the greater mechanisms of 
193 Fords to help enable roads to be passable during floods . 












the Madikwe Initiative. All they saw was a succession of white outsiders arriving and 
acting as if they were the only knowledgeable experts. Such observations were not 
limited to project participants. According to the NWP&TB's Madikwe operational 
warden: 
Since Mafisa started, I can't see any local people who have taken executive positions, 
or who are being trained as executive managers, or who are participating in any way 
in Mafisa's executive capacity. I always see people coming from far afield. If it is 
because of incapacity amongst local people then why don't they train them? That is 
the only thing that worries me. They [Mafisa] are not locally situated and if they 
leave, everything will fall apart. If they had just one person on site - just one amongst 
all those people, that person will be able to carry on and source funding or whatever 
(interview, 27 August 2000). 
The NWP&TB itself did employ a black Setswana-speaker as their local community 
liaison officer (CLO). Like all the NWP&TB personnel, the CLO was employed 
through the Board's head office in Mafikeng and was therefore not from the local 
area. Despite his language skills and, moreover, his skin colour, I rarely heard a 
positive word spoken about him in the villages. Rather, his association with the 
NWP&TB and Mafisa was held against him. Comments such as the following were 
common: "[the CLO] may as well vaccinate all the animals, he is so bad as a CLO" 
(Molatedi resident,14 September, 2000); "The CLO must know the aspirations of the 
community. That man ... I don't know. To me he is part ofMafisa - he dances to their 
music. How often does he come to Supingstad? I don't know. What does he come 
here for? An emphatic I don't know" (Chief Suping, 29 August, 2000); "[The CLO] 
is supposed to represent the reserve to us, but everyone is complaining about him. 
They say he is not a man of his word. He makes promises and never fulfils them" 
(RDP Chairperson, Lekgophung, 26 August 2000). 
Such rancour towards the CLO, a Tswana man, went beyond whether or not he was 
good or bad at his job. Rather it was another indication that the deeper problem 
project respondents were raising was not about language, race or colour. Instead, such 
signifiers of difference were revealing of a clear perception that those in control of 
resources were all outsiders, the 'other', as opposed to 'us' the villagers, and that that 
was a threat both to the possibility of real capacity building and to any sense of local 
autonomy. Frequently, villagers, feeling imposed-upon, expressed their antagonism 











contest power structures and hopefully thereby to regain control - and local 
autonomy. 
What this shows is that the development encounter had provoked an increasingly 
vocal protest about exogenous control and the exercise of power. A central element of 
the protest was thus to discredit the manner in which Mafisa was operating its 
development interventions: Mafisa's top-down approach was portrayed to me, by 
many project participants, as illogical, irrational and doomed to failure. Through the 
use of development language ('we need to be workshopped more', 'we need to be 
empowered to do things for ourselves', 'we need to be represented at the big 
meetings', 'they must not decide things without our participatory involvement'), 
project participants were expressing how the Madikwe Initiative was failing to realise 
its own rhetorical aims of empowerment and capacity building. 
Those and other criticisms revealed an inherent ambivalence in the way Mafisa 
operated as a development organisation. The Madikwe Initiative was supposedly 
functioning in the villages in order to benefit village residents, to build capacity and 
to bring empowerment. Yet, according to many village respondents, it was apparently 
not only failing to empower (the projects were still highly dependent and 
unsustainable because local capacity was nowhere near adequate and no long-term 
vision of capacity building seemed evident in the Initiative's approach to 
interventions) but was itself simultaneously reaping the majority of benefits through, 
for example, its control over resources and decision making and through the way it 
used resources on its consultants' salaries. 
The presence of such criticisms about Mafisa indicated that respondents were not, on 
the whole, merely down-trodden, dependent objects of development. Rather, such 
criticisms discursively disrupted Mafisa's authority. They revealed the existence and 
persistence of a power imbalance that left villagers still bottom of the hierarchy, albeit 
with a voice to express their discontent. And they made it clear that such an 
imbalance rendered the Madikwe Initiative rather more ineffective than Mafisa (and 











It was people's experience of participating in and observing Mafisa-Ied projects that 
had provoked this response, a response which itself initiated the creation of an 
increasingly united endogenous discourse oflimited yet growing resistance to 
domination by exogenous agents - a discourse that went beyond the projects to other 
village respondents who were familiar with the Madikwe Initiative. Indeed, it was 
respondents who were not actually participating in Madikwe Initiative projects who 
levelled some of the harshest criticisms at Mafisa: 
Mafisa do not fulfil their promises. They are an organisation that benefits by using 
other people. They need to understand our problems and to do that they need to 
consult the community. Projects are not progressing as expected. [The consultants] 
are making fools out of people (School Principal, Lekgophung, 21 August, 2000). 
The most negative thing is that people who are supposed to be training our people, they 
are benefiting more than the people. They are building up capital for NGOs and they are 
the ones benefiting most at the end of the day. Little or nothing has been done in 
Supingstad. In Lekgophung there are a few things like the resource centre, but to me, 
after so many years, it is very little .... Where are the initial records? DflD initially gave 
over four million Rand for the Madikwe Initiative to establish a fund for the three 
villages, but everything changed with the introduction of consultants. What happened to 
that money? I have not seen anything happening and I think we need an enquiry into 
their activities. Ifpeople have handled projects that involve funds, and nothing has been 
produced, there must be an enquiry into how those funds were used ... (ChiefSuping, 29 
August, 2000). 
Outside consultants with good intentions are welcome. But let me be honest: they 
[themselves] benefit a lot. More than the people they were sent to help. They are paid 
even when they do nothing. They are squandering money (Older man. Molatedi resident, 
26 August, 2000). 
The evident distrust of Mafisa and many of the consultants it employed is central in 
the above comments. It was a distrust that was strikingly similar to the distrust that 
several of the NWP&TB's management personnel as well as the majority ofMafisa 
consultants had about the villagers. That distrust was implicit in their beliefs that 
initiatives needed to be driven by supra-village structures, that the majority needed to 
be protected from a powerful local minority. The Madikwe Initiative, it seemed, was 
thus itself a site of mutual distrust. Phrases such as 'Mafisa do not fulfil their 
promises'; 'we need an enquiry into their activities'; 'They are squandering money' 
were evidence of deeply rooted perceptions that Mafisa and its personnel and 
consultants were benefiting at the expense of villagers, and a determination to claim 











Such a perspective sheds a new light on Chief Tsiepe's comment: 'Before, there was 
nothing', quoted at the beginning of this chapter. Before the Madikwe Initiative, 
control of what limited resources there were was located in the villages, albeit heavily 
contested between different organisations and committees, particularly in Molatedi. 
But at least it was not held and exercised by external agents. The Madikwe Initiative 
had brought a sense that there was now, in contrast, actually a void, and it was one 
that was filled by those exogenous power-wielders. Villagers had been relegated to a 
marginalised position in an area where once they (or, at least, their chiefs) had been 
autonomous - and that, ironically, in a context where they had been under the deeply 
marginalising South African apartheid government. Now, many village respondents 
were beginning to see the new system of 'democracy and development' as yet another 
process which generated a sense ofloss of control, of growing dependency; and they 
were starting to highlight the need to select, reject and appropriate exogenous 
methods, ideas and personnel if there was to be any possibility that the process might 
be reversed. This was particularly ironic in light of the new South Africa's democratic 
intentions of capacity building and empowerment, and it begged questions regarding 
the motives behind such notions. As James (1999:14) says: "Perhaps we should ask 
whether this seemingly benign and democratic libera1language does not mask the 
practical realities of the political and financial decisions shaping relief and 
development aid today, and helping to shape the structural political realities of 
tomorrow?" Empowerment, in this light, could be equated with subjection, the 
subjection of moulding people to fit into a new allegedly democratic order, not on 
their own terms but on the terms of a set of exogenous models. It was application of 
those exogenous models that ensured the majority of village residents would remain 
the weak leg of the Madikwe Project. And it was for that reason that the then still 
relatively inchoate rumblings of discontent about the models were beginning to rise to 
the surface. 
But, the weak leg had the potential, largely through its responses to such exogenous 
interventions, to show that dominant power structures often have ambiguous, 
contradictory aims, as well as a particularly impoverished, synchronic view of 
development - especially given their failure to address long-term capacity building, to 
focus on future generations. The power of the weak leg, therefore, lay in its ability to 











partners of the Madikwe project - a project that was shaped and operated not by 
villagers but by external dominating players. For the moment that discordant note was 
still relatively muted, loud enough for me to hear from my perspective as a social 
analyst undertaking long-term fieldwork in the villages, but largely unheard by the 













Over a decade after the country's first democratic elections, dealing with the legacies 
of apartheid is still one of the greatest challenges facing South Africa Levels of 
poverty are particularly extreme for the majority of people living in marginalised 
areas such as many of the rural parts of the former homelands, which were 
systematically underdeveloped during the colonial and apartheid periods. Such rural 
economies have, on the whole, remained depressed in the post-apartheid era, despite 
some efforts by central govemmentto stimulate development. Unemployment is high 
and income-generating opportunities are scarce. The concept of people-based 
conservation, whereby local residents are intended to reap significant economic and 
developmental benefits from ecotourism and conservation-related activities, is deeply 
alluring, particularly in such a context of poverty and lack of opportunity. This is 
especially the case in South Africa, where people based conservation can be seen as 
an apt means to achieve retribution for the draconian conservation policies of the pre-
democracy years that often resulted in local people being forcibly removed from land 
in order for game parks to be established. 
While the idea of such direct atonement for past injustices is indeed gratifying, 
particularly in a political sense, in this thesis I have argued that the notion of 
conservation being able to fulfil both ecological and rural development objectives is 
highly problematic. My fieldwork in and around Madikwe Game Reserve in South 
Africa's North West Province found great disparity between the rhetoric and the 
practice of the agencies driving the Madikwe project. The rhetoric included the 
NWP&TB presenting a powerfully appealing vision of its 'pioneering approach to 
people-based wildlife conservation' (Davies, 1997:2) which it defined as being 
shaped by the primary aim of fulfilling socio-economic goals. The Board's claim was 
that it 'puts the needs of people before that of wildlife and conservation' (Davies, 
1997). However, I found that the reactions and perceptions of the supposed 
beneficiaries of such people-based conservation told adifferent story. It was a story 
that featured images of pre-drawn, hierarchical relationships in which village 











NWP&TB's metoric, the so-called local community had not become an effective (let 
alone equal) stakeholder in the Madikwe project. Nor was it likely that those who 
comprised those imagined communities ever would do. Indeed, the neo-liberal 
rhetoric which accompanied approaches to conservation-driven development at 
Madikwe, and which has come to dominate much of South Africa's present political-
economic discourse, concealed the insidious operation of power that left local people 
marginalised and excluded - both from the Reserve and from the ecological and 
developmental operations which constituted the Madikwe project. 
One of the most salient conclusions that the work presented in this thesis suggests is 
that rhetorical shifts within hegemonic development discourse, from top-down to 
bottom-up approaches, seem to have little effect in practice. Although so-called 
people-based approaches now dominate the development arena, interventions are still 
characterised by power imbalances that are never in favour oflocal people. Indeed, 
the concepts that comprise people-based development, concepts such as participation 
and empowerment, have become absorbed into a new hegemonic, paradigmatic 
. discourse. As a result they have lost their vigour and their flexibility. Instead, they 
have the tendency to become, as Cooke and Kothari (2001) would say, a new tyranny: 
behind the appealing people-centred rhetoric, hegemonic power is exercised as 
rigorously as ever. 
A particularly pernicious aspect of this power is the way it facilitates and encourages 
the use of paradigmatic models. Like all paradigmatic models, those associated with 
people-based approaches to development ultimately fail to reflect the intrinsic 
complexities oflocally lived realities. Such was the case with development as it was 
being practiced at Madikwe at the time of my fieldwork. The NWP&TB's approach 
did not allow for, and hence could not accommodate, the multilayered socio-political, 
historical and economic factors that shaped, informed and comprised the everyday 
lives of the Madikwe project's intended beneficiaries, the residents of Supingstad, 
Lekgophung and Molatedi. While the Board's rhetoric was deeply alluring, it failed to 
translate into successful practice. Instead, it encouraged the application of a 
developmental model that was shaped without any real 'consultation with villagers. 
Moreover, village residents were collectively reduced to little more than a component 











nomiilal stakeholders in the Madikwe project. But from the start they were viewed as 
the weak partner. According to the NWP&TB's people-based conservation discourse, 
they were supposed to benefit substantially from the conservation operations in 
Madikwe. But, at the time of my fieldwork in 2000, nearly ten years after the Reserve 
had been established, the vast majority ofviUage residents were still not realising 
significant (or any) benefits. As a consequence, and in recognition that the supposed 
local community stakeholder was failing to play its role, a DflD-funded intervention 
programme, the Madikwe Initiative, was instigated by the NWP&TB. Its goal was to 
address the apparent weakness of the local community as a partner in the Madikwe 
project. For the local community was seen as an entity whose weaknesses. needed to 
be 'cured', and itself strengthened, ifit was going to become effective as a partner 
and thus reap benefits from the Reserve. But the Madikwe Initiative was also 
constrained and compromised by the developmental model that shaped the Madikwe 
project in its entirety: its role could never really be much more than that of a palliative 
analgesic. Furthermore, as I have shown, by the end of my fieldwork in 2000 it was a 
largely ineffective one at that. 
As demonstrated in chapter seven, the Madikwe Initiative - which was managed by 
Mafisa, an NGO with no local roots in the area - was organised and implemented in 
such a way that villagers found themselves irrevocably wedged at the bottom of a pre-
established hierarchy. They were left with little or no say either in project design or 
implementation. Managerial control rested entirely with the NGO's outsider 
consultants. The result was a series of projects that remained highly dependent on the 
NGO at the time of my research and that were far from being, or being able to create, 
the sustainable entrepreneurial businesses that the Madikwe Initiative plans had 
envisioned. The 'community stakeholder' was thus left in a situation where it was still 
failing to fulfil its expected role. 
The problem was that the imagined community stakeholder, diverse as it was, was 
being hindered, if not precluded, from participating in any significant manner in the 
Madikwe project by the way the whole enterprise, along with the remedial Madikwe 
Initiative, was structured. And local residents had no part in shaping or establishing 
those structures. The neo-liberal, democratic language that goes hand in hand with 











negative manifestations of power within those approaches. Meanwhile, it was the 
dominant partners' operations that were reaping the benefits. The majority of village 
residents had not become more empowered, or less marginalised, to any significant or 
lasting degree. They were not richer - or poorer. But the difference was that the 
presence of the Reserve, and the rhetoric that had accompanied it, had created 
massive expectations in the villages. 
In each of the chapters in this thesis I have presented one particular aspect of what is 
essentially a single argument: that people-based conservation, as it was being 
practiced in and around Madikwe at the time of my fieldwork, was fundamentally 
flawed. Nine years after the Reserve had first been established, and two and a half 
years into the Madikwe Initiative, the vast majority of villagers were still 
marginalised or excluded rather than empowered and benefiting stakeholders. People-
based conservation was failing to realise its potential and to fulfil the goals presented 
in the NWP&TB's rhetoric. The presence of the Reserve had not brought the 
substantial benefits that many villagers said they had been led, by NWP&TB 
personnel, to anticipate. This was in large part because of the Madikwe project's 
tightly governed power structure, a structure in which villagers did not feature in any 
meaningful way. On any given level, local residents could only participate in ways in 
which the dominant partners (the NWP&TB, the Madikwe Initiative consultants and 
the private sector lodge operators) indicated was appropriate. 
In chapter two I described how, from the moment of its first conception, the Madikwe 
project was shaped and informed by the prevailing political climate. When it was 
established in 1991, the Reserve fell within the borders of what was then still the 
Bophuthatswana homeland. The political climate was one of turmoil, with 
Bophuthatswana's president, Lucas Mangope, struggling - and ultimately failing - to 
retain control of his 'independent state'. The anti-apartheid movement, particularly 
the ANC, was the enemy. Rather than give in to them, Mangope preferred to form an 
alliance with the extreme right wing Afrikaner movement known as the Volksfront. 











activists,195 it was inevitable that antagonism between the former Bophuthatswana 
administration (which, it is important to remember, included ChiefSuping of 
Supingstad) and the post apartheid ANC government, would not simply disappear. 
Indeed, in chapters four and five, I argued that the suspicion and distrust between 
major players on the Madikwe stage - suspicion and distrust that was a product of 
that apartheid past - had an untold impact on the development process. This was 
particularly so because the post apartheid atmosphere of reconciliation and 
forgiveness was not conducive to confronting on-going conflicts and tensions that 
were rooted in the apartheid era, particularly those tensions centring around issues of 
local governance. 
A good example, described in chapter four, was the unwillingness of the NWP&TB 
and Madikwe Initiative agents to accommodate the concerns of a chief who had also 
been an ex-homeland leader, and whom they viewed as nepotistic and autocratic. The 
pervasiveness of the homeland administrationlANC government tensions was 
particularly well illustrated by a NWP&TB general manager's view of the Chief 
Suping dilemma: "He was Minister of Internal Affairs in the Homelands government 
and is therefore in conflict with the ANC ... maybe it is better to leave ChiefSuping to 
his politics and concentrate on the more progressive ones who want to take the 
opportunities. We can't get entangled with local politics ... " (interview, 25 July 2000). 
Particularly significant is the general manager's attempt to maintain the fiction (that 
he nonetheless no doubtbelieved) that the NWP&TB's presence was not political. 
On every level Madikwe-linked development was profoundly and inescapably driven 
and shaped by politics. That politics was not contained, or containable, in distinct 
national, provincial or local spheres. Rather there was a continuous overlapping, a 
blurring ofboundaries between the national and the various levels ofloca1. As Mohan 
and Stokke (2000) argue in their critique of participatory development: " ... places are 
constituted by economic, social, cultural and political relations and flows of 
commodities, information and people that extend far beyond a given localitY. Thus, 
what is required is 'a global- sense of place' rather than conceptualisations of the local 
as discrete communities" (2000:15). 
195 The conflict has been well documented For particularly comprehensive overviews, see, for 











Either oblivious to that kind of imperative or else constrained not to notice it, the 
Madikwe Initiative's development agents sought to compartmentalise what they 
viewed as political issues, to consign them to the sphere of central government where 
they understood politics to reside, and hence to avoid addressing anything they 
regarded as political, even within the specific socio-politica1 contexts in which they 
intended to introduce development interventions. As I have demonstrated in chapter 
five with the case of the Bopitikelo Community Centre in Molatedi, however, it'was 
not actually possible for the Madikwe Initiative to avoid becoming embroiled in local 
tensions, particularly those concerning issues of governance. Both the NWP&TB and 
the Madikwe Initiative's agents claimed that, because they were affiliated to 
government, they were obliged to work with the supposedly democratically elected 
local government structures rather than solely with village-based committees - or, 
indeed, with the chiefs and their tribal authorities. 
Such a policy obligation, however, contradicts the agencies' people-based 
development rhetoric because central to the discourse underpinning it is a strong 
emphasis on avoiding or minimising state intervention and strengthening 'the local' 
through effective representation and organisation, and doing that so that local people 
can succeed in controlling resources and reaping the benefits (see, for example, 
Hulme and Murphree, 2001). Yet, by prioritising working with district councils rather 
than with village-based governance structures, the Madikwe Initiative was, 
effectively, encouraging and abetting the encroachment of state control into the 
villages, whilst simultaneously depoliticising the development process (cf. Ferguson, 
1990, who demonstrates a similar finding for development interventions in 1980s 
Lesotho). 
Furthermore, the working-with-Iocal-government route meant that residents more 
aligned with the chief than with somewhat distant and, at times, antagonistic local 
government officials were effectively alienated from the Initiative's interventions. 
The approach therefore had·a negative impact on the implementation of projects 
because it resulted, again, in exclusion - as was blatantly evident in the example of 











Because of its commitment to that working-with-Iocal government approach, the 
Madikwe Initiative was unable to accommodate village-Reserve level governance 
conflicts. Its tendency, instead, was to describe such conflicts as a political problem 
and therefore something" for central government to resolve, as opposed to something 
that could, or should, be addressed locally through their own interventions. Yet, the 
intensely negative impact this had on the development process indicates that it is only 
logical for development practitioners to explore and work with, rather than 
analytically to separate out, power relations on a local level as well as between the 
state and various levels of civil society from development exercises. Furthennore, 
rather than viewing the state as an unconnected, impartial other entity, my findings 
indicate that perhaps more could be gained by such developers were they to address 
different visions of the state and the role it should play, or not play, in rural contexts. 
In a different way, chapter three has also argued that the Madikwe project was 
moulded by an ultimately marginalising exogenously driv n hegemonic discourse. By 
tracing the rhetoric of the NWP&TB to where it originated in people-based 
development discourse, I have shown how it conformed to a changing 
conceptualisation of development (from top-down to bottom -up) that was 'politically 
correct', but nonetheless intrinsically political. The rosy picture of successful people-
based conservation with satisfied stakeholders working in harmony was at once upset 
by a village respondent who claimed it was only the 'stickholders' who were 
benefiting. As my fieldwork progressed it became evident that, in most villagers' 
views, the NWP&TB and the private sector were the ones not only in control, but also 
those who were reaping the benefits. The Madikwe project was not the bottom-up, 
local-people-take-centre-stage initiative touted in the NWP&TB rhetoric. 
Another major problem revolved around the pressure within people-based 
conservation discourse generally of the need to form a representative committee, what 
Barrow and Murphree (2001) call an organisational vehicle, whereby any given local 
community is meant to be represented by a single, legitimate, democratic structure. 
This has often been presented as one of the central prerequisites for successful project 
implementation within people-based conservation rhetoric (see, for example, Barrow 
and Murphree, 2001) - and just as often critiqUed as one of the most problematic, as I 











discuss in chapter five, illustrates how the presence of such a structure can, indeed, be 
highly advantageous for development interventionists. The RDP forum had succeeded 
in dominating (or accommodating) village politics in Lekgophung and, according to 
village residents, seemed to be successful in representing majority views. Hence, 
development focussed interventions had proceeded relatively smoothly in that village. 
In Molatedi, on the other hand, there was a plethora of conflicting committees and 
structures - most themselves products of various kinds of development intervention 
over the years - and so no one single structure with which the developers could work. 
And since Molatedi' s residents were unable to fulfil that organisational 
developmental precondition, the Madikwe Initiative's agents seemed unable to 
accommodate the ensuing tensions. This severely hindered the Initiative's ability to 
fulfil its aims of reaching as wide a target group as possible. Yet, as the example of 
the NWP&TB-initiated Community Development Organisations (CDOs) illustrated 
(see chapter four), it was also impossible for external development agents to establish 
or impose such a structure. Sithole (2004) has reported having found the same 
problem with resource management committees (RMCs) set up by the Mafungautsi 
State Forest Reserve authority in Zimbabwe. Although supposedly democratically 
elected, the RMCs were highly contested by other local structures and organisations 
and were "clearly a source of dissent and dissatisfaction" (2004:269).As described in 
chapter four, the CDOs at Madikwe not only failed to overcome, but actually 
contributed to even greater social fragmentation and conflict, particularly in Molatedi 
(as, indeed, did the Molatedi Service Committee- another imposed structure). What 
these examples indicate is that the evolution of representative committees clearly 
needs to be the result of local processes, locally driven rather than externally 
imposed. The situation highlights the difficulties, if not absurdities, of trying to apply 
. prevailing development models to specific local settings. It also reemphasises the 
power imbalance that left villagers external to the Madikwe project, the weak 
appendage in need of doctoring. 
A particularly effective, if unintentional, method of maintaining that power imbalance 
was the way in which the development agents tended to adopt marginalising binaries 
when applying people-based conservation notions to the villages. An example I 











categorised chiefs as autocratic and the antithesis of democratic, and how they failed 
to acknowledge the grey, overlapping layers in-between the two extremes. By doing 
so, I argued, NWP&TB employees and Madikwe Initiative .consultants succeeded in 
constructing an impenetrable binary, one that retarded for them the process of 
accessing local knowledge and understanding the intricate, multi-layered tensions that 
shaped local governance issues in each village. And, as I show, it also enabled them 
to justify their exclusion of the entire village of Supingstad from the Madikwe 
Initiative's interventions. 
The democracy/autocracy binary was only one instance of such over-simplified 
assessments I encountered during my fieldwork. Indeed, I came to see the same 
conclusion, as did Henkel and Stirrat (2001), that people-based developmental 
thjnking is the product of a reactive discourse and is therefore prone to producing 
pronounced binary oppositions that reflect its own dualistic concern to differentiate 
interventionists from 'the people'. Bottom-up, people centred approaches were 
adopted in reaction to the palpable failure of top-down approaches, a response to 
appeals by critics such as Chamber's (1983) call for 'reversals'. The rhetoric I heard 
in and around Madikwe was thus shaped by dualistic polarities (such as the 
statel1ocal, democratic/autocratic raised above, and also modern/traditional; 
exogenous/endogenous and so on). Use of these polarities obscured any meaningful 
reflection by the agents of development about the complex realities which comprised 
the socio-political situations in each of the three villages. 
Developers' understanding of the situation in Madikwe was a clear manifestation of 
. how false or misleading knowledge can be created and applied within the 
development arena, a tendency that has been well described in post development 
critiques (see chapter three). Particularly pertinent is Ferguson's (1990) description of 
development as an interpretive grid that constructs its own view of the subjects of 
development, a view that often has little bearing on the complex reality of specific 
situations and local contexts. Similarly, in Misreading the African Landscape, 
Fairhead and Leach (1996) show clearly how policy makers failed to access local 
knowledge and thus generated a false understanding of the factors that shaped the 











the development arena produces misleading knowledge about the 'third world' which 
then enables it to exercise power over local populations. 
Critiques such as these support my own fieldwork findings which underscore how, 
despite a conceptual change in approach, from top-down to bottom-up development, 
little has really changed. External development operators still tend to approach 
specific localities with preconceived ideas, what Said (1978) called 'the mind forg'd 
manacles' of developmental models. When the local fails to fit the official mould, the 
typical outcome is marginalisation or exclusion, rather than reflexive reconsideration 
of the pre-ordained model. Given such scenarios, it is not difficult to see why Escobar 
(1995) advocates the destruction of the development paradigm in its entirety and 
Sachs claims that "The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual 
landscape .. ." (1992: I ). 
For many people living n~xt to the Madikwe Gan;le Reserv , realisation of the 
economic and developmental benefits that were supposed to come from the Reserve 
was not their only priority. Indeed, as I show in chapter six, a majority of residents 
were just as concerned, if not more so, about Madikwe's conservation operations and 
about the natural heritage within the Reserve to which they were denied access, as 
they were about those seemingly elusive economic benefits. But, again, the way 
Madikwe was conceptualised and run forestalled the possibility of most villagers 
gaining access to it. As I argue, Madikwe was a culturally constructed landscape with 
deeply political underpinnings that excluded local people. It was a representation of 
an imagined past, a pristine wilderness in which people did not feature. 
Hidden Within this construction was a powerful paradox: Madikwe was seemingly 
about conservation and South Africa's natural national heritage. This was why it was 
a tourism destination - a place where wild animals could be viewed in their natural 
habitat. Yet according to NWP&TB rhetoric the Reserve needed to be, first and 
foremost, a commercially oriented and viable business so that the main purpose of 
conservation there was to generate a profit so that the Reserve could act as an 
'economic engine' for development in the area. This glaring spotlight on development 
meant that conservation became sidelined in the rhetoric of the NWP&TB - albeit not 











economic value on its conservation operations, and was hence able to adhere to a 
policy which did not, in the main, allow local residents access to the Reserve. The 
argument was that a greater profit could be realised if the Reserve attracted visitors 
willing and capable of paying high prices for exclusive ecotourism experiences - in 
other words a kind of fortress conservationism allover again. Catering for such an 
elite market meant that the Reserve had to remain uncluttered by bus loads of day 
trippers in order to preserve the illusion that visitors were 'at one' with nature. The 
result for local residents was, again, exclusion. 
In a similar argument that focussed rather less on tangible and immediate economic 
benefits, many village respondents claimed that if the local population were ever 
really to benefit from the Reserve it would be through future generations. This 
reflected a long-term view central to which was the need for school children to be 
exposed to and educated in both conservation and the private sector practices of 
ecotourism and lodge operation that sustained the Reserve. Through developing an 
interest in such operations, and being given the opportunity to make educational 
choices that would capacitate them to command good jobs within conservation and 
lodge management, future generations would, said villagers, finally be able to break 
the mould that rendered them little more than a marginalised afterthought in the 
Madikwe project. 
But, at every turn the majority oflocal residents' views were either unheard or 
ignored. Comments such as 'they didn't want to listen to our ideas'; 'they have their 
own agendas'; and 'projects that are initiated are very foreign to us' were common 
among those made by village residents about the project. l96 Villagers found 
themselves placed, seemingly irrevocably, at the bottom of an exogenously 
established hierarchy. Indeed, the Madikwe project did not cater for local needs. 
Rather, the entire enterprise was designed and administered around the interests of the 
Reserve itself, and not around the neighbouring villages or their residents. 
Development was only ever seen by the Madikwe Initiative in conjunction with the 
Reserve and its requirements (such as a need for service industries and labour); and it 
196 In order of citation: middle aged unemployed woman in Lekgophung; 28 August 2000; young 
unemployed man in Supingstad, focus group discussion, 1 September 2000; middle aged woman, 











was those requirements, rather than villagers' priorities and requirements, that defined 
and shaped the Initiative's interventions. As ever, then, it was mainstream institutions 
and their operations and interests that dominated the scene, with local villagers being 
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work! worked plmI plm ABaBatla Kgatlhegclwang 
Nakoe plm Tckanye Tiro? 
lelelele Tsoya [YIN] 
khotswanc lelSeno ka 
kgwedi 
T ...... :l 
2 
Prefered location of Has worked Reason for Pensioncr (P)I 
work [loeaVcily]1 recenlly (job " . leaving lasl Unable 10 
. l.cfelo Ie Ie year]! A Ba job/ work (5) 
Kgatlhegelwang NeOa Dira l.cbaka ia go A 08 TlogClse 
[Mogaeff eropong) [Tiro + Ngwaga] Ilogcla liro Tiro(P)I 













J) lIouse Hold Expenditure! Ditshenyegelo Iwapa 
Approximately h"w much per momh does the house hold spend on the following items? 
Tckanyet50 Il ka nna madi a mnkae a kae a ka dirishvang lie ba lapa ka kgwedi mo go l5e dilateiang? 
lIemsIDilwana Produced by Cost! Where are Ihe items hemsl Dilwana Produced Cost Where are t he items 
111-11 Bokae usually purchased?! by lUll IDokae usually pun:hased71 
Ntshiwake 
(Rand) Gantsi direkwa kae? 
Ntshiwo ke 
(Rand) Galllsi dirckwa kae7 
Dairy I'roducts/Dikuno tsa maswi R Clothing! Diaparo R 
Vegetables! Merogo R Transport! Dipalamo R 
MeatiNnma R Paralinl Paralini R 
Starches! Setatshe R Electricityl Motlakase R 
Oiher food! Dijo Tse dingwe R Wood/ Dikgong R 
Cleaning materials! T5a go phepafatsn It. Lighling{ Mabone R 
Toil~triesl Tsa go tlhapa R Hire-purchase! R 
Theko ya tuello ka kgwedi 
I louse hold goods! Diphatlho tsa mo R Waterl Melsi R 
t.bI.l:J 












4) Housing! Malo 
a) ""hose house is lIIis~! Ke ntlo ya ga mang? _______________________ _ 
b) Are any rooms rented out?/ A lona Ie matlo a I~ a hirisang? YesiNo [R, __ --'pfm) 
cj Docs lIIe HH have access to fields"! Aba na Ie tetla ya lema ditsha? Yes/No 
How many hectares? How much is used? None More lIIan half Less than half All 
d) What are lIIe fields used for?lBa di dirisetsa eng? Crops Livestock vegetables OIher ______ ~ 
What crops are gTOwn? _________ -'-___________________ ~ 
What happens to lIIe produce? 
e) What is the income from the fields?1 Ke letseno lefe Ie Ie bonwang? _______________ _ 
I) Docs lIIe HH have any olh~r sources ofincome?l Agona Ie madi a Ie a bonang gOlswa gongwe? YeS/No 
cnherSou~es, _________________________________________ ___ 
g) Does the HH own any Iivestock?1 Ba na Ie moruta ore wa leruo? 
l.ivestockl Leruo NoJ Reason for No. sold Livestock! Leruo NoJ Reason for No. sold 
Palo keepln&! Le baka annually Palo keepingl/ Le annually 
18 go rna baka la 110 rua 
GoatsIDipodi Pigs! Dikolobe 
Can leI Dikgomo . SheeplDinku 
Chickens/Dikgogo Donkeys 
Where do the animals gTllZl:? _____________________________ _ 
What are lIIe main problems willi agriculture? _________________________ ___ 
h B'di d IJslMfu ) ulI ng eta 0 ta wa nt 0: 
BuiJdial! aumberl Palo V8 matlo I 2 3 4 5 
Number of Rooms! Palo ya diphaposi 
Type ofSlructure/ MolUta: 
[Traditional! Setso - T] {Modem I Scshweng - M] 
Year boilllNgwaga wa kago 
Builder! Moagi 
(e.g. Self. family.lTiends. outside contraclor) 
Flooring materiaL' Monno wa v!oer 
Building materfaV Mofuta WI dikago: 
Building numberlPalo "a ·mallo I 2 3 4 5 
Concrete Bloc~na sa block sa concrete 
Brick (clay or <:ement)IDitena (Isa mmu or cemente) 
WanJe and Daub/Oikota Ie I1haltll 
Mud onl~iSerctse fela 















I Roolille mat&riaV Diueo !sa tbulelo: Buildinll. Number! Palo \'a mallo I 2 3 4 S 




Other! Tse dingwe 
I) Services and Fadlltles! Dltlreo Ie Diugo Diope 
I) Water! Mels! 
I. Where do you get your water from! Le bona kae mctsi? 
Piped (public)! Dipeipi (lSI botIhe) 0 Piped (private)Dipeipi (tsa private) 0 
Wat&r vendor! Barekisi ba metsl 0 OtherfI'se dingwe ___ -------O 
II. Where is your water supply? (disllll .. rrom ...... 1 
MelSi a lona a ISWI kae? [II 50 kpIa bobcol 
III. Where did you gel Wlter from before using this supply?/ 
Le ne Ie bona me1si kae pele? 
IV. How much time a day was spent fetching water before?!Le ne Ie tsaya nako c kae pele goga melSi? 
V. Did you have 10 pay for it tben?/ A ! Lene Ie a duella? YcslNo 
V!. Do you mind payina for il now?1 0 uumelela go a dule YcslNo 
~n: ____________________________ ~----------------~-----------
2) TraasportfDipalamo 
I. Does anyone in the household own a vehicle? 
A Moncwe ona Ie koloi fa lapeng? 
II. What type of vehicle(s)?/ Ke ya mofula mana? 
III. Where do you go sbopping? / Ba reka kae? 
IV. How often do you go?{ Le ya gakaeteng? 
3) Telecommunications! Tlhaelersano 
I. Where is the n~arest telephone you can access?! Ke mopla 0 ofe 0 puli'? ___________ _ 
How often do you usc it?lBao dina ga kac? ____________________ _ 













Ill. When did you last receive/send a ~f Ba k ..... adile leng kgmsa be amogetse leng mn .. w"lo? _____ _ 
IV. How do people usually get messages 10 you1 
Batho go Ie gale ba fitlhisa melaelSajangkwa go bona? _________________ _ 
4) Is your house connecled 10 mains electricity?1 A ntlo )'a bona e golegeletsWe motlakase1 YeslNo 
J) How would you Tate the followlDIL services in tbe village?! 
Ba bona jane ditirelo 1ft dllatel.ng mo molSenl wa bona? [Plcase circle one' 
I) HEALTHCAREITSA SEEMO SA BOPHELO 
Excellent Very good Adequate Bad 
Maemo antiha Oi siame thala Di fagare Dimaswe 
2) ROAOSIDITSELA 
Excellent Very good Adequate Bad 
Maemoantiha Oi siame thala Oi fa pre Oimaswc 
3) SCHOOLSlDIKOLO 
Excellent Very good Adequate Bad 
Macmoantiha Oi siamc thata 01 f.gare Ofmaswe 
4) TF.LEPHONE ACCESSIPHITLHELELO VA MOO ALA 
Excellent Very good Adequate Bad 
Maemo anliba Oi siamc lbala Ol ra pre Oimaswe 




Oi siame thata 
Adequate 
Oifagare 
6) ACcEss TO SHOPS! PHlTLHELELO KO OISHOPONG 
Excellent Very good Adequate 





7) ACCESS TO TRANSPORT!PHlTLHELELO KO OIPALAMONG 
Excellenl Very good Adequate Bad 




Oi maswe lOla 
Very bad 
Oi rnaswe tola 
Very bad 
Oi masw. lOt. 
Very bad 
Oi maswe tota 
Very bad 
Oi m""-we Iota 
Very bad 
Oi maswc tota 
Very bad 











k) Please nnk the order in wblcb you Ibink Ibe follo ... ill& services need 10 be improved: 
Fa mol!&Wa 0 dilirelo tse di ka tokafadlwaog ka leng: 
(I • most in need of improvemellb7'hata se se tihokang go lokafodiwl1 ] 
SERVICE- I RATING WHO SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE 
Schools/Dikolo 
Transport/Dipalamo 




Sewage/Kgclclo ya Ieswe 
Water supplyl TJllagiso ya mel$i 
Refuse removal 
Shops 
Other service that need attention! I.e tse dingwe 
Please give reasons for your choiccsITswee ISwee fa mabaka a kgetho ya ntlha ya gago 0 be kae gore 0 bona e Ie mang yo 
o ka nnang maikarabelo mo go tokafalseng dltirelo tse: ____________________ _ 
L) House hold appliances and furnltnre/ Dldiriswa In montluncle fenctshan: 
Lounge suite/sofa + Ie ditilo 
1',.; ..... . . 
n-n F .... _7~1 .. . .~ •• mon, thot. 
, Srtnrn nntlana 
. TV! I"'evWm! 
V; ....... lv;,._n 
<;,nv.; <:ptnfn 
flu .... 1 S_."",; 
R.rli"'e:. 













PART 2: ATTl'IVDES, AWA.llENESSAND PERCEPTIONS 
KAROLO YA BOBEDI: MA.IKUTLO, TSIBOSO LE MOGOPOLO 
Al General- Attitudes Towards tbe Reserve( Kakaretso; Malkatlo M.lebu, Ie Serapa 
I) Have you ever been to the Reserve?1 A 0 kile WI ya kwa serapeng? Yes/ No 








Gangwe Ie Gape 
For what reasons?! Ka mabaka a fe7 ____________________ _ 
2) Are you interested in going to the Reserve?! A 0 kgatlhegela go erela serapd 
What are your reasons for (not) wanting to go? 
Yes/No 
Mabalea a gago ke afe? 1), __________________ _ 
~,-----------------3) ________________ ___ 
3) Do you feel that you can go to the Reserve anytime? 
A 0 ikudwa gore 0 lea e tela serapa nako ngwe Ie ngwe? Yes/No 
Please give reason/A 0 lea fa mabalea:, ___________________ _ 
4) What was the area like before the lWerve was set up? 
Pele go tlhomiwa senpa lefelo Ie Ie De Ie ntse jang? 
S) Has the Reserve made a diffelence to the area? 
A! Serapa se dirile pharologano mo lefelong Ie? Yes/No 
In wbatways?! Ka ditsela dife?, ______________________ _ 
6) Has the Reserve benefitted the local villages?1 A serapa se sethusitse baagi? Yes/No 
Yes-Whichones?!Ba feng M L S Other! Bangwe.: ______ _ 
In whatways?1Ka ditsel. dife?, ____________________ __ 
No- Whynot?lNnyaa- Goreng? _____________________ _ 
7) Do you think some villages benefit more than others? 
A 0 nagana gore gona Ie motse 0 0 boelwang go fda e mengwe? Yes/No 
PleaseexplainlTlhaJosa: ________________________ _ 
B) Has the Reserve benefitted your village in particular?! 
A serapa se tswetse motse wa lona mosola? Yes/No 













9) Has the Reserve made any differences to your life? 
A serapa se direle phetogo rno botshelongjwa gago? 
Yes: What?IJang? 
10) How could the Reserve be of greater use 10 (a) you? 
YcslNo 
Serapa ge se ka go tswela mosolajang (a) Wena? ________________ _ 
~)~~Mots~, ___________________________________________ ___ 
II) Whit are the most positive things about the Reserve? 
Ke eng se se itumedisang ka serapa se? 1), ______ _ 
2), _______ _ 
3), ______ _ 
12) What are the most negative things about the Reserve? 
Ke eng se se sa itumediseng ka screpa? 1), _______ _ 
2), ______ _ 
3), ______ _ 
13) Do you think it is important to protect wildlife? 
A 0 nagana gore go mosola gosireIetsa diphologolo? YcslNo 
Whyl Why not?! GorenglGoreng go se sannajalo? _______________ _ 
14) Are you interested in seeing the wild animals? 
A ona lekgatlhego ya go bona diphologolo!sa nasa? Ycs/No 
IS) What products that come from the reserve should be available to local residents? 
Ke dikuno dlfe tse ditswang ka fa smpeng tse di ka dirisiwang ke metse e mabapi Ie serapa? 
17) Should local residents be allowed access to hooting?1 A baagi ba letlelelwe go tsoma? Yes/No 
Yes- Should the hunting be controlled?/A Ietsomo Ie laolwe? Ycs/No 
Yes-How?/Jang? _______________________ _ 
18) Whose interests should the Reserve prioritise? 
Scrapa Be tshwanetse go beela dikgatlhego!sa ga mang pele? /Clrcle ODe) 
Everyone local residents only All South Afiicans International visitol'li 
Mongwe- Ie mongwe Baagi selegae fela Baagi botlhe ba Afaika Borwa Baenggo tswarnoseja 













19) Do you know~yonc involved in landcIaims in the area? 
A 0 itse mongwe yo 0 badang paclo ya lefatshe? Yes/No 
20) How do >lIU think the landclaims should be resolved?/ Fa 0 a kanya poelo ya lafatshe eka rarabololwa 
jang? __________________________________________________ ___ 
21) Do you think the land the Reserve is on could be used bener in a different way? Yes/No 
A 0 akanya gore lefatshe Ie Scrapa se leng go lona Ie ka dirisiwa botoka ka mokgwa mongwe? 
What "''By?! Ka tsela e/'c? ________________ _ 
BlAttiludq oftbose NOT Emploved In MGR or a Relaled Business 
Maikutlo a ba sa direa, mo MGR Ie diklwebol ditirelo 1st di ami nang. 
I) Do you know anyone who works either in the Reserve or in ajob related to it? 
A 0 itse mongwe 00 dirang gongwe scrapcng kgOlsa mo lirong e e golaganeng Ie sona? 
[No- go 10 question 5/ 
i) How many people'l/Ke batho bale kae? 
Yes/No 
3) What do they do?/Oajana ba dira eng? 1), ____ -
2}, _____ _ 
3), ___ , 
4) Why do you think they got the job?1 Ke goreng fa 0 nagana ba bone tiro? ___________ _ 
Did everyone have the opportunity of applying for that job? 
A mongwe Ie mongwe 0 ne a na Ie tshono ya go kopa tiro? 
No:'" Please explain! Nnyaa: Tlhalosa: 
Yes/No 
5) Pleuse estimate how many people from th is village you think work in the Reserve or. D related business: 
Ka kopa kabakanyetsa gore ke batho ba Ie kae ba ba dinng mo scrapeng kgotsa mo dikgwelso Ise di .amanang? 
NoneiOpe <)0 <20 <30 <40 <50 <)00 <200 <500 
How many people from other local villages?1 Sa ba kat golsW8 mo metseng e mengwc? 
VillageiMotsc: ________________ _ 
None/Ope <)0 <20 <30 <40 <50 <100 <200 <500 
VillagelMolse: _____________ _ 
Nonc/Ope <)0 <20 <)0 <40 <SO <100 <200 <500 
6) What criteria do you feel il is necessary to fulfil in order 10. work in Ihe Reserve? 
Fa 0 nagana go tlhokega seemo se feng gore 0 kgone go dira mo sempeng? ______________ _ 
7) Would you like to work in the reser ... e?1 A 0 ka rata go dira rno scrapeng? YesiNo 













PART THREE: COMMUN1C4.TIONI [(AROLO YA BONE: TLHAELATSANO 
I) Who represents the village to MGR?! Ke mang 0 e metseng mo ko MGR? ______ , 
2) Who do you feel should?! Ke mang yo 0 tshwanetseng? _______________ _ 
3) Who represents MGR to the village?! Ke mang yo e metseng MGR kwa motseng? _______ _ 
4) Who holds meetings about matters relating to MGR? 
Ke bo mang ba ba tshwarang dikopano ka merero ya MGR? ______________ _ 
Please estimate how often are meetings held?lDikopano ditshwaro sa kae? 
Daily Weekly Fortnightly Monthly Bimonthly Quarterly Yearly 
5) Are you ever invited to ,\,ch meetings?! A batle ba Ialediwe kwa dikopanong? Yes/No 
6) Have you ever been to such a meeting?/A ba setse ba kile ba tsenela kopano eo? Yes/No 
Yes - How many times?!Gakae. _______________________ _ 
How did you hear about the meeting(s)?IO di utlwelajang dikopano tseo?, __________ _ 
7) What are the roles of the following organisations?! Ke karolo e feng e e tsewang ke me.kgatlho e e latelang? 
A) The Tribal AuthoritylBorre ba KgotlaIDikgosana, _____________ _ 
B) The Village Service Committee (VSC)'--_____________ ---
C)TheDi~Council, _________________________ ___ 
D) The Community Development Organisation (CDO), ______________ _ 
E) The ReconstruCtion and Development Pr<lgramme (RDP), _______ ~ ____ _ 
8) Have you ever been to meetings held by any of the above? 
A ba setse ba kile ba ya dikopanong dingwe tsa mekgatlho e? Yes/No 
Y~Howoften? ____________________________________ ___ 
10) Do you feel you know what is going on in MGR? 
A 0 t1ha1oganya se se dirafalang mo serapeng? Yes/No 
Please elaborate! Ka kwa tlhalosa'--____ ~ _______________________ _ 
II) Do you feel you are involved in what is going on?1 
Ao bona 0 tsaya karo ka botlalo mo serapeng? Yes/No 













12} Would you like to be more involved?/ Aba ka rata go akarediwa? Yes/No 
13) What are some strategies that could lead to you being more involved?/ Ke eng so 50 dirwang gore 0 tetefallle 
learoloyagago? __________________________ _ 
14} Do you feel that communication structures between the Reserve and the village are effective? 
A ba ikutlwa kgolagano Ie serepa e tsamaya sentle? Yest No 
15) How could they be more effective?/ Ba bona dika tsamaisiwa sentle jang7 __________ _ 
16} Are communication structures within the village effective? 
Ba bona kgolagano e ntse sende? Yes/ No 
17} How could they be more effective?/ E ka dirwa jang gore e tsamaye sentle? _________ _ 
PART FOUR: TOURISM 
I} Do you think tourism is a good thing for the area? 
A 0 gopola gore bojanala bo siametse tikologo e 0 leng mo go yona? Yes/No 
Wh~whynm? ___________________ ~ ________________ _ 
2} Do you think the village can benefit from tourism?1 A mooc 0 ka bona Ietseno mo bojanaleng? Yes/ No 
~/Whynm? __________________________________________________ _ 
3} If you were a South African tourist coming here for the first time, what would you most like to see? 
Fa 0 ne 0 Ie mojana1a wa Afiika Borwa e Ie lantlhil 0 tla ka fa, 0 ne 0 kae Ie !sa go bona eng thata !hata? 
4) lfyo,u were an international tourist, and this was your first time in the country. what would you be.most 
interested in seeing in this areaW Fa 0 De 0 Ie mojanala wa boditshaba e Ie lantlha 0 tIa mo nageng e, 0 ne 0 
ka kgatlhiwe ke go bonaeng? ____________________ -----
S} Woul~ you like to see tourists coming to the village?! A 0 cletsa go bona bajanala ba tsile mo motseng? 
Yes/No Why/ Why om? _____________________________________ _ 
6} Tfyou were to show a visitor around the village, what would you show them?/ Fa gotwc 0 bontshe bajanala 













7) Do you think tourists should stay in the Reserve and not come to the village?! A 0 gopola gore baeti ba nne 
fela kwa serapeng ba sa tie rna motseng? Yes! No 
Please elaborate: ___________________________ _ 
8) Are you interested in your history and heritage?! A 0 Ikurnelala setso sa gaga Ie tsoseletso ya ditirayala? 
Yes! No What do you find are the most interesting aspects?! Ke dintlha dife 0 !sayang gore di 
botlhokwathata? ______________ _ 
Who taught you about this history! Ke mang a go rutileng ka ditiragalo tse? _________ _ 
9) Do you think it is important to know who your ancestors were, how they lived and where they came from? 
A 0 gopola gore ga botlhokwa gore 0 itse badimo ba gaga, gore ba ne ba phela jang ka kopo tIhalosa batswa 
kae? Yes/No. Please expIBin:_' ______________ _ 
10) Do you think tourists would be interested in Tswana culture?! A 0 gapola gore bajanala ba ka kgat/hegela 
setso sa SetsVl'3lla? Yes/No Please elaborate: ___________ _ 
II) What are the most important things about Tswana culture that outaiders should understand?! ICe eng se Be 
botlhokwa mabapi Ie setsO sa Batswana se batswakwa ba tshwanetseng ba Be t/haJoganye? ____ _ 
12) If you were travelling in a foreign country such as America and someone asked you to explain where you 
come from, what would you answer?! Fa 0 ne 0 jetse nala kwa dinagengtse di kwa ntle jaaka America 
batho ba be go kopa gore 0 ba tlhalosetse gore 0 tswa kae, 0 t1a araba 0 ren81 _______ _ 
14) How would you explain the difference between thel 0 ka thalosajang pbarologanyo fa gare sa Batlokwa, 
Balele and Bahurutshe? _________________ .,.--____ _ 
15) How would you explain what life is like in your village?! 0 ka tIhalosa botshelo jwa morse wa lona 
jan81 _______________________________ ___ 
16) Are you interested in the cultures and histories of people in other countries?! A 0 na Ie kgatlhego rna 
ditsong Ie ditiragalong!Sa dinaga di sele? Yes/ No 
What aspects would you find especially interesting?! ICe sintlha si fe tse 0 ka bonsng si itumesisa? __ _ 
17) Paries Board are interested in setting up Heritage Tourism projects in the Reserve, so that tourists can learn 
about the people who come from this area. Wbat do you think of this idea?! Bothali ba bojanato bo 
kgatlhegela atolosa siprojeke !sa segopotso sa bojanala mo serapcng, ka sa jalo bajanala ba ka ithuta ka 













18) What do you think should be included in such Heritage projectS?1 Ke eng se 0 gopolang se lea okediwa mo 
projekenge ya segopotSo'? ________________________ _ 
19) Who should be in charge of setting up these projects?! Ke mang yo 0 maleba Ie go rulaganya diprojeke tse? 
20) What benefits can you envision coming to the village as a result of heritage tourism?! Ke dikuno di fe tse 0 
di bonelang kwa pele tse di tlang ko motseng ka nllha ya tsosoloso ya bojanala? ________ _ 
21) Do you think there could be any negative impacts on the village?1 A 0 nagana gore go ka nna Ie menagano 
mengwe e e sa nyalaneng go tswa mo motsetseng? _________________ _ 
PART FIVE: MAFISA AND THE MADIKWE INITIATIVE 
I) How long have you been living pennanently in the &TW 0 phidile fa sebaka se sekae? ______ _ 
2) Have you noticed any differences in the area since 19987 Yes/No 
Please elaboratelTlhalosa : _______________________ ,--_ 
3) Have you ever heard of the Madikwe Initiative (MI)? Matisa?1 
o itse go Ie kae ka Mil Matisa YeslNo (No-gotoQI3J 
4) What are theirroles? __________________________ --'-_ 
5) What are the goals?1 Diphitlhello ke eng? ____________________ _ 
6) Have you evCf applied for a Mafisal MI training programme'? 
A ba setse ba kile ba dira kopO ya go tse nna lenaane katls la MaflSalMl? Yes/No 
Yes- What was ill Eme e leng? _______________________ _ 
What was the outcome! Ditlamorago e nnile eng7 ________ --'-_________ _ 
7) Do you know anyone wbo has applied for a Mafisal.MI training programme? 
A ba itse mongwe yo 0 dieileng kopo ya lenaame katiso ya MafisalMl? Yes!No 
Yes- Which programme(s)?1 Ke Ie naane Ie feng? _________________ _ 
8) Have you ever been 10 a Mafisal Ml meeting?1 A ba setse ba kite ba tse nna kopano ya Mafisa/Ml? 
Yes! No Yes - How did you hear aboul.it?/Gorengbanc ba ya? ____________ _ 
Why did you go?/A! Ene ele kopano e e botiho.kwa? _____ . _________ ---
Was it a useful meeting? Yes/No \Vby} why nOl? _______________ _ 
9) Have Mil Mafisa brought any benefits to the local residents?1 
A e tlisitse dipoelo mo ba aging ka kopo t!halasa? 
Mobt~i Y,~ ______________________________________________ __ 













~~~~ Ym, _______________________________________ __ 
~~ vm __________________________ __ 
10) Do you think MJlMafisa arc effective?! A 0 tsaya gore MIlMaflSa e a dira? Ycs!No 
Please explain/I'fualosa:, _________________________ ~ ____ _ 
II)What should be done differently?! Ene e kanna OOtoka fa e ka 00 e dirajang? _________ _ 
12) What arc the best aspects of Mafisa?! Ke eng dilo tse di botIhokwa ka Mafisa? _________ _ 
And the worst:l! Tsi di seng botlhokwa ka MaflS8? ______________ . ___ _ 
13) Do you know of any development projects in the area'!! 
A go na Ie ditlhabololo dingwe tse 0 di itseng? Yes/No 
Yes - What projects? ______________________________ _ 
Who was responsible for setting them up?! Kc mang yo di simotseog1 ____________ _ 
Who is running them now?lKe mangyo 0 di tsamaisons; ka nuo e? ___________ _ 
14) Who has benefited most?! Ke 00 mang ba ba boetsweng OOgol01 ___________ ----
15) How could more people benefit'IIDi ka thisangjang bontsi ba batho? ____________ _ 
16) How do you feel about outside consultants worJcing in.the villages? 
Ba ikutlwa jang ka consultants tse di dirang mo metseng gotswa kwa otJe7 _________ _ 
17) What have.they done for people?! Sa diretse merafe eng? _______________ _ 
18) What do you feel should be done inthefuture?!Sa~la gokadirwaengmonakong e e tJang? __ _ 













Appendix 2: Photographs 
Th. Snpitik. ]n C~ntre i. 2000, ' 0111<' months after il ,,'as flooded. 













































Appendix 3: Colonial Chronologies 
This appendi.l.l is included specifically to highlight the superficiality of colonial 
histories that are concerned only with categorising and confining people to bounded 
social entities and geographical locations. It presents colonial and apartheid era 
interpretations of the histories of the villages ofSupingstad, Lekgophung and 
Molatedi. It should be read in conjunction with the section An Historical View in 
chapter two. 
Story 1: The BaHurutshe of Supingstad 
Suping - born c. 1830 died 1896 
Thebe Suping - born c.1850, died 1949 
Legangwe Michael (unofficial acting chief) - born c. 1890 died 1951 
Peter Masiela ~ born c. 1899, died 1953 
Hendrik Suping (acting chief for Victor) - born 1907 
Mathews Mangope- born 1912, died 1970 
Victor Simane Suping - born 1945 -
Source: Breutz, 1953. 
The people who live in Supingstad today are predominantly BaHurutshe people, a 
people led by BaHurutshe chiefs, said to be descendents ofwhatLestrade calls the 
'semi-mythical, eponymous hero' Mohurutshe (1928:427). The so-called BaHurutshe 
are said to be one of the oldest Tswana groupings of people, senior in rank to all other 
Tswana (Ellenberger, 1912; Lestrade, 1928; Schapera, 1937; Breutz, 1953:16).197 
They were classified by the colonial government as Western Sotho, as were the 
197 Rheinallt alone claims the BaHurutshe split from the Barolong, which he claims is the oldest 
Tswana 'tribe'(1937:18-19). Lestrade states unambiguously: ''Where there is a marked divergence in 
anyChwana [Tswana] tribe from the general scheme [of the BaHurutshe] such divergence is to be 
regarded as a secondary development, and the practice of the BaHurutshe as older and more 
characteristic of the group; for this tribe, with its offshoots, is looked upon by all the BeChwana 
[BaTswana] as being the oldest and most archaic of the Chwana [Tswana]-speaking group as a whole" 
(1928: 427). The seniority of the BaHurutshe gave them the right to go lorna thotsi (bite the pumpkin-
the pumpkin being the earliest crop grown by the Tswana), a tradition whereby other tribes could not 
harvest their crops until the BaHurutshe chiefhad given his permission (Rheinallt, 1937). Lucas 












BaLete of Lekgophung, while the BaTlokwa of Molatedi were labelled Southern 
Sotho (Schapera, 1937:58-60). 
BaHurutshe people settled in the Molopo River area, near Mafikeng (in what is now 
North West Province) in the 15th or 16th century (Rheinallt Jones, 1937) and possibly 
as early as 1300 (Breutz, 1953). According to the Short History of the Tribes of the 
Transvaal (1905), the first split in the Bahurutshe came after the death of the third 
Chief Molope, some time in the mid 15th century. His eldest son, Mohurutse, 
remained chief of the main tribe, known still as the BaHurutshe, while Kwene 
became chief of the new sub-group who became known as the BaKwene. Mohurutse 
had two sons, Motebele and Motebyane. Although Motebele was heir, Motebyane 
fought him for the succession and won. He was succeeded by Melore and then eight 
other chiefs about whom little is known. The ninth, Pule, son ofKealedi, was born 
sometime between 1580 and 1600. Two of his sons, Manyane and Manope fought 
and Manope became chief, succeeded by his son, Kontle. Under Kontle, in 1881-2, 
the Bahurutshe split again, into three groups: the first under Kontle remained at 
Dinare (in what is now Botswana); the second under Sebogodi, went to Mochudi 
(also in present day Botswana), and the third, under Suping, went to Vinlcrivier (farm 
no. 132 - see map 5, page 41) and became the Bahurutshe ba Suping with the 
tshwene (baboon) as their totem (History of Native Tnbes: 11-13; Breutz, 1953:16-
23). 
The BaHurutshe of Suping also stayed briefly in Lekgophung in 1882-3, which is the 
present day village of the Balete, under Chief Tsiepe, located on a portion of 
Hartebeestefontein (farm no. 195 on map 5,page 41), which adjoins Vinkrivier. 
Suping was aru.Lious to secure land for his people and applied to the government to 
grant him some ofHartebeestefontein as well as neighbouring Vinlcrivier. Between 
1891-3 the government of the South African Republic considered Suping's request 
and, although the Superintendent of Natives recommended granting him the location 
in 1892, his recommendation was not approved by government. Suping therefore 












trustee, on 9 Apri11894. He also retained the use of parts ofHartebeestefontein (849 
hectares). 198 
In 1894, because of differences with neighbouring fanners, Suping and his people 
moved to Odi, close to Gaborone, in what is now Botswana Suping died there circa 
1896. He was succeeded by his son, Thebe, who was born circa 1850. The 
BaHurutshe of Suping returned to Vinkrivier after the anne.l.l.ation of the Transvaal in 
1900. In 1903 they built the present village of Supingstad. 
Story 2: The BaLete of Lekgophung 
Mokgosi - born c. 1790, died 1886 
I Mokgobjwa - born 1823, died 1932 
II Tsiepe - born c. 1855, died 1945 
ill Mmamogola ThutwengBrownMokgobjwe- born 1912 died 1975 
ChiefKgosingkwe Tsiepe - born 1944 
Source: Breutz, 1953. 
The people classified by colonial historians such as Breutz (1953) as the BaLete (lit: 
buffalo) of Lekgophung are said by such sources to be descendants of Chief XV 
Mokgobjwa He died circa 1780 and was succeeded by his son Powe and then his 
grandson Mokgosi. According to Breutz (1953) the BaLete came from the area 
subsequently known as Volksrust and trekked to Ramoutsa in what became 
Botswana In 1891 they split and some people left the BaLete parent group and 
trekked to Peseke, ten miles away from Ramoutsa, in the north-western comer of the 
present (2007) Marico District. At that time Mokgosi was chief. His son, I 
Mokgobjwe was born there in circa 1823, the son ofSedikwe, his fourth wife. In 
1892-3 the group again split, and a sub group, under I Mokgobjwe, moved to 
Segakwane on Skuinsdam (fann no. 131 - see map 5, page 41) where they became 
known as the BaLete wa Mokgobjwa, from whom the BaLete of Lekgophung today 
are directly descended. They then moved to Ramotlhabane, on Hartebeestefontein 
198 In the 1913 Land Act, both Vinkrivier and a portion ofHartebeestfontien are listed as black owned. 












(fann no. 195 on map 5, page 41) in 1893. In 1901 they bought two portions of 
Hartebeestefontein fann (2547 hectares). Their land adjoins that of the Bahurutshe of 
Suping. I Mokgobjwe died in 1932 and was succeeded by II Tsiepe. In 1919 he was 
recognised by the government as 'headman for purely administrative purposes' 
(Breutz, 1953). He retired in 1942 (and died in 1945) and appointed his son, III 
Mmamogola Thutweng Brown Mokgobjwe, to take his place, who in turn was 
succeeded by his eldest son, present day Chief Tsiepe, born in 1944. 


















According to Breutz (1987) the BaTlokwa ofMolatedi came from the northeast of the 
country where they lived on the fann Houwater 'Malan' in Pilansburg (or 
Potchefstroom). When their population increased to the e.LJ.tent that Houwater became 
too cramped, some people moved to Bopitiko Doornhoek, Elandsrivier, under Chief 
. Mosime Tsile. But Bafopeng people were already living at Bopitiko. Inevitably 












trekked to Piloe Zwaatverdiend where they worked a copper mine and became 
famous as bracelet makers. Mosime Tsile was succeeded by :\10nageng, ,,·ho in turn 
was succeeded by Tsiie :\1atlabane. :\10kao, and Taukohan (Tall·Kubong 1905 
history). Then Molefe. eldest son ofTaukoban's second wife, quarrelled with 
Taukoban's heir (Iv1akala), and left with a following of people. He sellied at 
Grootfontein, and was succeeded by Khasoane, Tlobane, and then Bogachui. "lney 
purchased Grootfontein in the 18905. 
The BaTlokwa or "'Iolmedi are directly descended Irom Makabe, the eldest SOn of 
raukoban's first wife. who had remained at Piloe. :\1akabe wa.~ sllCceeded by 
Bogatsui (Bogatchoe), Kgosi and then Iv1atlapeng. But in til.: early 1830s th", 
Matabelc. led by Mzilikazi, invaded the area. ;vlatlapt'ng and his followers fled into 
the mountains, to nwene nwene, located in pre.~ent day Madikwe Game Reserve 
(pictured in the photograph below), which became the BaTlok"a capital in the 1870s 
(H llilinall et ai, )997).l99 
Ph"I,,~ ,aph ta~. n.1 T,w<n. T",ene, I\-bdil,we G.me Re'er,"", iw 2000. looting oot ","or Ih . 
plai", toward, 80t,,,·ana. 
"" Archaeu]ogicoJ ,ur,e)", cnnd\ICted by Prufc»", HulTmon of Lhc Uni",,,ity ofWitwat<r"and in 
1997 have mapped Dif"'lane , itc" wruugh{]ullhc RC'C'K While 1 was in ~Iadikw. Ijoil",d an 
,",ch,,",ological 101 .. of the lI..,e"., loct b~' Prof.,,,,"" Huffman. and ,icwcd wc T,w. n. Tsw. ne site a, 
well", ."rly Iron Ag. ,it.,. Paniculmly nC(i ceool. ",.r. hullo"" in Ihe "",k, lhat hod h •• n ground OIn 












Once the Matebele threat had died down, ChiefMatlapeng came out of the mountains 
and built a village at Letloken. But by then there was increasing pressure on land and 
resources from white settlers. Afrikaner farmers troubled Matlapeng and his people to 
such an e~tent that he eventually trekked to Sechele, and then, in around 1868, he 
moved back to Tswene Tswene, where he ruled for some twelve years200 before he 
died in a battle between against the BaKwene (Breutz, 1987:385). Matlapeng left four 
sons: Gaborone, Sedumedi, Kgosi and Sebolawa He was succeeded by Gaborone in 
about 1880.201 
While they were still at Tswene Tswene, Gaborone and Sedumedi quarrelled. 
Sedumedi left and went back to the old tribal home at Let10ken (Putfontein) where he 
was 'squatting' and, according to Hunt (1905), ~ously awaiting permission from 
the government of the South African Republic to buy the farm. Gaborone eventually 
left Tswene Tswene, due to pressure from Afrikaner farm rs, and established himself 
at a place that came to be known as Gaborone, the capital of Botswana today. Kgosi 
and Sebolawe stayed at Tswene Tswene, where Kgosi took over the chieftainship 
when Gaborone left, and his people became known as the BaTlokwa ba Kgosi - from 
whom the majority of people living in Molatedi at the time of my fieldwork were 
directly descended. Kgosi was succeeded by Sebolawe who trekked eastwards to 
Naaupoort (farm no. 150 - see map 5, page 41), founded the village ofMolatedi in 
1890, and set up as an independent chief. 
200 According to Ellenberger (1912) Matlapeng only lived at Tswene Tswene for five years before his 
death. 
201 A photograph of Chief Gaborone, taken by Irish photographer Duggan-Kronin in the 1930s or 












Appendix 4: Vleischfontein Mission 
Ph>!" 2: ""I<i,ehfon(ein ' 1;"ion, M.dik". (;arne R .. er> 0, (.~ell in 2000, Th. ",-;ginal I RR~ 
bd~diJlg w •• 'ILU ,landing but i, out or,jOO( i~ U,. forogroun~, 
Vleis~hfontein .'vIission, wh~re ] lived for the first six months of my liehl Slay, wa.~ a 
long established presence on Vleischfontein j'aml, one oftlle twenty-eight farms that 
became Madikwe Game Reserve. OWr the bener pari ol"lhe century 01" its exislence, 
lhere is ~vidcnce that the Mission had a signiii~ant impact on the lives of local 
n:sidents - particularly through the mission s~hool. as is described helow, 
Ac~ording to one sour~e (CauaviJlan, 19%), Vlei'J.Chfontein Farm was bought in 
1885 by J~suit missionari~s. and the first building was erected by Fr Croonenberghs 
in December orthat year. Th~re were SOme live villages in the urea comprising a 
population of more than four hundred people. On Chrishnas day in 1885 Cltief 
Gabonlne (who was slililiving at Tswene Tswene, some <) km to tlle north) visited 
th~ mission 3nd negotiated starting a school and chapel for his subjO'CIS. rhe school 
opened a few montlls later "itll 3bout I"orty young male pupils and d~mar:.d was so 












Another account (Proctor, 2000) claims that Vleischfontein was the first Roman 
Catholic monastery in the Transvaal, set up by the Jesuit Missionaries of St Aidans 
College, Grahamstown in 1882 (although they bought the land in 1879). After 
Rhodes' invasion, in 1890, of what is now Zimbabwe, Vleischfontein became the 
base for a number of Jesuit missions in Matabeleland and Mashonaland. It was a 
halfway station on the wagon road to the Jesuit Zambezi missions in Bechuanaland 
and Rhodesia, which was the primary access road to the north. This was the Mafeking 
road, made famous by Herman Charles Bosman,202 and it stretched from the centre of 
the Dwarsberg range through to Derdepoort and northwards to Bulawayo. 
Livingstone visited the Madikwe area several times during the 1840s203 and even 
Rhodes stayed there on occasion. But when the railway to the north was built 
Vleischfontein lost its im.portance as the main route north and, in 1894, the Jesuits 
sold it to the French Oblates of the Order of Mary Immaculate. They, in tum, were 
replaced by the Holy Family Sisters, who were the first nuns most villagers had ever 
come into contact with. The nuns started a sewing cottage industry and bartered 
clothes for food with villagers. In this way they slowly changed villagers' dress 
(proctor, 2000). 
Accounts agree that there was a substantial black African population living and 
farming on the Mission land. At its height, over one hundred children attended the 
school that Chief Gaborone had originally suggested to the first Jesuit missionaries, 
including some from nearby villages. Among them was Phora Suping, Chief Victor 
Suping's grandmother, who was born in Supingstad in 1905. She was 96 years old 
when I met her in April 2000, but clearly remembered seeing her first white 
missionaries when she was 18. Indeed, in the first decades of the twentieth century 
the only way black Africans could access formal education was through mission 
schools. 
Some sources claim that the mission became a place of refuge for black African 
people displaced from their land by Afrikaner farmers. There were thriving gardens 
and orchards, the threat of drought ameliorated by a network of springs and dams 
202 Bosman wrote a: collection of short stories titled Mafeldng Road, first published in 1947. 












constructed by the missionaries. The dams were stocked with barbell, and it was a 
time of "peace and plenty" (Cazzavillan, 1996). 
But others hint at a story ofintennittent but incremental tension between local 
residents and missionaries. According to Cazzavillan (1996), after the death of old 
ChiefMoatshe in 1940 the inherent strains in village/mission relationships became 
more pronounced. Leadership was taken over by Moatshe's sons. 
Vleischfontein and the other farms that comprise Madikwe Game Reserve today were 
declared a 'Whites Only Area' in terms of the 1913 Land Act. As legislation became 
progressively harsher towards black Africans it became too difficult to continue with 
their work, so in 1950 the Oblates closed the mission and moved to Silkaatskop 
(Cazzavillan, 1996). The farm was bought by an Afrikaner farmer. The mission's 
gardens and orchards soon disappeared. The spring was diverted because of a new 
road and, as Cazzavillan says, the only sign of the dams today is "a slight indentation 
in the ground and a stony bank" (1996:3). In the 1970s missionaries from Silkaatskop 
reopened the school, but the mission was finally abandoned when the farm was 
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